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Translator's Introduction:
The War, Tōdai, and
Tachibana Takashi
War is the health of the State. It automatically sets in motion
throughout society those irresistible forces for uniformity, for
passionate cooperation with the Government in coercing into
obedience the minority groups and individuals which lack the
larger herd sense.War is the health of the State. Only when the
State is at war does the modern society function with that unity of
sentiment, simple uncritical patriotic devotion, cooperation of
services, which have always been the ideal of the State lover.
—Randolph Bourne1
For much of its modern history Japan was at war. Alone
among major Asian nations, it escaped colonization by the
Western powers. But like virtually all modern states,
Imperial Japan was built on war, and its history to 1945 is
1 Bourne, “The State” (an essay left unfinished when Bourne died of flu in 1918 at the
age of 32), in Randolph Bourne: The Radical Will, ed. Olaf Hansen (New York: Urizen,
1977), pp. 360, 375.
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a history of war. The Meiji state fought to establish control
over the three main islands that form Japan’s traditional
territory, then moved militarily to colonize the northern
island of Hokkaido and establish its claim to Okinawa. It
contemplated military expansion in Korea in the 1870s and
1880s only to back off and focus on economic and military
development at home; as a sort of consolation prize, it
seized jurisdiction over Taiwan. Two decades later it was
ready for war with China. Military success in the Sino-
Japanese War (1894-95) strengthened Japanese interests in
Korea and—until intervention by France, Germany, and
Russia forced Japan to back off—Manchuria and China’s
Shandong peninsula. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)
confirmed Japanese control over Korea, which Japan soon
annexed, and gave Japan railway rights in southern
Manchuria. A naval alliance with Great Britain, the greatest
European naval power, concluded in 1902 and extended
into the 1920s, enabled Japan to profit from very limited
military involvement in World War I: it seized the German
positions in Shandong and the South Pacific. In the wake
of the Russian Revolution, Japan sent 70,000 troops to
“protect” the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The years between
1919 and 1931 saw no further territorial gains. In fact, Japan
withdrew from Shandong and Siberia. But 1931 marked the
beginning of fifteen years of hard fighting, Japan’s Asia-
Pacific War. It engulfed first Manchuria (1931-33), then
China (1937), then southeast Asia (1940-1941).2
2 There have been many Japanese treatments of Japan's fifteen-year war, and some
have been translated into English. Most notable is Ienaga Saburō, The Pacific
War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931-1945, tr. Frank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon,
1978). See also Takeyama Michio, The Scars of War: Tokyo during World War II, ed. and tr.
Richard H. Minear (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007) and books by Louis Allen,
Robert J. C. Butow, John W. Dower, Thomas R. H. Havens, Edwin P. Hoyt, Akira Iriye,
and John Toland.
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Our concern here is the period 1935-45, the last ten years
of Japan’s fifteen-year war. What Randolph Bourne wrote
of the United States during World War I holds true for
Japan during these years. In collaboration with right-wing
forces, the Japanese government moved to enforce loyalty
to the state and its embodiment, the Shōwa emperor. State
pressure intensified in 1925 with the passage of the Peace
Preservation Law, “the capstone of police repression in
Imperial Japan.” The law targeted “anyone who had
organized an association with the objective of altering the
kokutai [国体, national polity] or the form of government
or denying the system of private property and anyone who
has joined such an association with full knowledge of its
object.” The penalty: up to ten years imprisonment with or
without hard labor.3 In 1928 the government increased the
penalty to include the death sentence. In 1933 the Diet voted
to authorize the “unification” of national thought.
On March 15, 1928 a government sweep resulted in 1,600
arrests of leftists nationwide. By the end of the year, the
arrests totaled 3,400; by the end of 1929, 8,400. In April
1928 leftist worker and peasant organizations were banned.
Arrests for political crimes rose from 6,000 (1930) to 15,000
(1933) before dropping off to 4,000 (1934) and 1,700 (1935).
Arrests of students followed a similar trajectory: from
under one hundred per year in 1925-27 to a thousand or
more per year in 1931-33 to well under two hundred per
year in 1935-37.4 The standard English-language account
attributes the steep decline not to a change in policy but
3 Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2000), pp. 506-07.
4 Takeuchi Yō, Daigaku to iu yamai; Tōdai funjō to kyōju gunzō (Tokyo: Chūō korōn shinsha,
2001), p. 151.
tokyo university and the war | vii
to “a shortage of targets.”5 The authorities used informal
pressure to good effect, but they were not above naked
repression. In the first chapter translated here, Tachibana
Takashi quotes a student activist’s account of a
demonstration at Tōdai in 1932: “I remember well the first
demonstration at the university in which I took part. In a
lavatory on the side of the Faculty of Economics arcade, I
unfurled very fearfully the red banner that had been slipped
to me. Indeed, it had written on it, ‘Absolute Opposition to
Imperialist War!’ At the predetermined hour, one student
began a speech in the arcade. It was a matter of only a
minute, no more. More than a minute was dangerous. The
students who were in the area, apparently nonchalantly—I
too was one of them—gathered with a sudden cry, raised
the red flag quickly; there wasn’t time to form up, and like
a strong wind we raced toward the main gate. We crossed
the road, and in front of the third or fourth building that
was the student co-op came the cry, ‘Run for it!’ It was
instantaneous. In the twinkling of an eye, a truckful of
police from the Motofuji Station drove up. We fled, each
man for himself, as fast and as far as possible, out of the
jurisdiction of the Motofuji Station.” Of the Tōdai student
demonstration later that year in support of Professor
Takigawa of Kyoto University, Tachibana writes: “This was
the end of the student movement before the war;
afterwards, there were simply no comparable events.”
Arrests were numerous, and convictions brought severe
sentences. The trial of Communist Party members (1931-32)
produced four life sentences and fifteen sentences of ten
5 Richard H. Mitchell, Janus-Faced Justice: Political Criminals in Imperial Japan (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1992), p. 81.
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years and up. By the time these sentences were handed
down, Japan was at war in Manchuria.
Tokyo Imperial University
The first paragraph of Randolph Bourne’s statement
continues: “[I]n general, the nation in wartime attains a
uniformity of feeling, a hierarchy of values culminating at
the undisputed apex of the State ideal, which could not
possibly be produced through any other agency than war.
Loyalty—or mystic devotion to the State—becomes the
major imagined human value. Other values, such as artistic
creation, knowledge, reason, beauty, the enhancement of
life, are instantly and almost unanimously sacrificed, and
the significant classes who have constituted themselves the
amateur agents of the State are engaged not only in
sacrificing these values for themselves but in coercing all
other persons into sacrificing them.” Tokyo Imperial
University was prewar Japan’s foremost institution of
higher learning. It embodied a good many of Bourne’s
“other values, such as artistic creation, knowledge, reason,
beauty, the enhancement of life.” So it was natural that,
once the state had eliminated the popular organizations,
however weak, that it saw as a challenge, it turned its
attention to the university. For years, professors had been
relatively free on campus; that changed.
Admission to Tōdai was the goal of bright male students
from all over Japan, as well as sons of the elite. Graduates
became key figures in government—seven pre-war prime
ministers were alumni, including those in office between
1936 and summer 1941. In 1937 over 70% of the higher civil
service were graduates, as were 50% of the judges.6 The
6 Inoki Masamichi, “The Civil Bureaucracy in Japan,” in Robert A. Ward and Dankwart K.
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story was similar in business and the arts and the media.
Think of Tōdai as Harvard and Yale combined or Oxford
and Cambridge combined.7
In creating a single national university (Kyoto Imperial
University was founded two decades later, in 1897, and
other national universities followed), the Japanese had
many models to draw on. Of primary importance were the
universities of Germany, France, Great Britain, and the
U.S. From France the Japanese adopted “a centralized
educational system under the control of a ministry of
education;”8 from the U.S., curriculum and methods; from
Germany and France, a chair system, with each professor
in charge of a field and exercising wide control over junior
faculty and graduate students in that field.9 Professors
enjoyed enormous prestige: “They were well-funded, and
virtually certain of extended periods of study abroad. They
stood at the crossroads of education and government, for
their best students manned the most important ministries.
They were public as well as academic leaders, consulted
by government bureau chiefs—often their former
students—to serve on study commissions. They were
sought out by publishers to give leadership and tone to
Rustow, eds., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1964), pp. 296-97.
7 In Japanese, the university's formal name was Tōkyō teikoku daigaku, usually
abbreviated to Teidai or, after the war, when Imperial was dropped, Tokyo University or
Tōdai. Teidai, Imperial University, used the first syllables of the second and third
compounds of its formal name: Tōkyō teikoku daigaku. (東京帝国大学, 帝大). Tōdai is
Tokyo University, the first syllables of the first and second compounds of its name:
Tōkyō daigaku東京大学, 東大). Tachibana uses Tōdai to refer to both, as in his title,
Tennō to tōdai天皇と東大, and I will follow suit.
8 Herbert Passin, Society and Education in Japan (New York: Columbia University, 1965), p.
69.
9 Passin, p. 70; Jansen, Making, p. 542. On the Japanese universities, see especially Byron
K. Marshall, Academic Freedom and the Japanese Imperial University, 1868-1939 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992).
x | university of massachusetts amherst libraries
debates on issues of the day.”10 Tachibana’s story focuses on
a handful of the Tōdai faculty during the years 1931-45.
In the 1930s Tōdai was made up of seven “faculties”: Law,
Letters, Medicine, and Physical Sciences—these four had
been part of Tōdai from its start in 1877—plus later
additions: Engineering (1886), Agriculture (1897),
Economics (1919).11 Its students numbered around 7,000.
Its faculties guarded their independence jealously. Each
faculty elected its dean and controlled its own personnel
decisions; together, the faculties elected presidents to
preside for three-year terms. Sometimes presidents had
their hands full dealing with their own faculties. Presidents
also mediated between the Ministry of Education and these
faculties. Often in these years the Ministry of Education
was in the hands of right-wingers; always it was subject
to the influence of the National Diet. Marshall writes that
“the Tōdai faculty…was consistently in the forefront of the
most intense confrontations with the imperial Japanese
government.”12
As the following chart of life spans makes clear, the story
of Tōdai in these years is overwhelmingly the story of men
born within a few years of 1890: Ōuchi, Nambara, Takagi,
Hijikata, Tanaka, Kawai, Maide, Yanaihara, Minoda. In
1940 these men were about fifty, at the height of their
professional careers. Kawai died during the war, and
Minoda committed suicide shortly after the war ended.
Several—Nambara, Ōuchi, Takagi, Tanaka,
Yanaihara—played particularly significant roles after the
war.
10 Jansen, Making, p. 542.
11 For discussion of the term “faculty” as an issue of translation, see below.
12 Marshall, Academic Freedom, p. 4.
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Not surprisingly, the story also involves several men much
older: Minobe Tatsukichi and Tsuda Sōkichi (both born in
1873), and Hiraga Yuzuru (born in 1878), who became
president of Tōdai in 1938, at the age of 60. And several were
much younger: Takagi Yasaka (born in 1901), Maruyama
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Masao (born in 1914). The actors were all men. Women held
a very few professorial positions in private universities
before 1945, but there were no women professors at Tōdai.
In the United States the same generation includes
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (born 1888),
businessmen Joseph P. Kennedy (1888) and J. Paul Getty
(1892), five-star General and President Dwight D.
Eisenhower (1890), Chief Justice Earl Warren (1891), and
scientist-educator James B. Conant (1893). Politician and
diplomat Henry L. Stimson (1867) belonged to the
generation before; President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882)
fell in between. Contemporaries in other countries
included Adolf Hitler (born 1889), Jawaharlal Nehru (1889),
Charles de Gaulle (1890), and Mao Zedong (1893). Winston
Churchill (1874) had been born a decade and a half earlier.
In his preface Tachibana writes: “I tried to look through
the peephole that Tōdai offered. It became a book on the
making of contemporary Japan. In fact, the peephole that
Tōdai offered provided a viewpoint precisely suited to that
goal. In order to transform Japan as quickly as possible
into a modern state, the new Meiji government established
Tōdai to import western culture and to nurture human
talent. So at its founding, Tōdai’s history was ipso facto the
history of modern Japan. And the years from the late Meiji
era until 1945 were the ‘imperial era’ in which Japan called
itself the ‘Great Empire of Japan,’ and for that period Tōdai
called itself the ‘imperial university’ and bore the central
task of nourishing the human talent of Imperial Japan.”
Tachibana Takashi
Tachibana stresses the importance of point of view in
history-writing, that the history of Tōdai during the war
depends significantly on who is writing the history. In his
chapter on the Hiraga Purge, he writes: “Historical truth
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lies in complexity… On any number of issues the judgment
of history is still pending, but for the Hiraga Purge most
of all, historical judgment varies with the historian. The
critics call it the rash act of a military officer-president who
understood neither the value of scholarship nor the raison
d’ètre of the university; those who praise it say it saved
Tōdai.” So it’s important that we know as much as possible
about Tachibana Takashi himself. Many factors offer clues
to his position in Japanese society and his thoughts about
Tōdai.
Tachibana Takashi was born in Nagasaki on May 28,
1940.13 Japan was already at war on the Chinese mainland.
Tachibana’s father taught in a girls’ school. His family was
Christian; his mother was a follower of Christian activist
and educator Hani Motoko. In 1942 the family moved to
Beijing, then under Japanese occupation; the Ministry of
Education had appointed his father assistant principal of
Beijing Normal School, an institution for training teachers.
The family returned to Japan only after the war, in 1946, so
the five-year-old Takashi did not experience the climactic
war years in Japan or the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. In
Emperor and Tōdai, he writes about having no substantive
memories of the war except for the scene in Beijing in
August 1945 when the adults gathered to listen to the
13 Tachibana's birth name was Tachibana Takashi, written 橘 隆志. But the characters
with which he writes his name now are different. Tachibana, mandarin orange, is one
complicated character of sixteen strokes—橘; the two characters he uses now are
simple, easily recognizable characters—tachi (stand), and hana (flower)—立花. And
the two characters with which his parents wrote Takashi—隆志—have yielded now
to one character, the first of the old two—隆. There is a tradition in Japan, especially
before Tachibana's generation, of people of letters choosing pen names. But a pen
name with the same pronunciation as the birth name? Most likely, this pen name is
largely a matter of convenience for the public, a change from the difficult-to-read-
and-write 橘 to the generic, easy-to-read-and-write 立花.
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emperor’s radio broadcast announcing the end of the war.
At the time, Tachibana was four and a half.
Tachibana’s Tōdai ties are long and involved. He hoped
to study the physical sciences, but slight color-blindness led
to his rejection by the science faculties, and he turned to the
Faculty of Letters. He did his senior thesis on the French
philosopher and spiritualist, Maine de Biran (1766-1824)
and graduated in 1964. For two years after graduating, he
worked for the magazine Bungei shunjū. Then he quit and
went back to Tōdai for graduate work in philosophy. The
Tōdai student unrest of 1968-69 interrupted his graduate
work but provided fodder for his pen: he published a
number of essays about the riots. When he sought to
resume graduate work in 1970, he ran into bureaucratic
demands that he pay tuition retroactively, and he refused.
Twenty-five years later, beginning in 1996, Tachibana
taught in Tōdai’s General Studies Division, and his
writings on science led to contract appointments in 2005
and since, and Tachibana has been able to teach into his
seventies.14
As a writer, Tachibana has covered a wide range of
topics, attracting enormous attention and several lawsuits:
Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, the Lockheed bribery
scandal, near-death experiences, space travel, cancer. He
14 One bit of Tachibana trivia: Tachibana built himself a workspace that is itself a work
of art. It is a three-story concrete structure, with a full basement and a sub-basement.
It sits on a narrow triangular strip less than five minutes by foot from Tachibana's
home; the building leaves no room on any side. At its broad end, the building is less
than 14’ wide; at its narrow end, 30’ away, the building is just over 6’ wide. The entire
building occupies 290 square feet. Take away the stairwell at the narrow end, and the
working space per floor is less than 220 square feet. Imagine a usable space 20’ x 11’.
And that's before installing bookshelves on all walls. Tachibana works on the third
floor, where the bookshelves cover up the three windows. Tachibana is a night
creature; the only light is artificial light. On the exterior, the narrow end of the
structure sports a huge cat face, painted on, as tall as the entire second floor. The
architect and Tachibana were high school friends.
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himself is a cancer survivor (in 2002, when he was writing
this book); his wife died of cancer in 2000. His books
number in the many dozens. He has also been a figure in
radio and TV journalism and has acted on TV.
Several factors in Tachibana’s life appear to have
significant bearing on this book: educational achievement,
including crucial years at Tōdai, offering access to Japan’s
elite; journalistic connections offering avenues for
publication of his views; experience as an outsider of
sorts—a Christian upbringing in a non-Christian society,
a member of a family involved in and committed to
education, ties to Nagasaki. One of the refreshing aspects
of this book is Tachibana’s refusal to oversimplify or make
complicated issues appear simple, double weaves appear
single. At the end of the book Tachibana writes of the
relation between past and present: “When you write
history, the world seems to be a world of double weave
of discontinuity and continuity. Even in an age like 1945,
when it seems there is great rupture in every facet of
society, if you look again from a slightly changed angle,
society in every aspect is continuous. After all, history all
relates to ‘now.’ While I’ve been writing of various eras, my
thoughts have leapt ahead any number of times to Japan’s
‘now.’ In order truly to understand Japan’s ‘now,’ I’ve had
any number of times to place ‘now’ atop that historical
double weave—discontinuity and continuity—and amend
my view.” But the reverse is true, too: now also relates to
then. Tachibana laments the decline in influence of Tōdai
and its leaders. He writes of Nambara Shigeru’s impact in
the days after the defeat in 1945 (Nambara was dean of the
Faculty of Law, then Tōdai president): “It’s inconceivable
for those who know only a much later day in which Tōdai
professors have lost virtually all influence on society, but
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in that chaotic era Nambara’s words had great power and
guided society.”
Tachibana is quite pessimistic—both about Japan and
about Tōdai. In his introduction, he comments: “With the
landslide victory of Koizumi’s Liberal Democratic Party in
the general election of 2005, Japanese politics seemed to
make a major transition from the 1955 order to a 2005
order. We still don’t know the historical meaning of the
2005 order. But looking back at history, each time Japan
has turned a major corner, it has made great mistakes,
mistakes in judging objective conditions or mistakes in
choosing a course of action. History offers many cases
where a slight mistake of judgment or choice at a turning
point becomes, long afterward, a mistake that cannot be
undone, that boomerangs. (This is true both of personal
history and of national history.) Studying history is
probably the sole way to prevent such tragedies from
recurring.”
In his Epilogue Tachibana becomes even more specific
and biting. Japan failed; Tōdai failed. Indeed, in literal
translation the title of the Epilogue is “The Day Tokyo
Imperial University Was Defeated.”15 “The day” is August
15, 1945, the day Imperial Japan was defeated; Tachibana
shocks us by substituting Tōdai for Japan. And about
postwar Japan, Tachibana writes: “Today [2005] we are
about to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of August
15, and what I feel acutely is the utterly hopeless
irresponsibility of Japan’s leaders. Whose responsibility
was it, that first lost war? They decided it was okay to leave
that issue unclarified, that there be ‘collective atonement
15 To avoid awkwardness in English, I have translated that title as “The Day of Defeat: For
Japan and for Tōdai.”
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of 100,000,000 Japanese,’ with no individuals taking
responsibility. And how about the second lost war—the no-
action no-plan for our current ‘lost decade’ (a decade that
is already fifteen years long) after the bubble burst in 1991?
Has responsibility for the second lost war been pursued?
Has the Japanese economy emerged from this second lost
war? I doubt it.”
“My Tōdai”
This book started as a serial, “My Tōdai,” in Bungei shunjū,
one of Japan’s premier mass-market monthlies. The sixty-
six installments cover Tōdai from its establishment in the
1870s to 1945 and occasionally beyond. But Tachibana does
not devote equal treatment to the early years. His narrative
reaches the era of the Russo-Japanese War in Chapter 11; it
reaches 1928 and the mass arrests of Japanese Communists
in Chapter 25; it reaches the May 15, 1932 Incident in
Chapter 35. Thirty-four chapters for 1877-1932; thirty-two
for 1932-45. And as early as Chapter 4 Tachibana is already
looking ahead to the 1930s and devoting space to Minobe
Tatsukichi’s emperor-organ theory.
One indication of the author’s commitments is his focus
on certain of the Tōdai faculty. He spends much time on
Professor of Law Hiraizumi Kiyoshi (in the section of the
book immediately preceding what I have translated here)
and Professor of Economics Hijikata Seibi; but it is clear
that to Tachibana they are bad guys. He writes much about
Tōdai president Hiraga Yuzuru; in Hiraga’s case
Tachibana’s praise for the Hiraga Purge offsets his
criticism of the militarization of Tōdai during Hiraga’s
tenure. But his real heroes are members of the Faculty of
Economics—Kawai, Ōuchi, Yanaihara (all forced out of
Tōdai in the late 1930s) and members of the Faculty of
Law—Nambara, Tanaka, Takagi. These were great men of
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their day, although for them the years 1935-45 were indeed
a dark valley and they themselves at odds with the times.
They showed their true mettle when the day belonged to
others; “their day” came after 1945. Their day was also
qualitatively different from today. Those men were giants,
and Tachibana believes we are stuck today with inferior
imitations. Tōdai’s prominent professors once had moral
authority beyond the campus; such is no longer the case.
For nearly fifty years the Asia-Pacific War has been a
major theme of my own work and translations: the Tokyo
war crimes trial, battleship Yamato, the writers and poets
who survived Hiroshima, the intellectuals who lived
through the war. So my interest in Tachibana’s book
centers on the later years. Even focusing on the later years
did not solve the problem of length. To begin with
Tachibana’s Chapter 51, “The Tōdai Faculty of Law: Taboo
and Disgrace,” means to delete much material in the earlier
chapters that relates directly to the war; I have in mind
particularly Tachibana’s chapters on the nativist ideologue
Hiraizumi. I have begun instead with the aftermath of the
Emperor-Organ Incident, in which rightwing attackers
drove Minobe from the House of Peers and eliminated his
constitutional theory from the law schools of Japan.
Tachibana’s Chapter 51 provides me a convenient starting
point, even if it is not Tachibana’s starting point.
Minobe held that the emperor was an organ of the state,
one part of the polity; the greater unit was the state. This
emperor-organ theory had held sway for decades on
Japan’s faculties of law, in its textbooks, in its civil service
examinations. It enjoyed far more support among
intellectuals than the conservative constitutional
interpretation of Hozumi Yatsuka (1860-1912) and his
disciple Uesugi Shinkichi (1878-1929), who argued that far
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from being a mere organ of the state, the emperor was the
state.16 But economic collapse during the great depression,
the government’s backing down in the face of Anglo-
American threats at the London Naval Conference in 1930,
the assassination of Prime Minister Hamaguchi in 1931, the
Manchurian Incident of 1931-33: these events punctuated
Japan’s slide to the right. The assault on Minobe marks a
very black day in the history of academic freedom in pre-
war Japan. The Tōdai Faculty of Law covered itself with
shame, not with glory.
Emperor and Tōdai
In 2005, when Tachibana turned the series “My Tōdai”
into a book, he changed the title to Emperor and Tōdai. In his
foreword, he explains why:
When all is said and done, the most important figure in
Japan’s modern and contemporary history is the emperor.
It’s not that in every age particular flesh-and-blood
emperors played such a large role. It’s that the emperor
concept or emperor system played a central role.
Japan’s modern history began with the overthrow of
seven centuries of samurai rule (the Kamakura,
Muromachi, and Tokugawa shogunates) by a revivalist
revolution that made Japan once again a state centered on
the emperor. 1868 began as a revival of the system of court
rule, and the Meiji political leaders pulled off the great
political trick of giving the emperor system the backbone of
an authorized constitution. Thus they made Japan change
all of a sudden from a pseudo-ancient court-rule state into
a modern state.
The emperors who ruled over “the great Japanese
16 For Hozumi, see my Japanese Tradition and Western Law: Emperor, State, and Law in the
Thought of Hozumi Yatsuka (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
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empire” that had been created in this fashion were unique.
They resembled the absolute monarchs who had ruled
Europe in an earlier age. At the same time, they were given
the shamanistic character of the emperors who had ruled
Japan in prehistoric times. At the same time, they were
made military rulers similar to those who secured political
power in ancient Japan by means of military revolution.
Beginning with the Meiji Emperor, the emperors took for
their ceremonial dress the uniform of commander in chief
of the military, including army and navy. Emperors
sometimes played the role of enlightened monarchs urging
on the creation of the modern state, sometimes of absolute
sovereign ruling both civilian and military realms, and
sometimes of military ruler bringing peace to the realm by
subduing those who didn’t revere them.
At times those who revered the emperor projected onto
him more than one of these roles, so the term ‘emperor’
has more than one meaning. Hence the emperor came to
function as a multi-faceted, profoundly mysterious
political arrangement unique to Japan. Early in the Asia
Pacific War that emperor turned into the national-
essentialist symbol of the ultra-nationalists. He became the
political symbol of Imperial Japan, an Imperial Japan that
sought as military power to expand and extend its control
to all Asia. At the same time the national-essentialist myth
of living god became attached to him, and the emperor
became the sacred symbol of unparalleled power, uniting
in himself politics, military, and religion.
This sacred symbol was revered as Japan’s highest value
and became the principle governing the entire lives of all
Japanese. With the rejection of Minobe’s emperor-organ
theory, all Japan became hostage in the blink of an eye to
the reactionary concept of the kokutai, and by black magic
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the kokutai concept controlled Japan. That great change in
values contained within itself all the seeds of the later
destruction of Japan.17
Tōdai was the chief stage on which this black-magical
control by the kokutai concept arose. In the era just before,
attacks from the left on the emperor-system state had held
sway, and the advent of an age of revolution had been
clamored for. Then, too, Tōdai was the chief stage. In
reaction, an attack on the left began, led by right-wing
nationalists, and soon the right-wing nationalists turned
to terror. The right-wing student movement spawned
terrorists and therewith a great drama that shook the age.
Tōdai was its stage, too. This is why Tōdai is the best place
to comprehend the trends of the time.
This is the biggest reason I changed “My Tōdai” to
Emperor and Tōdai. The key figures in this great historical
change were the emperor, the imperial (or anti-imperial)
ideologues, the imperial (or anti-imperial) ideologists. And
Tōdai was the center stage where this conflict over views of
the emperor arose most fiercely.
There are various books describing Japan’s recent and
contemporary history, but the distinguishing
characteristic of my book is that it describes that conflict
17 Kokutai国体is not a technical legal term but a rhetorical one; it is a claim to
uniqueness, to something that sets Japan apart among the nations. What is that? The
traditional late-nineteenth, early-twentieth century answer was Japan's imperial
house or emperor system. Few Japanese chose—or dared—to challenge head-on the
term or the exceptionalism it represented. So in the 1930s the nativist right could
launch a campaign to “clarify the kokutai,” attacking any ideas it deemed
incompatible with the uniqueness of Japan's imperial house. In the 1930s that
included liberalism and, of course, democracy, socialism, and communism. The
journalist Hugh Byas suggested more than 75 years ago that the term kokutai is
analogous to “the American way of life,” a claim to national uniqueness, to national
exceptionalism. (Byas, Government by Assassination [New York: A. A. Knopf, 1942], p.
292n6.) In Japan in the prewar era, it lay around like a bludgeon, waiting to be picked
up and wielded against those the right perceived as its enemies. See also my
discussion of translation, below.
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in detail. Without understanding emperor (ideology) and
right-wing ultranationalism, you can’t hope to understand
the great change in Japan of the day. Maruyama Masao
too thought that way, conceptually, and so he began his
famous Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics with
the chapter ‘The Logic and Psychology of Ultra-
Nationalism.’18 But that chapter left me quite unsatisfied.
Because in reality, merely setting out that plausible,
abstract analysis of the ‘logic and psychology of ultra-
nationalism’ that as good as hijacked the Japan of that day
brought nothing real to mind.
With his abstract condemnation of the reality of the logic
and psychology of the ultra-nationalists, Maruyama cut
them down and left them for dead. I wanted to make my
way more deeply, into the very tissue of their brains, the
marrow of their bones, to know that era’s change with a
greater degree of reality. I thought I’d like to portray the
drama of that historic turning point less as political science
or as history than as non-fiction. That’s the back-story of
18 Maruyama Masao (1914-96) was Japan's leading political scientist in the latter half of
the 20th century. A student and then professor at Tōdai, he took a prominent role
soon after the war in seeking an explanation for Japan's war. As Tachibana indicates,
he found that explanation in his own field: intellectual/psychological history.
Maruyama, Gendai seiji no shisō to kōdō (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1956-57); ed. Ivan Morris,
Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics (London: Oxford, 1963). Other studies
of wartime Japan include the following: Thomas R. H. Havens, Valley of Darkness: The
Japanese People and World War Two (New York: Norton, 1978); Haruko Taya Cook and
Theodore Cook, eds., Japan at War: An Oral History (New York: New Press, 1992); Akira
Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War 1941-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1981). Treatments of Tōdai intellectuals during this era include
Andrew Barshay, State and Intellectual in Japan: the Public Man in Crisis (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988; Atsuko Hirai, Individualism and Socialism: the Life and
Thought of Kawai Eijirō, 1881-1944 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); Frank
Miller, Minobe Tatsukichi: Interpreter of Constitutionalism in Japan (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1965); Richard H. Minear, ed. and tr., The Scars of War: Tokyo during
World War II: Writings of Takeyama Michio (Lanham [Md.]: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007);
Richard H. Minear, ed. and tr., War and Conscience in Japan: Nambara Shigeru and the
Asia-Pacific War (Lanham [Md.]: Rowman & Littlefield and Tokyo: University of Tokyo
Press, 2011).
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this book, and I’ll leave it to the reader to judge how far I’ve
succeeded.
I have quoted this passage at length for several reasons.
First, this is Tachibana speaking directly to his Japanese
readers. It tells us much about Tachibana himself and
about his reading of his readers. This is his history and
theirs: what are its lessons for them? At the end of Chapter
14 Tachibana describes one of the lessons he himself learns:
As I accustomed myself to documents of the time, I came
gradually to understand that that age was more right-wing,
more ultranationalist than our later generations think. It’s
not that there was a minority of right-wing
ultranationalists. It’s that the ways of thinking and feeling
of everyday people were right-wing to an extent
unimaginable today. The people were emperor-
worshippers. The theory that the common people of the
time were all duped, that they were forced to say what
wasn’t in their hearts, has been spread widely after the war;
there was a time when it was considered the standard
historical view. But that’s not how it was. Virtually all the
common people of the time seem truly to have believed
what today one can only think of as extreme right-wing
views. When I understood that, I knew truly, at a gut level,
what caused the war.
In this book I’ve written about the emperor and the right
wing in more detail than is usual in history books because
I thought they were the key to unlocking the history of that
time. I was born in 1940. I was five when the war ended,
so I have virtually no real memories from that time. I’m of
the generation that received a purely postwar democratic
education from elementary school on; I received no
militarist elementary education at all. Hence when I try to
understand that age, there are many aspects utterly absent
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from my own common sense. They are all things that I
would have known instinctively had I been of the same
generation as those who were adults at the time.
Second, Tachibana’s discussion of his titles permits me
to comment on a third change of title, my choice of title. For
Tachibana, “My Tōdai” yielded to Emperor and Tōdai; now
Emperor and Tōdai now gives way to Tokyo Imperial University
and the War. The issue is in part one of chronological
coverage: Emperor and Tōdai covers 1877-1945; I spotlight
1935-45. Limiting the time span inevitably increases the
importance of the war, which is not to say, of course, that
it was unimportant in Emperor and Tōdai. And my audience
is different. This introduction—beginning with the
quotation from Randolph Bourne—seeks the most
appropriate context within which non-Japanese can
approach Tokyo University in the war years. My readers
are not Japanese; this history is not mine or theirs. What
can it teach us? In a sense, my truncated translation alters
Tachibana’s focus, from the history of a mindset to the
history of an institution and of individuals within it. It is
less about views of the emperor, more about how a crucial
institution and the individuals within it reacted in time of
great stress. Tachibana’s heroes are my heroes, but there is
a subtle difference in the reasons. I see first and foremost
an institution kowtowing—for the most part but not
entirely—to the pressures of the day and a few individuals
refusing to kowtow. That history resonates with my own
experience in academia: as an undergraduate and graduate
student at Yale and Harvard, 1956-67; as a fledgling
assistant professor at The Ohio State University, 1967-70;
and as an associate and full professor at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst, 1971-2008.19
Context
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Tachibana is sharply critical of the wartime Tōdai, but
comparing it with universities under stress in other
countries might soften his verdict. In establishing Tōdai in
the late 19th century, Japan’s leaders had drawn on existing
models in Germany, France, England, and the U.S. I submit
that it makes sense now to set Tōdai into the broader
context of universities in the modern world: how have they
reacted, how are they reacting, to the stress of wartime?
There isn’t space here to address that broader context in
depth, but consider only the United States, Harvard
University, and World War II.20 Does its experience bear on
our judgment of Tōdai?
James B. Conant (1893-1978), a chemist by training, was
president of Harvard University beginning in 1933 and
through World War II; he retired in 1953 to become U.S.
ambassador to Germany. He had long favored U.S.
intervention in the war in Europe. Here are excerpts from
a speech Conant gave at a mass meeting on the Harvard
campus on the evening of December 8, 1941: “We are here
tonight to testify that each one of us stands ready to do his
part in insuring that a speedy and complete victory is ours.
To this end I pledge all resources of Harvard University. … A
state of war presents an academic community with special
19 On hearing of my decision to begin with Chapter 51, Tachibana reacted
understandably by questioning the wisdom of eliminating in particular the five
chapters dealing with the leading right-wing scholar Hiraizumi Kiyoshi. Unless we
see more of the ideological underpinnings of the wartime right, how can we judge
those in the opposition? But for my purposes the exact nature of that ideology is
somewhat less important than the fact of the opposition. See also note 32.
20 This analysis echoes what Carol Gruber concluded of American scholars in World War
I: “[P]rofessors assumed that knowledge is effective chiefly in association with power,
and they ultimately came to serve the interests of power rather than the interests of
truth.” Gruber, Mars and Minerva: World War I and the Uses of the Higher Learning in
America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975), p. 259. Gruber draws on
an essay by Merle Curti that takes the issue back even further: “The American Scholar
in Three Wars,” Journal of the History of Ideas 3 (June 1942).
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problems. We must put first things first in these grim days.
And our first and over-whelming consideration is how each
of us can best contribute to the cause. … Defense work is
war work and takes precedence over every other
consideration. … We go forth tonight pledged to a two-
fold task: the winning of this war and the preservation of
the American way of life.”21 Mutatis mutandis, these could be
the words of President Hiraga of Tokyo University or his
successor.
Like his Japanese counterparts, Conant had influence in
government circles. Conant wore many hats: president of
Harvard University; member of important national
education committees; member of several secret
government committees, including the National Defense
Research Committee (Conant was head from 1941 through
the end of the war)22 and the Manhattan Project (Conant
chaired the S-1 Section Executive Committee of the Office
of Scientific Research and Development). The speech on
December 8 was not the only time Conant rallied the
university and the public to the cause. At the annual dinner
of the New England Society of New York on December 22:
“We now stand undivided. We are all Americans. We are
pledged to outbuild, to outproduce, to outfight, and finally
to overthrow the tyranny of the Axis powers. … We are now
fighting to defend our American way of life.”23 Again, on
May 14, 1942: “In war, particularly in a total war like this, it
21 Harvard, UAI 5.158.48, Box 5.
22 Hershberg, Conant, p. 128: “The NDRC…broke with the past by carrying out most war-
related scientific research under contract to civilian universities and institutes. Later
accepted as a norm, this strategy…fostered a transformation of the relationship
among American universities, government, and the armed forces that would long
outlast the war for which the committee was created.”
23 “What Victory Requires,” Dec. 22, 1941, in Vital Speeches of the Day, 8:9 (Jan. 15, 1942),
199-202.
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behooves every individual and every institution not merely
to obey orders but to cooperate in every way with those
who carry the responsibility of authority. Therefore I have
no doubt that every academic institution will endeavor to
adapt itself to this plan [conscription] by which college men
will be educated for a few years at least with the object
of making them more effective in the war.”24 On
Commencement Day, 1942: “To speed the day when the Axis
powers surrender without conditions, we now dedicate the
resources of this ancient society of scholars…”25
This interventionist stand represented a significant shift
in Conant’s thinking. In a long response in 1937 to
Archibald MacLeish, who argued that academics must take
sides, Conant had said this: “I refuse to admit that the
scholar should take up arms in [the world struggle between
the right and the left] even to the extent of joining a
people’s front (though personally I hardly need tell you that
if I am forced to fight, I hope it will be on that side). The
people’s front, or its equivalent, may yet turn out to have
sheltered as much spiritual and intellectual tyranny as the
other side. … [T]he things I think important in a university
have suffered from the enemies of learning who may be
either radicals or reactionaries. … I think above all the
scholar qua scholar must be careful lest his very existence
be lost by his becoming a combatant….”26 But only three
years later—still eighteen months before Pearl Harbor,
Conant spoke approvingly of a “Pax Americana.” In his
24 “American Youth and the War” (to National Council for Books in Wartime, May 14,
1942), Vital Speeches of the Day, 8:16, 500-502.
25 Quoted in John T. Bethell, “Harvard and the Arts of War,” Harvard Magazine
(September-October 1995), p. 39.
26 Conant to MacLeish, June 25, 1937; quoted in Hershberg, Conant, pp. 113-114.
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diary for June 29, 1940, Conant noted: “Expressed my views
[to Harold Dodds, president of Princeton University] on
U.S.A. armed to the teeth, belligerent and running the
world. A Pax Americana like the Pax Britannica of the 19th
Century.”27 President Hiraga of Tōdai could hardly have
said it better.
Here is one description of the impact of the war on
Harvard: “During the war years, it had housed more than
60,000 men and women assigned to army, navy, and air
corps programs that ranged from military chaplains’
training to a course in soil characteristics for airstrip
construction. Almost 80 University laboratories had done
war-related research…. …[A]lmost 650 of the University’s
2,000 faculty members left for military duty or other
government service… All told, almost 27,000 students,
alumni, employees and faculty members served in the
armed forces, and 691 lost their lives.”28 Among the notable
Harvard figures in the Manhattan Project were J. Robert
Oppenheimer and current or future faculty members
Bainbridge, Case, de Hoffman, Glauber, Hornig,
Kistiakowsky. Indeed, “When [physics] classes began in the
fall of 1943, only eight of 44 prewar lecturers and instructors
were still in place.”29 Other major contributions came from
Howard H. Aiken (computers), Gordon Allport
(propaganda), Leo Beranek (fiberglass), E. J. Cohn (blood
plasma), Louis Fieser (napalm), Frederick V. Hunt (sonar),
Edwin O. Reischauer (analysis of Magic intercepts), George
Wald (night vision), Robert Woodward and William
Doering (quinine). Harvard honored the American military
27 June 29, 1940; quoted in Hershberg, Conant, p. 126.
28 Bethell, “Harvard and the Arts of War,” p. 34.
29 Bethell, “Harvard and the Arts of War,” p. 41.
tokyo university and the war | xxix
by conferring honorary degrees on Admiral Ernest J. King
(1945), Generals Dwight Eisenhower and Henry Arnold and
Admiral Chester Nimitz (1946; General Douglas MacArthur
was voted a degree that was never conferred); J. Robert
Oppenheimer and Generals George Marshall and Omar
Bradley (1947).30 Conant had surely made good on his
commitment to “dedicate the resources of this ancient
society of scholars.”
In the U.S. today Harvard is integrated fully into the
military-industrial complex; it resembles far more closely
what it became in World War II than what it was before
World War II.31 Much the same can be said of Tōdai.
Perhaps the major difference between Tōdai in the 1930s
and Harvard then and since is not that Tōdai supported
the war effort and Harvard did not, but that the wars the
U.S. fought did not end in obvious and utter defeat. In
comparing the two universities, we should bear in mind as
well the vast disparity in physical situation: the U.S. was
never about to lose the war to Japan; the Harvard campus
and Boston were never firebombed; Harvard did not
provide hundreds of suicide pilots.
Might we not paraphrase Randolph Bourne and argue
that war is “the health of the university”? It is important
here to define our terms. If we mean the university as
institution—enrollments, endowment, public support,
research funds, prestige, access, influence, then the
statement can hardly be challenged. If, however, we mean
the university as intellectual and moral leader, then war
may well be the illness of the university.32
30 Bethell, “Harvard and the Arts of War,” pp. 37-39, 48.
31 The same holds true of all major research universities: Berkeley, Columbia, Yale, and
the others.
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Issues of Translation
In translating Tachibana’s book, I’ve encountered
relatively few problems, but let me mention a few of them.
Tachibana writes often of relations between Tōdai
professors and their closest students. In Japanese the usual
32 To speak of my own experience as an academic, national priorities have been a
leitmotif of my career. For most of my seven years (1960-67) of graduate training I
received funding under the National Defense Education Act (1958). That legislation
aimed “To strengthen the national defense and to encourage and assist in the
expansion and improvement of educational programs to meet critical national
needs.” Those critical needs included modern languages (e.g., Japanese, Chinese,
Russian) but not classical languages. The act was an immediate response to American
shock at the Soviet launching of Sputnik, earth's first orbiting satellite (October
1957).My first regular appointment was as assistant professor of history at The Ohio
State University. On arrival in Columbus in 1967, I had to sign an oath: “I, _______, do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the State of Ohio against all enemies, foreign
and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same… SO HELP ME
GOD. … I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any political party or organization
that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States or the
Government of the State of Ohio by force or violence; and that during such time as I
am an officer, instructor, or employee of The Ohio State University, I will not advocate
nor become a member of any political party or organization that advocates the
overthrow of the Government of the United States or the Government of the State of
Ohio by force or violence.” I also signed an affidavit that I was not a member of a long
list of organizations. I remember only that the Sakurakai was one of them. I had
heard of it as an organization of radical right-wing Japanese military officers in the
1930s. No, I wasn't a member.I remember sitting in the Ohio State football stadium
for a fall convocation—it was probably 1967—listening to the university's president,
Novice Fawcett, warn incoming students against their professors: they are experts, he
intoned, but only in their fields. I have regretted ever after that I didn't walk out. My
memory is that no one did walk out.In 1971 I moved to the University of
Massachusetts. Shortly after my arrival there, I was asked to sign this loyalty oath: “I
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend the Constitution of the
United States of America and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and that I will oppose the overthrow of the government of the United
States of America or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any illegal or
unconstitutional method.” But between 1967 and 1971, I had changed. I refused to
sign, and a number of us brought suit against the oath, and as a result the university
backed down and agreed not to enforce it. Of course, filing suit is quite different from
refusing absolutely to sign the oath. Would I have sacrificed my job had we lost in
court? I doubt it. Loyalty oaths to the contrary notwithstanding, the situation I faced
was light years removed from that of professors at Tōdai in the 1930s.My experience
of Japanese universities has always been in the privileged (and removed) position of
visiting graduate student or visiting scholar. I spent three years attached to Kyoto
University (Faculty of Law, 1964-55, 1970-71), six months attached to Tokyo University
(Faculty of Law, 1993-94), and a total of seven months attached to Hokkaido
University (Faculty of Letters, 1975, Faculty of Law, 1994). In my first two years at Kyoto
University my Fulbright advisor was the political scientist Inoki Masamichi
(1914-2012), who plays a minor role in Tachibana's story; but Inoki and I never
discussed these matters.
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terms are sensei 先生and deshi 弟子. Sensei is ‘master,’
‘teacher,’ ‘instructor,’ ‘doctor.’ The sensei role in Japan in
the 1930s was far broader than it is in Japan today, not to
mention the U.S. in the 1930s or today. It involved, often,
a major role in the private life of the sensei’s students:
arranging jobs, of course, but sometimes also marriages.
What of the other pole in the relation—deshi? It translates
as ‘pupil,’ ‘disciple,’ ‘adherent,’ ‘follower,’ ‘apprentice,’
‘protégé.’ Is ‘disciple’ too archaic a term? In English
‘disciple’ has an obsolete meaning (as verb) to teach or
train, but its overwhelming sense (as a noun) is far
stronger: “an adherent of the doctrines of another…” Is
‘disciple’ too strong? Certainly, ‘student’ is too weak.
Writing of one person who studied with Kawai Eijirō,
Tachibana refers to her as Kawai’s last “direct deshi.” A
direct deshi studied with the master; indirect deshi studied
with the master’s deshi and are second-generation deshi.33
Writing of someone who had likely been a member of
Ōuchi Hyōe’s undergraduate seminar, Tachibana says that
he was “virtually a deshi.”
The Tōdai Faculty of Law (and the other faculties, too)
accepted applicants straight out of “higher school.” The
“higher schools”—in 1920, there were fifteen—were the
royal road to the university. “Higher school” students
entered at seventeen and graduated at twenty. In a real
sense, the “higher schools” played a role in Japan
comparable to that played by undergraduate colleges in the
U.S. today. But it was a rare “middle school” student who
got into a “higher school:” in 1920, about five per cent, or
under 10,000.34
33 Since Tachibana speaks here only of “direct deshi,” I have translated the phrase as
“disciple.”
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Most students entered Tōdai at 20 and graduated at 23;
the standard curriculum was three years, not four. In the
1930s, unlike today, there was no “General Studies
Division,” no core curriculum that all Tōdai
undergraduates took. Students were admitted directly to
a faculty 学部 (gakubu)—Agriculture, Economics, Law,
Letters, Engineering, Medicine, Physical Sciences. Tōdai in
the 1930s represented graduate training as we know it
today in the U.S today—not to the doctorate, perhaps, but
certainly as far as the masters’ degree. Is “faculty” the best
translation of gakubu? Or should it be “department”?
“Faculty of Law” and “Faculty of Medicine”? or “Department
of Law,” “Department of Medicine”? In terms of numbers of
professors, faculties then were closer to departments now.
But I have chosen “faculty” to underline the
professionalism and independence involved. Hence I speak
of “faculty meetings,” not department meetings.
Tokyo Imperial University had a consultative body made
up of the dean and two elected representatives from each
faculty. The Japanese title is hyōgikai 評議会, with hyōgi
denoting conference, consultation, deliberation, and
hyōgikai, council or conference or board (as of trustees).
How to translate hyōgikai? Faculty Senate? Most Faculty
Senates in existence in the U.S. today are far larger, more
unwieldy, and less powerful bodies than Tōdai’s hyōgikai.
Following Byron K. Marshall,35 I’ve settled on University
Council.
The crucial ideological battles at Tōdai in the 1920s and
34 Donald T. Roden, Schooldays in Imperial Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1980), p. 40n81.
35 Academic Freedom and the Japanese University, 1868-1939 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992).
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1930s led to the firing of professors. The names of the
victims are an honor roll of the left: Takigawa, Yanaihara,
Kawai. The major exception, as we shall see, was the right-
winger Hijikata Seibi and his band, the “renovationist
faction” of the Faculty of Economics. The single most
famous victim of persecution was Minobe Tatsukichi, pre-
eminent constitutional scholar of his day, but he had
retired (retirement was mandatory at age 60) before the
right-wing propaganda operation had swung into high
gear. So—to its shame—the Tōdai Faculty of Law could
avoid direct involvement in that battle. Tenure as we know
it today in the U.S. did not exist in Japan in the thirties.36
Professors at Japan’s imperial universities had both more
security and less. More: full professors were imperial
appointees and could be punished only exceptionally and
via a cumbersome bureaucratic process. The process was so
cumbersome that university administrators and Ministry
of Education bureaucrats relied more often on informal
pressure leading to “voluntary resignations.” Less: once
administrators made up their minds to it, professors could
be fired. “Academic freedom” was no absolute bar to
persecution; at least until the 1930s, Tōdai academics were
relatively safe in their classrooms; but publications and
speeches away from campus were a potential source of
trouble. The term for action against a professor is kyūshoku
休職, which means, literally, “temporary retirement from
office, layoff.” But the aim in these cases in the 1930s was
permanent, not temporary. So I have translated kyūshoku
throughout as firing.
Government officials, on the one hand, and Tōdai
36 But tenure “as we know it today in the U.S.” is not always a sufficient safeguard against
academic witch hunts.
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academics, on the other, play key roles in this story. But
except for some of the career military officers, the major
figures in both camps came from the same elite. We learn
from Tachibana that Professor of Law Takagi was a life-
long friend of Kido, Minister of Education and later Privy
Seal; they had known each other since higher-school days.
Marshall states that “Almost half of the 480 individuals who
served as cabinet ministers between 1918 and 1964 were
Tōdai alumni.”37 The proportion seems to be the same for
judicial officials. These were people with life-long
connections. President Hiraga was both a career naval
officer (his highest rank was vice-admiral) and a Tōdai
graduate and professor. Yes, there was outside pressure
on Tōdai from the government periodically, but the key
figures on both sides were often from similar backgrounds
and well-acquainted.38 The threat from within, from right-
wing nationalists and camp-followers among the faculty,
was as dangerous to Tōdai’s institutional health.
I have left the term kokutai untranslated. Let me explain
why. Its two constituent Chinese characters, 国体, mean,
separately, land, country, territory, domain, and substance,
body, style, form. The Kenkyusha Dictionary defines the
compound as “national structure; the fundamental
character (of a country); national polity.” And the term is
often translated as national polity.39 But national polity is
a tautology—polity means “a particular form or system of
37 Academic Freedom, p. 193.
38 A quick scan of the Glossary reveals that a great many of the men who figure in this
account were graduates not simply of Tōdai, but of First Higher School before that.
39 National polity “is the more common translation, partly, one suspects because it has
dignity without precision. We may not know what it means, but it sounds impressive.”
Minear, Japanese Tradition and Western Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1970), p. 67.
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government,” for which there is a second Japanese term
seitai 政体, “a form [system] of government…a polity.” A
related term, taisei 体制, has several meanings: structure,
system, order, set-up, organization; anatomy;
Establishment. Referring to the overall system of formal
(e.g., secret police) and informal controls that served to
keep the Japanese people in line and supporting Japan’s
wars, Japanese writers including Tachibana speak of the
Japanese governmental system after about 1935 as the
“wartime taisei” (戦時体制, senji taisei). That Japanese
system was notable for its mobilization of informal
controls, such as neighborhood associations and other
preexisting groups. I have usually translated senjitaisei as
“wartime order.”
In descending order, the prewar academic ranks at
Tōdai were
Let me say a word about each term and how I have
translated it. Kyōju is easy: professor. But bear in mind that
kyōju 教授 professor
jokyōju 助教授 associate/assistant professor
joshu 助手 assistant or helper
kōshi 講手 lecturer
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on the model of 19th century German universities, prewar
professors in Japanese universities were far more powerful
than professors in American universities then or now.
Alone among the faculty, they were imperial appointees;
they exercised near-absolute control over their protégés, of
course, but also over jokyōju and joshu. All power rested with
them. Jokyōju is associate/assistant professor. In American
universities today, most associate professors have tenure,
and they and assistant professors—unlike Japan’s prewar
jokyōju—vote in faculty meetings. To underline this clear
difference from kyōju (professor), I have translated jokyōju
assistant professor. Prewar joshu had finished their
academic training and were assigned to assist a specific
professor but did little or no teaching. For the former
reason in particular, teaching assistant seems inadequate.
Research associate? Intern? Tutor? Instructor? Instructor is
a rank that hardly exists any more in American universities,
but—partly for that reason—I have used it here to translate
joshu. Kōshi is an anomalous position, similar to American
“lecturer” or “adjunct or visiting professor”—teaching,
perhaps, but without rights and duties within the faculty.
Readers should remember these differences between pre-
war Japanese academic ranks and current American
academic ranks.
With the author’s permission, I have altered the text to
suit English-language readers. I have eliminated some
names and places or consigned them to footnotes. Often I
have eliminated given names once the individual has been
introduced; I have usually eliminated titles—president,
professor, assistant professor, instructor. In these and
other ways I have worked to make the text as accessible
as possible to readers who are not Japan specialists. The
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italicized synopses leading off each chapter are mine, as is
the Glossary.
Let us turn now to Tachibana Takashi’s story of Tōdai
in Japan’s era of war. It is part intellectual history, part
biography, part social history of the Tōdai faculty; it is less
scholarly monograph than collection of vignettes. However
we label it, it’s a fascinating story of human nature under
great stress, of academic ambition and achievement and
careerism and corruption and shipwreck, of intrigue, of
faculty members plotting against colleagues, of at least one
outright spy; of a good many flag-wavers, of others
who—to paraphrase Lillian Hellman—cut their
consciences to fit the fashion of that dark era, and of a few
who did not cut their consciences, some even conspiring,
at substantial personal risk, to hasten the end of a war they
opposed. As in any institution under great stress, there are
some scoundrels, many conscience-cutters, few heroes.
Those who criticize war, those who refuse to cut their
consciences, are the exceptions. Tachibana’s account
makes them his heroes.
Tachibana gives us anecdotes he has culled from
standard history books but also from diaries, memoirs, oral
histories. He is a very able storyteller. He has a great story
to tell. He does not rush things. He allows time for
digressions and asides. Sit back and let him tell this story in
his own way, at his own pace.
Richard Minear
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Author's Preface to the
English Translation
I was born in 1940; the war between Japan and the United
States began the very next year. I entered grade school in
1947, after the war ended and after the new constitution
had been enacted; so the education I received was purely
and entirely a post-war democratic education. The greatest
riddle for those of my generation is why all Japan plunged
into that insane war and did not stop until the catastrophic
defeat that brought the country to ruin.
Pat explanations of that riddle existed, but I found none
of them persuasive. In the end, in the course of the seven
years it took to write this book, I arrived at my own
explanation. The book’s subtitle was “The Life and Death of
the Great Japanese Empire,” and I conducted my autopsy
with my gaze riveted on the two axes, ‘emperor’ and ‘Tokyo
University.’ The ‘emperor’ axis is particularly important:
the greatest key to understanding that age lies in
comprehending in real terms the strength of the
overwhelming domination by the emperor system and
emperor-state ideology. Without exception, all the history
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books speak to this issue, but they tend to deal with it in
abstract terms. They may be persuasive for those who lived
that era, but for my post-war democratic generation they
seem abstract, lacking in realism.
I think this book does remedy that problem. Rather than
ideological analysis, what I focused on was right-wing
thinkers who wielded great influence in that time; I
portrayed their personal charisma and the demonic
charisma of their arguments. In that era many young
people were entranced by that charisma; some became far-
right terrorists; some, drunk on the “aesthetics of
annihilation rather than defeat,” sacrificed themselves in
special attacks at the end of the war. In particular, these
right-wing thinkers preached the “decisive battle on the
home islands” and “one hundred million dying rather than
surrendering” and in June 1945 passed the law creating the
“civilian patriotic defense corps” and prepared to send all
Japanese to the front lines as “patriotic soldiers.” Had the
emperor not decided to terminate the war on August 15,
inconceivable numbers of Japanese would have been the
victims.
On the other hand, while the vast majority of Japanese
society was moving, ever onward, to war, some individuals
did fight boldly against that tide. In their various arenas
they acknowledged the reality of imminent defeat and
carried on nobly. Some were Communists; some were
Christian. And some were fighting liberals.
Tokyo University was the main stage on which these
forces collided. And at Tokyo University a final attempt to
bring about the end of the war took place, and word of it
in fact reached the emperor’s ear. It is generally accepted
that this was one of the threads supporting the emperor’s
decision to terminate the war.
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Tachibana Takashi
Tokyo, February 2013
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1The Tōdai Faculty of Law:
Taboo and Disgrace
In which the author lambastes the Tōdai Faculty of Law for its
failure to respond forcefully to the attacks from the outside on one
of its most distinguished professors, Minobe Tatsukichi. Minobe
had already retired, but the attacks intensified after 1934. In
September 1935 he resigned from the House of Peers. The author
focuses on Minobe’s disciple Miyazawa Toshiyoshi and his junior
colleague Nambara Shigeru. This chapter is Chapter 51 in the
Japanese original. Readers should remember that they are
beginning the author’s account not in mid-stream but fully three-
quarters of the way across.
Going along or acting out of conviction, most Tokyo
Imperial University1 professors cooperated actively with
1 RHM: The formal title of the university before the war was Tokyo Imperial University
(Tōkyō teikoku daigaku, Teidai for short). After the war it became Tokyo University (Tōkyō
daigaku, Tōdai for short). To minimize confusion, I have used Tōdai throughout.
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the military and the war. But some professors—albeit a
minority—stood at the opposite pole. The two who deserve
to stand at the top of this list are Kawai Eijirō and
Yanaihara Tadao of the Faculty of Economics. Because of
their fierce critical spirit, both lost their positions as
professors. Kawai was forced out in 1939 and died during
the war, in 1944. Yanaihara was ousted in 1937 but
reinstated right after the war and after serving as dean of
the Faculty of Economics and then head of the General
Studies Division, became president of Tōdai (1951-57).
Japan’s sudden turn to the right and the establishment
of political control by the military took place after the
February 26 Incident, and Kawai Eijirō was the only
person in the entire world of commentators to criticize the
military head-on for the Incident. In the Imperial University
News of March 9, right after the Incident, he wrote: “First
of all, we feel a duty to express deep condolences on the
deaths of Home Minister Saitō, Finance Minister
Takahashi, and Chief of Military Training General
Watanabe, slain by the cruel bayonets. Quite a few
politicians have fallen victim to the violence of the last
several years—Hamaguchi Osachi, Inoue Junnosuke,
Inukai Tsuyoshi; but when these people were felled, it was
still unclear what the ideology of the opposing side was.2So
their deaths were literally unforeseen. But since the May 15
Incident, fascism—particularly fascism within the
military—has become obvious and cannot be covered up.
The men killed this time made opposition to this fascist
trend their conscious goal and likely foresaw that the
result might be their own deaths; yet they faced that
2 RHM: Hamaguchi (prime minister), shot 1930, died 1931; Inoue (former Finance
Minister) and Inukai (prime minister), assassinated March 15, 1932.
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prospect head-on and sought with their bodies to stem the
tide of fascism.”
Who Is to Blame for Defying the Emperor’s Order?
Kawai was a militant liberal, and when he first made his
debut in the media, he was known as a champion in the
fight against Marxism; but after the May 15 Incident of
1932, fascism and statism (state socialism) bore the brunt
of his criticism. Beginning in 1933 he published essays on
current events from that perspective, one after the other,
in various journals of opinion; in 1934 he collected them
into the book Critique of Fascism.3 This book sold well, one
printing after another. The infamous Minoda Muneki,
leader of the right-wing assault on “leftist” intellectuals,
deluged him with criticism—Kawai was an “early
proponent of the tactic of the Popular Front,” a
“collaborator with social democratic revolution,” a
“proponent of bald-faced intervention in the prerogative
of supreme command,” an “anti-military, anti-war”
thinker, a “proponent of Chinese-style dependence on
England and the U.S.”45 The Home Ministry, too, told
Kawai through intermediaries that it wouldn’t ban his
books but asked him to withdraw them voluntarily. Kawai
refused to do so, saying, “If you want to ban them, be my
guest!”
On the point of anti-fascism, the liberal Kawai was rock-
solid. He was fierce, too, in his criticism of a military with
links to fascism: “What’s wrong with fascism is many times
worse when it emerges from within the military. Hitherto
3 Fuasshizumu hihan, Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 1934.
4 RHM: Minoda's phrase shinajinteki [literally, like Chinese people] has at least a tinge of
condescension. Shina for China was common, usually derogatory, usage in the 1930s.
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Japan’s armed forces have had the duty of protecting our
land against foreign enemies, and they’ve been entrusted
with weapons so they can perform that duty; because they
are Japan’s armed forces, the nation has voluntarily given
up its weapons and felt comfortable entrusting the defense
of the country to the armed forces. But lo and behold, the
weapons that were to be used against foreign enemies are
being turned on the nation, and taken unawares, the
nation that trusted the armed forces and felt comfortable
entrusting weapons to them has come under attack by
them.”
Further, he blamed the upper echelons of the military for
allowing this revolt to happen: “When it comes to turning
twelve or thirteen hundred officers into a mutinous army
that defies the emperor’s order, who is to blame, anyway?
The Incident didn’t just spring from nowhere; it has roots
in the past. The fascism that raised its head after the
Manchurian Incident: such people in the military should
have been suppressed promptly by drastic measures. X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X.”6
The censor’s deletion continued beyond this point.
The sense of the deleted part became clear later in the
court proceedings concerning the charge that Kawai
infringed the publications law. Critique of Fascism was
banned in October 1938, together with three other Kawai
books, and Kawai was prosecuted for infringing the
publications law. But the trial wasn’t public, so the content
of this deleted passage was not generally known. Still,
6 RHM: Prewar and wartime Japanese censorship involved deleting passages but
noting the fact and extent of deletion by means of such measures as this string of Xs.
What is striking here is that the censors let any of this stand.
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according to the court transcript, the sense of this passage
was as follows: “Before the May 15 Incident, there were
incidents of this type that were prevented before the fact;
but military lawyers for the defendants in the May 15
Incident were made to state in open court that the
assassins of General Nagata Tetsuzan were patriots of high
ideals. If the military allows that to happen, how can it be
said to have done enough to suppress fascism in its ranks?”
Kawai had already made his anti-fascist stance clear at
the time of the May 15 Incident, in “Critique of the May
15 Incident.”7 There he not only stated his own ideological
position—“Along with being anti-Marxist, I also oppose
right-wing renovation”—but also took sharp issue with
“direct action using military force” as a method of social
renovation. Kawai’s critique of the February 26 Incident
developed his critique of the May 15 Incident, but its
fundamental points are the same. When we read this essay
today, Kawai’s assertions sound absolutely common-
sensical, but at the time no one else was criticizing the
military’s involvement in politics so openly, and Kawai was
regarded as extremely brave for doing so.
“The Tōdai Faculty of Law, Too, May Be Hit”
In Nambara Shigeru Remembered,8 Maruyama Masao,
Nambara’s protégé who at the time of the Incident was an
assistant professor in the Faculty of Law, speaks of these
issues with Nambara, who compares the right-wing attack
with an assault on a moated castle:
7 “Go-ichigo jiken no hihan,” Bungei shunjū, November 1933.
8 Kikigaki: Nambara Shigeru kaikōroku, ed. Maruyama Masao and Fukuda Kanichi; Tokyo:
Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1989.
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Nambara: At the time of the Takigawa Incident, the outer
moat was filled in, and at the time of the Minobe Incident,
the inner moat too was filled in.9 At the university, silence
reigned. At the time of this incident only Kawai Eijirō criticized
the military boldly. He really hung in there.
Maruyama: The students too were astonished that he hung
in. And Japan plunged ahead into the fascist era…
Nambara: […Kawai's critique of Marxism, too, was
amazing], not to mention that when he turned to fascism as
target, the debate took on a different tone. In particular, right
after the February 26 Incident, he attacked it in the Imperial
University News and then elaborated in essays he published in
various magazines.
Maruyama: His was a fierce critique of statism: if the army
has a greater voice than the nation as a whole because it has
weapons, you can't say that speech has been publicly
guaranteed unless you give weapons to the entire nation.
Statism exists at the root of the evil that let this terror to go
unchallenged….
Nambara: At the time, no one else was making that
criticism. That's how resolute he was. On that point you have
to give him very high marks…. And as a result he incurred the
displeasure of the military.
Why did so few critical voices arise from Tōdai? At the time,
quite strong rumors had it that if something happened,
Tōdai would be hit by right-wing terror. The Emperor-
Organ Incident and the February 26 Incident were virtually
simultaneous; in content, too, they had deep links. In a
word, both issued from the idea that Japan was in essence
9 RHM: In other words, first the outer defenses were dismantled, then the inner.
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a divine, emperor-centered state, so it should be
reconstructed accordingly (the clarification of the kokutai).
The emperor-organ issue rejected a legal scholar who
distorted the kokutai in his emperor-organ theory, and the
February 26 Incident marked the trend, via coup d’etat, to a
state actually ruled directly by the emperor.10
Throughout this period the attacks on the Tōdai Faculty
of Law by Minoda Muneki, who touched off this issue,
continued unabated. According to Minoda, the Tōdai
Faculty of Law traditionally took an “academic tone
antipathetic to the kokutai,” aroused China’s “anti-Japan,
scorn-Japan, resist-Japan” ideas, spread anti-kokutai ideas
that would turn Japan into a democracy (since emperor-
centered politics was Japan’s original kokutai, democracy
was anti-kokutai), and rejected and despised the national
spirit of its own country. The Faculty of Economics had
become the general headquarters of the Comintern’s
Popular Front tactic, so Minoda called for the dissolution of
Tōdai.
In virtually every issue, Minoda’s Genri Nihon named
Tōdai’s famous professors—Takagi, Yokota, Kawai,
Miyazawa, Rōyama, Suehiro, Yabe—and attacked them as
enemies of the state. In fact, via such attacks, Minobe was
consigned to oblivion as a scholar, and he was set upon by
right-wing thugs riding that wave of agitation. The rumor
10 RHM: Kokutai (form of state; polity) was increasingly at issue in the 1930s, with right-
wing nationalists arguing that Japan's unique kokutai precluded democracy. The
emperor-organ issue involved Minobe Tatsukichi's argument that the emperor was
an organ of the state; right-wing nationalists like Uesugi Shinkichi held that the
emperor was the state and hence could not be considered an organ. The February 26
Incident of 1936 was an attempted coup d'état in which some 1,500 troops occupied
central Tokyo, assassinated former prime ministers Takahashi Korekiyo and Saitō
Makoto and General Watanabe Jōtarō. The revolt was put down on February 29.
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that the Tōdai Faculty of Law would be attacked couldn’t be
dismissed as crazy.
tokyo university and the war | 8
Maruyama: Just before the February 26 Incident, Minobe was
assaulted by the right wing.
Nambara: Yes. February 21, 1936. Thugs stormed into his
house, Minobe was shot, and he was taken to the Tokyo
University Hospital.
Maruyama: For some time before then, there had been talk
that if something happened, the Tōdai Faculty of Law too
would be attacked; was there talk within the Faculty of Law
about the February 26 Incident—consultation or talk about
what came next?
Nambara: There was a big snowstorm before dawn. Right
off, I went to the university: snow was falling, there were
serious news reports, and there was almost no one at the
university…. I too had encountered political incidents my
whole life, but the morning of the February 26 Incident was in
some sense graver than the later day, December 8, when war
was declared. That's my feeling.
Maruyama: Among the students, reports flew that Tōdai
might be shut down. I also heard rumors that Police
Headquarters had telephoned several Tōdai professors to tell
them the police couldn't guarantee their safety, so please hide
somewhere….
Nambara: That sort of thing apparently did happen.
Indeed, I went to my study, and it was still dark. Snow was
falling; no one was around. By chance I met only Takagi; I
don't know about the younger faculty, but no other professors
showed up. The two of us talked, then phoned former
president Onozuka and asked him to seek refuge somewhere.
And then we thought that Yasaka and Miyazawa—those two
were always in the crosshairs of the right wing and the
military—should do something. Gossip was flying, and
reports came in that the Asahi newspaper and the Tōdai
Faculty of Law were targets. In fact, they did hit the Asahi.
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Even the police worried for the safety of the professors,
so at this time people knew you couldn’t get away with
spouting anti-rightist, anti-military words. The Incident
happened, yet everyone kept silent.
At the end of the previous essay, Kawai shoots his critical
arrows at the intellectual class that kept silent about
February 26: “Today the nation stands at a crossroads and
must pick one of two futures: the will of the nation or the
violence of one group…. At this time one often hears the
intellectual class whispering: how powerless we are in the
face of this violence! But in this sense of powerlessness
lurks a dangerous psychology that exalts violence. This is
the hotbed that breeds fascism.”
When we look back on history, we can say that after the
February 26 Incident the intellectual class became as Kawai
described it. Engrossed in their sense of powerlessness,
doing nothing at all, either they were pulled along by the
trend of the time or perceiving the trend of the times early
on, they chose to ingratiate themselves with that trend. No
matter which route they took, they contributed to the rise
of fascism.
Minobe’s Prime Disciple Reflects
I’ll talk later about those who curried favor, but I want to
say something now about those who gave in to a sense of
powerlessness and were swept along. There were two types
of people who were swept along: a minority who long after
the war reflected deeply on what they did and wrote about
it, and the large majority who didn’t reflect at all (or merely
reflected a bit and rationalized in their own heads what
they did) and wrote nothing at all.
As representative of those who did reflect, I offer
Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, constitutional scholar and Minobe
Tatsukichi’s prime disciple. Miyazawa started his career as
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instructor under Minobe, became assistant professor in
1925, and in 1934, after Minobe reached mandatory
retirement age and retired, became professor and
succeeded to Minobe’s chair. So long as Minobe was
healthy, he was of course the leading advocate of the
emperor-organ theory, so on the emperor-organ issue he
continued to be attacked fiercely by Minoda Muneki and
the anti-emperor-organ people. Hence, at the time of the
February 26 Incident, both friends and officials warned
him to hide.
And when Minobe’s books were banned and the
emperor-organ theory disappeared simultaneously from
courses on the constitution at every university, Miyazawa
too jettisoned the emperor-organ theory. The Tōdai
constitution course continued to exist but avoided virtually
anything related to the emperor system, even the
constitution’s basic stipulations about the emperor system.
Minoda’s Genri Nihon wondered whether Miyazawa
deserved the title professor of constitutional law at Tōdai.
Minoda wrote:
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Miyazawa Toshiyoshi succeeded to Minobe Tatsukichi’s
constitution chair at the Faculty of Law of Tokyo Imperial University,
but in the last several years has published virtually no study—even
in the Law Faculty’s own Law Association Journal—on the
imperial constitution that is his specialty but publishes vacuous
critiques of the day in low-brow magazines; worse than that,
most recently he has written mainly film criticism and
occasional pieces and published a collection of these essays.
Especially in this day and age, can we say that Miyazawa is
fulfilling his scholarly duties?
In the Program of Lectures on the Constitution11 that Miyazawa
used for his university course in 1937, of a total of eight pages
on the emperor, five concern succession, and one each concerns reign
names and imperial landholdings. For Article 1, the fundamental
principle of the imperial constitution, he simply posts its text and
gives not one word of explanation. For Article 4, he doesn’t even post
its text. By contrast, in dealing with the Imperial Diet, once
past the introduction he divides the discussion into nine parts
and devotes seventy pages to it, but not one word refers to
the legal relation between emperor12 and Diet. Despite this
ignorance of the Imperial Constitution’s principles, he holds this chair
and squanders his time on criticism of film prizes. Inauspicious
events continue to occur at home and abroad, from the
Manchurian Incident down to today's China Incident; does he
have a scholarly conscience about Japan's internal and foreign
crises of the last several years? (Italics in original.)
11 Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Kempō kōgian: Kōgiyō. 1 1938. RHM: Article 1: “The Empire of Japan
shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.”
Article 4: “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of
sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution.”
12 RHM: To indicate respect for the emperor, Minoda leaves the space immediately above
the word ‘emperor’ blank.
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In short, until the war ended, Miyazawa avoided the
constitution and the emperor system completely. After the
war ended, he was once again active as the holder of the
chair of constitutional law at Tōdai, and until his
retirement (in 1959—after retiring from Tōdai, he became
professor at Rikkyō University), he was considered the
chief interpreter of the new constitution.
For Miyazawa the issue of his own flight from the
emperor-organ theory seems to have remained a lifelong
trauma, and immediately after he retired from Rikkyō
University in 1969, he published the huge two-volume
Emperor-Organ Theory Incident13 that collected all the
materials concerning the issue. In its final summation,
Miyazawa writes: “People who look back on this incident
now will surely be shocked at the crazed nature of the
attack on the emperor-organ theory and at the
spinelessness of the officials and party leaders in the face
of it. Moreover, they’ll wonder why the resistance of the
scholarly world and the journalistic world was so weak. On
the one hand, the fascist forces propelled by leaders of ‘real
power’—the military—were so strong that they suppressed not
only opposition argument, of course, but all criticism; on the
other hand, love of ‘liberty’ had not sunk its roots very deeply into
the Japanese society of the day.”
It wasn’t only in the conclusion; in the text, too, he says
this of his own spinelessness at the time:
13 Tennō kikansetsu jiken: shiryō wa kataru, 2 vols., Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1970-71.
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At just that time, I was asked to write a column “Comments
on Current Events in Journalism” in the Tōkyō Asahi newspaper,
and I skimmed the pages of various magazines. I happened
on Sassa Hiroo's article “On Minobe Tatsukichi.”14 I was struck
by his view of Minobe—“standing tall like a towering tree,
withstanding even the gale, not afraid of the blizzard…fearing
nothing, believing in the right, expressing what he has
decided is the truth—it certainly never comes from the
superficiality of an intellect that seeks to parade its ideas.”
Irritated by events in the Upper House, I wrote the following:
“In the Diet some members are criticizing Minobe's theory
as infringing the kokutai. I think they are simply buying into
this slander by a group that has ulterior motives; but these
were speeches in the Imperial Diet, so they had considerable
impact. Probably for that reason, Professor Minobe
attempted ‘A Personal Explanation’ from the dais of the House
of Peers and tried at great length to enlighten some of the
critics. As I listened to Minobe's explanation, which he
reduced to the simplest terms possible, I thought that if there
were any who still thought Minobe's explanation infringed
our kokutai, they were either ignoramuses beyond redemption or
people seeking to use the term kokutai to wreak personal harm. No
matter which, there was no difference between them insofar
as the grave poisoning they administered.”15
This column in the Asahi was the only thing Miyazawa
wrote in support of Minobe. After writing it, he became
increasingly spineless. He remembers:
14 “Minobe Tatsukichi-ron,” Chūō kōron, March 1935.
15 These emphases were not in the original but were added by Miyazawa himself when I was
putting this book together.
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Right after I delivered this manuscript to the Asahi, I was
summoned by Dean Suehiro. The dean warned me
kindheartedly: this latest incident in the House of Peers is a
political issue with very deep roots, so it's best for you to be
very careful what you say or do. When I mentioned this
manuscript, he said, well, if you've already submitted it,
there's nothing to be done.
When the essay ran in the newspaper, I immediately
received several letters calling it “disgraceful.” I thought, yes,
indeed, this incident does go deep. When my essay ended, the
Tokyo Asahi immediately ran an essay by Imaizumi Teinosuke.
I don't recall the details, but it was an attack on constitutional
theory of the Minobe stripe. I heard they had to run
something like it because of criticism my essay engendered.
Thereafter, spineless, I kept silent. Of course, under such
conditions, no journals commissioned me to write. I wrote
journalism only as requests came in, so since there were no
requests, you might say it was natural that I stayed silent; but
it's also true I didn't take the initiative myself to write.
What did Miyazawa do in this period in which, spineless,
he maintained his silence? Believe it or not, he became an
avid ballroom dancer and frequented dance halls: he
confesses so in Testimony on Shōwa Intellectual History. (A
commentator in the press found out about it and ridiculed
him mercilessly.)
Here I’d like to note that Dean Suehiro of the Faculty of
Law kept Miyazawa from further writing. For one thing,
even before the Minobe issue, Minoda and his crowd had
made fierce attacks on Suehiro, painting him as a Marxist
who stressed “Communist-style expropriation of land
without compensation,” who “taught the tactics of fierce
dispute as a substitute for communist revolution,” who
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spoke of “the military as parasitic” and advocated “the
acceptance of crimes committed by the property-less.” The
issue had been taken up in the Diet by members of the
Upper House affiliated with Minoda; so Suehiro probably
didn’t want to exacerbate things. For another, it was likely
related to another situation I’ll speak about later.
For Miyazawa, the trauma from the emperor organ
incident seems to have been large, so before completing his
book, he spoke as follows in the Asahi Journal’s “University
Autonomy—Events and People:” “Professor Minobe was no
longer at the university, so this incident didn’t involve the
university directly. But for a university, myself included,
not to do anything, to hunker down, and withdraw without
saying what needed to be said…. In retrospect, the feeling
that we had no self-respect is always with me. In that sense,
I reflect as a university person, couldn’t there have been
a bit more action? That’s what I thought after the fact. …
We kept silent, well, we were without self-respect… As
university people, we had no self-respect. It’s not an
experience to be happy about, and I think it should make us
reflect.”16
Disciples Who Jettisoned Minobe
Among those who, like Miyazawa, felt a strong sense of
guilt and often talked of it is Nambara Shigeru, first
postwar president of Tōdai. Here’s what he says in Nambara
Shigeru Recollected:
16 “Daigaku no jichi—jiken to hito,” Asahi Jyaanaru; Asahi jyanaaru henshūbu, ed, Daigaku
no jichi, Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1963.
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Tsuji Kiyoaki: Next, the emperor-organ issue. This, too, we can
call a showdown between the military and the university. The
starting point was criticism of Minobe in the Army Ministry's
pamphlet, “On Strengthening the Fundamentals of National
Defense.”
Nambara: When I think of the trouble Minobe
encountered for the emperor-organ theory, I confess, I have
very great remorse. Why didn't I defend his theory? Was there
no way to do so? He was already then an emeritus professor
and had left the university—but how could those of us who
were direct disciples not defend him? We in the Tōdai Faculty
of Law, colleagues, disciples of his, weren't able to give him
a bit of protection. To this day, it's a source of absolutely
unending regret.
After all, the only thing we did—I'm embarrassed to say
this—was give a dinner party to console him. Sympathizers in
the Faculty of Law, including also Ōuchi and others from the
Faculty of Economics, invited Minobe to dinner at a Chinese
restaurant in Ueno. There were about ten of us. We consoled
him, trying in that inadequate way to make it okay. No, we
consoled each other—that's all it amounted to. Minobe said
not a word about his own anguish and of course not one word
of resentment; without asking our aid, he conversed with us
lightly and calmly. I thought it was noble of him. That's stuck
in my memory to this day. Inside lay truly sorrowful feelings,
feelings he couldn't acknowledge himself. In a sense, that's
how grave the situation was. We didn't make a formal issue of
it; we could only offer him vague consolation.
Was this truly all they could have done? Nambara himself
says he was “embarrassed,” and it’s the greatest disgrace of
the Tōdai Faculty of Law that this was all they did.
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The tale continues with deference for the anguish of
Miyazawa Toshiyoshi:
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Tsuji: When Professor Miyazawa reached retirement age and
left Tōdai, at his final Faculty Meeting he recalled those days.
It sounded as if he was speaking for the first time of the
anguish he had been living with as the direct inheritor of
Minobe's constitutional theory. It was very poignant.
Nambara: I think he took just the right tone. It wasn't just
Professor Miyazawa; the rest of us bear the same guilt. It's
something unconscionable we've been living with. What was
it that Miyazawa said?
Maruyama: He'd been called in by Hozumi Shigetō, then
dean of the Faculty of Law, who said, “If you become an issue,
please resign. Don't involve the Faculty of Law.” What he
meant was that earlier, Minister of Education Matsuda Genji
had responded to questions in the House of Peers as follows:
“In the Imperial University there's virtually no professor left
who believes in the emperor-organ theory. If there is a
problem, it's only Miyazawa.” Probably, it was just after that
that Hozumi spoke. Miyazawa replied, “Of course I've no
intention of involving the Faculty of Law.”
Tsuji: In short, it may be strange to say he laid down his pen,
but if he himself kept silent, the peace of the Tōdai Faculty of
Law would be maintained, and if anyone asked him about this
attitude, he'd resolved to keep silent. Since then, Miyazawa
said, he'd always held to that resolve.
Nambara: So what happened between him and Minobe…?
Maruyama: Miyazawa said nothing explicitly….
Tsuji: As for the details, he didn't want to cause trouble.
About Minobe, nobody ever said anything to me. It was
precisely as if it was a taboo at the Tōdai Faculty of Law, wasn't
it? Was it ever an issue at Faculty Meeting?
Nambara: Minobe was never an issue in Faculty Meeting.
I don't think there was ever even a report. He was called a
“scholarly renegade,” chased from the Upper House, and
19 | university of massachusetts amherst libraries
accused of lèse majesté; truly isolated and without assistance,
he fought the battle on his own.
Maruyama: In that day everyone who believed in the
emperor-organ theory lost their jobs. The head of the Cabinet
Legislation Bureau, quit, too.
Nambara: It was the year after February 26. Before and
after, the atmosphere was inexpressibly stifling. To an extent
unthinkable today, no voices were raised in protest—in
academia, among commentators, in the press, in society at
large. It's absolutely unconscionable.
I must comment here that it’s not the case that both
academy and commentariat immediately “fell silent and
did not speak” about the emperor-organ theory. Even in the
documents in Miyazawa’s Emperor-Organ Theory Incident,
several distinguished commentators decried this trend of
the times in roundabout or indirect fashion. Meriting
particular mention here is the resounding criticism of
Kawai Eijirō. It appeared in “Critique of the Minobe Issue,”
in the Imperial University News of April 15, 1935. Unlike
today’s University News, the Imperial University News was
recognized widely as a newspaper of the first order and
drew broad public attention. Kawai begins with a general
discussion of “How Legal-Theory Argument Should Be
Treated” and then proceeds in order concretely, with “Has
Minobe’s Theory Been Properly Understood and Studied?”
He criticizes the critics sharply: “If we stigmatize his theory
merely because its words and terms go against common
usage, that would be truly hasty and unfair. … For the past
thirty years this theory has reigned unchallenged; it’s not
something you can erase and wipe off the earth overnight
merely by stigmatizing it…. To think that with pressure and
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coercion one can eradicate a scholarly theory is a sacrilege
against all learning.” Moreover, since this issue concerns
the kokutai, a more serious treatment is necessary. In
general, critics of the emperor-organ theory assert that
Minobe’s theory infringes the kokutai, but Minobe himself
asserts that it does not—why should the two parties make
diametrically opposed assertions? “What is the source of
this difference? Is it that, based on a common assumption
about the kokutai, there’s a difference in judgment of
whether it infringes the kokutai? Or are different
assumptions at work? I hold that there’s no difference in
belief in the kokutai but that there is a difference in the
concept of what the kokutai is.”
Framing the issue in this way, he asserts: “Minobe’s
theory has been accepted and gone unchallenged for thirty
years because it was thought not to infringe the kokutai,
and one concept of the kokutai figures in this judgment. But
suddenly this year, when it is claimed that the theory does
infringe the kokutai, the premise is a different concept of
kokutai. When the prime minister and cabinet ministers say
in the Diet that they oppose Minobe’s theory but that it does
not infringe the kokutai, they base themselves on the former
concept of kokutai. Here there are two concepts, and the two
are not distinguished but conflated.” Thus, we should begin
by ordering these conflated concepts, not by standing on
one and condemning the other: “The proper order is first to
clarify the kokutai and only then judge whether the kokutai
is infringed. Declaring that a specific theory infringes the
kokutai and using this to clarify the kokutai turns that order
upside down.”
Having pointed out the logically nonsensical nature of
right-wing assertions that simply shout “clarification of the
kokutai,” he counter-attacks: “In commenting on this
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incident, the communists are said to smile with
satisfaction that the issue of the kokutai has at last come to
the forefront of discussion. Hearing this, I break out in a
cold sweat. I’d like to believe the good intentions of some
of the kokutai people, but if they cause people to feel even
one drop of unreason or unnaturalness about belief in the
kokutai, that is not simply their responsibility; it is a loss for
the nation as a whole. The kokutai people think again.” Here
for the first time the rhetoric of the anti-communist Kawai
takes wing.
Along with “Critique of the February 26 Incident” and
other essays, this essay of Kawai was collected in The Times
and Liberalism, published in 1937 and banned the following
year. That not one essay of this sort emerged from the
Faculty of Law is the disgrace of the Faculty of Law; without
Kawai’s essay, the disgrace of the Faculty of Law would have
been all the greater. (The Faculty of Economics originally
was a part of the Faculty of Law, and people thought of the
two as one unit. Kawai was a graduate of the Faculty of
Law.)
The Takigawa Incident: Behind the Scenes at Tōdai
Let me list one more disgrace of the Tōdai Faculty of
Law: the Takigawa Incident. The Takigawa Incident (also
known as the Kyoto University Incident; 1932-33) involved
conservative reaction against the teaching of Takigawa
Yukitoki (1891-1962) and led to his firing and the
resignations of most of the Faculty of Law. It was the first
great issue of academic freedom, and the Tōdai Faculty of
Law did virtually nothing. Indeed, that fact left a trail that
led all the way to the issue of the emperor-organ theory. In
the Nambara Shigeru Recollected passage about the emperor-
organ theory, there is the following: “To be sure,
we—especially the younger people—all worried, tacitly,
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whether there wasn’t something we could do. But at the
time we couldn’t even convene an informal faculty
gathering. At the time of the Takigawa Incident, we’d
actually managed to convene an informal faculty
gathering, but this incident happened after the Takigawa
Incident. In the less than two years after the Takigawa
Incident, the times had suddenly gone straight downhill.
When I think what the result might have been had we
issued a joint declaration, for example…but it was nothing
like the Takigawa Incident.”
What happened at the time of the Takigawa Incident?
Tōdai was apathetic.
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Tsuji: According to what I heard rumored, the Tōdai Faculty of
Law was extremely apathetic.
Nambara: That's right. Among the younger professors,
Yokota and Miyazawa and I stirred. The issue arose of whether
for the sake of Kyoto University, we should make contact and
try to help. Then in Faculty Meeting, consideration was given
to some formal step, but in the end we held an informal
faculty gathering. The dean was Hozumi, and we younger
professors led by Yokota argued fervently that the Tokyo
Faculty of Law should lend its support to Kyoto University, that
we couldn't do nothing. But we were checked by our elders’
argument in favor of prudence: think of what may result if
the Tokyo Faculty of Law acts; when all is said and done, we
must be prudent. We lost overwhelmingly. There was nothing
more we could do. … We younger men were a tiny minority. At
the time Minobe as senior professor swung to the side of the
senior professors against the younger professors who wanted
to support Kyoto University. In addition to Minobe, Onozuka
Kiheiji (political science), then president of the university,
swung against the younger professors. In Onozuka Kiheiji: The
Man and the Accomplishments, there's this: “The issue was what
Tōdai's stance toward this incident was to be. In the Faculty
of Law, an informal faculty gathering was convened, but in
the end the senior professors’ argument for prudence held a
large majority, and no action ensued. The words of Minobe,
published later, that ‘Its main cause was concern lest Tōdai too
be drawn into the whirlpool, that professors would resign en
masse, that students would be led to jeopardize their futures,’
can be taken to represent the argument for prudence….”
When one compares this with events of years past17, one
senses in the attitude of the Tōdai Faculty of Law toward
the Takigawa Incident a wholly different world. That’s how
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much it speaks of the gravity of the times, and on this point
the previous opinion represented by Minobe probably
matches reality; but the author and others today still doubt
and rue the fact that the Faculty of Law was unable even to
issue a declaration.
What was President Onozuka’s frame of mind and policy
toward this incident? Popular opinion seems to have
expected something of Tōdai, and especially of Onozuka;
but he likely had his hands full defending Tōdai.
What did this “hands full defending Tōdai” mean?
Already at this time the fierce assault on the Tōdai Faculty
of Law by Minoda and his ilk had begun, it was taken up
in the Diet and the Home Ministry, and a movement had
begun to fire problematic professors. It would not have
been strange had a second and third Takigawa Incident
arisen at Tōdai, and Onozuka, operating behind the scenes,
was attempting to prevent that from happening: “The next
spring after the Incident, in the president’s speech to the
university on University Commemoration Day, March 1,
1934, he said, ‘I don’t believe it appropriate to speak to you
of the details, but I am doing everything I can.’ From this
statement one can see his satisfaction and confidence that
he was fulfilling his own duty in this Incident. Therefore
in the same speech he could say also, ‘In order for the
university to fulfill its destiny faithfully, I feel acutely the
need to maintain a dauntless attitude that does not curry
favor with the age, does not flatter power, does not bow
to tangible or intangible violence, does not go astray in
propaganda.’”
In concrete terms, what did Onozuka do? The same book
17 The Sawayanagi Incident: at that time the Tōdai faculty cooperated with the Kyoto
University faculty and won out against the Ministry of Education.
25 | university of massachusetts amherst libraries
introduces this episode: “…the Ministry of Education made
an issue of a foreign-language economics textbook that
then-Assistant Professor Arisawa of the Faculty of
Economics was using and investigated it. At that time,
fortunately, nothing came of it, but several years later,
recalling that time, Onozuka said, ‘What caused me the
greatest worry in my time as president was being able to
keep the Takigawa Incident from spreading to Tōdai. It
was good nothing happened to Arisawa at that time.’”
President Onozuka Kiheiji’s Secret Pact
But were Onozuka’s all-out, behind-the-scenes efforts to
keep the Takigawa Incident from spreading to Tōdai so
great? In order to beef up military training, the military
had arbitrarily increased the trainers sent by the military,
so Onozuka protested strongly, even threatening to resign
as president, and got the army to back down. On that issue,
when the talk of resigning or not resigning took place, he
said in University Council (Tōdai’s highest decision-
making body) that some things in the course of the
Takigawa Incident still hadn’t become public. The record
says:
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On the Kyoto University issue, Onozuka said, “That issue isn't
wholly resolved yet, and there is some concern that in some
form it will cause problems for university officials hereafter, so
I'll mention the secret steps I have taken,” and he mentioned
especially the following two points:
1) At appropriate times I have advised the Minister of
Education directly or indirectly via the chief secretary (honest
counsel concerning the Ministry's actions and proposed
solution).
2) Via the chief cabinet secretary I have advised Prime
Minister Saitō (arguing the universality and the importance
of the Kyoto University issue, I said that it was not proper to
use force to shut down the Kyoto University Faculty of Law and
warned him in advance that even if it came to that eventuality,
Tōdai was utterly unable for several reasons to admit the
Kyoto Law students).
This account is not comprehensible by itself, but the
unclear parts become clear in Nambara Shigeru Recollected.
Nambara is speaking: “At just that time—1933 to January
1936—I was elected to the University Council…. So I had a
good many chances to speak with Onozuka. Onozuka was
confident he had done what he had to do. What that
was—the prime minister of the time was Saitō Makoto,
and Onozuka had acted preemptively, meeting with Saitō
and reaching an agreement. First, Tōdai would not allow
such an incident to arise. The Office of Instruction in the
Ministry of Education had a list of those to be fired after
Takigawa. At Tōdai it was Minobe, Ōuchi, Yokota, Suehiro,
in that order. He got them to withdraw that list. Second,
even if because of this incident they shut down the Kyoto
University Faculty of Law, Tōdai would not accept those
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students. The sense was, Don’t send the Kyoto students to
study at Tōdai; so he supported Kyoto University indirectly.
Professor Onozuka was close to both Prime Minister Saitō
and Minister of Education Hatoyama, and he knew them
well, so he made that preemptive move in good
conscience.” In short, what Onozuka did was to conclude
a secret pact between the government and Tōdai. Tōdai
would not do what it had done in the earlier Sawayanagi
Incident—join with Kyoto University and cause the
Ministry of Education utterly to lose face. In return, the
government wouldn’t start a second Takigawa Incident
that would draw its victims from Tōdai.
How widely was this pact known? To judge from the
record of the University Council meeting and from
Nambara’s testimony, it was known at the level of the
University Council. And this pact lay in the background
of the action Miyazawa Toshiyoshi testified about earlier,
Suehiro’s taking steps to prevent bad things from
happening; Suehiro must have known of it.
Yanaihara Tadao’s Critique of February 26
In the light of history, was entering into this secret pact
really the right thing to do? After all, because of this pact
(well, not merely because of it; chicken-heartedness and
lack of courage probably factored in, too), even as the trend
of the times turned more and more in a strange direction,
the prominent professors who served on the University
Council all kept their mouths shut and didn’t raise their
voices in protest. And in the February 26 Incident, both
Prime Minister Saitō Makoto and the former prime
minister—the government officials who were party to the
pact—were assassinated, so the pact too ceased to exist,
and for a long time Tōdai continued to fear a second
Takigawa Incident.
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To mention one more thing here, it wasn’t the case at the
time of the Takigawa Incident that there was no move at
Tōdai to support Takigawa. Nothing happened on the side
of the professors, but on the student side a great uproar
arose. At Kyoto University the students of the Faculty of
Law rose up in support of Takigawa, supported the
professors who made bold to resign en masse, and there
was a major commotion in which the mass withdrawal of
students was threatened. The students sent delegations to
all the imperial universities in the country and called for
joint struggle. At Tōdai, too, in response to this call, the
students rose up, and the resulting commotion was said
to be the largest in the prewar history of the student
movement.
According to the report in the Imperial University News,
this is what happened:
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FACULTY OF LAW STUDENTS TOO RISE UP
MASS MEETING OF STUDENT ALLIANCE CONVENED
ARRESTS CLIMB TO 38
POLICE FINALLY ENTER CLASSROOM
21st (Wednesday): Professor Minobe's lecture in front of
about 700 first and second year Law students began as usual
at 10 a.m., but suddenly at 10:20, at one student's signal, a
dozen or so students stood up around the hall, rushed up onto
the dais, surrounded Minobe, and declared that the lecture
was over; at the same time, with heavy rope produced from
their bags, fifty to sixty students sealed all the exists, and with
a rope ladder they'd prepared, a student climbed to the
second story and hung ten-foot white banners from the north
windows—“Reinstate Professor Takigawa Immediately!”
“Don't Disrupt Academic Freedom!”—and with a salutation by
a student representative from the Faculty of Law, a student
mass meeting was opened in the packed but quiet hall. As
handbills were distributed— “Defend the Moderator!”
“Toward an All-Japan Boycott!” “Student Mass Meeting,
Banzai!”—representatives from Kyoto and Tōhoku Universities
gave brief, ardent reports of what had happened and called
for support; then came speeches by representatives of the
higher schools, and to large applause the following
resolutions of the Student Assembly of the Faculty of Law
were read out:
—Defend to the death academic freedom and the freedom
of research!
—Urge professors to rise up!
—Law Faculty Student Assembly, Banzai!
The Takigawa Incident was five whole years after the
March 15 Incident, so at Tōdai, the Shinjinkai organization
had been crushed, the Japan Communist Party
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organization too had been crushed, and the student
movement was as good as extinct. Makise Kōji was the
leader of the Communist Youth Alliance, the only
organization remaining at the university; he writes of
conditions at the university shortly before the Takigawa
Incident: “I remember well the first demonstration at the
university in which I took part. In a lavatory on the side of
the Faculty of Economics arcade, I unfurled very fearfully
the red banner that had been slipped to me. Indeed, it had
written on it, ‘We Oppose Imperialistic War Absolutely!’
At the predetermined hour, one student began a speech
in the arcade. It was a matter of only a minute, no more.
More than a minute was dangerous. The students who were
in the area, apparently nonchalantly—I too was one of
them—gathered with a sudden cry, raised the red flag
quickly; there wasn’t time to form up, and like a strong
wind we raced toward the main gate. We crossed the road,
and in front of the third or fourth building that was the
student co-op came the cry, ‘Run for it!’ It was
instantaneous. In the twinkling of an eye, a truckful of
police from the Motofuji Station drove up. We fled, each
man for himself, as fast and as far as possible, out of the
jurisdiction of the Motofuji Station.”18
In a situation where normally it wasn’t possible to give
even a one-minute speech, it was absolutely unheard of
that seven hundred students gathered and held a mass
assembly of this order. The background factors that made
possible so large a mass meeting include of course the
impact of the Takigawa Incident—it was big news in the
press, but also an all-out organizing project of the entire
18 Watakushitachi no Takigawa jiken, ed., Takigawa jiken Tōdai henshūiinkai (Tokyo:
Shinchōsha, 1985).
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Communist Youth. (In the previous two days, many small
meetings had been held by students gathered according to
the higher school from which they had graduated.) At that
time in the Tōdai Communist Youth, an underground press
printed the Tōdai cell organ—Warriors of the Red Gate19—in
mimeograph, handbill-like, and the normal run was eight
hundred copies, but at the time of the Takigawa Incident,
the run expanded to all of one thousand copies. This, the
sole medium, was most effective in assembling the
students.
Inside the lecture hall sealed from inside, student leaders
made impassioned speeches one after the other, and the
scene was one of wild excitement—several hundred
students stamping their feet on the floor, applause, cheers;
but after only about thirty minutes of this mass meeting
sealed in the lecture hall, police squads and guards
suddenly surrounded the hall, forced the doors, peeled off
the students one by one, and arrested them. This was the
end of the student movement before the war; afterwards,
there were simply no comparable events.20
To return to our story, as I stated earlier, Kawai was
the only person to criticize the February 26 Incident head-
on. Though not head-on, one other person did criticize it
sharply: Yanaihara. In his privately-circulated newsletter
Dispatches, Yanaihara wrote as follows of his own
experience on the final day of the February 26 Incident:
19 RHM: Tōdai's historic gate was the Red Gate.
20 TT: Many students took part in this mass meeting, and among the authors of the
book Our Takigawa Incident, which contains the recollections of participants in a
commemoration fifty years later, are many noteworthy names, including Ōkōchi
Kazuo (Tōdai president), Nakamura Akira (Hosei University president), Ōgiya Shōzō
(commentator), Imai Tadashi (movie director), and others.
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Feb. 29, 1936: Morning—someone told me, “Today's the day
the government will put the revolt down.” The children had
set out for school but returned right away—“The trolleys aren't
running.” It will be military force against the band of young
army officers who on the 26th led their units to occupy the
center of Tokyo after they attacked and killed or wounded
important high officials and senior councilors ….
They acted to clarify the kokutai. But they themselves
resisted direct orders and showed that they were great
kokutai-unclarifiers.
Out of hatred, they killed even Takahashi (Minister of
Finance), who pushed for the reconciliation of national
defense and finance but whom they considered a leader in
estranging military and people. However, their conduct shows
that they themselves were the greatest estrangers of military
and people.
Hot-blooded daring they have, but not righteousness;
faith, but not knowledge; relying on violence, they seek to
steer state policy. It must be the responsibility of thinking
people to declare firmly in the face of this trend that they go
counter to justice. But since the May 15 Incident there have
been several incidents of this type, and now the assassination
of Chief of Military Education General Nagata: we cannot say
it's enough to proclaim justice, to say that evil acts will
inevitably be punished, to point to the right path. There's no
authority above, there's no order below, and now the situation
is close to civil war. They simply cry at the top of their lungs, in
a formulaic manner, “Clarify the kokutai!” But at a time when
the conscience whereon the state rests has become empty,
even the vastest military and state too must collapse from
within, of their own weight and corruption. Thus those who
chant ‘Clarify the kokutai!’ are in reality destroyers of the
kokutai.
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When I think of the country's present and future, my heart
breaks in anger. From unfathomable depths the tears well up,
and it is as if the flame in my heart dies. As I stand alone in the
great drifts of snow piled up in my yard, angry and grieving,
the despairing cry “Perish!” that the young prophet among us
left behind resounds like the incoming tide.21
These are impassioned and fiery words. This was a private
journal with a circulation of only several hundred, so
officials didn’t learn immediately of its contents, and these
words caused Yanaihara no problem. Yanaihara continued
to write severe criticism afterwards in this private
newsletter, but eventually, because of what he had written
in this journal, he was forced to resign.
21 RHM: The young prophet was Fujii Takeshi, close disciple of Uchimura Kanzō; “Perish!” is a
refrain in his poem “Perish!” See the discussion in Chapter 2, below.
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2Yanaihara Tadao: A
Christian Against the
Establishment
In which the author describes the remarkable career of a
prominent economist and Christian whose convictions led him to
oppose Japanese imperialism and colonialism. The author treats
briefly Yanaihara’s student days (and romantic entanglement
with another prominent figure in this tale) and his hair-raising
encounter with “bandits” in Manchuria. Yanaihara’s reading of
the Manchurian Incident differed sharply from that of Hijikata
Seibi, his future antagonist. This background sets the stage for the
author’s subsequent account (in Chapter 3) of Yanaihara’s
expulsion from Tōdai.
The Man Appointed Assistant Professor on the Basis of
One Letter
Let me introduce Yanaihara Tadao. The Tōdai Faculty
tokyo university and the war | 36
of Economics was founded in 1919 and included a chair
in colonial policy. Its first occupant was Nitobe Inazō
(1862-1933), economist and ethicist and educator and
Christian, who had lectured on colonies at the professional
schools that later merged to become Tōdai. After studying
at Sapporo Agricultural College, Nitobe studied economics
at Johns Hopkins University in the U. S. Then, as brain trust
for Gotō Shimpei, chief of the civil government section of
Japan’s colonial administration in Taiwan, he was involved
in policy across the board. He himself became chief of the
Sugar Bureau and worked to expand Taiwan’s sugar
production. That and other accomplishments gave him rich
practical experience and made him ideally suited to teach
colonial policy. But the next year, 1920, he was appointed to
the very important post of Under Secretary General of the
League of Nations, a first for a Japanese. He resigned from
Tōdai and left for Geneva.
To succeed Nitobe in the chair in colonial policy, the
Faculty of Economics chose Yanaihara, a 1917 graduate in
political science. After graduating from Tōdai, Yanaihara
had entered the Sumitomo home office and then been
assigned to the Besshi Mine in Shikoku. At First Higher and
then at Tōdai, he had been a disciple of Nitobe, and from
his student days he had been interested in the colonies;
after graduating, he intended to become a hands-on
colonial administrator. His first choice was Korea, but
personal reasons led him to sign on for a while with
Sumitomo. From First Higher School days, he had been
close to Maide Chōgorō, who had become an assistant
professor of the Faculty of Economics at the time of its
founding, and the negotiations to hire Yanaihara bore fruit
quickly. But the way the decision was reached was quite
informal. In Speaking of Myself, Yanaihara gives this
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account:1 “Nitobe had gone to Geneva for the League of
Nations, and the Tōdai chair in colonial policy was vacant.
The Tōdai Faculty of Economics looked for his successor,
and it became a matter of ‘How about Yanaihara? He’s a
disciple of Nitobe—how about it?’ At the time, it took
serious work if you wanted to become a university
professor—writing up research, and the like. At the time
I’d written nothing. Because for three years I’d been at the
mine. They said he hadn’t studied colonial policy, but he’s
Nitobe’s disciple; he must have written something. I hadn’t
studied very hard, so I hadn’t written anything. Well, he
must have written letters. So they looked at a letter I’d
written a friend and concluded, Well, okay. It’s true: I
became a Tōdai assistant professor on the basis of one
letter.” Becoming a Tōdai assistant professor on the basis of
one letter: it had never happened before, and never since.
But once he joined the Faculty of Economics, Yanaihara
quickly distinguished himself.
Spirited Debate on Colonial Policy
At about the same time, Ōuchi Hyōe quit the Finance
Ministry and became an assistant professor; he wrote the
following recollection: “When Yanaihara began to lecture,
the students were amazed at the freshness and depth of his
theories. And Colonial Policy immediately became a Faculty
of Economics classic. In fact, he holed up in his study every
day from early to late, drawing up his lectures with a will;
not only that, but he published scholarly writings, one after
the other. His Colonies and Colonial Policy, New Foundations of
Colonial Policy, and The Population Problem are monuments
1 Yanaihara, “Onore o kataru,” Zenshū, 26.
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to his efforts in these years, and each is a classic of high
quality.”2
Before returning to the university, he hadn’t published a
thing; but now good books appeared, one after the other.
Among them the most famous were the practical books
on Japan’s administration of its colonies. Here is Ōuchi:
“In the decade after 1926, he planned studies of the
administration of Japan’s colonies and decided to set out
himself to do them; in each colony he cast his net
broadly—people and materials. This is how his famous
four-part work came to be: Taiwan Under Imperialism, The
Manchurian Issue, Studies on the South Pacific Islands,3 India
Under Imperialism. Each of these was a major scholarly work
and in essence a critique of Japan’s colonial policy
grounded on solid research. The talk of the town was about
how very scholarly they were and about how very alarming
they were to the colonial officials, about how most of these
books were banned from import into the colonies they
dealt with and were translated in China and Russia, about
how Studies on the South Pacific Islands became the prime
reference guide for the staff of the American Occupation
after the war—implicitly, a high evaluation of these books.”
Yanaihara criticized the administration of the colonies
sharply, so if he went to do on-site research, Japan’s various
colonial administrators kept an eye on him; before you
could say Jack Robinson, he would be tracked by spies.
Reportedly, spies even made their way into his Tōdai
courses, and as for foreign students from the colonies
2 Ōuchi Hyōe, “Akai rakujitsu—Yanaihara Tadao no isshō,” in Yanaihara Tadao: Shinkō,
gakumon, shōgai (Iwanami).
3 RHM: As a result of Japan's alliance with Britain in World War I, Japan had taken over
Germany's colonies in the South Pacific.
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taking his courses, they in particular were investigated
rigorously and blocked. I’ll say more about that later, but
first I want to touch on his student years.
“Boy-Love” Relation with Kawai Eijirō
Immediately on entering First Higher School, Yanaihara
joined the Debate Club. Kawai Eijirō, two years ahead of
Yanaihara, was a club member. Written twenty-five years
after Kawai’s death, Egami Teruhiko’s Biography of Kawai
Eijirō first made public the fact that in his First Higher
years Kawai had homosexual proclivities.4 (Those close to
him had known all along.) It shocked Kawai fans, but this
biography was based on Kawai’s unexpurgated diary, to
which the family had given Egami special access; so the
account is reliable. (To protect Kawai’s privacy, his students
had made considerable deletions in the diary as printed in
his Collected Works. Those who have read the uncut original
say there are many other sections that can’t be made public,
so full publication is either impossible or will happen at
best some decades from now.) Egami writes clearly of
Kawai’s sexual orientation, setting out concrete examples
such as the following. His partner at the time was Nasu
Shiroshi, who was to become a professor in the Tōdai
Faculty of Agriculture. I give Nasu’s name because—as will
become clear—this relation has significance for the Kawai
Incident of 1939. Nasu was two years ahead of Kawai, and
the two spent the summer vacation in the same lodging in
4 RHM: The Japanese term is “youth-love” or “boy-love” (shōnenai). It has far less of a
pejorative connotation than (in the U.S. in the modern era) the term ‘homosexual.’ All
the parties in this account went on to contract long heterosexual marriages. In the
biography, Egami references Socrates, Plato, and Greek boy-love and states that Kawai
was sometimes the older lover, sometimes the younger loved. The voguish term
‘homosocial’ may be useful here. Shōnenai relations began with the homosocial and
shaded off into the homosexual. In the 1930s physical contact was rarer in Japan than
in some societies, so embraces are of greater significance.
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Akagi, the mountain resort in Gumma Prefecture. Egami
writes: “Thus Nasu, for whom he’d been pining, finally
came to the Igaya Inn. Hearing the innkeeper’s daughter
say, “Nasu-san…,” he hesitated for a moment, then rushed
to greet his beloved. … Eijirō was in seventh heaven. He
was ecstatic to spend time—even if only briefly—under the
same roof in this chalet far from the bustle of the city,
with a friend with whom he shared brotherly love…. He
and Nasu slept side by side, holding hands, and he found
even the violent rain that thundered in the air and rattled
against the rain shutters quite like a symphony wishing
him joy in that love….
“The two went boating on the lake and crossed to a small
island. In the silence—all they could hear was the
twittering of birds—they embraced and kissed, sank into
an enchanted, charmed world, lost track of time…. The
relation between them at the time was indeed close to the
passionate love between a man and a woman. But when
things got too sensual, Eijirō had second thoughts, felt
shame, even feared that the relation might harm Nasu, and
proposed a total break. Nasu didn’t agree. He said, ‘Don’t
threaten that! I’ll agree to whatever conditions you want
to set. But I simply can’t agree to a total break.’ And he
started to cry. Theatrically, Eijirō flung aside the hat he’d
been wearing hugged Nasu, and said, ‘Please let’s go back
to the way we were.’ In the woods above Numajiri, the two
spread a cloak on the ground, sat on it, and spoke again of
the foolishness that their brotherly love had led to and how
they had come to speak of a total break.”
Citing Egami’s biography, Kasuya Kazuki writes:5 “He
5 Nasu, Kawai Eijirō den.
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formed passionate attachments; he was a seeker after Eros.
Adonises: they too had value, and he was a pushover for
Adonises who were smart.” It began in his First Higher
School years with his boy-love relation with Nasu, and it
continued throughout his life. It’s why those of his students
he liked particularly were bright Adonises. He summoned
them to his home and even bathed with them (one of them,
reportedly, was a later director of the Bank of Japan). And
he sought close emotional ties with his disciples. (He
wanted to be loved by his opposite numbers as much as he
loved them. Both sides invaded the privacy of the other and
wanted their own privacy invaded.) If that hope was not
met, he sometimes got violently angry. I’ll have more to say
about the fact that at the time of the Kawai Incident, some
disciples were ostracized because they aroused that anger.
When Yanaihara arrived as a first-year student, the same
sort of relation developed between Kawai and Yanaihara.
In Yanaihara’s diary of his First Higher years, there’s the
following:
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At about two in the afternoon I was invited by Kawai and went
to talk with him in his room in East Dorm…. We talked until
six, then went to eat together. Again on his invitation we set
off for Kawanishi's place.6 Talked until eleven…. Back to dorm
at twelve, and at the entrance to South Dorm he invited me
once more to go to the athletic field, where we squatted and
talked. Talk turned to life in Akagi; I'm dying to go this
summer and see what it's like, and the desire to live the pure
life with my dear Kawai in beautiful Akagi grew phenomenally
strong. For the first time Kawai used my given name Tadao. He
said at first he had been in awe of me and didn't think he could
hold hands with me….
It was a dark night, not a star in the sky, and on the gentle
slope of the athletic field he embraced me, and as in a dream
I imagined what a clean and ideal friendship in Akagi might
be. The houses across the way loomed like a chain of hills.
Ah—truly trance-like. I had no sense of time. I wasn't sleepy; I
wasn't cold; I was in ecstacy.
When roosters crowed and the folks who did winter
outdoor training were about to appear, I came to and looked
at my watch—already five a.m. We stood up on the dewy field
and entered my room again for a bit. Light showed in the east,
the steam heating came on, people got up, and finally at six
we parted. We'd talked from two in the afternoon to six the
next morning. I don't remember much of what I said or heard.
On parting, Kawai hugged me and said, “Tadao. Please stay
pure at all costs. I love your purity.”7
They talked for sixteen hours straight, holding hands, at
times embracing; so at one bound, the two had developed
6 Kawanishi had been ahead of Yanaihara in middle school.
7 RHM: Twice in this final passage, Yanaihara uses the English word ‘pure.’
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quite a relation. When you look at contemporary
photographs of Yanaihara, he was indeed an attractive
young man—one of those “bright Adonises” Kawai favored.
There are other accounts in the diary reporting that later,
too, they—although not for so long a stretch—and talked
for hours. But one can infer that Kawai was the more
ardent of the two, that Yanaihara wasn’t so ardent. There’s
this entry for another day: “I don’t think I’m lukewarm,
but I am relatively indifferent [on sexual matters]; I’m
philosophical. In contrast with Kawai’s ardent sincerity, I
am even rather unresponsive. Kawai said he’d serve me
utterly. Then he said I should treat him in any way I
wanted, that if I did so, our friendship would flourish.8 But
I simply couldn’t conceive that Kawai existed for my sake
alone. Kawai was my respected elder brother; could I treat
him selfishly? The decision is difficult. But maybe I need
to be candid with him. I’ll never forget Kawai’s love, his
sincerity; Kawai did win a place in my heart.”
But in his First Higher years, Yanaihara was closer to
classmate Mitani Takanobu than to Kawai. In his
biography of his father, Yanaihara Isaku writes as follows:
“Beginning about February of his first year, he became
close to the upper-classman Kawai Eijirō; but at this time
he truly felt love and affection for his classmate Mitani.9
For example, in his entry for March 4: ‘In the afternoon
walked toward Yanaka with Shin-san [Mitani]. Returned
after about four hours. Ah, Shin-san, the Shin-san I respect;
my equal Shin-san, laconic Shin-san; I love Shin-
san—more than Kawai.’ He met ‘Shin-san’ occasionally,
8 RHM: The words ‘serve’ and ‘friendship’ are in English.
9 TT: Mitani served in the Foreign Ministry before becoming Grand Chamberlain in the
Household Ministry.
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went to the public bath with him, together paced the
athletic field at night, together read the Bible.”
Yanaihara Becomes a Christian, a Disciple of Uchimura
Kanzō
Mitani was a fervent Christian, and invited by him,
Yanaihara was drawn deeply into Christianity. First, with
Mitani, he joined the First Higher Christian Club, then
became a disciple of Uchimura Kanzō. That event
determined his entire life thereafter. Yanaihara writes:10 “In
October 1911 Uchimura threw open the doors of his
Kashiwagi congregation. At the opportunity, I went with
friends and fortunately was admitted. Soon thereafter, in
January of the next year, Uchimura’s beloved daughter
Rutsuko11 died; the memorial service was held at the Non-
Church building. Uchimura appeared intensely grief-
stricken and in a strong voice said, ‘This isn’t Rutsuko’s
funeral but her wedding.’ This was my first Christian
funeral, and I was stunned to hear such unexpected words,
and then when the coffin was taken to Zoshigaya Cemetery
and interred, Uchimura took a handful of dirt and raising
his hand high, shouted in a voice as if squeezed from the pit
of his stomach, ‘Rutsuko, Banzai!’ As he did so, it was as if I
was struck by lighting, and my whole body was transfixed.
Solemn feelings took me captive: this is a huge thing;
Christianity is amazing; this isn’t something to respond
to half-heartedly. I began to attend Uchimura’s Bible
meetings with great seriousness.”
Up till then, Yanaihara had gone to church half-
heartedly, looking to find new friends; thereafter, he
10 “Watakushi wa ika ni shite kirisuto shinja to natta ka.”
11 RHM: The name Rutsuko was a Japanese approximation of the Biblical Ruth.
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confronted Christianity head-on and for that very reason
grew deeply worried. Two months later, his mother died
back at home. She died knowing nothing of Christianity.
Could she not go to Heaven? Yanaihara’s love for his
mother was particularly strong, so he worried constantly.
In his diary he wrote: “Will God admit Mother to Heaven?
Or will only those who know Christ be resurrected and not
Mother? I’d have no hope of being reunited with her….
She’d never said Christ’s name, so he wouldn’t take pity on
her? If so, what of those people who lived before the birth
of Christ? What of those righteous people in remote areas
who never knew Christ?”
Agonized, he went to Uchimura and broaching his
agony, asked Uchimura to respond. He thought he’d learn
quickly that such-and-such was the way it was, but to his
surprise Uchimura answered, “I don’t know.” And then he
said, “You’ll learn the answer after a lifetime of faith.”
Yanaihara writes: “‘Even Uchimura doesn’t know!’—this
was a major discovery for me. I had to learn directly from
God myself. And faith—one doesn’t understand all at once,
in a flash. You have to study for a long time.”
Yanaihara resolved then to spend his life as an
independent proselytizer. Yanaihara’s life has three facets:
scholar, educator, and in the Christian world, independent
proselytizer in the Christian tradition a la Uchimura.
Uchimura never belonged to any church, emphasized Non-
Church-ism, and on each Sunday convened his private
Bible Study group; he dedicated his life to spreading the
Gospel via a magazine Uchimura published himself.
Following his example, many of his disciples, too, carried
on with their own private Bible-study groups and
proselytized via private journals and assemblies. By means
of such activity, the Non-Church movement had and has a
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unique influence in Japanese Christianity. From the time
of Uchimura’s lèse-majesté incident at First Higher School
in 1891, many First Higher students became his disciples;
when Yanaihara returned to Tōdai as assistant professor,
quite a few Tōdai professors, assistant professors, and
students were members of the non-Tōdai Bible study group
Uchimura convened. So Yanaihara proposed that if there
were that many people, then why not a Bible study group
at Tōdai? And beginning in 1924-25, the Tōdai Bible Study
Group was formed. Among its chief members, in addition
to Yanaihara, were Nambara Shigeru, Tanaka Kōtarō, and
Takagi Yasaka; many prominent figures joined. This group
lasted until 1937, when Yanaihara was driven out of Tōdai;
among the younger members who had joined in the
interim were Ōtsuka Hisao and many others who became
distinguished professors. In its final stage, the group
changed into an assembly where Yanaihara preached the
Gospel. In addition, from 1933 on, Yanaihara held home
gatherings on the second floor of his home, and these too
were popular; he had to limit the attendance to forty-two or
-three people lest the second floor collapse.
Many people wanted to hear Yanaihara’s talks, but only
a limited number could be accommodated in such
gatherings, so after 1933, when the meetings began,
Yanaihara created the private journal Dispatches to take the
place of letters in conveying his doings and distributed it to
those interested. Gradually it grew to a circulation of about
a thousand. It was this private journal that ran his essay on
the February 26 Incident (see the previous chapter) and this
journal, too, that ran the stenographic record of “The Land
of God,” delivered at the lecture meeting away from Tōdai
that became the grounds for driving Yanaihara from Tōdai.
How did Dispatches get its start? In September 1932, after
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the Manchurian Incident, Yanaihara went to inspect
Manchuria. The Southern Manchurian Railroad train on
which he was riding between Xinjiang and Haerbin was
attacked by bandits, and Yanaihara escaped miraculously
with his life. This event was reported in Japan’s
newspapers, too, and there were banner headlines,
YANAIHARA MISSING; so many acquaintances worried
and inquired. It would have been difficult to try to answer
these all one by one, so he said he’d print something—it
became the inaugural issue of Dispatches.
In 1932, the year after the Manchurian Incident,
Manchukuo had been established, and as soon as that
happened, the Kwantung Army had invited professors
from the Tōdai Faculty of Economics, wanting to learn
from them about running the new state. Those invited were
Yanaihara, Ōuchi, and Hijikata Seibi. (All three were key
figures in the Faculty of Economics strife I’ll tell about later.
In the expulsion of Yanaihara that set off the strife, Hijikata
was the chief figure pushing for his expulsion. Ōuchi
supported Yanaihara.) Hijikata had set off happily for
Manchuria, but Yanaihara and Ōuchi declined the
invitation. Why did Yanaihara say no? Because from the
time the Manchurian Incident arose (the incident at the
Marco Polo Bridge), he had thought it suspect. He wrote:12
“When the Manchurian Incident took place, I was
suspicious. In light of the past history of the Japanese
administration of Manchuria, or of Taiwan or Korea—it
was the same in the colonies of foreign countries—if you
studied their histories, in view of the situation at the time
in Manchuria, it was not likely that the troops of Zhang
12 “Watakushi no ayunde kita michi.”
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Zuolin would bomb the Southern Manchurian train tracks;
I doubted it. As a scholar, I also doubted that the ethnic
Manchus would create an ‘ethnic state.’ Hearing and seeing
things, making on-site observations, I was really dubious.”
After turning down the Army’s invitation, he set off
himself for Manchuria to investigate—after all, he knew
many people working for the Southern Manchurian
Railroad. The more he investigated, the more he grew
convinced it had been an Army plot. It was on this trip that
he came under bandit attack. According to “Attacked by
Bandits” in the inaugural issue of Dispatches, this is what
happened: “I awoke suddenly to a fierce juddering of the
coach. The train stopped, and the lights went out; it was
pitch black…. The train had stopped and the lights gone out
because the bandits had sprung the rails and were waiting
in ambush; we had derailed…. With the sudden stop, we
came under small-arms fire from the left.… The bandits
fired for a while, then stormed the train, shouting a strange
shout. They numbered, it was said, a hundred or so. We
locked the compartment from the inside and kept quiet.
Bandits kicked at the door two or three times and cried,
“Open up!” but then they went away…. Here and there came
the ominous sound of windows breaking, and then an eerie
interval passed when we didn’t hear a single voice roaring
or weeping.”
The attack ended after less than an hour: “When we went
to the next railcar, one Japanese passenger had been
speared through the skull—a grisly corpse lying face up.
His blood had splashed and dyed the white skirt of a
Russian girl. We went to the first- and second-class coaches
at the front of the train, and they appeared to have been the
target of the bandit attack; they had received much gunfire
that broke windows and compartment doors and wounded
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passengers…. From front to rear, virtually the entire train,
fully loaded with five hundred passengers, had been
overrun and pillaged: four of the Japanese soldiers on
board and one passenger had been slain; two Russians had
also been killed…. Our compartment with its four
occupants in the center of the train was the only
compartment totally overlooked, so none of us was injured,
and there wasn’t even damage to our luggage; we hadn’t
been threatened by pistols waved in our faces—no, we
hadn’t even seen a bandit face or been seen by one. It was
truly a miracle.” This event deepened Yanaihara’s belief
that God was protecting him, and he reaffirmed his resolve
to believe in God and communicate His word.
A “Fighting Principle” Learned from Christ
This inspection trip to Manchuria deepened Yanaihara’s
conviction that the Manchurian Incident was an army plot,
as he had sensed at first, and after returning to Japan, he
treated the Manchurian problem in a topics course in
1932-33. In the next year, 1934, he worked those lectures
up and published them as The Manchurian Problem.13 In the
preface he wrote: “What I wish to convey to you here is
not materials, not data…. What I wish to convey is simply
and solely a critical spirit. Because the danger of blindness
is greatest where criticism is lacking.” This book is very
critical on the Manchurian issue: he states that “It’s already
clear that Japan is essentially an imperialist state” and
argues that Japanese capitalism has reached the stage of
monopoly capital, that the Japanese Army is deeply
implicated in the Manchurian issue, that the newly
established Manchukuo is “a country rare in world history,”
13 Manshū mondai, Tokyo: Iwanami, 1934.
tokyo university and the war | 50
founded on principles that don’t fit with the principle of
national self-determination, and that as concession-holder,
Japan is deeply complicit in that founding.
Naturally, the military expressed displeasure at this
course, and a strange situation arose: when Faculty of
Economics students took military drill, their instructors
(active-duty officers) ordered them not to attend
Yanaihara’s lectures. Inoki Masamichi, then a student,
writes as follows:14
In April 1934, when I entered the Tōdai Faculty of Economics,
there was a convocation for new students. The speakers were
Yanaihara Tadao and Kawai Eijirō…. After welcoming remarks
by those in charge, Yanaihara took the podium. Yanaihara
began to speak, with what appeared to be notes in one hand,
and gradually it dawned on us that they were final exams
from the previous year.
It's now thirty years in the past, so I don't remember his
precise words, but two impressions are still crystal-clear
today. One, rapping those exams in his right hand loudly on
the podium, he exclaimed, “It's a disgrace!” As a topics course
in the academic year 1933, he'd chosen the theme, “The
Manchurian Problem.” He'd been reading those exams and
discovered from some of them that military officers assigned
to Tōdai had told students, “Yanaihara's lectures are
unpatriotic, so don't go.” He exclaimed, “How can they call
someone in the same university unpatriotic? It's a disgrace!”
With the Manchurian Incident, Yanaihara’s life changed
decisively. In “Battle Scars,” Yanaihara writes of this
14 Yanaihara Tadao: Faith, Scholarship, Life.
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episode with the military instructors:15 “From that time on,
my scholarship and my faith became a united force and
caused me to confront the Manchurian Incident…. I said
publicly what for the sake of truth I needed to say. But
even if I was criticized or impugned for that reason, I said
not a word in defense or protest. I had determined to take
that attitude. In later battles, too, I held generally to that
principle, and the result—for the public and for me as an
intellectual—was more often a plus than a minus. It goes
without saying that this was a fighting principle I’d learned
from Jesus.”
“A Word” on which He Risked Everything
Yanaihara’s life thereafter was devoted to “saying
publicly what…I needed to say.” But in Japan after the
Manchurian Incident, freedom of speech was rapidly being
lost, and it wasn’t all that easy to say “what I needed to
say.” Moreover, what Yanaihara thought “needed to be said”
was not roundabout criticism of national policy via lectures
in the Faculty of Economics on “The Manchurian Problem”
but more head-on, the assertion that Japan’s national policy
after the Manchurian Incident was fundamentally wrong.
This was a matter not simply of criticizing policy mistakes
but of asserting that Japan as a state should be denounced
for having become a state utterly unjust before God.
At the time, when nationalism was hounding all Japan,
it took great courage to say that. Still, beginning with the
ceremony marking the third anniversary of the death of
his master Uchimura Kanzō, Yanaihara began to make that
assertion publicly. To do so required firm resolve.
Yanaihara writes:16 “On March 26, 1933 we held an assembly
15 “Ikusa no ato,” Zenshū 26.
tokyo university and the war | 52
on the third anniversary of Uchimura’s death, and Mitani
Takanobu and I were two of the four speakers…. I had tried
to turn down the invitation to be a speaker, saying that
I wasn’t a proselytizer, that I was a younger generation,
and that I was sorry; but they simply wouldn’t take no.
The deepest reason for my declining was that if I took the
podium, I had only one thing to say. Moreover, that was
given me with great clarity. I feared saying that thing. It
would jeopardize my social standing, of course, but also my
physical freedom.”
What was that thing? His son writes:17 “It was that since
the Manchurian Incident, which had been cheered on by
an extreme nationalism that took the emperor as absolute,
Japan’s policy was based on falsehood…. Yanaihara spoke
for twenty minutes on ‘A Man of Sorrows.’ He spoke for
twenty minutes, throwing his heart and soul into his
words. Thinking back on this lecture, he wrote: ‘I wept for
Japan—since the Manchurian Incident, it had been sinning
in the eyes of God. It was a lecture I gave fully resigned
to the consequences, and after we returned home, my wife
said of her thoughts as she listened, ‘For a brief moment I
grew tense, but I resolved that whatever happened to the
family was okay and prayed with all my strength to God.’
I was grateful for her words. Not looking back, instead
setting my face toward Jerusalem, I confronted the trend
that was heading rapidly and violently toward fascism.’”
What did “setting my face toward Jerusalem” mean? At the
end of his life Jesus headed for Jerusalem and set his course
toward Jerusalem.18
16 “Omoide,” Zenshu 26.
17 Yanaihara Tadao den.
18 RHM: The references here need some explaining. “A man of sorrows” is from Isaiah
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What did he say in “A Man of Sorrows”? Yanaihara
writes: “Amid such chaos, the one who sees the reality of
things and speaks the truth is indeed a man of sorrows.
A man of sorrows is not someone who bemoans personal
matters…. When lies fill the world and no one understands
the reality of things, a man of sorrows is the one person
who perceives the true state of human affairs, who speaks
up when everyone else keeps silent. Truth isn’t something
that all people in this world can understand easily. Truth
itself has its sorrow. Therefore the man who knows the
truth is necessarily a man of sorrows.”
For Yanaihara, Jesus Christ is the paradigmatic man of
sorrows, who realized that there was no hope for all
mankind living in sin and unrighteousness unless he
himself died on the cross; he became a man of sorrows. And
amid general derision he ascended the cross. The prophet
Jeremiah foresaw that if it continued on its course, his
fatherland Judea, filled with unrighteousness, would be
destroyed by God; but no one believed him. Jeremiah was
hated, ridiculed, killed. And Judea was destroyed.
Uchimura Kanzō was the epitome of a man of sorrows:
preaching pacifism during the Russo-Japanese War, he was
termed a traitor, a rebel.
Now, by clamoring that in the Manchurian Incident
Japan had sinned, Yanaihara sought to join this lineage of
men of sorrow. He knew, of course, that he would be called
a traitor. He writes: “Not a single country supported Japan
at the League of Nations. Japan stood isolated…. What
53:3 and has been interpreted as a prefiguration of Jesus. To set one's face toward
Jerusalem is from Ezekiel 21:2: “Son of man, set your face toward Jerusalem, and speak
against the sanctuaries; prophesy against the land of Israel.” Again, it is an Old
Testament verse taken to be prefiguration. In the New Testament, Jesus sets his face
toward Jerusalem knowing he is going to his death.
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made Japan isolated? Foreign countries said Japan didn’t
keep its promises…. All the countries of the world speak
badly of Japan…. Should our beloved country have made
a mistake, if today’s crisis arose from Japan’s violation of
God’s righteousness, what should we Christians do?…
Anyone at all can do it: if the nation makes a mistake, bear
guilt for it. Die for it. This is the man of sorrows.”
Further, Japan’s nationalism was the greatest evil: “The
essence of Japanese ideas lies in the concept of the state.
This is probably the most beautiful of Japanese ideas. But
where there is the most beauty, there will be the greatest
evil also…. If in the case of individuals, greed and lies are
bad thoughts, national greed, national lies are profoundly
bad ideas. Moreover, dressing up and justifying greed is
an extreme sin…. If Japanese Christianity is to protect and
perfect Japan’s unique state concept, it must renounce with
all its strength the concept of state greed and lies.” In short,
the Manchurian Incident is a great evil that the state,
carried away by greed, has committed. To cloak what it did
out of greed in the guise of justice is to commit great sin.
Slightly modified, these words appeared later in
Dispatches; they weren’t word-for-word what he said at the
ceremony. Watanabe Miyoji was in the audience that day
and asked on the spot to become one of Yanaihara’s
disciples. We can gather from the thoughts of that
Yanaihara’s words were in fact more bitter, more
impassioned:19 “In ‘A Man of Sorrows,’ Yanaihara pointed
out the unrighteousness of Japan in the Manchurian
Incident. Struck by his fierce vigor, I listened with sweaty
hands, praying for his safety. For me, into whom had been
19 Yanaihara Tadao: Shinkō, Gakumon, Shōgai.
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pounded the thought that the state was supreme, what he
said then—that the Christian God transcended the state,
that if the state committed unrighteous acts it could not
escape God’s judgment—was a thunderclap out of a clear
blue sky and caused me to tremble, body and soul; my eyes
were opened. Yanaihara made known to me the existence
of a living God who governs history; I received a clear sign
that I must follow this teacher.”
Grappling Head-on with the Issue of the Emperor
Just before that memorial service, Yanaihara wrote an
essay “The Backward-Yearning and the Progressive in the
Japanese Spirit” (January 1933). His statements there about
Japan’s statism were even more impassioned. He lined up
the arguments glorifying the Japanese spirit: “All of them
take the state to be the root of our Japanese culture, the
Japanese spirit, set the emperor at the center of the state,
and make the emperor either the highest good as the true
self of the people or the source of executive power or the
majesty of the state. Hence the core of our Japanese spirit
is taken to be the statism of a state commanded by the
emperor and that has its unity in him. So the concept of
kokutai forms the core of studies of the Japanese spirit, and
the focus of kokutai studies must be state supremacy and
the divinity of the emperor.” At the time, fearing they’d get
burned, no intellectuals apart from the emperor-believers
touched these issues—the kokutai, the divinity of the
emperor, statism; but Yanaihara addressed them head-on.
Even more than was the case with the speech we’ve just
considered, Yanaihara girded up his loins to write this
essay. He reflects: “I remember particularly the essay ‘The
Backward-Yearning and the Progressive in the Japanese
Spirit’ that I published in the January 1933 issue of Risō. This
was an issue I had to address, and I thought carefully and
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wrote resolutely. The issue was the fundamental relation
between Christianity and the kokutai. This essay is included
in my The People and Peace, and when that book was referred
for legal penalty, this essay was the most problematic. I
myself value this essay most highly.”
It’s an essay that makes tough reading, so I won’t discuss
it here in detail, but its essence is the issue of the divinity
of the emperor. For Yanaihara, a Christian, the stumbling
block was that he simply could not set the divinity of the
emperor on the same plane as the divinity of the Christian
God. If the emperor was divine, he argued, it was a
different divinity from the divinity of the Christian
God—the all-knowing, all-powerful creator of the universe.
To begin with, when emperor-believers said, “The emperor
is universal morality and must be followed,” weren’t they
assuming “the existence of a universal morality that
transcends the emperor, that provides a foundation for the
emperor, that the emperor too must follow?” The emperor-
believers also argued that the emperor was majesty
personified. If that was the case, “The fact that the emperor
is majesty itself—is that the ideal emperor? Or is it the real
emperor? Is it a standard the emperor should follow? Or
is the emperor the very standard?” Thus: “The foundation
of the divinity of the emperor is not his person but his
office, and the foundation of the emperor’s humanity is
not his office but his person. The actual emperor is divine
in his state office, but that is not to say that as a person
he is divine—most-sacred, most-loved, all-knowing, all-
powerful. In life and person, he, like all human beings, has
personhood relative to the God of creation.” This was his
conclusion. Before the creator-God, the emperor too has
the same personhood as all human beings, so the emperor’s
divinity isn’t in conflict with Christian morality.
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Moreover, statism “gives birth to the assertion that
morality is what the state wants, what is to the state’s
benefit,” and “this statism conflates the ideal state and the
real state…so it becomes in the end the assertion that
morality is what benefits the state…. This is a very shallow
view of morality and the state; it’s like a self-complacent,
egotistical view of human life. True patriotism recognizes
morality as a universal axiom that transcends the state, and
it criticizes the actual state in terms of that morality; where
the actual state contravenes morality, it must point that
fact out and remonstrate and so draw nearer to the ideal of
a moral state, letting the light of morality shine out from
within. So true patriotism does not consider state benefit;
it considers state morality.” True patriotism thinks first of
the morality of the state, not its benefit.
Perhaps because it was a difficult essay built up on very
fine logic, this essay didn’t cause the journal that ran it to be
banned; moreover, the book that reprinted this essay—The
People and Peace—didn’t suffer immediate ban, either. (It
was published in 1936; the ban came in 1937.) As per usual,
lengthy criticism was published in Minoda Muneki’s Genri
Nihon, including “Scholarly Critique of Former Tōdai
Professor Yanaihara’s Blasphemy, Anti-Military and Anti-
War Ideas, and Argument for Giving Up the Colonies.” And
because that was an abstruse critique of an abstruse essay,
it didn’t win much popular acceptance. So—unlike the
Takigawa Incident and the Minobe Emperor-Organ
Incident that Minoda’s attacks had occasioned—it didn’t
occasion a sensational Yanaihara Incident. Still, this essay
should be remembered as a counter-blow aimed directly
at the tenor of kokutai-absolutism, at the out-and-out
celebration of statism.
Between 1933, which saw the publication of this essay
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and Yanaihara’s speech on the third anniversary of
Uchimura’s death, and 1937, Yanaihara spoke out
vigorously. In his own words:20 “In the four years and eight
months after my speech on the third anniversary of
Uchimura’s death, in discourse and lectures, in books and
travel, I worked very hard. In this span of less than five
years, I think I produced as much as most people produce
in a lifetime. Looking back now, I think I did really well. It
was work I couldn’t have done without divine assistance.”
The Contrast: Hijikata Seibi’s Evaluation of the
Manchurian Incident
1937 concluded that period of amazing activity.
Yanaihara aroused the ire of officials with the essay, “The
Ideal State,” which appeared in Chūō kōron, and with the
stenographic record of the speech, “The Land of God,”
which ran in Dispatches and led to the ban on publication.
1937 was also the year Yanaihara’s resignation from Tōdai
became unavoidable. I’ll have more to say about that later.
What I want to mention first is the visit to Manchuria of
Hijikata Seibi, point man in driving Yanaihara out in the
great dispute (it was about to begin) at the Tōdai Faculty of
Economics.
Yanaihara and Ōuchi Hyōei rejected the invitation to
Manchuria, but Hijikata accepted with pleasure. That event
appears in Hijikata’s memoir, and reading it, one sees how
different his thinking about Manchuria was from that of
Yanaihara and Ōuchi. Hijikata writes: “The Manchurian
Incident had roots reaching back to the Sino-Japanese War
of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05; our
ancestors shed much blood, left many of their bones to
20 “Omoide.”
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bleach on the plains of Southern Manchuria…. Via the noble
sacrifices of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had secured
a foothold in Southern Manchuria, and for a while peace
was maintained. In the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917,
the United States, too, had recognized the ‘special interests’
of Japan in Southern Manchuria. Under the Zhang Zuolin
regime, not only was the right of Japanese to own land not
recognized, but peace and order tended to break down; it
was feared that in the attempt to oust Japan from Southern
Manchuria, Japan’s several decades of managing Southern
Manchuria would come to naught. Even if there were
actions of the Japanese military during this time that
should be criticized, the sense of the great majority of
Japanese was that, at best, we should not renounce
Southern Manchuria.
“So the great majority of Japanese who heard of the
Manchurian Incident did not stint in their applause. To
be sure, opinion on the Manchurian Incident among
intellectuals critical of the military’s action was divided.
Even if they didn’t support the military’s action entirely,
some recognized it as a fait accompli and thought it right
to establish a regime that pacified Manchuria and planned
the development of resources and the betterment of the
residents; others rejected the military’s action
categorically. I was among the former.”
Even though the vast majority of Japanese shared this
opinion, from Yanaihara’s point of view it accepted “the
state lie (the immorality) that disregarded morality and
focused on state benefit.” The basic evaluations of the
Incident differed completely between the two men;
Yanaihara refused the invitation of the Kwantung Army,
and Hijikata accepted it. And when he went to Manchuria,
Hijikata got an astonishing welcome. He writes: “That
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evening a reception to welcome the delegation was held
at the Yamato Hotel. Beginning with commanding officer
General Honjō, all the headquarters officers
attended—Itagaki Seishirō, Ishiwara Kanji, and so on. By
blind chance, my seat was directly opposite Gen. Honjō….21
“Next morning in the Yamato Hotel in Mukden, a knock
came on my door. I opened the door, and it was Colonel
(later General) Ishihara Kanji; it was our first meeting. He
was energetic, his face ruddy, and he told me the following:
some idiots were talking nonsense, that Manchuria was
Japan’s lifeline (at the time in Japan, it was often said that
Manchuria was Japan’s lifeline). but he himself had never
said that or thought it. Manchuria was only a foothold. Now
we must advance to Shanxi and Shaanxi.22 In Shaanxi rich
oil fields were said to exist; the colonel’s ambitions for
managing the continent were very large.” Already at this
time, shockingly, the grand plan was already formed in
Ishiwara Kanji’s head: to advance into Shanxi and Shaanxi
and control even oil. And Hijikata hadn’t the slightest
criticism of that plan; he admired it without reservation.
Thus, sucked in by military policy, university professors,
too, moved steadily rightward. It is natural, of course, that
even those who at the start of the Manchurian Incident
had their doubts moved steadily in the direction of
rationalizing the Incident (greed over morality). Hijikata
21 RHM: Honjō was commander-in-chief of the Manchurian Army (1931-32) and was
arrested as a war criminal in 1945; he committed suicide in November 1945. Itagaki
was a chief plotter of the Manchurian Incident; he was tried by the U. S. as a war
criminal and executed in 1948. Ishiwara was a chief plotter of the Manchurian
Incident.
22 RHM: These two provinces lie southwest of Beijing, on the other side of Beijing from
Manchuria, so Japan would need to control Beijing, too. Shaanxi's southern border
abuts Sichuan Province and is not far from the Yangzi River. Ishihara's plans are
indeed large.
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writes: “It goes without saying that the Manchurian
Incident and the establishment of Manchukuo that ensued
differ significantly from the Russo-Japanese War.
Formally, of course, sudden military intrusion into another
country’s territory is invasion. But it wasn’t carried out
entirely without reason. Over more than twenty years,
Japanese had lent a helping hand in the development of
Southern Manchuria. The foundation they had built and
managed laboriously was being shaken by the policy of the
Zhang Zuolin regime…. Thanks to the Kwantung Army,
banditry was suppressed, and peace and order maintained.
The Manchurian Incident was an explosion of public
indignation on the part of the Japanese people at
unfriendly treatment at the hands of the Zhang Zuolin
regime. At the time, China had not been unified
territorially under the Guomindang regime, and the north
was divided among warlords. There was no reliable
peaceful regime, and Russia threatened from the north;
so the fact that with Japanese cooperation an independent
and peaceful regime was established in Manchuria was a
further consideration…. On these grounds I approved the
Manchurian Incident and subsequent Army actions in
Manchuria.”
The appraisals of the Manchurian Incident and the
military of Yanaihara and Hijikata differ so greatly that
one senses that a head-on collision between them was
inevitable.
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3Yanaihara's Expulsion at
the Hands of the “Fat Pig”
In which the author reports on how Japan’s war in Asia came
to Tōdai. He describes Tōdai’s increasing involvement in the war
effort—in personnel, ideology, curriculum. Within the Faculty of
Economics, the “Renovationist” faction around Dean Hijikata
Seibi led the charge against those who opposed increasing
involvement in the war effort;in the ouster of Yanaihara Tadao
it achieved a first victory. The author analyzes the standard
explanation for Yanaihara’s forced resignation and finds that the
true reason lay elsewhere.
“Marxism” vs. “Liberalism”
After the Manchurian Incident in 1931, Japan entered its
time of emergency, its quasi-wartime footing. And after the
Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, it plunged into the
era of true war. In that process, Japan’s nationalism grew
ever fiercer, and Japanese society top to bottom moved to
wartime footing. Tōdai was no exception. Within the
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university, the renovationist clique of professors with
connections to the military (the name came from the desire
to renovate Japan into a state of total mobilization for war)
came to rule the roost; pacifists and war-shunners grew
fewer in number.
This use of the terms “renovation” and “renovationist
clique” differs completely from their use today. The same
issue will come up later, too, but to say a bit now by way
of explanation: the leaders of Tōdai’s renovationist clique
were Hijikata Seibi (dean of the Faculty of Economics), the
key figure in driving Yanaihara Tadao out, and the bunch
of professors in league with him—Honiden Yoshio, Tanabe
Tadao, and the others. They founded the journal Renovation
(its inaugural issue appeared in October 1938), and the lead
essay of that first issue, “The Mission of the Renovation
Association,” gives the essence of their views. First, to speak
of Japan’s current situation, Japan is fighting a war that
began on the continent and preparing for the even greater
war with the Allied Powers that will arise in the future.
Such a situation makes “Japan’s fundamental renovation
unavoidable.” What should be renovated? How? “The
existing economic structure is organized basically for the
goal of profit.” With it, Japan is unable over the long run
to ensure “the large-scale production of military goods and
the provision of robust fighting men.” To build a wartime
structure for the long haul, it is “necessary first of all to
change the existing structure in favor of the state, so
selfishness no longer governs.” At the same time, it is
necessary to “rebuild today’s unjust society from the roots
up” and, in addition to expanding the production of
military goods, satisfy the lives of the common people,
“construct a true national community,” and thereby
“accomplish the true mobilization of the state.” In order
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to prepare for the war already being waged and the war
against the Allies that is foreseeable, it is necessary to
reorganize totally the economy and the state—up till now,
these have been governed by personal profit and self-
interest—and build a totalitarian structure centering on
the state. In short, turn Japan into a totalitarian state
similar to fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Hijikata, it so
happens, was also well-known as an expert on Italian
fascism.
Notice the difference in awareness. In today’s society,
“fascism,” “Nazism,” “totalitarianism” are all negative
terms, but at the time that was not the case. Rather, they
were all positives pointing the way to a new age. Taken
together, they meant “renovation.” With links to the
military, the renovationist clique pushed for the creation of
a totalitarian state as war goal. The Faculty of Economics
included not a few professors—Ōuchi’s Marxist-
sympathizer group and Kawai’s liberal group—who
loathed the renovationists and their goal, and the two
factions clashed. It developed into major strife, and the
Tōdai Faculty of Economics nearly collapsed. In any case,
in the Hiraga Purge (1939) that was the climax of that strife,
a total of thirteen faculty—professors, assistant professors,
and others—were fired or resigned. Of these, eight were
dissuaded from resigning and in the end stayed on.
In the Faculty Group Incident of one year earlier, Ōuchi
and three other left-wing professors aligned with the
Rōnōha had been arrested, so the Tōdai Faculty of
Economics was short on faculty and nearly collapsed.1
When they hear “Tōdai strife,” postwar generations are
1 On the Faculty Group Incident and the Rōnōha, see Chapter 4.
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likely to summon up the great riots of 1969 (the all-
university strike, the blocking of the entrance
examinations) and the Tōdai All-Student Alliance’s fight to
seize and defend Yasuda Auditorium.2 But generations a
bit older, when they hear “Tōdai strife,” will think first of
the strife in the Faculty of Economics that began in 1937 and
continued for several years.
The Expulsion Drama Hijikata Orchestrated
The expulsion of Yanaihara lit the fuse of this great strife.
The drama of the expulsion of Yanaihara stemmed from
confrontation between Yanaihara and Hijikata, dean of the
Faculty of Economics. In The Agony of Democracy, Minobe
Ryōkichi summarizes what happened at Faculty Meeting:
“Dean Hijikata pulled from a purple furoshiki the September
issue of Chūō kōron and said, ‘In time of crisis Yanaihara’s
essay in this issue [“The Ideals of the State”] is not an
appropriate view, I think, for a professor to hold. I respect
Yanaihara as scholar, and in this essay he doesn’t say
explicitly that he’s talking about Japan; but in fact he says
that public opinion on the war is being controlled and that
the war is not just—it’s surely satire about Japan; it’s anti-
war. What do you say, colleagues?’”
Ōuchi took more detailed notes at the Faculty Meeting
that day (November 24) and tells what came next:3 “In
response, several professors stood up valiantly and said,
‘This essay may be written in the abstract, but it’s clearly
an argument against Japan’s current war.’ And this: ‘This
essay has serious implications for Japan’s official policy.’
2 RHM: Zenkyōto was the umbrella alliance of student organizations at the center of the
1969 student riots.
3 Ōuchi Hyōe, “Yanaihara kyōju jishoku no ikisatsu” (“The Events of Yanaihara's
Resignation”), in Nambara Shigeru, ed., Yanaihara Tadao: shinkō, gakumon, shōgai
(Tokyo: Iwanami, 1968).
67 | university of massachusetts amherst libraries
These advocates and the dean were of course on precisely
the same page: there’s no need to criticize Yanaihara’s essay
in detail; we should simply decide by majority vote that
Yanaihara is not fit to be a professor. Oppressed by this
atmosphere, mouth agape, I couldn’t stop myself but said,
‘Discussion about the essay—shouldn’t that happen after
we’ve read it?’” The “several professors” who joined
immediately in Dean Hijikata’s attack on Yanaihara were
Honiden Yoshio and Tanabe Tadao, whom I introduced
earlier as the renovationist faction.
Establishing New Specialties and Courses at the Behest
of the Military
To understand what was happening at Tōdai at the time,
you need to know what was happening in Japan. The Japan-
China Incident that began at the Marco Polo Bridge in July
1937 quickly developed into full-scale war with China. In a
major mobilization involving several stages, hundreds of
thousands of troops were sent to various parts of China,
and from then until 1945, normally about 1,000,000 troops
were fighting in China. It was called an incident, but from
1937 on Japan was at war.
The flames of the Incident leapt first to Shanghai, and
hoping to bring about a quick end to the fighting, the
Japanese Army landed in Hangzhou Bay and then aimed
for Nanjing: capture Nanjing, the chief city of the Chinese
Republic, and China would surrender. But even though
Japanese forces occupied Nanjing (December 1937), the
fighting did not stop, and the war rapidly became a
quagmire. The next year, 1938, Japan passed a national
mobilization law, and in every sense Japan went onto
wartime footing. After August 1937, when the national
spiritual mobilization movement was started, the whole
society suddenly moved to wartime footing.
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If you read the diary of Nagayo Matarō, Tōdai president
at the time, you’ll understand and be fascinated by what
happened—things unimaginable today—as the university
was engulfed in the wartime order. For example, take this
entry from October 28: “Today I addressed the following
telegram to General Terauchi, Supreme Commander for
North China, General Matsui, commander for Central
China, Vice Admiral Hasegawa, commanding officer of the
Third Fleet, and Major General Ōkōchi, Commander of
Land Forces: ‘In victory after victory, the fierce fighting of
our loyal Imperial officers and men has reaped great fruits
of war and enhanced national prestige greatly. It is truly
everlastingly moving. Representing all the employees and
students of Tokyo Imperial University, I hereby express our
deep gratitude.’”
This isn’t a telegram Nagayo sent as an individual; it’s
a formal telegram of gratitude that as president,
representing all the staff and students of Tokyo Imperial
University, he sent to the entire China command of the
Army and the Navy. Since the imperial universities were
created by the state as special organs of the state to study
and teach (in the words of the university decree) “the theory
and application of the scholarly arts essential to the state,”
the enhancement of the prestige of the state was something
very much worth congratulating.
And note well: formal mobilization had begun, and from
the universities, too, men were heading quickly, in droves,
for the battlefield. According to the Imperial University News
for October 11, 1937, at the end of August the number of
students drafted from universities nation-wide had already
reached 1,000; the universities at the top of the list were
Tōdai with thirty, Kyōto University with forty-three, Osaka
University with twenty-four, Kyushu University with
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twenty-one. The “call-up of students” came in December
1943, but that meant merely that the “student deferment”
(for university students, postponement of the military
physical until the age of twenty-seven) was no longer
operative; even students were drafted when they turned
twenty. Even before that time, many students had taken
the field. Once the call-up came and they were drafted,
students who had already passed the military physical and
entered the reserves (a few graduate students—particularly
medical students—past the age of twenty-seven) had to
head immediately for the front. According to the Imperial
University News for October 25, 1937, counting Tōdai
students, faculty, administrators, and employees, two
hundred-fifteen (sixty-six of them students) had been
called up already; most numerous, at eighty-two, were
those in medicine. Tōdai—the entire institution—had
already been engulfed by the war.
Moreover, in terms of education and research, there
were parts of Tōdai that could not avoid becoming engulfed
wholly by the war. This was because in the university at the
time, the study of military affairs (weapons) was a major
field of research and education. For example, the ship-
building curriculum included a course in the design of
battleships. Nagayo’s successor as president, President
Hiraga—with the “Hiraga Purge,” he put an end to the
turmoil in the Faculty of Economics—was Japan’s leading
battleship designer and had set his hand to battleships
Nagato, Mutsu, Yamato, Musashi; he was called “the
battleship god.” When Nagayo was president, Hiraga was
dean of the Faculty of Engineering, and together the two
were invited to the christening of the battleships. From
Nagayo’s diary:
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November 16, 1937
Tuesday. Clear.
Attended christening of battlehip Hiryū at Yokosuka Works.
There and back by car. Dean Hiraga of Engineering went with.
…
Progress in Japan's shipbuilding knowledge is astonishing.
It's not simply the independence of the ship-building
industry; setting new standards in submarines, cruisers, and
the like, it now builds world's finest ships—astonishing. …
Today's launch completely according to plan, not even tiny
miscalculations, ended without incident. They say Hiryū tests
new design features.
In passing, let me note that it was not only the shipbuilding
curriculum that studied military arts. The aeronautics
curriculum studied planes for military use; there was also
the ordnance curriculum, a curriculum specializing in the
study of weapons. Traditionally, the ordnance curriculum
studied gunnery and gunpowder and bombs, but soon an
independent explosives curriculum was set up in the study
of explosives, but , distinct. Moreover, the fifth ordnance
course carried on the study of chemical weapons.
Military studies were carried on in close conjunction
with the military, of course, and as “commissioned
students,” many military men from both Army and Navy
were admitted to study at the university. There were only
thirty “commissioned students” in 1938, but they increased
year by year, and by about 1942, there were more than 120.
On graduating, the military’s “commissioned students”
were commissioned Naval Ordnance ensigns and Army
Gunnery lieutenants. In these fields of study, it was not
merely the students, but also the faculty: military men
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joined the university ranks as professors, lecturers, and the
like. Hiraga Yuzuru himself was a military man with the
rank of vice-admiral. After graduating from Tōdai, Hiraga
entered the Navy, became a naval officer, studied abroad at
the British Naval Academy, and learned the world’s finest
ship-building arts. While a military officer, he became a
Tōdai professor and trained many officers. Virtually all the
World War II ship-builders were Hiraga’s disciples.
A further index of the close ties between university and
military at this time is the special-researcher system for
graduate students. Upon promising to enter the military
after graduating, a faculty’s outstanding students were
allowed to advance to graduate school. While they were in
graduate school, the military paid not only for their tuition,
but also for their living expenses. (At a time when the salary
of a university instructor was 70 yen, they received 90 yen.)
Each year from 350 to 400 were selected, and always one
quarter of them were Tōdai students.
Moreover, in response to requests from the military, the
Faculty of Engineering also established a new curriculum.
In the section on the Faculty of Engineering in the Tōdai
Centennial History, there is the following: “Beginning in 1942
with the establishment of a course on oil, the establishment
or expansion of courses in each of the existing specialties
continued to advance at an unusual pace, virtually all in
response to requests from the military; the rationales for
the changes teem with phrases that reflect the times:
‘modern scientific war,’ ‘excellence in scientific weapons
determines victory or defeat,’ ‘to establish a national
defense state of a high order,’ ‘in the attempt to respond to
the urgent demand of the state,’ ‘to contribute to the great
work of establishing the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity
Sphere,’ and so on. There was even a course ‘Chemical
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Weapons.’ Here is an example from the fifth shipbuilding
curriculum: the rationale gives ‘The military’s intent
regarding the establishment of this curriculum.’ The
establishment of this course in large-scale production of
weapons is due to ‘the fervent demand of the military,’ and
this statement is appended: ‘If by any chance budget
overruns might lead to the elimination of this program, we
wish this program to continue even if the funds have to
come from the Army budget.’ Here we can see how much
the military clamored for the establishment of this
program.”
In 1942 various specialties and lecture courses had been
established in response to the demands of the military. Not
only that; in response to the demands of the military
supplies industry as a whole for more students in science
and engineering, an entire second science and engineering
department was established—Engineering II. President
Hiraga established it, and in his report to the Ministry of
Education he stated explicitly that the goal in creating
Engineering II was to foster human talent for the
prosecution of the war: “In Chiba, Tokyo Imperial
University has set aside over 80 acres of land and is
bending every effort to establish Engineering II, new, on
a greater scale than the existing Faculty of Engineering,
thereby increasing the fostering of the human talent the
state needs and responding to the strong demand of the
state. If we turn this plan into reality, three years from
now we will be able to offer the state four hundred twenty
useful human talents per year and contribute thereby to the
sacred task of constructing Great East Asia.”
In fact, this creation of Engineering II, too, began earlier
in Nagayo’s term as president. Here is a passage from
Nagayo’s diary:
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May 8, 1938: Sunday. Cloudy, then clear.
Yesterday at 11 Dean Tamba of Engineering came.
Feeling has arisen among core of faculty that in present
crisis and to improve future state fortunes, faculty cannot sit
idly by, and in March former Dean Hiraga set up a curriculum
plan for Engineering II. Tamba and new and old
representatives to the University Council all in agreement.
Before consulting Faculty Meeting, he wanted to ask my
opinion and showed me outline of his curriculum plan for
Engineering II.
1938 was the year the national mobilization law was
implemented, and in the form of an attachment to the
national mobilization law, an “Ordinance Controlling the
Employment of Graduates” was established by Imperial
decree. It focused on military production. Because the
competition for science and engineering students had
become intense, rather than leave the choice of employer
of science and engineering students to the free choice of
the individual, it regulated employment, focusing on the
state. Each business reported to the Ministry of Health the
numbers and specialties of the new graduates it needed for
each factory and office, and the Ministry of Health made
the allocation. During the Soviet era, Russia had this sort of
system, with the state controlling the careers of university
graduates in letters and in the sciences. This is one reason
it’s often pointed out that there are similarities between
Japan under national mobilization and communist
countries (communist countries virtually always have
mobilization systems). While national mobilization
existed, the state controlled the distribution of labor power
(the places that hired graduating students). Even after this
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system was set up, science and engineering students were
very much in demand, far too few to meet the demand, so
then there was no alternative but to create Engineering II.
The Issue of a Procession to the Meiji Shrine
But as in the Nagayo diary that I quoted earlier, behind
this plan lay an impatience on the part of some university
people. Large-scale war had already begun: “Was it enough
simply to sit idly by?” From the very start of the Japan-
China Incident, there began an across-the-board shift in
mood toward greater cooperation in the war effort.
Earlier, when left-wing student movements flourished,
it was unthinkable that the university actively cooperate
in the war, send congratulations to the military, or shout,
“Long live military victory!” But as the Japan-China
Incident progressed, such things became taken for
granted. Consider the entry from Nagayo’s diary for the
day Tōdai celebrated the fall of Nanjing:
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December 16, 1937. Thursday. Clear.
We hold a ceremony to commemorate the fall of Nanjing.
Platform set up on north side of athletic field, 5,000-6,000
employees and students line up in designated places, at 9:45
the university brass band played the Kimigayo twice, my
message, three shouts of “Long Live the Emperor,” three shouts
of “Long Live the Imperial Army and Navy,” ceremony ends.
Most present form procession, walk to palace, bow at
Nijūbashi, then process to Yasukuni Shrine, break up there.
After ceremony, accompanied by the chief cabinet
secretary, I present letter of thanks from Imperial University to
Army and Navy and say words of gratitude to Army Minister
Sugiyama in Army Minister's official residence, and to Admiral
Yamamoto, vice minister, in Navy Minister's official residence
(Navy Minister was at palace today), chat briefly about the
war, return home.
The backlash against Professor Yanaihara, advocate
against war and for peace, arose in this changed time and
mood.
The occasion for the first great collision between the
anti-war professors and the renovationist professors was
the issue of processing to the Meiji Shrine for that year’s
Meiji Ceremony (November 3, the birthday of Emperor
Meiji). In fact, at the November 24 Faculty Meeting of the
Faculty of Economics that dealt with the expulsion of
Yanaihara, the main topic there, too, was the visit to the
Meiji Shrine. At issue in the visit was that both “Friends of
Economics,” the autonomous student organization of the
Faculty of Economics, and Ōuchi had declined to take part.
For that reason Ōuchi, as we saw earlier, kept a careful
memo about the day’s give and take.
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What was the issue of the visit to the Meiji Shrine? Let’s
consult then-dean Hijikata’s The Events Are Long Behind Us:4
4 Hijikata Seibi, Jiken wa toku narinikeri (Tokyo: Keizai ōraisha, 1965).
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In 1937 the Japan-China Incident spread to the Shanghai front,
and wearying of the siege, our military fought a very tough
battle; in the attack the three brave soldiers carried the
bomb.5 Praying for the eternal success and the victory of the
imperial forces, public-spirited students tried to organize a
visit to the Meiji Shrine in anticipation of the November 8
Meiji Ceremony ….
But at first Tōdai officials vetoed the plan. I don't really
understand why, but I heard it was probably because it was
proposed by right-wing students, and a decision of the Deans’
Council vetoed it…. But whatever the reason, at the meeting of
the university's University Council several days later…the issue
arose of whether to allow a visit to the Meiji Shrine by
students who wanted to go. Representatives of the Faculty of
Natural Sciences raised the question, “Why not permit it?” But
the Faculty of Law was strongly opposed, and the majority
leaned against permitting it. … Then I stood up and said I
couldn't help it if the majority rejected the plan, but I wanted
to be told explicitly, there and then, the reason for the denial.
This was a visit that was voluntary (not mandatory) for public-
spirited students who wished to go to pray for the military
success of officers and men at the front. The speculation that,
for example, it was the scheme of a few right-wing students
was no reason to deny it. If it was, it might be said that to deny
it was to express anti-war ideas. Indeed, I'd like to be given a
clear reason for the denial. This was a question directed to the
president. Then the president responded, “Hmm, if that's the
case, let's approve it.” (Emphasis in original.)
5 RHM: The incident of the three brave soldiers became an icon of the war: during the siege,
the three joined forces to carry a large bomb to the base of a rampart, blowing up the
rampart at the cost of their lives.
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The condition for the president’s permission was that the
students conduct themselves in a way befitting students. If
that was to happen, it was thought that a professor should
accompany them, and given the circumstances thus far,
that responsibility fell to Hijikata (Honiden volunteered to
go along, too).
Hijikata’s account continues:
That November 3 the rain fell pretty heavily all morning….I
too thought that on a day like this, when it had rained all
morning, few would join the procession to the shrine. But as
luck would have it, or perhaps because the concern of the
students for the crisis was higher than that of their
highnesses, the professors, those who defied the rain and
gathered…became a large procession of more than a
thousand. That day President Nagayo came to the entryway
of Yasuda Auditorium to see the procession off; he said to me,
“Hijikata, thank you.” I responded, “We're off.” … When it left
via the main gate, the procession was occasionally brought
to a halt by the phalanx of photographers from newspapers
and elsewhere, but with all of us very calm and with no
ostentatious flag-waving apart from a single banner, we
walked in the rain to the Meiji Shrine and paid silent
obeisance at the shrine and then disbanded. Of course, that
day's evening editions and the next day's morning editions
reported on the procession and ran photographs.
Indeed, this procession of 1,000 Tōdai students to the Meiji
Shrine and their prayers for victory were reported
prominently in the general press. But strangely, if you
search the Imperial University News, there’s not a single line
about it. It seems the student mainstream ignored this
great patriotic event that Hijikata writes up here so
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grandiosely. In any case, Hijikata was furious that virtually
no students from the Faculty of Economics had taken part.
When he looked into the matter, the meeting of the
committee of the Friends of Economics that discussed
whether it should take part appears to have been taken
over by left-wing students who forced a decision against
participation. Hijikata summoned the members and
admonished them: “I have long regretted that some people
in the university lack patriotic ardor. No matter what the
situation in normal times, I thought that in this time of
national crisis, patriotism would blaze up. But on this issue
of the procession to the Meiji Shrine, the committee didn’t
show the slightest patriotism; without even sticking to its
own rules, it decided against participation. To encourage
soul-searching, I call on all its members to resign. From
now on I want you to keep in mind Article 1 of the
University Law—‘The university should give heed to the
cultivation of state thought’—and not have anti-state, anti-
patriotic feelings.” As I wrote earlier, the first topic of the
November 24 Faculty Meeting of the Faculty of Economics
that criticized Yanaihara’s essay, “The Ideal of the State,”
was in fact this issue of replacing the members of the
committee of the Friends of Economics.
Perhaps because this had happened, the atmosphere
within Tōdai thereafter became more and more patriotic,
and as in the Nagayo diary I cited earlier, on December
12 all students and faculty participated in the ceremony to
commemorate the fall of Nanjing. After the ceremony, all
6,000 processed to the plaza in front of the palace, together
bowed to the palace, and then all marched to Yasukuni
Shrine to bow. Such events took place, and no one objected.
Tōdai, too, had rapidly turned patriotic.
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Non-Confidence in Ōuchi as University Council
Representative
To return to the story of the November 24 Faculty
Meeting of the Faculty of Economics, there was a second
major item on the agenda. It was to oust Ōuchi from his
seat on the University Council. The University Council was
the university’s highest decision–making organ; it included
two representatives of each faculty. At the time, Ōuchi was
a representative of the Faculty of Economics. The issue was
the attempt to kick him out. Hijikata thought that the
Marxist Ōuchi was unquestionably behind the anti-war
left-wing students in the Faculty of Economics and wanted
to oust him. In the colloquium University Autonomy 6 held in
1963, Ōuchi speaks as follows: “I first became an issue at the
Faculty Meeting of the Faculty of Economics of November
24, 1937; it was the same day as the Yanaihara Incident
we’ve discussed, and the political background was precisely
the same. The right-wing professors around Hijikata
apparently wanted to make me resign at the same time as
Yanaihara, so they had to pin something on me. As I said
before, in Yanaihara’s case they made it an issue that his
essay was not patriotic; so they pinned something else on
me. It was that on November 3 of that year, at the time of
the Meiji Ceremony, there was a proposal that the ‘Friends
of Economics,’ the association of Faculty of Economics
students, form up and go en masse to pay obeisance at the
Meiji Shrine, and when they asked what the faculty thought
of it, Hijikata said by all means do it…but I said it’d be okay
if only those who wanted to go went. Hijikata said of this
statement that if such an unpatriotic fellow represented
6 Daigaku no jichi, ed. Tanaka Kōtarō (Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1963). Participants
included Tanaka, Suekawa, Wagatsuma, Ōuchi, Miyazawa.
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the Faculty of Economics, he would not serve as dean, so
he would resign. I said the whole thing was utterly silly,
but he said he was resigning, period. In response, Honiden
and Tanabe argued that there was no need for Hijikata to
resign but that I should resign.” This was all a charade acted
out by Hijikata, Honiden, and Tanabe. As we’ve seen, in
the attack on Yanaihara, too, the same charade was acted
out. In Ōuchi’s Fifty Years in Economics, he speaks once again
of this time and quotes Honiden and Tanabe: “At the time
of the Yanaihara Incident, Honiden and Tanabe said in
Faculty Meeting, ‘We must now drive England out of
China. Once we’ve done that, we’ll deal with the Tōdai
scholars who preach peace.’ Listening to their grandiose
statement, I thought they must have lost their minds, but
thinking about it afterward, those fellows had been truly
prophetic. At the time they were prophets who already
believed firmly in the victory of fascism.”
Hearing these statements, today’s young folks may all
think, with Ōuchi, that these people “must have lost their
minds,” but at the time such thinking was not rare: the
“renovationist” faction, the university’s renovationist
faction, and the military’s renovationist faction all thought
basically that way. Japan’s chief enemy was England, which
ruled the world, especially with huge colonies all over Asia,
and Japan’s historic mission was to liberate the colonies
from England. The lead essay in Renovation, “The Mission
of a Renovationist Society,” which I introduced earlier, also
started off: “Japan is the last bastion defending the East
from foreign invasion, and the liberation of Asia is the
historic mission assigned Japan.” Also in that first issue
of Renovation, “The Fundamental Principles of Japan’s
Economic Renovation,” a long essay contributed by
Tanabe, argued, “The stage that the Japanese economy is
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facing is development toward a controlled economy for the
sake of preparing for war;” the war for which Japan must
prepare was the war of intervention of the Allied Powers
that would follow the China Incident. “In short, according
to our firm belief, the current incident is not simply a
conflict between Japan and China. It is a conflict, in part
camouflaged, with England and Russia, and we cannot
predict when those two countries—perhaps along with
France and the United States—will intervene.” The
renovationist faction within the military often voiced the
same thought; it was the common sense, so to speak, of all
the renovationist factions. In the final analysis, the greatest
point of difference at this time between the leftist
faction—Ōuchi and the others—and the renovationist
faction—Hijikata and the others—was their different takes
on the war and the crisis.
Yanaihara Writes His Apology
In My Resume, Ōuchi recapitulates: “At the time in the
Faculty of Economics, these three professors—Hijikata,
Honiden, and Tanabe—were at the center of a movement
advocating that Tōdai’s cooperate in the war effort. We had
no interest in that and didn’t join so foolish a movement.
Then they attacked us publicly and privately, saying that
because those fellows Yanaihara and Ōuchi weren’t
interested, the students too weren’t interested, and Tōdai
as a whole was negative and critical about the crisis. But we
hadn’t the slightest idea that they, who were saying these
things, would go farther and stir up trouble.
“It was, I think, November 1937. A full meeting of the
Friends of Economics—the organization of Faculty of
Economics students—was held…and at that time Honiden
gave a speech saying that Tōdai should cooperate a bit more
in the crisis. But I just thought I didn’t have to cooperate in
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the military’s aggressive war. One day in Faculty Meeting
right after the meeting of the Friends of Economics,
Hijikata suddenly produced a copy of the September issue
of Chūō kōron, pointed to Yanaihara’s essay, and came out
with, ‘The guy who wrote this essay is not fit to be a
professor. I ask that the Faculty Meeting make that
decision.’”7
Yanaihara’s essay, “The Ideal of the State,” that the dean
made an issue of: it was supposedly so problematic, but it
simply wasn’t. On reading it, you understand that at once.
But it isn’t an easy essay to read: it quotes the Old
Testament copiously and is hard to make sense of. Even if
you want to make an issue of it, it’s hard to do so in a way
that everyone will understand. To hear Hijikata, who sank
his teeth into it at the Faculty Meeting, he says this: “When
I read this essay through, I thought it was inappropriate
for the times. To be sure, if you read it today, it’s entirely
unexceptionable, harmless. It’s different if it’s a critique of
a happy, peaceful age. But at the time it was a problem.
It’s a satire that cites the words of the prophet Isaiah to
suggest that Japan is fighting an unjust war. Of course, it’s
one thing if he addressed a memorial to the government
making an anti-war argument point-blank. Was there a
single person in Japan then so brave as to do that? But this
essay in a mass-circulation journal, satirical and sneering
at the crisis, stirred up people’s emotions to no purpose,
merely sapped the fighting spirit of our officers and men at
the front, and didn’t help in coping with the crisis.”8
Yes, Chūō kōron was banned simply because it included
7 Watakushi no rirekisho.
8 Hijikata, Jiken wa toku narinikeri (1965).
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this essay, but did this essay seal Yanaihara’s fate? No.
Given that even his adversary Hijikata calls it “harmless,”
it can’t be of much use as clincher. In fact, at the Faculty
Meeting in question, most people hadn’t read it. Ōuchi
asksed, “Shouldn’t we read it first?” and the issue of
Yanaihara’s “Ideal of the State” was tabled until the next
Faculty Meeting. In the meantime, Ōuchi rushed about
saying Yanaihara had agreed to write a letter of apology
to President Nagayo—this we can divine from the Nagayo
Matarō Diary. The Yanaihara issue had already come to the
attention of the Minister of Education (Kido Kōichi, later
Privy Seal), and Nagayo had been a close friend of his for
many years, so with Kido’s consent Nagayo could seek a
satisfactory solution:
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Nov. 27, 1937: Saturday. Clear.
University. Three professors Ōuchi, Maide, Mori appear.
Make presentation about problem in Faculty of Economics.
Exchange opinions, promise to act prudently.
10:30: appointment at Minister of Education Kido's home. …
Also on Yanaihara issue: Minister is always in touch with me,
and if said person intends to express sincere apologies to me
and Faculty Meeting, we wish to warn about future conduct
and settle issue amicably. Even if as result of negotiations with
Interior Ministry, incident grows more serious and
punishment necessary, I express hope Ministry of Education
will respect university autonomy and not be heavy-handed….
Seek agreement of Minister of Education. Kido: “I agree fully.”
Back to university, summon Dean Hijikata
immediately….state my view that once Yanaihara has gone
through formality of apology to Faculty Meeting and
president, I'd like harmonious solution, with any further steps
taken in consultation with me. Hijikata says he agrees in
general, but two or three professors have very decided
opinions, and he will exert every effort to see that nothing
arise contrary to my will.
Return home. Ōuchi and Maide appear at 3. Consult on
solution…. If the two can get Yanaihara to present letter of
apology that satisfies me, then ask their full cooperation in
satisfactory solution to crisis….
Nov. 28. Sunday. Clear.
*Yanaihara Issue.
Ōuchi Hyōe comes. Yanaihara grateful for my good will,
intends to express very respectful contrition; presents text of
Yanaihara's handwritten apology. I cut one sentence of
original, express satisfaction with rest.
At this point, agreement had been reached to settle the
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matter with the presentation of Yanaihara’s apology. The
apology was actually written and is included in Nagayo’s
diary:
Nov. 30, 1937.
Your Honor, President Nagayo:
I regret sincerely that my published words have caused
trouble and occasioned you worry. It goes without saying that
I prize obedience to the constitution and laws of the land, and
I love Japan deeply…. But because the method of expressing
my ideas was inadequate, I was unable to convey my true
intent and have been delinquent in not living up to the
responsibilities of a professor, so I have caused you concern. I
humbly express my regret. It is my true intention to exercise
full caution henceforth.
Yanaihara Tadao (seal).
Hijikata still was dissatisfied and expressed his strong
opinion, but by main force Nagayo got him to accede to this
proposed solution. In his diary Nagayo writes of his reason
for this proposed solution, and to read what he says is to
understand that Nagayo was an extremely perceptive man.
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University self-control and self-discipline are necessary. But
when that takes the form of a response to pressure from
outside, it destroys university autonomy and is not something
I can tolerate.
He did not break the laws of the state. If the university as
a whole rides the current of the times, it is in trouble. Not
right to paint everything the one color of patriotism and the
militarists.
When no person who embraces liberal ideas can be a
university professor, academic freedom collapses. I am
extremely patriotic and extremely worried for the country.
The individual concerned apologizes for inappropriate
speech. It is wrong to go further.
Yanaihara is a fine scholar. His reputation overseas is high.
It is narrow-minded to drive out those with different ideology.
Unity in diversity is university ideal.
President Nagayo Reconsiders
By November 30, agreement had been reached. But
suddenly on November 30, another report reached officials,
and everything fell apart. The next morning, abruptly,
Yanaihara wrote out his resignation.
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From Nagayo's diary:
*It Is Decided Yanaihara Will Resign.
4:30: returned home. 5:00: Yamakawa appeared.
He reports: as result of consultation at official residence of
Minister of Education, apology is wholly insufficient; passages
in two writings apart from Chūō kōron are completely
irreconcilable with spirit of kokutai; should questions arise in the
Diet, there is absolutely no justification, and the university too
will not escape getting embroiled in the matter. There is no
alternative to Yanaihara's resignation.
Looking at these two writings, I too find them utterly
unacceptable. Decide his resignation is only alternative. …
Immediately summon Ōuchi and Maide, tell them the
situation, decide to have Yanaihara submit resignation prior
to tomorrow's Faculty Meeting; together we visit Onozuka; he
too agrees entirely with me…
Home at 10 p.m. (Italics: Tachibana.)
What were the two writings that caused it all to fall apart?
One is the essay that appears in the following passage from
Ōuchi’s “The Events of Yanaihara’s Resignation”: “Things
changed suddenly the next day. At 5:30 on Nov. 30, Maide
and I were summoned by phone to the president’s home.
The president said sternly to us: ‘I’ve tried till now to
protect Yanaihara, but now this apology is simply not
enough. Even prior to the Chūō kōron essay, there is the
text of another speech by Yanaihara. And the officials in the
Ministry of Education say it leaves them no room to defend
Professor Yanaihara in the Diet. I too read it, and it was
absolutely wrong of Yanaihara. Given its existence, there
is no alternative but to ask Yanaihara to resign; I regret it,
but impossible is impossible; I can’t allow the government
to be put into a quandary on his account.’ Up till then, I
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too hadn’t known of this speech; it was a passage from a
eulogy for Fujii Takeshi. Yanaihara himself probably never
ever expected it might become an issue.”
Fujii Takeshi was a disciple of Uchimura Kanzō and
older than Yanaihara; he was the disciple Yanaihara
respected most highly. After graduating from the Tōdai
Faculty of Law, Fujii entered the Home Ministry and served
as a prefectural official but soon resigned to become an
independent preacher. He turned to Uchimura Kanzō and
until Uchimura’s death was close to him. Soon after
Uchimura’s death, Fujii too died, as if following Uchimura
in death. He was a great inspiration to Yanaihara, and the
two were also close personally, so close that Yanaihara had
married Fujii’s younger sister.
Fujii had strong passions, on the order of the Old
Testament prophet Jeremiah; he lamented the rottenness
and rampant evil of this world and exclaimed that as things
stood, Japan would incur the wrath of God and perish.
Among his fiercest prophetic poems is “Perish!”, with the
refrain: “Perish! Country of soiled virgins, country of young
men without self-respect / Country of beasts and insects
that do not know true love! / Perish!” Yanaihara responded
strongly to this poem. The reflection he wrote the day of
the February 26 Incident was to this poem—“The quatrain
‘Perish!’ that the young prophet among us left behind
resounds like the incoming tide.”
Each year thereafter, on the anniversary of Fujii’s death,
Yanaihara held a memorial service, and the following
problematic words from the 1937 memorial service
appeared in his private newsletter Tidings: “Today, in a
world of lies, we sit at the funeral of the ideals of the Japan
we all love, the Japan that has lost its ideals. I am beyond
anger. I am beyond tears. Please, everyone, if you
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understand what I’ve said: to give life to the ideal Japan,
please first consign this country to the grave!”
The True Reason for Yanaihara’s Resignation
According to the standard explanation, this passage
from the speech became the decisive factor in Yanaihara’s
expulsion. But I don’t think that’s true. As you understand
if you read Nagayo’s diary closely, the problem was two
writings over and above the Chūō kōron essay, “Ideal of the
State.” And the problem was the kokutai. The problematic
writings contained “passages that are completely
irreconcilable with the kokutai.” But this memorial address
contains not a single line that infringes the kokutai. The
true problem, it’s clear, was not this memorial address but
something else. Ōuchi’s account continues as follows about
“Ideals of the State”: “If you don’t get caught up in the
trivialities of words and grasp what Yanaihara wants to
say, it is clear at first glance that it does not come from an
unpatriotic heart.” “Please consign Japan to the grave!” may
be immoderate, but it’s mere rhetoric, isn’t it?
What sealed Yanaihara’s fate is another book, Nation and
Peace, that was laid on the chopping block at this time. “The
Nostalgic and the Forward-Looking in the Japanese Spirit”
has a series of vehement passages that reject Japan’s kokutai
head-on and say the emperor isn’t a god. It fits to a tee
the description “passages that are completely irreconcilable
with the kokutai.” In this essay Yanaihara discusses various
theories of the Japanese spirit: “They all say that the state
is at the root of our nation’s culture, of the Japanese spirit,
that the emperor is the center of the state; so they make the
emperor either the highest good as true ego of the nation,
or the person who is the source of action, or the object of
the state’s highest reverence. Hence they hold that the core
of our Japanese spirit is a belief in the supremacy of a state
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led by the emperor and finding its unity in the emperor.
Thus I take the concept of kokutai to be the center of studies
of the Japanese spirit, and the center of kokutai studies
must be the state as highest value and the emperor as
sacred…”
Yanaihara addresses the issue of the emperor first: “The
basis of the emperor’s divinity is not his person but his
status, and the basis of the emperor’s personality is not the
status but the person. The reigning emperor is god in his
state status, so it is not the case that he personally has all-
sacred, all-loving, all-knowing, all-powerful divinity. In life
and person, he is the same as all humans and has human
life relative to the Lord and Creator.” Then he turns his
attention to the issue of the state: “[The view that the state
is supreme] gives birth to the assertion that what is moral
is what the state wants, what benefits the state…. This is an
extremely shallow view of morality, of the state; it is like a
complacent, egotistic view of human life. True patriotism
recognizes as morality a universal self-evident truth
transcending the state and criticizes its own actual state
in terms of that morality; by pointing out and correcting
what is contrary to self-evident truth, it approaches the
ideal state and must try to let the light of morality shine out
from within the state. So true patriotism thinks not of state
good but of state morality.”
The book was banned the next day, so we can tell that
it was on this very day that the officials too grasped its
problematic nature. Yanaihara himself wrote9 that the
work is “something I wrote on mature reflection, fully
resolved to take the consequences,” and “when that book
9 Yanaihara, “Omoide: 4,” Yanaihara Tadao zenshū, vol. 26.
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incurred judicial penalty, this was the most problematic
essay. I myself set the most store by this essay.” From this,
too, we see that “The Nostalgic and the Forward-Looking in
the Japanese Spirit” was the real problem.
The above becomes clear on reading the Tokyo
prosecutor’s office’s “Documents Concerning the Cases of
Infringement against the Publication Law involving
Yanaihara Tadao and Several Others.”10 Yanaihara’s
writings—
A: essays in the Iwanami volume The Nation and Peace;
B: the private newsletter Tidings; and
C: “The Ideal of the State” in Chūō kōron
—were investigated for infringing the publication law
on the following two counts: profaning the dignity of the
Imperial House; and upsetting public peace and
tranquility. Half of A and all of B and C were investigated
only for “upsetting public peace and tranquility.” The only
passages in The Nation and Peace investigated for the greater
crime of “profaning the dignity of the Imperial House”
(Article 26 of the publications law) were in the essay, “The
Nostalgic and the Forward-Looking in the Japanese Spirit.”
The documents state explicitly that it was considered
criminal that “despite writing and publishing [these
passages] rejecting the absoluteness of our country’s
emperor and profaning the dignity of the Imperial House,
he still hasn’t changed his mind.” The issue is crystal clear.
Why, then, have all those involved maintained that the
problem was the memorial address, not the essay that
rejects the godhood of the emperor? I think it’s because
identifying the latter as the problem was too dangerous.
10 Gendaishi shiryō 41: Masu mejya tōsei 2 (46 vols.; Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1962-80).
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Had that passage become famous, it wouldn’t have been
surprising if something had happened, such as fanatic
rightists coming to run Yanaihara through. Nor would it
have been surprising if university officials at the
presidential level and even the Minister of Education had
been called to account. To divert the public gaze from an
abstruse essay that few had read (it appeared first in Ideals,
a small-circulation journal of theoretical philosophy),
everyone maintained in unison that the issue was the
easier-to-understand, less-dangerous memorial
address—“Look! Look! Here’s the problem!”—and that
became the standard explanation.
On December 2, the day after he submitted his
resignation, before three hundred people filling Lecture
Hall #7 to overflowing, Yanaihara gave his final lecture. The
Imperial University News ran a very detailed report on its
content and wrote as follows about the final moments:
“Now every head in the entire lecture hall was bowed, and
in the silence faint sobs began to be heard…. ‘I fear with all
my heart that after I have left the university will become
fascist. I fear absolutely…that the university—especially the
Faculty of Economics—will move at the whim of the
currents of the outer world. If that happens, scholarship
of course will perish…. I depart, taking my leave of the
university, my study, colleagues, students. But for me
myself, this is not important. I do not fear those who can
kill the body but not the soul. If I fear no one, neither do
I hate or grudge. Rather, I scorn those whose bodies alone
are fat, their souls thin. Don’t become that sort of person.’”
Long afterwards, Hijikata wrote of this peroration as
follows: “In his farewell lecture to students, Yanaihara
satirized me harshly—‘I scorn those who are fat as pigs
and whose souls are thin,’ wrote ‘I don’t like marching at
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the head of a parade,’and left Tōdai. Those with fat souls
really are different from us ordinary mortals.” Was that the
image Hijikata had of himself? Unaware he was doing so,
he changed “fat” to “fat as pigs.”
Ōkōchi Kazuo was a member of the Faculty of Economics
amid this turmoil; long afterward, he became president,
and in a graduation speech—by general consensus a great
speech—he said, “Don’t become a fat pig; become a thin
Socrates.” That passage alludes to this exchange between
Yanaihara and Hijikata.
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4Spy H., Who Sent
Professors of Economics to
Prison
In which the author completes the story of Yanaihara Tadao’s
expulsion from Tōdai. He then reviews the mass arrests of the first
Popular Front Incident (December 1937), which included many
members of the non-Communist left, and the arrests of three
professors of the Faculty of Economics in the Faculty Group
Incident (February 1, 1938). The Tōdai spy Hashizume Akio takes
center stage, along with the arrest of Ōuchi Hyōe. Throughout this
period, Japan’s war in China has a major impact on events at
Tōdai.
In the Lecture Hall, Scattered Applause
One of those present at Yanaihara’s final lecture of was
Ōgiya Shōzō, for many years editor in chief of Weekly Asahi
and architect of that magazine’s golden age. At the time,
tokyo university and the war | 96
Ōgiya was a novice reporter for the Tokyo Asahi; he had
graduated two years earlier from Tōdai’s Faculty of Letters
with a specialty in Japanese history. Long afterward, in an
essay about Yanaihara’s resignation, he wrote as follows1:
1 “Tōdai hikkashi” (The Publication-Indictment Issue at Tōdai), Bungei shunjū, October
1955.
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I rushed to the lecture hall. Students came streaming in. There
were also some people in suits. … Among them were likely
Special Police from the Motofuji Station, eagle-eyed men in
threadbare suits. …
10:30. Professor Yanaihara Tadao arrived. His slender frame
was bent, and he seemed sad. “I think you know. Yesterday,
not wanting to cause further trouble for the university, I
submitted my resignation….” Then he turned to his lecture,
serenely. It was about the role of bank capital in colonies….
The lecture went on for an hour.
He said, “I'll stop here. In conclusion….” And then, raising his
head, he spoke to this effect: “The mission of the university
lies in criticizing the policies of the actors of the day from
a higher, comprehensive viewpoint. Sometimes that involves
criticizing even war itself. Sometimes such criticism is useful
to the actors, sometimes not. That's unavoidable in the world
of the university…unavoidable.” In the term ‘actor’—specifying
neither government nor military—I sensed a sign of the
times.2 The hall had become very quiet… Scattered applause
was heard in the hall.
“But at this parting, students, I want to say only one thing to
you. No matter how your body may be stained, may you keep
your souls unstained. I respect such people. And I despise
those who—no matter how splendid their bodies—have
souls that are stained…”
Thunderous applause. A storm of applause—as if a dam
had burst. Amid it, seeming a bit cheered up, Yanaihara left
the building.
The Mass Arrest of Four Hundred Rōnōha Members
2 RHM: Other translations of Yanaihara's jikkōsha include executor, performer, implementer,
even policy-maker.
tokyo university and the war | 98
Within a scant two weeks of Professor Yanaihara’s final
lecture, mass arrests of Rōnōha people nationwide were
carried out (the first Popular Front Incident), and at one fell
swoop four hundred people in eighteen prefectures were
arrested on suspicion of infringing the Peace Preservation
Law. Among those arrested were famous left-wing men of
letters3 and sitting representatives in the Diet: Kuroda
Hisao (Social Mass Party) and Katō Kanjū (Japan
Proletarian Party). Virtually all those arrested were leading
members of the Japan Proletarian Party or of labor unions
affiliated with the JPP or of the national council of labor
unions. Among those arrested: virtually all the
powerbrokers of the non-Communist left.4
What was the Rōnōha? In a word, Rōnōha was a collective
term for the non-Communist left that sought no ties with
the Comintern—that’s the most understandable and
accurate description. It wasn’t a factional group with any
organization of its own; this label was applied by
journalists.
Under the influence of the Comintern, those in the
socialist movement met in 1922 and formed—illegally—the
Japan Communist Party. But it splintered quickly over the
issue of whether to make the abolition of the emperor
system a slogan, and it dissolved under the shock of the
official terror against the socialist movement that arose
after the Great Kantō earthquake of 1923. In 1926 the party
was reestablished, but there was a confrontation over the
direction to take thereafter between two
3 RHM: Tachibana mentions, among others, Yamakawa Hitoshi, Ōmori Yoshitarō,
Sakisaka Itsurō, Arahata Kanson, Suzuki Mosaburō.
4 RHM: Tachibana mentions Inemura Junzō, Yamahata Hideo, Shimagami Zengorō,
and Akamatsu Isamu, who after the war all became Socialist Party Diet
representatives.
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factions—Yamakawa-ism, which advocated proceeding as
a mass political movement based on the labor movement
(for this faction, socialist revolution became a distant goal),
and Fukumoto-ism, which argued a two-step revolution,
first a bourgeois revolution that overturns the monarchy,
with progressive revolutionary party members taking the
lead, then a rapid transformation to socialist revolution.
The movement split. In the end, via a ruling of the
Comintern, Yamakawa-ism was rejected as opportunism,
and under the leadership of the Comintern, the Japan
Communist Party moved forward as a Leninist party of
professional revolutionaries aiming at a two-stage
revolution.
Put simply, the Rōnōha was Yamakawa-ism, which parted
ways with the Comintern at this time; among the
strands—labor movement, farm movement—of the mass
movement, it was consistently stronger than the radical
movement led by the Communist Party. The Communist
Party had greater leadership than the Rōnōha only among
students and intellectuals who favored a radical idealistic
movement.
Government officials drew up the Peace Preservation
Law specifically to control the Communist Party and create
a structure that could suppress political parties that hoisted
such slogans as “a change in the kokutai” (i.e., abolition of
the emperor system) and “non-recognition of private
property” in particular. In 1928 they added the death
penalty. But the Rōnōha aimed at a legal mass movement
with a legal political organization and didn’t call for
abolishing the emperor system or not recognizing private
property, so it couldn’t get tripped up by the Peace
Preservation Law.
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The Popular Front—the Comintern’s Major Policy
Change
So why did officials apply the Peace Preservation Law to
the Rōnōha at this time and make large-scale arrests nation-
wide? In the background lay a major change by the
Comintern. The Comintern’s previous policy had called for
breaking up the social democrats: the social democratic
parties were the revolutionary party’s greatest enemy, so
crushing them was the shortest path to revolution. In July-
August 1935, the Seventh Congress of the Comintern
turned instead to the anti-fascist Popular Front: in order to
fight fascism, make common cause with all political forces
that oppose fascism; form a Popular Front.
In Japan at this time, the Communist Party had already
been destroyed; the end of the Communist Party was the
December 1933 incident when Party members tortured two
suspected Central Committee spies and murdered one of
them.5 The last member of the party’s central committee
was arrested in March 1935, so when the seventh congress
of the Comintern adopted the tactic of the Popular Front,
there existed in Japan no party organization to follow that
guidance.
But with this change in Comintern tactics, the fierce
fighting in Europe between Communist Party and social
democrats disappeared, and the great political fault line
became fascism vs. Popular Front. In 1928 the Fascists came
to power in Italy; in 1933, the Nazis took power in Germany.
In France and Spain the Popular Front won electoral
victories, and even in China, thanks to the Comintern’s
change in policy, national unity arose for the sake of the
5 RHM: In December 1933 Party members tortured two members and killed one
accused of betrayal.
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resist-Japan hate-Japan policy; up till then, there had been
fierce opposition and civil war between Guomindang and
Communist Party.
In the absence of the Japan Communist Party, the
Comintern’s policy change was communicated to Japan by
various routes and had a major influence on the remaining
non-communist left. Nosaka Sanzō’s “Letter to Japanese
Communists” was delivered through the American
seaman’s union, but more general newspapers and
magazines had a much greater role in communicating this
change; the mass media reported on the policy change itself
steadily throughout 1935. A bit later, in October 1936, Kaizō
put together a thirty-page special issue, lining up articles by
such luminaries as Arahata Kanson and Minobe Ryōkichi.
The general election of 1936 was held a scant few days
before the February 26 Incident. In part as a result of the
Comintern’s change in policy, the Social Mass Party made
great gains, growing from five seats in the Diet to eight. In
this election Katō Kanjū ran on the ticket of the most left-
wing Proletarian Party with an anti-fascist slogan and won
the most votes nationwide. In 1935, Katō had gone to the
United States at the invitation of the American Federation
of Labor (AFL) and at that time met Nosaka Sanzō, then in
the United States; he heard from him firsthand about the
Comintern’s change of policy. Katō’s election battle was the
Popular Front epitomized in Japan.
The election returns likely frightened officials. In
November that year the Japan-Germany pact was signed.
This mutual defense treaty is formally the “German-
Japanese pact against international communism” (i.e., the
Comintern), and the heart of the pact is that the two parties
cooperate in sharing intelligence and taking the defense
measures necessary to confront the Comintern. A secret
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annex provided that if either country were attacked by the
Soviet Union, both countries would respond. The Soviet
Union and the Comintern were seen as one and the same.
The Japan Communist Party was the Japan branch of the
Comintern, so the Communist Party was under the control
of the Comintern and received its support: manpower,
material, ideology. Under the Peace Preservation Law’s
rubric of “associations that aim to change the kokutai and
reject private property,” the Japan Communist Party was
included, of course, but also the Comintern itself. And in
the “crime of pursuit of ends” of the Peace Preservation
Law, actions on behalf of the Comintern were also covered.
This meant that after the Seventh Congress, once the
Popular Front became formally a Comintern tactic, it
became possible to use the Popular Front to charge the
Rōnōha under the Peace Preservation Law. A December 22,
1937 news release made the connection: “Since its
founding, the officers of the Japan Proletarian Party have
worn a mask of legality, based on the directive of tactical
camouflage issued by the Comintern, headquarters of
world communism, and have been engaged in a strange
communist movement. Aware of this, officials have exerted
every effort at surveillance and just recently seized
evidence that, based on the guiding principles of the
Rōnōha that serve communism, the Japan Proletarian Party
is engaged in secret maneuvering to change the kokutai.
Now, after careful deliberation with officials of the
Ministry of Justice and in view of the current crisis, the
officials have finally lowered the boom on the entire party”
(Italics: Tachibana). It reported that the Japan Proletarian
Party had been declared illegal under the Peace
Preservation Law. Unlike the Japan Communist Party, the
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Rōnōha didn’t have a superstructure, so the Japan
Proletarian Party was singled out as the core organization.
In addition, a page-two report, “Intent to Mobilize the
Masses Aiming at Communist Revolution,” explained this
policy change at the Comintern’s Seventh Congress. This
wasn’t Asahi commentary; it was the explanation put out by
the Home Ministry’s press office: “[The Comintern] made
a major change in its previous policy and took a policy
similar to that of the Rōnōha, so the activities of the Rōnōha
since then have gained strength and rapidly intensified.”
Noting that the anti-fascist Popular Front struggle that the
Japan Proletarian Party boasted of matches Comintern
policy precisely, it said: “Recently, based on the ideology of
the Rōnōha, the Japan Proletarian Party gives evidence of
intending to change the kokutai, and it has become clear
that the establishment of the anti-fascist Popular Front,
the central movement goal, is exactly the same as the
Comintern’s new policy—to mobilize the masses for
communist revolution.” The Rōnōha movement had always
been a legal organization and legal movement, so sophistry
was necessary to ensnare it in the Peace Preservation Law:
Japan Proletarian Party equals Rōnōha equals communist
revolutionaries equals anti-fascist Popular Front equals
Comintern Popular Front equals goal of communist
revolution equals goal of changing the kokutai equals
infringement of the Peace Preservation Law. But at every
stage, this sophistry makes very large logical leaps and
factual mistakes.
In fact, in both word and deed the Rōnōha had always
drawn a line between it and the Communist Party and
taken pains to preserve its legality, so such sophistry wasn’t
so easy to sell. As we shall see later, this sophistry was
stretched to the limit when applied of all Rōnōha members
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to the Faculty Group. There were eleven members of the
Faculty Group—Ōuchi, Arisawa, Wakimura, Uno Kōzō,
Takahashi Masao, Abe Isamu, Minobe Ryōkichi, and the
others, and it was for this reason that all except Abe and
Arisawa were found innocent in the first trial: “it is not
recognized that they were aware that the Rōnōha was a
society with the aim of realizing a proletarian revolution.”
Then in appellate court, the Rōnōha itself was not
“recognized as a society with the aim of changing the
kokutai,” and all were found innocent. The rest of the
group—Yamakawa Hitoshi, Katō Kanjū, Suzuki Mosaburō,
and the others—fought till the end; but while the fight was
still going on, the war ended, and the Peace Preservation
Law lapsed. So all had the charges against them dismissed.
To return to the earlier article, the italicized part—“in
light of the current crisis”—of course referred to the fact
that beginning with the Sino-Japanese Incident (July 7, the
Marco Polo Bridge incident), Japan went onto war footing.
By December 15, when these Rōnōha mass arrests were
carried out (the news accounts came one week later), the
war was already in full flood. In fact, the mass arrests were
carried out two days after the fall of Nanjing.
The Man Who Tailed Ōuchi, Arisawa, and the Others
The account in the last chapter—that all Tōdai held a
ceremony to commemorate the fall of Nanjing, with faculty
and students processing from the ceremony to the palace
and to Yasukuni Shrine, bowing at the palace and praying
at the shrine: all that took place on the day after the Popular
Front Incident. In the first Popular Front Incident only
former—not current—members of the Tōdai Faculty of
Economics were arrested: Ōmori Yoshitarō, former
assistant professor, and Sakisaka Itsurō, former instructor
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(he became a professor at Kyushu University and resigned
in the March 15 Incident).
The second Popular Front Incident occurred on February
1, 1937, a scant two months after the first Popular Front
Incident; on that day current professors—mainly from
Tōdai—were arrested. Ōuchi was considered the “authority
in Marxian economics” and was the central figure of the
Faculty Group. In My Resume, he says of the events:
Ōuchi: Meanwhile, in December Rōnōha members were
arrested. And I was Rōnōha, and a motion was introduced at
Faculty Meeting calling for Rōnōha professors to resign. Amid
this panicky state of affairs, in the evening edition for January
29, 1937, an article appeared saying that the Faculty Group,
I and the rest, would likely be arrested. I thought that was
strange. On the one hand, I thought that they'd never arrest
us, but given the disorganization of the authorities of the day,
they just might.
Takahashi: Tell us about the arrest.
Ōuchi: At that time, it had already been in the air for two
or three days, so even though I thought it wasn't necessary, I
prepared against all contingencies and did make preliminary
plans with Arisawa and Minobe. We agreed on what to say
and how to say it.
But afterwards that caused real trouble. A spy found out
about it. To this day I still don't know the details…but they
knew it all: where I ate, what I said and when.
In the arrests nationwide in the Faculty Group Incident
that day, thirty-eight people got picked up, but the focus
was the Faculty Group of the Tōdai Faculty of Economics:
Professor Ōuchi and Assistant Professors Arisawa and
Wakimura. In addition, Minobe Ryōkichi and Abe Isamu,
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professors at Hōsei University, were arrested, too, but they
were Ōuchi disciples of the Tōdai Faculty of Economics and
until recently had been Tōdai teaching assistants, in the
same group as Ōuchi and the others; so “Faculty Group”
equaled “Ōuchi Group.” Arisawa’s specialty was statistics,
and he was a major expert on controlled economies; in the
next day’s papers he was identified as “a Marxist authority
on war economy.” Arisawa had long been known as a
central figure of Marxist economics at Tōdai, and he had
been implicated earlier, too, in the Takigawa Incident; at
that time he was Tōdai’s most prominent red professor.
Later, looking back on that time, then-president Onozuka
Kiheiji made the famous comment, “I’m glad nothing
happened to Arisawa.” In the speech of Miyazawa Yutaka in
the Lower House of the Diet criticizing red professors, the
speech that triggered the Takigawa Incident, there is this
passage: “A middle-aged assistant professor who handles
statistics in the Tōdai Faculty of Economics uses a book by
Marx as text and criticizes the theory of marginal utility
unmercifully; he praises Marxist economics and is the
worst red professor.” It was clear to those involved that this
was a reference to Arisawa. In the symposium of retirees
in Fifty Years of the Tōdai Faculty of Economics, Arisawa
remembers that time this way: “Even the students sensed
that I was in trouble, and some even said, ‘Professor
Arisawa, this is the last class, isn’t it.” The owner of the
second-hand bookstore Shimazaki said, ‘Professor, it’s
over.’ (The store was in front of the Red Gate; its proprietor
had taken a course with Arisawa.) In response, I said
boastfully, ‘Don’t talk nonsense. They can’t touch me.’ But
one day Dean Mori summoned me and said, ‘You’ve been
made an issue of in the House of Peers, and there’s been
an inquiry from the Ministry of Education. What text are
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you using?’ The text was Diehl and Mombert Wert und Preis
[Value and Price], a book of readings, and it actually did
include an essay by Marx, but there were also pieces by
Böhm-Bawerk, Marshall, Ricardo, and others.6 I knew
because I’d read it. I explained, ‘It’s a book Faculty Meeting
accepts as a textbook. And we read it from page one; right
now, actually, we’re reading Marx.’ Then Mori said, ‘I just
don’t know what to say. I do understand.’ And that was
the end of it. Several days later I bumped into him in the
corridor and he told me, ‘Arisawa, that matter is settled.’”
Arisawa had escaped arrest in the Popular Front
Incident, but at the time he’d had a strange premonition.
In “My First Night in Custody,”7 Arisawa writes of his arrest
as follows: “Yesterday I met in the study with Professor
Ōuchi and Wakimura. A report had come in from a news
organization that the Popular Front Incident appeared
likely to spread, that the day was near when several Tōdai
professors would be arrested. That’s what we discussed.
We wondered—if people were going to get arrested, who
would it be? The three of us agreed that Ōuchi and I were
most in danger. Ōuchi said to me, ‘If I get arrested, I’m
going to dig my heels in and fight. I won’t resign.’ I said yes,
of course—me too, and left. That night I went to a meeting.
Also at that meeting was N., who had made his name as
commentator on economics and somehow or other was up
on the doings of the Metropolitan Police. N. warned me:
Arisawa, your Economics colleague H. is stirring up
trouble. You’re in grave danger; be careful. At the time H.
was also serving as a part-time employee of the Police,
6 RHM: Ausgewählte Lesestücke zum Studium der politischen Ökonomie, eds. Karl Diehl and
Paul Mombert (Karlsruhe, 1913 and later editions).
7 “Kambō no daiichiyo,” Keizai seisaku nōto.
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completely outside his specialty. I thought, there’s no more
room for doubt. There’s been a shadow following me, and
I’m its target. The only thing I don’t know is when the
attack will come.”
H. was Assistant Professor Hashizume Akio, and his field
was banking and currency. He had become an assistant
professor in 1925 and would become professor in 1939, so
promotion to professor took fourteen whole years (it
normally took five or six); it’s possible he became a Home
Ministry Police employee out of disaffection on that
account (I can’t get promoted because of the Ōuchi’s
group’s opposition, so I’ll get them!). During the turmoil
in the Faculty of Economics, Hashizume acted as shadow
advisor to the renovationist faction—Hijikata and the
others; when the Hijikata faction, too, disappeared in the
Hiraga Purge (1939), his path opened up, and he was
promoted to professor. During the war, he ran the Faculty
of Economics as dean, and with the war’s end, he took
responsibility and resigned. The fact that Hashizume had
become an employee of the Metropolitan Police was well-
known; everyone involved knew it. In order for a university
professor to become an employee of another government
agency, Faculty Meeting had to approve; so the Faculty
Meeting of the Faculty of Economics had duly approved. I’ll
speak later about that.
Let’s continue now with Arisawa’s sinister story of his
arrest:
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On New Year's Day, a holiday, I was flying a kite with the
children in the vacant lot in front of our house, and a man in
a suit came along and asked where Mr. Arisawa's house was.
I replied I was Arisawa, and he said, “Oh?” and left. I thought,
he's a queer one, but he was another of the shadows lurking
near me. Just two or three days earlier, at close to midnight,
a man had routed my wife's family out of bed and inquired
where I lived and whether I was home. This guy said he was a
newsman, but when my wife's mother said she'd guide him to
my home nearby, he said no and left. The next day she came
and told me he was an ominous fellow. He too may have been
one of the dark shadows. I found it intolerable to wait, sitting
on my hands, for the dark shadows to reveal themselves at a
time of their choosing—Today? Tomorrow?
When I heard the horn of the tōfu peddler, I thought, I've
escaped for another day.8 That's because arrests for thought
crimes always took place at dawn. The night before I'd been
late getting home, so I thought, I'll go back to sleep. Just then
the doorbell rang, piercingly. That must be them, I thought,
and in the entryway I heard the footsteps of the maid who
went to answer the door. My wife, who had got up, shook me
awake, and said, “They've come for you.” Footsteps clomped at
the back door and stormed into the garden of the detached
building.
I told my wife, “Don't wake the children,” and went into the
living room. I remember thinking how dim the lights seemed.
In front of the table in the middle of the room sat an
unpleasant-looking fellow. Four or five guys stood beside him,
expressions hard, legs spread wide.
8 RHM. Tōfu peddlers made the rounds in the early morning, to provide food for breakfast.
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Who Was the Spy?
To return to Hashizume: the proposal to allow
Hashizume to become an employee of the Home Ministry
was submitted to Faculty Meeting one week before the
Yanaihara Incident occurred. Perhaps it’s better to say that
the Yanaihara Incident occurred one week after
Hashizume became a Home Ministry employee. This
passage from the symposium of emeritus professors shows
us that everything that took place then was a linked series.
The speaker is Wakimura Yoshitarō, and he’s talking about
right after he returned from study in Europe (October 29,
1937)9:
9 Gojūnen.
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Wakimura: A fellow appeared who'd been in my seminar. He
was a classmate of Sakomizu Hisatsune and other officials
and was close to some mid-level bureaucrats; he came to my
home and warned me: They're drawing up a list now of
liberals to be purged under wartime thought control—mainly
the Home Ministry's Metropolitan Police Bureau; it's very, very
big, so take extreme care. That was at the end of January 1937.
These two events meant that something bad would happen;
while I was thinking that, at the university the renovationist
movement surfaced and brought a sort of fascism to the
university.
Ōtsuka: You mean, the journal Renovation appeared?
Wakimura: No, I think that happened a bit later. In 1937 the
visit to the Meiji Shrine was the issue, and we were told to join
the renovationist movement. I refused….
I had some prior knowledge, so when the issue of
Yanaihara arose—no, one week before it arose—when E.'s
becoming an employee of the Metropolitan Police was
presented to the Faculty Meeting, I thought, Now we're in for
it. Someone—who was it?—asked the question, how did E.'s
specialty “relate to the Metropolitan Police?” The explanation
was, “Price controls have now become a major problem for
Japan's peace and order, so it's necessary for the Metropolitan
Police to hire an economist.” Then one week later—the dean
brought his purple furoshiki to Faculty Meeting. Even now I
can't forget that furoshiki.
The E. here is Hashizume. And what was wrapped up in
the purple furoshiki the dean brought to Faculty Meeting?
I told that story in Chapter 3: in order to kick Yanaihara
out, Hijikata brought to Faculty Meeting a purple furoshiki
that held the September Chūō kōron with Yanaihara’s
problematic essay, “The Ideals of the State.”
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Whether the story of the spy that emerged in Ōuchi’s My
Resume refers to Hashizume or to another spy, I don’t know;
but both are possible (probably both were true). By which I
mean that as an indication that official spies were involved,
Fifty Years has this passage. Arisawa is talking:
Suzuki Kōichirō: You learned later that spies had attended
your lectures. Would you tell us about that?
Arisawa: Then—when was it?—students warned me that
spies were attending my lecture. I asked, “Really—spies?” They
said one day a man they hadn't seen before was at the lecture,
so when it ended, the students followed him all the way, and
near Yūrakuchō he entered the office of the Metropolitan
Nichinichi newspaper. They told me, “So, Professor, you've got
to be careful.”
Even before then, I'd been very careful in lectures with my
statements and choice of words—a long tradition of Professor
Ōuchi. So I was confident that I wouldn't get tripped up by my
own words.
Andō: The Peace Preservation officials had got hold of
lecture notes from professors they were checking on at various
universities—Tōdai, Kyushu University, and the rest—and
duplicated them and distributed them to senior councilors
and high officials. After the war these notes turned up among
materials politicians donated to the National Diet's
Constitutional Documents Room. I think they included notes
from you Tōdai professors. To judge from them, it appears the
police sometimes sent spies, sometimes bought notes from
students.
Hashizume became an employee of the Metropolitan Police
not merely to supervise price controls but also to be a
thought control spy. Again, we know that from The Road I’ve
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Traveled, the oral reminiscences of Tanaka Kōtarō, who as
dean of the Faculty of Law at the time was involved in issues
of the Faculty of Economics. Tanaka wrote:10
10 Ikite kita michi (Tokyo: Ōzorasha, 1997 [Sekai no Nihonsha,1950]).
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The professors with right-wing connections said that once
they got Yanaihara, O. and K. would be next. O. was Ōuchi;
K. was Kawai. And from that time on the issues of O. and K.
moved forward….
Again—it was the end of January 1938—the following
appeared as an article in the Asahi: “A storm of mass arrests
will soon hit the remnants of the Popular Front. It involves
some dozen or so university professors. In this time of the
China war, the prosecutor's office is making an issue of the
communist movement.” We could pretty much guess who the
problem professors were. In the Faculty of Law, after two or
three interested parties had checked the basis for the article,
we knew that the suspects were Ōuchi, Tsuchiya, and Arisawa.
As a counter-policy, we decided to have the president ask
Minister of Education Kido to use all his influence. But the
president was sick, so Takagi Yasaka and I—I was dean—got
briefed by the president and went to meet Minister Kido. This
was on February 1. And it was on that morning that Ōuchi
phoned my home: “The police are here.”
At nine that morning I went with Takagi to Kido's residence,
explained that Ōuchi was a great person and scholar, and
asked whether the news item was true or false; should such
a thing occur, we urged him to exert every effort. In response,
Kido said he couldn't ask the Home Ministry to free Ōuchi on
the ground that there was no factual basis, and if the Ministry
of Education were to undertake to punish him, it would set
a bad precedent of Ministry pressure on the university; so he
couldn't do that, either. With these euphemisms, he rejected
our request. All we got was a vague response that he'd try.
It's from that meeting that I remember Kido saying, “The
problem is there's a pipeline from within the university to the
Metropolitan Police.”
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This last sentence, everyone agrees, refers to Hashizume.
Ōuchi’s Arrest
To return to Ōgiya’s “The Publication-Indictment Issue
at Tōdai,” from which I quoted at the beginning of this
chapter, Ōgiya too writes of the fact that behind the
Incident lay the band of renovationist professors and
Hashizume: “The actions of the band of renovationist
professors, not simply within the university but also in
conjunction with forces outside the university, lit a signal
fire of ‘university renovation.’ If the research and the
comments in Faculty Meeting of individual professors were
communicated to right-wing and official forces outside the
university, it was clear where the agitation would lead. And
the person who functioned as intermediary between these
right-wing forces inside and outside the university was
said to be the renovationist faction’s H.”
The Asahi article I mentioned that appeared earlier in
Tanaka’s memoirs was by a colleague of Ōgiya. Ōgiya heard
about the impending arrests of the Faculty Group from a
reporter covering the Home Ministry: “It was a few days
after the Yanaihara Incident. Out of the blue came a report
from an older reporter who covered the Home Ministry.
That afternoon, I rushed to see Ōuchi at the Tōdai Faculty
of Economics. When I told him in brief the content of that
memo, he said, “Yes, I see…” and hand to forehead, looked
grave. His dimly-lit office with its mountains of Western
books looked so dignified, even eighteenth-century; I can
still see vividly his broad forehead as it turned ashen.”
Ōgiya doesn’t note precisely when that took place, but it’s
undoubtedly the day before the arrest.
Ōuchi immediately told President Nagayo about the
report. The entry in the president’s diary for January 31
reads: “Ōuchi had news that he was in danger and would
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be arrested the day after tomorrow, but he wanted, he said,
to reassure me he would never cause problems for the
university. When I asked where he had heard the report, he
said it was from an Asahi reporter. I said that was really too
bad and that if by any chance it really happened, he should
take earnest care for his health, and we parted.”
Ōgiya, who had passed the word to Ōuchi, was sleeping
on night duty when he was told to go to the scene to report
Ōuchi’s arrest:
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I was on the night shift, and was roused from sound sleep
around 3:30 a.m. It was the head of the Metropolitan Police
desk. Six or seven police-beat reporters stood around,
imposingly. The desk officer quickly and crisply passed out the
assignments: “This morning they're rounding up the Faculty
Group. Seems Ōuchi is the most ‘eminent.’ You know him, so
cover his house.”
I shook like a leaf, embarrassingly. “Excuse me,
but…I…really…why not make me the contact person in the
office?”
“What's the matter?” In the eyes of the older reporters, out
for blood, I probably appeared unreliable in my incoherence.
As it turned out, the desk officer and I would wait in the office
as contact people, and I heaved a sigh of relief.
Dawn broke. Arisawa was arrested. At Sugamo Commercial
Higher School, so-and-so was arrested… At Sendai, Uno
Kōzō…but no word came in about Ōuchi.
“The police went into the house. Don't know why, but they
left empty-handed.” I felt relief. And soon: “He asked whether
they had brought an arrest warrant. The police left, apparently
to get one. He's a university professor, after all.”
And along with that report, an article flowed in over the
phone: “Professor Ōuchi smiled and said to his wife and high-
school-age son Tsutomu…: ‘What? It's not a big deal. I'll be
right back,’ and changed into an Ōshima kimono….” Taking it
all down, I went weak.
Here I’ll jump ahead in time and write about what
happened six years later, after the appeals court returned
a verdict of innocent. As I said earlier, the Faculty Group
were all found innocent. And the Rōnōha itself was found
not to be an organization to which the Peace Preservation
Law applied (i.e., an organization aiming to change the
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kokutai), so that was the same as saying the whole incident
was built on air.
Normally, if such a verdict of total innocence was handed
down, it was a matter of course that professors who’d been
indicted and forced to resign from Tōdai would return to
the university. But that wasn’t the case with the Ōuchi
group. I’ll have more to say about that later, but here I’d like
to think about who was behind the incident. Ōmori Akira
was the oldest son of Ōmori Yoshitarō, who died tragically
of cancer in July 1940, while the case was still in the courts;
Akira was a reporter, then an author, and wrote about these
events. He surmises: 11
Who set this up? The main actors, those with the greatest
responsibility, were Abe Genki, the “Japanese Himmler,” head
of the Home Ministry Police, and Tomita Kenji, chief of the
Police's Civil Order Bureau. Then Tomita's subordinate Inohata
Keijirō of the Civil Order Bureau added ardor to the Rōnōha
arrests, as was attested to after the war by the former Special
Police section of the Police. Also in the background was
pressure from the Army.
Their acts were driven, of course, by thirst for the fame
associated with promotion, and about ten days after the
Rōnōha arrests, Abe was promoted to Police Superintendent
and Tomita, to chief of the Police Affairs Bureau. Abe had long
been welcome at Kido Kōichi's home since they both came
from Yamagata Prefecture, and afterwards Tomita became
governor of Nagano and won favor with Konoe Fumimaro,
who spent time in Karuizawa; he became a torch-bearer for
Konoe's new-structure movement and moved up in the world.
11 Ōmori Akira, Rōnōha no Shōwashi (Tokyo: Miki shobō, 1989).
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This Tomita Kenji was not the lightweight that
‘torchbearer’ implies. He was chief cabinet secretary for the
second and third Konoe cabinets, and afterwards, too, he
was a key figure in the Home Ministry; his name appears
at every turn in the Hosokawa diary, the Prince Takamatsu
diary, and elsewhere. He was also the prime disciple of
Hiraizumi Kiyoshi, the Tōdai Law Professor who was one
of the leading intellectual figures in the wartime national-
essence movement.12 Knowing this background, you know
that the Rōnōha arrests (the Popular Front Incident) were
an enforcement tactic carried out with the backing of vast
state will and in full awareness of the legal unjustness (in
the words of the former disciple loyal to Wakimura
Yoshitarō, it was a purge of liberalism in the interests of
thought control under the wartime order): “According to
the recollections of the Special Police, planning for the
arrests began about the time the Japan-China Incident
began, and in History of the Home Ministry (published
postwar), the arrests of the Popular Front movement began
in June 1937. Minobe Ryōkichi points to the preparatory
stage—‘About the spring of 1937 Assistant Professor
Hashizume Akio of the Faculty of Economics became an
employee of the Home Ministry and was a sort of advisor to
Civil Order Bureau Chief Tomita.’13 Except that according
to Wakimura, who had a good memory, the issue of
Hashizume’s becoming an employee of the Home Ministry
came before the Faculty Meeting at the end of November,
about a week before the expulsion of Yanaihara.
“Hashizume’s employment by the Police probably began
12 RHM: Hiraizumi was Tanibana's focus in the five chapters immediately preceding the
chapters I have translated.
13 At the time, Tomita was still chief of the Peace Preservation Bureau.
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formally, as Wakimura says, toward the end of November,
but there wasn’t time after that to begin an investigation.
Tomita’s use of Hashizume as spy to investigate the
Marxist professors of the Faculty of Economics and so on
did begin, as Minobe says, in spring 1937. By the fall, it
was pretty much set. Excepting that the spying likely began
much earlier.” (Italics in original.) If even Hashizume had
direct contact with a man like Tomita, we know he was no
run-of-the-mill rat.14
Ōuchi Doesn’t Regain His Professorial Status
To return to the tale of the three professors—Ōuchi and
the others—who were found not guilty on appeal, about
then (1940) the Tōdai presidency had passed from Nagayo
to Hiraga to Uchida Yoshikazu, who had come up through
the Faculty of Engineering, and Uchida quickly sought a
meeting with Ōuchi, back from being found innocent.
Uchida said, “It’s great you’ve been found not guilty. It’s
also gratifying for the university…. I’ve been wanting to
welcome you back to school if possible; but conditions
inside the university and outside make that impossible. I’d
really like you to submit your resignation. It’s very difficult
to speak concretely about those conditions inside and
outside; it’s all very vague. But the opinion—albeit
informal—of the Faculty of Economics that I’ve heard from
Dean Hashizume is that your return would cause trouble.
Moreover, you can probably imagine the opinion of the
Ministry of Education. In view as well of other conditions,
I do hope you’ll acquiesce in my request.”15
Ōuchi responded:
14 RHM: The phrase “no run-of-the-mill rat” [tada no nezumi] normally means “no run-of-
the-mill person,” but here the double entendre is surely intentional.
15 Ōuchi Hyōe, Watakushi no rirekisho (Tokyo: Ōdosha shoten, 1951).
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First, why did I move heaven and earth fighting for seven long
years on this tough issue? To clear myself of false charges.
And when I say myself, it's myself as university professor, not
myself as private individual. … In short, I fought so hard
because I thought that settling this issue was important for
the university.
Now, having achieved victory, I've come back to the gates of
the university. I want now to have my say about this matter as
someone inside the university. That is, I want to attend Faculty
Meeting and clarify responsibility for this issue. No matter
what I do over and beyond that, submitting my resignation
right away is no way to clarify the issue for the university.
Second, you said that in making this decision you'd asked
the opinion of two professors in the Faculty of Economics.
Those two are simply not the right people…. Hashizume
clearly is opposed to me, and he's one of the chief culprits in
this matter. Together with Tanabe, Hijikata, and Honiden, he
denounced me in Faculty Meeting, and at a time when no
one outside the university was calling me Rōnōha or anything,
he wanted to purge me from the university for being Rōnōha,
saying that was the Home Ministry's opinion, and presented
evidence in support of it. That's Hashizume.
And he presented to the Home Ministry documents that
my ideas were alarming. On this point, when I was
interrogated at the stationhouse, it was clear from the words
of people the interrogating me; they said, “There's been
sufficient investigation of your ideas, and we've heard as well
from someone at the university.” This someone at the
university—who was it? It was Hashizume, who was then an
advisor to the Metropolitan Police. It's natural that such a
person not rejoice if I return to my post. So if you decide this
issue after asking only such people for their opinions, it's
absolutely unfair to me; I can't accept it.
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What and how much did Hashizume squeal to the officials?
The words of the officials who interrogated him had made
that clear to Ōuchi. It’s not unreasonable that he wanted to
teach Hashizume a lesson, but President Uchida resolutely
refused to permit that. The war was in its final
stages—Saipan and Tinian had already fallen, Japan’s
defeat was certain, and the Tōjō Cabinet had resigned en
masse; and the level of intellectual freedom in society as
a whole, compared to when Ōuchi and the others had
entered prison, had dropped dramatically. President
Uchida knew immediately he couldn’t accede to Ōuchi’s
demand. In Fifty Years an Economist, Ōuchi writes as follows:
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The next day we agreed on a joint statement, handed it to
President Uchida, and left the university for good. In fact, we
had resigned ourselves long since to the idea that this is what
the university would do. Had we returned to the university,
we couldn't have existed in a Faculty of Economics in which
fascism ruled. So we weren't particularly angry at the
president's attitude.
But we had lived here and made scholarship our life's work
for twenty, even thirty years. Moreover, we'd had to fight, no
matter what the cost, for the sake of the freedom of the
university—that's what we'd thought and devoted all our
strength to for these seven years. Then the moment we came
back, having won the battle, our true parent disowned us.
That was truly the grief of a lifetime.
We grieved not for our personal defeat but for the defeat
of liberty at storied Tōdai, in particular Tōdai's Faculty of
Economics where we'd led the way in the twenty years since
its founding, for the defeat of the liberalism we'd fought for. In
this sense we took our expulsion from the university sadly but
with cool heads. And with cold hearts we took our final leave
of the Faculty of Economics.
After that we never again passed through the Red Gate.
Nor did we have any contact with the people of the Faculty
of Economics that had decided to bar our reentry. In the war's
final stages, we were completely unemployed and worthless
lumpen bourgeoisie.
The day of Japan’s defeat arrived less than a year later.
Under occupation by the U. S. Army, the wartime order
was completely overturned. And those at all levels of society
who were tied to the wartime order—one after another,
they were purged.
The Tōdai Faculty of Economics After the War
tokyo university and the war | 124
The Tōdai Faculty of Economics too was completely
upended. The professors who had been forced out for
ideological reasons during the whole agitation were all
reinstated: from Ōuchi on down, Yanaihara, Yamada,
Arisawa, Wakimura, Tsuchiya, Kimura—seven in all. And
as if trading places, seven professors tied into the wartime
order departed, beginning with Hashizume. (The main
“renovationist” group of Hijikata, Honiden, and Tanabe,
and the others had already been forced out in 1939 in the
Hiraga Purge; about them I’ll have more to say later.)
Maide Chōgorō, who succeeded Hashizume as dean, was
originally a quasi-member of the Ōuchi group, and after
the reconstruction of the Tōdai Faculty of Economics, the
Ōuchi group became its core. That’s why for a long time
after the war the Tōdai Faculty of Economics was heavily
Marxist.
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5The Collapse of the Kawai
Faction; the War Economy
Study Group
In which the author describes personnel issues within the Faculty
of Economics, notably Dean Kawai Eijirō’s failed attempt to
promote three disciples (after the war, one of the three became
Tōdai president). This event led to a realignment of factions within
the Faculty, Kawai’s resignation as dean, and the election of
Hijikata Seibi as his successor. The net result within the Faculty
of Economics was cooperation with the increasing militarization
of the Japanese economy and society. The chapter concludes with
a look back at the February 26, 1936 revolt and the strikingly
different reactions of Kawai and Hijikata.1
1 RHM: I have not translated Tachibana's Chapter 55, which focuses on the roots of the
factional strife within the Faculty of Economics.
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At the root of the factional fighting in the Faculty of
Economics lay personal relations, struggles for promotion,
and ideological confrontation, and these factors
intertwined in complicated ways. There were also changes
in the makeup of the factions. So that makes a consistent
exposition quite difficult. Examining the documents and
records, you often find completely different stories
depending on who’s doing the telling…
As of 1931, there were thirteen slots for in the Faculty of
Economics. There were thirteen professors, and twelve of
them were in their forties. Normally, there were a few open
slots, and the age spread was wider. If no one resigned or
died, there could be no promotion from within unless the
number of slots increased. If professors didn’t leave or die,
assistant professors basically couldn’t hope to be promoted.
If assistant professors didn’t move up, instructors too
would be frozen in place. In fact, in the seven years from
1932 to 1939, when the Hiraga Purge was carried out, there
were no changes at either professor or assistant-professor
level. So there came to be permanent assistant professors,
permanent instructors. According to the Centennial History,
this stagnation in personnel was the primary root of the
factional fighting.
Among the Unemployed, a Future Tōdai President
Thanks to this freeze in personnel, a man who became
an instructor was unable to become even a permanent
instructor (there was such a category). Such was the case
of Ōkōchi Kazuo, eighteenth president of Tōdai: “My term
as instructor ended, but even then I couldn’t get hired as
assistant professor.… Among the professors in the Faculty
of Economics, the factional fighting on personnel issues
was fierce, so for example, even if my mentor, Kawai,
recommended me for promotion to assistant professor, if
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other professors who opposed Kawai’s recommendations
in personnel matters got together and opposed his
recommendation, at that moment I’d have no job or have
to seek a job at another university: it was one or the other.
Of course, even I didn’t know whether Kawai had
recommended me or not, nor had I asked; to speak in terms
of results, I didn’t become an assistant professor. So each
month I received a research grant from a university fund
and beginning in the spring of 1932 became a part-timer in
the Faculty of Economics. … For several years thereafter, I
was a part-timer, a very unclear, unsettled position, and my
monthly stipend of 100 yen didn’t change.”2 What Ōkōchi
states here in general terms—“Even if Kawai (then dean of
the Faculty of Economics), recommended me for assistant
professor, if other professors who opposed Kawai’s
recommendations in personnel matters got together and
opposed his recommendation…”—actually happened.
But what Ōkōchi writes here, that he didn’t know
whether Kawai recommended him, hadn’t asked, and so
on, is not the truth. The recommendation was submitted
formally to the Faculty Meeting of the Faculty of Economics
(February 17, 1937; the recommendation had been entered
at the Faculty Meeting one week earlier, on February 10).
This personnel recommendation was unusual, and the
process in which after fierce debate it was voted down was
also unusual, so there wasn’t anyone in the Faculty of
Economics who didn’t know about it. Ōkōchi knew, too.
In essence, before the Faculty Meeting Kawai summoned
the three—Ōkōchi and Kimura Kenkō and Yasui Takuma,
the other two disciples he was recommending for
2 Ōkōchi, Kurai tanima no jiden (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1979).
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promotion at that meeting—and spoke of his plans; Ōkōchi
and Yasui were moved to tears by what he said. In Kawai’s
diary:
February 8-18. It was at Faculty Meeting on February 3 that the
personnel issue reached the final stage.
February 8: Invited Ōkōchi and Yasui (Kimura was ill) to my
house, spoke of the situation, and gave my opinion. All three
of us wept aloud. Both are sterling people. It's a delight to
have such disciples.
February 10: Proposed promotions to assistant professor.
Faculty Meeting seemed surprised. But I had taken the
initiative, acted as dean should.
February 17: A day to remember. All three
recommendations voted down. That evening with the four
of them—Yanagikawa, Ōkōchi, Kimura, Yasui—went to Tokyo
restaurant, bathed, then dined. Fight is over. I'm exhausted.
The result notwithstanding, I think I fought well. That's only
thing I'm happy about.3
Why was the Faculty Meeting surprised by the proposal
to promote these three? Because all were Kawai’s direct
disciples, and there were only three openings. This
proposal meant allocating all three assistant professorships
to his own disciples. In the world at large, if there is
factional conflict, it’s normal in allocating positions to
maintain the balance among factions. But in this case, it
meant keeping all the available slots in the hands of Kawai
and his disciples, so everyone was shocked at Kawai’s
arbitrariness.
3 Kawai, Kawai Eijirō zenshū (24 vols., Tokyo: Shakaishisōsha, 1967-70), vol. 23.
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Kawai’s Thwarted Ambitions
At the actual Faculty Meeting, Kawai’s ambitious scheme
failed. Why? Because in the week after Kawai
recommended assistant professor status for the three and
before his recommendation was voted on, an anti-Kawai
alliance came into existence. Kawai had become dean at the
March 1936 Faculty Meeting; at that time he had received
nine of twelve votes (all of the “majority faction”), and he
became dean with the support of an overwhelming
majority. Thereafter Kawai came to wield such power in
the Faculty of Economics that it was said, “If you’re not
a member of the Kawai faction, you can’t get promoted
to professor.” Kawai himself likely thought that even this
recommendation—to promote three disciples to assistant
professor at one go—was sure to pass. Had his plan
worked, all three would have become professors (normally
that process took three years), so Kawai alone would have
had overwhelming power in the Faculty of Economics. (At
the time, Kawai had a majority only in alliance with the
Hijikata faction.) But at the very last moment, the vote
went the other way. Why? Because in a sort of common-
law marriage, the Hijikata and Ōuchi factions formed a
common front against Kawai.
Araga Chōgorō’s “Tales of the ‘Hiraga Purge’”4 gives the
following inside account: “One snowy day, a sedan stopped,
its brakes grating on the ears in the cold morning air. A
swarthy gentleman opened the car door, stepped out, and
entered a gate that bore the nameplate ‘Ōuchi Hyōe.’ A
large German shepherd growled threateningly, startling
the gentleman; but when he realized there was a metal
4 “'Hiraga Shukugaku’ monogatari,” Kaizō, March 1939.
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fence separating them, he seemed relieved, rang the bell,
and asked to see Ōuchi. The calling card he handed in read
‘Hijikata Seibi.’
“It was early spring 1937. At this meeting an anti-Kawai
bloc in the Faculty of Economics was formed. But why in
the world did two men who seemed ideological opposites
find it necessary to join in a ‘Red Gate5 Popular Front,’ as
students termed this alliance?”
The immediate occasion was Kawai’s recommendation
of promotions to assistant professor for Ōkōchi and the
two others. Araga writes: “Ōkōchi’s promotion to assistant
professor came up when Hijikata and Honiden had finally
become unhappy with Kawai’s arbitrariness in the
administration of the Faculty of Economics. At the time
there were three vacancies in that rank, and Kawai tried
to force through the appointment of the three—Ōkōchi,
Yasui, and Kimura—all disciples. With this as turning
point, the Hijikata-Honiden faction left the Kawai faction
to work in concert with the Ōuchi faction. … Seven votes
to six. The allied forces of Hijikata and Ōuchi advanced on
all fronts. Virtually all the faculty’s officers were members
of the allied forces: dean (Hijikata), University Council
representatives (Ōuchi, Ueno), chair and vice-chair of the
Friends of Economics.”
These details were known widely among the students. In
a symposium of March 1939, “Student Views of the Hiraga
Purge,”6 one student of the Faculty of Economics spoke as
follows:
5 RHM: The Red Gate was a main entrance to the Tōdai campus, so “Red Gate” was often
used as metonym for the university.
6 “Hiraga keigaku o gakusei wa dō miru ka,” Chūō kōron, March 1939.
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Ōgi (Economics): Until two or three years ago the Faculty of
Economics had three giants and a three-way split. Professors
bind their own seminar students to them in master:disciple
relations; from their seminar students they pick their own
disciples, build their own power. The three-giant, three-way
split held for a long time, but finally it became a very great
problem. Cooperation between the Ōuchi and Hijikata
factions at the time of Kawai's firing: there's no way you can
say that was a scholarly matter, rather simply a matter of
relations among factions….
Higashi (Law): The Faculty of Economics is vulnerable to
ideological control, so I'd see it as academic schools
manifesting themselves as factions.
Ōgi (Economics): But the state of affairs in which Hijikata
and Ōuchi joined hands was based on the special conditions
of the time and can't hold from here on. Professor Kawai
himself recommended only his own instructors for assistant
professor status, and for that reason he was opposed by
Hijikata and Ōuchi.
The situation was known in this detail by students in the
Faculty of Economics, so it wasn’t the case that Ōkōchi
didn’t know.
But it’s still strange that Hijikata and Ōuchi, generally
regarded as sworn enemies, should suddenly have linked
up. In point of fact, there was an old and long-standing
tie between these two. Ideologically they were far apart,
but personally they had once been close. Here is Ōuchi:
“Hijikata and I had had a special connection. A good friend
of mine from middle school had gone to Sixth Higher
School and become close to Hijikata. When he and I began
cooking for ourselves at Yoyogi, Hijikata came and joined
us. For two years we ate at the same table. Thanks to that,
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we had no secrets from each other, but I was two years
older and played the part. Then, when Hijikata came back
from France, he taught me the new public finance. But he
disappointed me, and on various issues he and I went our
separate ways, and in later years, as you know, Hijikata
denounced me sharply. I don’t remember incurring
Hijikata’s enmity, so it’s entirely on account of the ideas I
embraced, on account of Hijikata’s patriotism.”7
What did the two agree to at that meeting? In fact, we
don’t know everything. The honeymoon between Ōuchi
and Hijikata was very brief, and the two became enemies
once more. So neither one liked to remember the time
when, strangely, they joined forces. Still, in the emeritus
symposium, Ōuchi spoke as follows: “A. [Hijikata] came to
my home and said, ‘I want to block B. [Kawai]. I’d like your
help.’ When I agreed to become one of the University
Council representatives, I was really acting in good faith.”
In short, when Hijikata came seeking Ōuchi’s cooperation
in blocking Kawai, Ōuchi agreed in good faith.
Hijikata’s take on this issue is the following. Hijikata
didn’t say anything at all about the blocking of the Kawai
faction as the top goal of a Hijikata-Ōuchi detente and
explained it as follows. Personnel issues in the Faculty of
Economics had been frozen, but there was a single
professorship open. President Nagayo had demanded
many times that the Faculty of Economics fill that position
as soon as possible. The first candidate was the most senior
assistant professor, Sasaki Michio (minority faction;
business accounting); but the majority faction was
opposed, so his promotion had long been stalled. In
7 Ōuchi, Keizaigaku gojūnen (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1960).
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particular, Kawai was absolutely opposed. His reason:
business accounting wasn’t true scholarship, so the
professorship shouldn’t go to it. Hijikata writes: “On other
personnel issues, Kawai held strong opinions, and on the
matter of instructors becoming assistant professors, unless
the individual had Kawai’s confidence, he wouldn’t yield
an inch. The Faculty’s personnel matters would stagnate,
indeed were already stagnated, and when Honiden and I
were considering whether there wasn’t some way to break
the logjam, to create a bit more give on personnel matters,
Kawai’s one-year term as dean came to an end.
“Prior to this, the minority had opposed the majority’s
proposals in each case, and within the majority Kawai
didn’t yield an inch on his opinions. So there was no way
to move forward on personnel matters. As a result of
conferring with Honiden on ways to break the impasse, we
decided we couldn’t do anything about ideology but that
on personnel matters we’d let bygones be bygones and
cooperate with Ōuchi so that personnel matters might go
smoothly. Such being the case, since I had once eaten at
the same table as Ōuchi, I took on the job of negotiating
with Ōuchi on this issue and—I think it was in March
1937—went to Ōuchi’s home.”
Secret Pact
What did the two talk about? According to Hijikata: “At
this meeting I said, ‘From now on I want promotions to go
smoothly, majority and minority cooperating—assistant
professors becoming professors, instructors becoming
assistant professors. Let’s follow generally the order in
which they were hired. But there will be times when we’re
not necessarily able to follow that principle, so let’s consult
each time on these issues. For the next term—that is,
beginning in April 1937—let’s make Honiden dean. I won’t
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become one of the two representatives to the University
Council, let alone dean. I ask you, Ōuchi, to be one of the
representatives to the University Council.’ That was the
broad agreement. I had the impression Ōuchi agreed with
these general points.”
According to the terms of this agreement, the two
factions would cooperate in making Honiden the next
dean. But notice: that isn’t what actually happened. After
graduating (Tōdai Faculty of Law—specialty: politics),
Honiden had spent five years in the Ministry of Agriculture
and Commerce. There he developed a warm friendship
with Kawai, and one year after Kawai moved from the
ministry to Tōdai, Honiden moved to Tōdai with Kawai’s
backing and became assistant professor; between 1922 and
1939 he was responsible for European economic history.
In personal terms, he was at first much closer to Kawai,
but beginning about 1935 he moved closer to Hijikata than
to Kawai. In the end, Honiden became a central figure in
the renovationist faction, so ideologically, too, there were
aspects that made for incompatibility with Kawai.
In Kawai’s diary Honiden appears repeatedly as the
initial H., and until 1935, it’s clear, the two consulted and
agreed on internal university issues. But at the end of 1934,
there’s a note, “Goodbye to 1934,” in which this appears:
“The first half of the academic year, up through Karuizawa
[Kawai’s vacation residence], was a half year of gloom. At
the university, the estrangement with H. was central. A.
[Araki Kōtarō] moved closer to Hijikata and became
isolated within the Faculty. Last year’s Takigawa Incident
and the developments involving the military probably
provided turning points.8 I clashed head-on with H. on the
issue, first, of the status of Kimura and Yasui, the
membership of the Friends of Economics committee, the
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publication of Friends, the admission to the library stacks
of those who weren’t instructors. They told me I was
oversensitive and not political enough.”
From this point on, relations between Kawai and
Honiden cooled rapidly. The fracture didn’t happen right
away, but as of 1937 Honiden joined the Red Gate political
alliance of the Hijikata and Ōuchi factions; he received the
support of both, and it was agreed that Honiden would
become the next dean. At the Faculty Meeting at the end
of February, Kawai’s own recommendations were all voted
down by the Red Gate Popular Front, so Kawai resigned
as dean and immediately called a Faculty Meeting to
determine his successor. Thereupon events took an
unexpected turn. According to Hijikata, it was this:
8 Kawai's anti-military speeches and writings became unacceptable to Hijikata,
Honiden, and the pro-military faction. Even Araki, who had been the closest to Kawai,
moved closer to their side.
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In due course, at the end of March 1937 Kawai convened a
Faculty Meeting to elect the next dean. Before the Faculty
Meeting, which was to begin at 1 p.m., I was waiting in my
study. It was about ten minutes before the Faculty Meeting
was to begin at 1:00. Ōuchi knocked on the door of my room
and entered. I wondered what was up. ‘We (Ueno, Yanaihara,
Maide, and the others) have discussed this matter, with the
result that none agree with recommending Honiden as dean.
Please give up all thought of making him dean.” I responded,
“That changes things. Who on earth will become dean?” He
said, “You.” I was speechless. Faculty Meeting was only
minutes away. I had no time to consult with anyone. All I could
do was enter the meeting with an air of nonchalance. Had it
been a Faculty Meeting I convened and had I submitted the
recommendation to be decided on, I might have withdrawn
the election item and postponed it; but it was a Faculty
Meeting convened by Kawai to vote on his recommendation,
so I was powerless. In the vote, I was elected dean, and Ōuchi
and Maide were chosen as representatives to the University
Council. When the meeting ended and I retired to my study,
Honiden came rushing in and demanded, “What on earth
came over you?” Honiden's surprise and anger were natural.
But given what I've mentioned, I could only explain my
conduct by saying that I'd been completely powerless. Though
unhappy, Honiden too promised me he'd cooperate and left.9
This is the back story of how after Kawai resigned as dean, a
strange coalition regime came into existence with Hijikata
as dean and Ōuchi and Maide as the two representatives
to the University Council. On personnel issues, there was a
9 Hijikata Seibi, Jiken wa tōku narinikeri (Tokyo: Keizai ōraisha, 1965).
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secret deal that the Hijikata and Ōuchi factions would work
together, and all the groundwork had been done; then, at
the very last moment before the Faculty Meeting and on the
single issue of who would become dean, Ōuchi suddenly
changed his mind and scored a tactical triumph. This back
story was never revealed by the Ōuchi side, and after the
war the turmoil in the Faculty of Economics came to be
talked of solely from the viewpoint of the Ōuchi faction,
so even today it’s not widely known. This tale makes clear
that Ōuchi was a master schemer. Only minutes before the
Faculty Meeting convened, he made a proposal that
Hijikata, even though surprised, couldn’t reject, and
suddenly it was a done deal.
But why should Ōuchi have chosen Hijikata as dean? He
likely thought that he could manipulate Hijikata more
easily than Honiden, to whom he had little personal
connection. And wasn’t it perhaps also because Honiden
had stronger fascist tendencies than Hijikata? To continue
with Hijikata’s account: “A ‘coalition cabinet’ was set up,
and Ōuchi and Maide became the representatives to the
University Council—that’s as I’ve recounted. Ōuchi also
served as convenor of the Friends of Economics, and to its
assemblies he invited people regarded as left-wingers and
often seemed to work to lift left-wing spirits. In contrast,
Honiden and Tanabe berated me on this issue:
‘Hijikata—what are you doing? Show some nerve!’” Ōuchi
used the fact he had made Hijikata dean adroitly.
The Yanaihara Incident arose under this regime. In that
incident, Hijikata took the lead in destroying Yanaihara.
He’d probably made up his mind to sever ties with the
Ōuchi faction. Precisely because Hijikata felt strongly that
to that point he’d had been wholly had—had been used—by
Ōuchi, he probably thought he needed to show strength.
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Conversely, the Ōuchi side felt strongly that it had been
betrayed by Hijikata. Given the basic ideological tendencies
of Hijikata and Ōuchi, it wasn’t a surprise that Hijikata
stood on the side denouncing Yanaihara. What was strange
was rather the fact that the two had joined hands even
temporarily. Continuing the passage quoted earlier, Araga
writes: “The Yanaihara Incident arose in July 1937, due to
the intensification of controls on speech. No sooner had
it arisen than the ‘Red Gate Popular Front’ came utterly
unraveled; Hijikata and Honiden rallied the Kawai faction’s
Tanabe, Nakanishi, and Araki to the banner of Japanist
economics and set about purging yesterday’s
friends—Yanaihara and Ōuchi—for their unpatriotic
ideas. The Hijikata faction had used the Ōuchi faction to
oust the Kawai faction. The Hijikata faction was a minority,
but its strength came from using the crisis as its shield. On
the Yanaihara issue, it mounted a concerted attack from
within and without…. In the end, having succeeded in its
attack on Yanaihara, the Hijikata faction turned to purge
Ōuchi and Kawai.”
On this occasion, a complete reset of the human
relations of the factions in the Faculty of Economics took
place. Now the main axis of confrontation wasn’t personnel
issues or Marxism, but nationalism/anti-nationalism. And
as I wrote earlier, the Faculty Group Incident, an event
unprecedented in Tōdai history, followed right on the heels
of the Yanaihara Incident: at one fell swoop Ōuchi and
Arisawa and Wakimura were arrested. At this time the
issue arose of whether to fire the three from the university.
In legal terms, even if a university professor was caught up
in an incident, his status did not become an issue before he
was indicted (after he was indicted, his status was forfeit).
With the exposure of the Faculty Group Incident, the
139 | university of massachusetts amherst libraries
Red Gate Popular Front dissolved completely, of its own
accord, and Hijikata took the lead in arguing that Ōuchi
should be fired before he was indicted. But Kawai, on the
contrary, stood up to defend Ōuchi: it was not proper in
terms of the principle of university autonomy to fire him
before he was indicted. Here a second reshuffling of
factions took place—Ōuchi faction plus Kawai faction vs.
Hijikata faction, and Hijikata resigned as dean. The “Tale
of the ‘Hiraga Purge’” continues: “In the February 1, 1938
arrests of the second Popular Front Incident, Ōuchi and
Arisawa and Wakimura were detained by the police…. The
Hijikata faction argued that such anti-patriotic professors
should be fired immediately. In response, in alliance with
the Kawai faction, the old Ōuchi faction expressed its
opposition based on pure reason: to decide on punishment
before the decision to indict was made was to jettison the
university’s academic freedom; punishment of professors
must be by vote of Faculty Meeting. People called this
faction the ‘pure reason faction’ and the opposing Hijikata
faction the ‘renovationist faction.’ The pure reason faction
held the majority. So Hijikata resigned as dean, and Maide
replaced him.” In short, in the last days of the Kawai
regime, the Hijikata and Ōuchi factions joined forces (the
Red Gate Popular Front) and chased out the Kawai faction
and gave birth to a Hijikata regime, and now the Kawai
faction plus the (old) Ōuchi faction joined to bring down
the Hijikata regime.
In the process, there were ideological realignments in
both the Hijikata and Kawai factions, and a new faction
was born—the renovationist faction. Here “renovationatist
faction” denoted the new Hijikata faction, and it’s
important to note that it differed ideologically from the
old Hijikata faction (which, in terms of ideology, had been
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simply anti-Marxist). As the passage from the “Tale of the
‘Hiraga Purge’” indicates, it was made up of different
people. In addition to Hijikata and Honiden, three from
the Kawai faction—Tanabe, Nakanishi, Araki—joined, and,
under the flag of “Japanist economics,” it became the
renovationist faction. Its axis of agreement was
“Japanism,” “nationalism”—or, one might say, a strong
affinity for Japan’s new order after the outbreak of the
Japan-China War, for the war economy, and for the
military leading it.
The original Kawai faction was made up of six: Kawai
himself plus Honiden, Tanabe, Nakanishi, Araki, and
Yamada Fumio. So the fact that Honiden, Tanabe,
Nakanishi, and Araki formed the renovationist faction
meant that save for Kawai and Yamada, the entire Kawai
group had moved, lock, stock, and barrel, to the
renovationist faction (or had created the renovationist
faction with themselves at its center).
The Birth of the War Economy Study Group
What sparked these developments was what I described
earlier—the January 3, 1937 (Meiji Day) procession to the
Meiji Shrine to pray for victory in the Japan-China War,
led by Hijikata and Honiden. The fact that a considerable
number of students did not take part in the procession was
due to conscious opposition by the left-wing leadership of
the Friends of Economics. Seizing on that fact, Hijikata
convened a Faculty Meeting and proposed punishing the
students who had been so imprudent: I’ve touched on that,
too. And in the Yanaihara Incident, what lit the fuse was
that in Faculty Meeting one day, Hijikata suddenly
produced the issue of Chūō kōron with Yanaihara’s essay,
“The Ideals of the State,” called it anti-war, and criticized it
as unbecoming a professor in a time of crisis. The demand
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that all the committee members of the Friends of
Economics be replaced and the criticism of Yanaihara’s
essay took place at the same Faculty Meeting.
In fact, there was a third proposal at that Faculty
Meeting. It was a motion by Hijikata that he resign as dean:
up till then, as dean and representative to the University
Council, Hijikata and Ōuchi had cooperated in
administering the Faculty, but because their opinions
differed too greatly, they were no longer able to cooperate.
This issue was not decided on the spot but tabled for the
next meeting, and in the interim Ōuchi and the others were
arrested in the Faculty Group Incident.
At the Faculty Meeting at which these three issues were
raised, there was discussion of still another important
issue. From the time the China Incident began, the
university had been a bystander, watching the progress of
the war; the proposal was that the university as university
stop being an onlooker, address actively the problems the
war brought, and make suggestions to the government
(about how to deal with the crisis).
The day after the Faculty Meeting, the Asahi ran an article
under the banner headline:
TŌDAI: MAJOR SWING AMID GUSTS OF CHINA INCIDENT
DEFEAT OF THOSE IN FAVOR OF STANDING ALOOF
BOLD SUGGESTIONS FOR CRISIS
FACULTY OF ECONOMICS TAKES STAND
The article discussed in detail this new current in the
Faculty of Economics. At the center of this development
were Hijikata and Honiden, and the two spoke by turns to
the reporter: “Candidly, there are among us two views of
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this Incident. One is that as scholars we should maintain to
the end a cool, observer’s view. The other is that we should
use everything from our areas of expertise to contribute
actively in some way or other to Japan’s current situation,
even if we don’t take a leadership role in dealing with the
Incident. On this point, as a result of extended debate in
the most recent Faculty Meeting, we decided that the
university belongs to the state, so research as research
should proceed for the most part in the latter direction. In
fact, some of us as individuals have concrete ideas about
how to address the Incident.”
One month later the Asahi ran these headlines—
SIDING WITH STATE POLICY
TŌDAI: A START
ECONOMIC STUDY GROUP ORGANIZED
The article reported the following actions: the agreement of
a band of professors at the Tōdai Faculty of Economics to
conduct research in accord with state policy has attracted
attention both within and without the academy, and a
Study Group on Economic Issues (tentative title) proposed
by Honiden is increasingly expected to start next spring.
The members are the five professors Honiden, Hijikata,
Tanabe Tadeo, Araki Kōtarō, Nakanishi Torao. Supporters
include, in addition to Hashizume Akio of the same faculty,
many in the Faculties of Law and Letters—in a word, the
“renovationist faction.” All the factional tangles within the
Faculty of Economics were reflections of the shock the
university received from the great change in
conditions—that war had begun. With the opening of
hostilities, every faculty member had to rethink his view
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of the state, and the renovationist faction (also called the
“crisis faction”) was steering the university in the direction
of commitment to the state that had gone to war.
The “Study Group on Economic Issues” that this article
predicted would start the following spring actually started
in May 1938, and the name had changed to “War Economy
Study Group.” The Asahi reported its opening ceremony
this way: “The professors of the crisis faction in the Tōdai
Faculty of Economics who are regarded as the
groundbreakers of the university’s new direction during
the crisis gained the support of Tōdai grads who are now
professors at private universities, and on the 2nd at 6 p.m.
in Kanda Academy Hall conducted the opening ceremonies
of the War Economy Study Group, taking the first step in
the direction of the state policy line they have long admired.
Present were Professors Hijikata, Honiden, Tanabe,
Nakanishi, Araki, Assistant Professors Hashizume,
Yūmoto, Yanagikawa…eighteen in all… At today’s meeting
Hijikata was named chair and the Tanabe’s Tōdai library
office was designated its office. After the group has used
Tōdai Economics grads to conduct the promised base
studies, it will appeal to other universities.”
In October 1938 the journal Renovation started, and the
first installment of Tanabe Tadao’s “Essentials of
Renovating the Japanese Economy”—a manifesto-like
document of the renovationist faction—was published.
That essay began with the sentence, “The stage the
Japanese economy now faces is development into a
controlled economy for the sake of preparation for war,”
and argued, “From now on economic life is the cooperative
life of all Japanese serving the sacred goals of the state.”
Tanabe discussed how to create a structure of national
mobilization for total war.
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In “The Renovationist Stance” in the same inaugural
issue, Honiden began, “The renovationist stance is the
stance of the state” and made explicit his absolute support
of war: “War is an opportunity to experience with our
entire selves the state that is invisible to the naked eye.
For that precise reason, on the occasion of this war, the
movement for statist renovation too gains yet more
strength.” As leaders of the “renovationist faction,”
Hijikata, Honiden, Tanabe, and Araki and Nakanishi—five
professors in all—played important roles in steering the
field of economics in Japan, then embarking on a war
footing, toward a pro-war economics. Note that four of
these professors, not including Hijikata, constituted the
old Kawai faction. For these people, the central issues now
were state and war, and the traditional factional opposition
eased willy-nilly.
The China Incident Changes Everything
How did these events look when seen through the eyes
of the old Kawai faction? In an essay of March, 1939,10 “The
Truth about the Tōdai Faculty of Economics Issue,” Yamada
Fumio of the old Kawai faction described the situation as
follows:
10 Yamada, “Tōdai keizaigakubu mondai no shinso,” Kaizō, March 1939.
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The majority:minority opposition lasted through the terms as
dean of Mori (two years), Hijikata (three years [his first term
as dean]), and Kawai (one year). When it got to the last, Kawai
deanship, the majority faction that had held for many years
finally collapsed. The immediate cause of collapse was the
issue of promoting Assistant Professor Sasaki to professor.
For whatever reason, President Nagayo requested of Kawai
that Sasaki be promoted…. Kawai valued faculty autonomy,
so it was natural that he should refuse to agree. Four
professors—Tanabe, Nakanishi, Araki, Yamada—thought
Kawai was right; all the others felt the Faculty of Economics
should accede to the president's proposal. At this point the
majority faction dissolved; Kawai and the four became the
new minority faction, and the other eight (the previous
minority faction plus four from the majority faction) formed
a new majority faction. Kawai resigned immediately because
a majority of the Faculty Meeting did not agree with him and
explained the logic of his resigning. Hijikata became the new
dean, and Ōuchi and Honiden became the two
representatives to the University Council.
In terms of ideology, of the character of the respective
professors, and of past estrangements, this new majority
reconciled irreconcilables, so it was extremely unnatural,
strange. It was expected to splinter sooner or later, but it fell
apart even sooner than expected. The changes in society that
accompanied the sudden outbreak of the China Incident
made Hijikata feel uneasy about an alliance with the Marxists
under Ōuchi. The procession to the shrine that increased the
emotional distance between Hijikata and Ōuchi and then the
Yanaihara issue intensified the opposition between the two.
Hijikata and Honiden and others thought that the ideas of
Ōuchi and Yanaihara were dangerous and wanted to kick the
two men out of the university. Three in the new minority
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faction—Tanabe, Nakanishi, and Araki—were in sympathy
with Hijikata and Honiden. Thus, these five formed the so-
called renovationist faction, and after Yanaihara's departure
from the scene, they turned their fire on Ōuchi. After the
arrest of Ōuchi in February of last year, the attack became
ever fiercer, with them arguing that he should be fired
immediately.
What changed matters decisively was the “sudden outbreak
of the China Incident” and “the changes in society” that
accompanied it. The moment war began, social conditions
changed greatly, all of a sudden, and people too changed
radically. The Kawai faction, originally a group of anti-
Marxists and considered a collection of liberal idealists,
disappeared into thin air, and its members became
supporters of the wartime order.
What Made Kawai Decide to Become Dean?
It’s well-known that amid these radical changes in
people and in society, only Kawai, mentor of these feckless
disciples, towered over all to the last. Irie Tokurō was a
newspaper reporter; though not a Kawai disciple, he looked
up to Kawai. Irie writes as follows:
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It was in 1936…that the February 26 Incident occurred. At the
time I was a student in the Tōdai Faculty of Letters. I had
virtually completed my senior thesis, and on a rare snowy
morning I was lying in bed when a friend and fellow-lodger
burst into the room to report that young officers were in
revolt. Shocked, I remember going out in the snow to see.
An even stronger impression on me was the essay, “Critique
of February 26,” that Kawai Eijirō published after the incident
in the Imperial University News. It was a bitter denunciation of
the violence…. The February 26 Incident shocked the public,
but from the journalists of the day came virtually no sharp
criticism. People were afraid to speak out. In that climate,
Kawai's sharp criticism caused a sensation. Students fought
to buy the Imperial University News sold at the Main Gate, and
they fixated on this essay.
Students had various reactions: the unavoidable
impression that here was the conscience of the university and
of scholars; respect for Professor Kawai's bravery and fear that
criticizing the military so sharply would have consequences.
Revenge came quickly. For seven years Kawai had served on
the Higher Civil Service Examining Committee, but in May of
that year he was kicked off it. In March of the following year he
left the deanship of the Faculty of Economics. His term wasn't
up; it was an abnormal shake-up [TT: it wasn't a shake-up,
but a resignation]. And the next year—1938—in the House
of Peers Baron Iida Iwakuzu held up three of Kawai's
books—Critique of Fascism, The Crisis and Liberalism, and Second
Student Life—and subjected them to all-out criticism.
The Ministry of Education asked Kawai to let the three
books go out of print, but he refused. The Police Office of
the Home Ministry banned them, but Kawai did not yield an
inch: “I can't think my theories are mistaken.” Even when the
Ministry of Education recommended resignation, he again
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turned it down: “It's regrettable that the Ministry ignores
Faculty Meeting.” At their wits’ ends, the officials of the
Ministry of Education finally put the issue before the Higher
Civil Service Committee, rammed through his firing, and
drove him from the university.
Toward the end of his prolonged court battle thereafter,
Kawai fell ill. In that era of the dark valley, he did not live to
see the dawn of the new day.
As journalist Irie Tokurō writes, the one of Kawai’s many
accomplishments that left the strongest impression on the
world then and now is that after the February 26 Incident,
when no one would utter words critical of the military, he
dared to criticize the military and continued to support
liberty. (In fact, even before the February 26 Incident, from
the time of the May 15, 1932 Incident, Kawai alone dared to
keep criticizing the military. And at the time of the issue of
Minobe’s emperor-organ theory, he was virtually alone in
defending Minobe.)
Kawai became dean of the Faculty of Economics in 1936,
and his deanship cannot necessarily be called a success.
But why did Kawai want to become dean? In fact, February
26 played a large role. In Kawai’s diary, there is a memo,
“Memories of 1936,” in which he wrote: “From that time
on, what I’ve been going back and forth on (in my mind)
is whether or not to be dean next year. I didn’t feel like
it, but the group of five urged it, and at last when I saw
the February 26 Incident, I thought that if I didn’t grasp
power, I wouldn’t be able to defend university freedom;
so I decided to accept the job.” The “group of five” here is
the Kawai faction: Honiden, Tanabe, Nakanishi, Yamada,
Araki.
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Kawai first resolved to become dean on February 22, a
scant four days before the February 26 Incident. Here is
that day’s diary entry: “February 22. Today for first time sat
down with Hijikata and H. [Honiden] and had an honest
discussion of what was on our minds. In today’s
conversation I began to think maybe I should become dean.
Afterward I went to see Minobe, and met with the group of
five…and decided to accept the deanship.” Minobe had been
hospitalized after being attacked and nearly killed by right-
wing thugs. Kawai’s strong consciousness of the danger
posed by the emperor-organ issue and this violent attack
led him to accept the deanship (to defend freedom of
speech, freedom of the university).
This consciousness of danger grew still stronger at the
time of the Incident, and in his diary for February 26, Kawai
resolved to proceed even though he foresaw that his own
life would be in danger:
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February 26
A day to remember. Morning: on way to university, learned
of today's events; at Faculty Club heard rumors. At meeting of
entrance exam committee, various people had stories. I kept
silent, thinking of future of university.
Tanabe later came to my room, said I'd better leave for
weekend, better to avoid being harmed in some
unpleasantness; Ōkōchi also worried and came, and Araki and
Yamada. I was grateful for their concern.
Snow falling heavily. Deciding after all to go home, I go by
taxi. In the cab have feeling that perhaps time has come and
think constantly about what I should do—resign?
Once I got home, the children came home from school with
various stories, indignant. Consulting with [wife] Kuniko, I
decided after all to come to Kōzu [in Kanagawa, along the
coast near Odawara], and decided, one, to think things
through at leisure, two, to study. To phone Araki, I left the
house in the evening. Going back and forth in my head: when
time comes, do I live or die? Surrender or resist? Next, the state
of the university after things calmed down, and the related
issue of my status. And what about the deanship? I'll accept it
with no worries for myself.
On evening radio, report of assassinations. It will likely end,
like May 15 Incident, in catastrophe. In any case, I'll watch
situation for few days and judge.
No matter what the situation, must be smart. Hope I can
conduct myself throughout with no concern for personal
safety. The rest is fate.
Hijikata’s February 26 Incident
Hijikata’s recollection of the February 26 Incident
makes for a fascinating comparison:
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It was about 10 a.m. on February 26, 1936. I hired a car and
driver and, through the snow that had been falling since
before dawn, we drove along the palace moat in the direction
of Tōdai. Soldiers with fixed bayonets came running, ordered
the car to stop, peered inside, and then said, “Proceed.” When
I asked what was happening, the driver said, “Don't you know?
Last night was something! Lots of soldiers on the march in
the middle of the night.” He told me part of the story. Come
to think of it, the site where the car was ordered to stop was
in front of the official mansion of Suzuki Kantarō, Grand
Chamberlain, who was attacked at dawn on that day.11 At the
Faculty Meeting, I learned for the first time the outlines of
the incident…. In chitchat before the meeting, Honiden said,
“This is how coups d’etat succeed, isn't it.” I said, “We don't know
yet that it's succeeded,” and Ōuchi agreed with this…. When I
got home, the radio was broadcasting the movements of the
“Rebel Units.” That evening soldiers loyal to the government,
with fixed bayonets, came and filled the area inside the gate
of my house, on alert all night—unbelievable. Anyway, wild
rumors were flying; the Faculty secretary said, “Some Law
professors are saying you're an advisor to the rebel army.” Even
well-intentioned professors were thinking and saying such
nonsense! I thought some of the rumors were malicious.
In terms of their thinking, Hijikata and the other members
of the renovationist faction had much in common with the
military’s renovationist faction (the young officers behind
the February 26 Incident). Hence Honiden’s remark that
“This is how coups d’etat succeed”—he virtually believed it
11 RHM: Suzuki was a prime target of the rebels, who shot him, leaving him gravely
wounded but not dead.
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had succeeded—and the rumor that Hijikata was the
mastermind of the rebel army.
I own a copy of the tome—it’s over 1,000 pages
long—Overview of the Economic Resources of Greater East Asia,12
for which Hijikata was chief editor. In the preface he wrote:
“Along with the glorious triumphs of the Imperial Army,
the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere marches
proudly and steadily toward construction. Japan’s Greater
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere of today has no parallels
in bloc-building, encompassing as it does so many diverse
elements. Nay, our country is replacing England as leader
of this great co-prosperity sphere that includes so many
and such varied peoples and cultures. We Japanese who
will lead Greater East Asia must first of all appreciate this
Greater East Asia.” A direct line runs from Hijikata’s
experience of the February 26 Incident to this preface.
12 Daitōa keizai shigen taikan (Tokyo: Nisso tsūshinsha, 1942)
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6The Travails of Tsuda
Sōkichi, Attacked as ‘Traitor’
In which the author traces the actions of Tōdai’s right-wing critics,
most notably publicist Minoda Muneki and his colleagues on the
journal Genri Nihon. They accused the Faculty of Economics
and the Faculty of Law of harboring professors whose thinking
was treasonous and formed an Alliance for an Imperial University
Purge. The Minister of Education joined the assault, only to be
outmaneuvered by Tanaka Kōtarō, dean of the Faculty of Law.
Much of the action focuses on Tsuda Sōkichi, distinguished
historian-anthropologist from Waseda University, who was
brought to Tōdai as guest lecturer on Asian political thought and
ran into student opposition organized by the right.
The Detailed Account of Hayashi Kentarō
Behind the great turmoil in the Tōdai Faculty of
Economics lay the factional fight among the three factions
of Ōuchi, Hijikata, and Kawai. But these three factions
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experienced changes in members, coalitions, and name
changes, so don’t think of them too schematically. To chart
the currents of the day in terms of major events:
To chart the factions during these years: at first, opposition
between the Marxist, Ōuchi faction, on the one hand, and
the anti-Marxist Hijikata and Kawai factions, on the other.
Then, when the Ōuchi and Hijikata factions joined hands
and excluded the Kawai faction, the Kawai faction
splintered, with one part joining the Hijikata faction to
form the renovationist faction that favored cooperating
with the war economy.
The power chart was redrawn: the Ōuchi faction and
what was left of the Kawai faction combined and seized
hegemony. It happened in the political fight over whether
to fire Ōuchi and Arisawa and Wakimura, who had been
1937: Japan-China War. Yanaihara Incident.
1938: Faculty Group Incident (the arrests of Ōuchi, Arisawa,
Wakamori). Banning of Kawai’s four books. Minister of
Education General Araki Sadao’s university reform.
1939: Hiraga Purge (firings of Kawai and Hijikata; protest
resignations of professors, assistant professors,
instructors—thirteen in all). Indictment of Kawai.
Beginning of criticism of Tsuda Sōkichi (the following year,
banning of his books).
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arrested in the Faculty Group Incident. Hayashi Kentarō
(later the 20th president of Tōdai) was serving at the time
as an assistant in the Western History Department of the
Faculty of Letters. According to his memoirs: “Thus, while
an unusual political fight was playing out among the
professors of the Faculty of Economics, barely twelve in
number, there came the arrest of the ‘Faculty
Group’—Ōuchi and Arisawa and Wakimura …. For Hijikata
and the renovationist faction, this was the perfect
opportunity to drive out the left-wing professors; puffed up
with success, they acted too arrogantly. From a bit earlier,
this renovationist faction had made contacts with
newspaper reporters and not only published their
renovationist views, but even let reporters know what
happened in Faculty Meeting and criticized colleagues,
albeit not by name. Then, with Ōuchi’s arrest, they began a
movement in Faculty Meeting to fire him immediately.”
Why does Hayashi make his appearance now? Because
in the end the issue of firing Ōuchi was not confined to
the Faculty of Economics but as a university issue came
before the University Council. (For the details, see Chapter
10.) Imai Toshiki played a decisive role in the University
Council, and Hayashi was an assistant to him; Hayashi
observed this incident at close hand from beginning to end
and left a detailed account….
The arrest of Ōuchi (the arrest of the Faculty Group) was
a major event, the first time in Tōdai’s history that a regular
Tōdai full professor had been arrested, and the newspapers
of the day gave it exceptionally heavy coverage. At the time,
the Faculty Meeting of the Faculty of Economics was
controlled by the Ōuchi and Hijikata factions, but cracks
in that alliance had already appeared. So Hijikata and the
renovationist faculty, who controlled (or thought they
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controlled) the majority in Faculty Meeting, tried to seize
this opportunity to fire at one fell swoop Ōuchi and the
Ōuchi faction, sympathetic to Marxism. The Kawai faction
was fundamentally anti-Marxist, so the renovationist
faction apparently felt that on this issue they’d surely go
along.
Minoda Muneki’s Hatred of Tōdai
At Tōdai, where professorial rank was concerned, faculty
autonomy ruled: in every faculty, only faculty meeting had
the power to hire and fire professors. In its origins, Tokyo
Imperial University was a comprehensive university
created when colleges that had been different schools
(different in both origins and histories) amalgamated, so
each faculty (each formerly a college) was a sort of
independent state with its own powers, and each faculty
meeting refused to let go of the right to hire and fire
professors. The roots of university autonomy lay in
freedom of research and freedom of teaching, but a third
important freedom, supporting those two freedoms, was
the freedom to hire and fire professors. Faculty meeting
alone had the right to hire and fire professors, and outside
forces, including the state, must not interfere in any sense
in the hiring and firing of professors: that was the great
principle of university autonomy.
If outside forces, notably the state, tried to intervene,
great turmoil arose and shook the university. The issue of
Minobe Tatsukichi’s emperor-organ theory arose after
Minobe had already reached the mandatory retirement age
of sixty and left, so it did not involve firing a professor; but
it was a problem that went to a freedom more important
than hiring and firing—the freedom of research, the
freedom of teaching. Nevertheless, the university response
was so slow that the freedom of the university was battered
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and then battered some more. At the same time, freedom in
the world at large was rapidly going down the drain. When
the emperor-organ theory became an issue, the outside
force interfering in university freedom was not the state
but right-wing statists linked to the military. Above all, it
was the Genri Nihon group, with Minoda Muneki in the
lead, and the national-essence members of the Upper
House.
Earlier, before the Emperor-Organ Incident, they had
stirred up the Takigawa Incident at Kyoto University and
driven out seven professors; in the Emperor-Organ
Incident, they drove all the professors who advocated the
theory from the faculties of the universities of the entire
nation and purged the emperor-organ theory from the
curricula of all Faculties of Law. Their power was
overwhelming. The attack on the emperor-organ theory
became a great public campaign that drew in the military
and the right wing, and under pressure, the government
twice was forced to issue declarations on the clarification
of the kokutai (1935).
According to these declarations, all government activity
must be judged in terms of clarification of the kokutai.
Education both in the schools and for the public was
reorganized to conform with clarification of the kokutai.
For university education, a Consultative Council on
Educational Reform was established (President Nagayo,
philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō, Hijikata, Hiraizumi, Kakehi
Katsuhiko, and others served as members) and a report was
issued: “The great Empire of Japan serves the divine will
of the emperor and the Sun Goddess of the one dynasty
through all time, which rules eternally. This is our kokutai
unchanging through all time. … Our education has its
source in the kokutai and takes the Japanese spirit as its
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core.” And it set about redesigning all university education
to “embody the true meaning of the kokutai.” The university
reform of Minister of Education Araki, which we’ll talk
about later, also has its origin here.
Not only in education but in controls on speech, too,
clarification of the kokutai became the new standard, and
from then on, the charge “contrary to the kokutai” led to
the easy suppression of speech of all sorts. Article 26 of
the publication law read, “When books or drawings are
published that blaspheme the dignity of the Imperial
House and try to destroy the government or throw the
constitution into confusion…” and mandated
imprisonment for up to two years and fines of up to 200
yen for authors, publishers, and printers. Its Article 27 read,
“When books or drawings are published that disturb the
public order or corrupt social mores…” and carried
imprisonment for up to six months and fines of up to 100
yen for the same parties. These two provisions were of great
use in controlling speech, and from then on these were
applied much more strictly.
The Tsuda Incident involved Article 26, and the Kawai
Incident involved Article 27, but what was at issue in both
cases was books published far earlier, books that until then
had been utterly unproblematic. Now, suddenly, legal
proceedings were brought against them. Why? Once
clarification of the kokutai was made the fundamental
social standard, everything changed, including the very
standard of judgment—“What does blaspheming the
dignity of the Imperial House mean?” “What does
disrupting public order mean?”
After the February 26, 1936 Incident and the beginning
of the Japan-China War in 1937 (the incident at the Marco
Polo Bridge), Japanese society as a whole moved onto war
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footing. The national spiritual mobilization movement
began at the same time as the fighting, and in 1938 the
national mobilization law was enacted; through these
measures, Japanese society from top to bottom and in all
its nookks and crannies was put on wartime footing. This
great transformation of society, placing the whole society
on war footing, was the greatest background factor for the
whole series of incidents from 1937 to 1939 listed at the
beginning of this chapter.
Under these conditions, the Genri Nihon group led by
Minoda stepped up its tenacious attack on Tōdai. Its
fundamental belief was that Tōdai was the nucleus of
anti-kokutai scholarship, that all the communist-
sympathizing professors preached Marxism themselves or
taught that it should be tolerated; so Tōdai was the general
headquarters of the movement to turn Japan red. Hence
in order to prevent the communization of Japan, it was
necessary to destroy Tōdai (in particular, its Faculty of
Law). In the Yanaihara Incident, too, the attack on
Yanaihara by Genri Nihon had been the spark. At this time
Genri Nihon intensified its attack on the Faculty of Law—on
Yanaihara and also on Miyazawa, Tanaka, Yokota, Rōyama,
and Yabe; its attack on Kawai of the Faculty of Economics
was particularly fierce.
Both Democracy and Representative Government Are
Anti-Kokutai
What did they criticize? In a word, anything they
thought didn’t suit the kokutai. To listen to Minoda and
the others, Japan’s kokutai made the authority and will of
the emperor unconditionally supreme—theirs was a belief
system centered absolutely on the emperor. So of course
the emperor-organ theory was unacceptable, as was
democracy, too. (It was unacceptable for the “people” to
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be “chief.” The “chief” had to be the emperor.1) It was also
unacceptable for the Diet to be the center. The Diet was
permitted only to assist emperor-centered government.
Miyazawa still seemed not to have discarded the emperor-
organ theory, and Rōyama preached democracy centered
on the Diet; neither was acceptable. Yabe advocated
democracy under the name of “majoritarian government”:
not acceptable. Tanaka, who advocated world law, placed
world law above the emperor: unacceptable. And
international lawyer Yokota, too, placed international law
above the emperor: unacceptable. (“It is fiendishness,
worse than the ‘emperor-organ theory, to say there is
natural law or international law superior to the
constitution of any given country.’”).
In short, virtually everything being taught at the Tōdai
Faculty of Law was anti-kokutai, so the Faculty of Law and
the Faculty of Economics should be shut down. Even should
they be permitted to continue to exist, unless changes were
made, other faculties might be infected by communist-
sympathetic ideas, red ideas; so Tōdai as comprehensive
university must be broken up and Law and Economics
allowed to exist only in isolation from the other faculties.
Moreover, custom and the concept of “the autonomy of
the university” held that the university itself had the power
to hire and fire, but such action infringed the kokutai and
the constitution’s explicit words that the emperor has the
authority to hire and fire officials. So independent power
to hire and fire must be stripped from the university and
returned to the Minister of Education, a direct servant of
the emperor. Such were their assertions.
1 RHM: “Chief” here (or “head”) is the second character of the four characters of the
Japanese word for democracy: people-chief-ism.
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The Reform Plan of Minister of Education Araki;
Tanaka’s Secret Plan
The chronology at the head of this chapter lists under
the year 1938 that General Araki Sadao became Minister
of Education and pushed “university reform.” What Araki
wanted to do, in fact, was precisely to destroy university
autonomy in personnel decisions. Araki was a leader of the
Army’s Imperial Way faction, but after the February 26
Incident, he had withdrawn from center stage (retired to
inactive duty) and been on his best behavior. Why did he
become Minister of Education and set about university
reform? In University Autonomy,2 Ōuchi explains: “1938:
Japan invaded China, and Chiang Kai-shek resisted
stubbornly, so nothing came of it…Educational renovation
was absolutely essential to military aggression. But as we’d
already seen in the Yanaihara and Ōuchi incidents, Tōdai
wasn’t an unstinting advocate of militarism, and it didn’t
suit the military that there were places where liberalism
existed. … So the military resolved to put General Araki,
considered the most thorough-going militarist in matters
of education, at the forefront of this issue. On May
26…Araki marched into the Konoe Cabinet. At the time
Araki was fiercely energetic, and he tried to push through
Japan’s intellectual revolution at one fell swoop. The first
thing he set his hand to was university administration; at
its core, he thought, lay the hiring and firing of university
presidents. So the Minister of Education immediately
summoned President Nagayo and handed him his
proposed university reform.
Araki was close to the Genri Nihon group, and what he
2 Daigaku no jichi (Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1963).
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asserted was word-for-word the reform of the imperial
universities that Genri Nihon had long been advocating. The
point of Araki’s reform proposal was to end the system of
choosing imperial university presidents via faculty
election. (The practice began in the early 1910s at Kyoto
University and spread gradually to Tōdai and all the
imperial universities). Democratic methods such as
election infringed upon imperial prerogative, so they were
contrary to clarification of the kokutai. The controversy
continued for several months thereafter, but in the end the
university won. This issue arose at virtually the same time
that the university was shaken by the Ōuchi issue, and in
order to know where the essence of university autonomy
lies and why it’s so important to defend it, more important
elements are involved. So let me speak first about these
other issues.
Why was the university able to resist the pressure of the
Ministry of Education on this issue? For one thing, the
university united quickly, locking arms behind the scenes,
and even though the Ministry schemed to break down that
unity, the unity held. Second, the university devised a
resolution of the issue that preserved the honor of the
Minister of Education (the university discarded university
autonomy in name but kept it in substance). In this entire
process, the leader on the university side was Tanaka, then
dean of the Faculty of Law (after the war Minister of
Education, Diet member, and chief justice of the Supreme
Court). He was a leader with great knowledge and pluck.
He was also the one who drew up the grand design of the
Hiraga Purge, which we’ll discuss later; along the way, it
looked any number of times as if the Hiraga Purge would
collapse, and it was he who supported it to the end. So let
me introduce him.
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Yoshimura Sachio’s “Tales of Tōdai II,”3 written after the
Hiraga Purge, describes how Tanaka fought against heavy
odds. Yoshimura writes as follows of Tanaka’s activity at
the time of Araki’s university reform: “Tanaka Kōtarō, the
sphinx—he’s truly wasted as a university professor. Were
he to enter politics, he has the strategy and fighting spirit
to become a true leader. One observer appraised the young,
highly-talented Tanaka as a man as to be feared, as likely
to come to grief by his own hand… He is a scholar filled to
overflowing with tenacity and fighting spirit, like a viper.
At the time of the university reform, from summer last
year into the fall, he faced the Ministry of Education single-
handedly and fought stubbornly to preserve university
autonomy….” Ministry of Education officials threw the
proposed solution, which I’ll describe later, back in their
faces: “This does not suit the Ministry’s intent for reform
of the university, so please take it back with you!” Of the
three Tōdai representatives there at the meeting with high
Ministry officials, university secretary Eguchi trembled,
and Dean of the Faculty of Letters Kuwada stuck out his
hand as quick as could be. But Tanaka bit off the words,
“We’ll never take that proposal back!”
“Take it back!”
“No, we won’t!”
With that back-and-forth, Tanaka made to leave, taking
the others with him. One of the Ministry officials said,
“Well, if you simply won’t take it home with you, we’ll send
it back by registered mail; it’s the same thing.” Tanaka: “Do
as you please. But I say for the record: taking it back
involves the will of the university; but if it’s mailed to us, it
3 “Daini Tōdai monogatari,” Nihon hyōron, April 1939.
tokyo university and the war | 164
isn’t the will of the university but something over which we
have no power. Don’t confuse the two!” With these parting
words, Tanaka left, and the Ministry side stared after him,
open-mouthed.
Tanaka was also the Faculty of Law professor who for
some time had been the object of the fiercest attacks of the
Genri Nihon group led by Minoda. The prime reason was
that Tanaka was a Catholic. Because he was a Catholic, he
rejected strongly the general custom, widespread in Japan,
of paying shrine visits. In his Law and Religion and Society,4
he argued that all modern states guarantee freedom of
religion, and the religious practices of specific religions
should not be compelled, so the shrine visits by primary-
school children often carried out in Japan should be ended.
In the same way, visits to shrines by officials in their official
capacity should also stop. For Minoda and the national-
essence people, “Japan, land of the gods” was a land of
shrines, so this was absurd. That’s why, for some time,
Tanaka had come under fierce criticism by Genri Nihon.
On the issue of university reform (specifically, whether
presidents should be elected), Tanaka took the lead in the
negotiations between the university and the Ministry of
Education. The record of the give-and-take is to be found
in University Autonomy, and the argument that “university
autonomy is the very life of the university” developed there
is telling, so let me summarize it here. According to Tanaka,
autonomy for the university is similar to independence for
the judiciary. Judges of local courts do not take orders from
the Justice Minister. Only when judicial independence
exists can legal fairness be guaranteed. He writes:
4 Hō to shūkyō to shakai seikatsu (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1927).
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In constitutional terms, university professors differ from
judges, but in terms of their official duties and in substance,
they are similar. Judges judge right and wrong; university
professors judge true and false…. If professors are influenced
by public opinion or become subject to official influence, we
cannot hope for the healthy development of the state's
learning. Education, too, must be separated from politics. …
University professors have no constitutional protections
such as judges have, and of course, they must not infringe
public order, sound customs, or the essentials of the kokutai;
but within the permitted sphere, they must be free. Based
on their years of scholarly experience, senior professors can
give guidance and encouragement to their juniors, but they
cannot order them. If you tell a painter who can paint apples
to paint Mt. Fuji, he cannot produce a fine picture. Nothing
good results if you strip the freedoms to create and to conduct
research from painters and scholars. Administrative officials
differ greatly: it doesn't matter if they find what they're doing
fascinating; if ordered by their superiors to stop, they must
obey. Even though both professors and bureaucrats are
officials, they differ on this point. The unfettered
independence and spirit of scholars is their lifeblood, and it
comes from a disinterested attitude toward scholarship. …
The virtues essential for the professions are not the same:
for administrative officials, obedience; for judges, fairness; for
scholars and artists, unfettered independence. Unless that is
the case, they will be lickspittles and not benefit the state.
They will exert a bad influence on a country's culture and
bring about its ruin. The spirit of university professors is
nourished in the autonomous society they form with their
colleagues. …
Autonomy sounds legalistic, but essentially it is the spirit of
family. The relations among professors within the university
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differ from the superior:subordinate relations among
government officials; they are the relations of colleagues, the
relations of senior, junior, student, not the relations of
submission to authority. There are, of course, differences in
levels of closeness; one discipline is ancillary to others; the
others make use of the one. So the recommendation of
professors and assistant professors is to elect as president
those who help them. For themselves and for their colleagues,
to be able to choose one who is suitable in terms of character
and scholarship is key.
In essence, the university is in these ways a society
organized according to completely different principles
than society in general. The election of university
presidents by professors and assistant professors: that has
a meaning completely different from elections in society
at large. So Tanaka dreamed up a unique compromise that
discarded the name but kept the substance: it gave the
Ministry of Education the name; the university kept the
substance. Elections in the university are elections, but
they mean solely that each person recommends a person
suitable for the position. So stop calling it an election and
call it a recommendation. Instead of a ballot, call it a
“position paper.” Have each person write a position paper
on who is suitable; collect the position papers, total them
up, and decide. This is the very essence of an election, but
its form differs.
When this proposal was submitted, the Ministry of
Education suggested it was necessary to make
responsibility clear—who was recommending whom, that
ballots not be anonymous. Moreover, so this kind of
selection process not leak outside and cause problems later,
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the procedure should be secret. It was squaring the
circle—sign the ballots, record the ballots, keep the vote
secret. The solution to this dilemma was to use perforated
ballots so that at the time of voting the two parts could be
separated. But how to leave a record of who voted for whom
if people submitted their ballots torn in two? The passage
in University Autonomy continues as follows:
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Tanaka: In the end the problem boiled down, as I touched on
earlier, to anonymous ballots versus signed ballots. For our
part, it was our thinking that unless the voting was
anonymous, you couldn't expect a true and fair
recommendation—we avoided the term election and spoke
of recommendation—so to the extent possible, maintain the
reality of anonymous ballots. So at Tōdai we decided—well, it
may be a slight evasion of the law—to make perforations in
the middle of the ballot so you could separate the part with
the candidate's name from the part with the recommender's
name, put the two in separate bags, and keep the signatures
absolutely secret. The voters’ names were written—these
were signed documents, but in reality they were anonymous
(chuckle). With this contrivance, we kept the reality of
anonymous ballots.
Wagatsuma: Whose idea was that? (chuckle)
Tanaka: The Faculty of Science's, I think.
Wagatsuma: Distribute the ballots. And the ballots have
perforations down the middle. Write your own name on one
half and the candidate's name on the other half; the same
number is on both halves. Then tear it down the middle and
put the halves in separate containers. And seal hermetically
the halves with signatures and take only the halves with the
candidates’ names and add them up, and then it's a matter
of who got the most recommendations—recommend that
person. But the number's the same on the two parts of the
ballot, so if you go looking and put the two halves together,
you can tell who recommended whom. Once there's an
official announcement of the winner, burn the ballots. That
serves the goal of anonymous voting splendidly. Whoever
thought that up was a clever man! (Chuckle.)
Miyazawa: …In reality, it's a completely secret ballot.
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Wagatsuma: So it saved the face of the other side and made
them back off.
Suekawa: Really, a brilliant idea.
Wagatsuma: I wonder what bright person thought it up.
Suekawa: Good idea, but a bit complicated.
Wagatsuma: It meets the needs of the other side. You sign
your name, but keep it secret, so, yes.
Tōdai: Domestic Enemy
Let’s return now to the attack on Tōdai by the right-wing
national-essence people. Minoda’s State and University,5
published right after the second Popular Front Incident,
bears the subtitle, “An Academic Indictment of the
Democracy and Anarchism of the Tōdai Faculty of Law!”
The whole book is an attack on the Tōdai Faculty of Law,
and the fifth section of Chapter 1—“The Traditionally
Anti-Kokutai Academic Style of the Tōdai Faculty of
Law”—includes the following (italics in original): “Very
recently, too, on January 31 three members of the Tōdai Faculty
of Economics, along with professors of imperial and private
universities around the country, were arrested under the Peace
Preservation Law. Far from being mere agitation—the “evil
practice of a university interfering in politics”—it in fact became
a movement, in time of crisis, to ‘change the kokutai’ in
collaboration with an enemy country.”
He’s speaking of the arrest of Ōuchi in the second
Popular Front Incident and says that in time of war that
incident is the equivalent of trying to stir up a revolution,
5 Kokka to daigaku: Tokyo Teikoku Daigaku Hōgakubu no minshushugi mukokka shisō ni
taisuru gakujutsuteki hihan, co-author Matsuda Fukumatsu (Tokyo: Genri Nihonsha,
1938).
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in collaboration with the enemy, “to change the kokutai.”
War began between Japan and China because in China a
“communist or communist-sympathizing popular front”
(the Guomindang and the Communist Party joining hands)
had come into existence. Since then, “anti-Japan, hate-
Japan, resist-Japan” ideas had spread to all China. Behind
the spread of these ideas lay the fact that Japan’s imperial
universities and Japan’s major newspapers and magazines
(run by graduates of imperial universities) were spreading
these ideas. And he asserted: “That a country’s national
universities have a traditional academic style of
denouncing and slandering their own country’s kokutai and
national spirit and of fundamentally repudiating and
denouncing its state policies, and that for a half century
the country has done nothing to change this officially
permitted and recognized academic style: is any similar
university and state to be found in history, old or new,
Eastern or Western?” In “The Empire’s National Policy and
the Imperial Universities’ Academic Style,”6 Minoda says
that very recently Chinese radio had broadcast: “Several
days ago two Japanese soldiers, graduates of imperial
universities, gave themselves up voluntarily to the Chinese army
and said they wanted to work for the Chinese army for
the sake of Asian harmony.” This was without doubt a
propaganda broadcast, but what it transmitted was
“regretfully, not without foundation ideologically.” Minoda
cited Minobe Tatsukichi’s comment in the Asahi (June 14,
1931) just before the Manchurian Incident: “It appears the
army believes strongly that it must maintain order in
Manchuria and Mongolia traditionally, by force, but nothing is
6 “Teikoku seifu no kokusaku hōshin to teidai gakufū,” Genri Nihon, December 1937.
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more damaging to the state.” Minobe said the very fact that
Japan is ruling Manchuria and Mongolia by military force
causes great damage to Japan; so graduates of such a
university, having been taught this, think that it will
further Asian harmony if, rather than staying in the
Japanese Army and continuing to fight, they throw
themselves instead into the arms of the Chinese. According
to Minoda, this is not at all surprising. Similarly, Minoda
cited the following passage from Kawai: “Quite recently,
Kawai Eijirō, whose most important four books have been
proscribed because they were judged to be ‘no different
from communism,’ spat out these preposterous lies, too, in
Critique of Fascism, the third edition of which was issued on
October 15 of last year, after the Incident: ‘I certainly hope
the countries of Asia regain their independence. But I don’t
agree with their depending on Japan to do so…. If they throw
out Great Britain and the United States only to substitute Japan,
then they’ll likely prefer Great Britain and the United States…
We absolutely must avoid a war that takes Japan as its focus.’”7
According to Minoda, if you’ve had that kind of education,
it’s not surprising that after graduating you throw your lot
in with the enemy.
The moment war began in China, the criticism of Tōdai
from this point of view became frighteningly fierce. The
essays collected in State and University are all attacks on
Tōdai from this angle. Mitsui Kōshi, a Genri Nihon colleague
who contributed a postscript to State and University, argued
that Tōdai was Japan’s domestic enemy: “Germany (in
World War I) was not defeated by enemy armies; it was
defeated and ruined by the deliberate policy of the
7 Kawai, Fuasshizumu hihan, p.365.
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domestic enemy, the Social Democratic Party. The
anti-kokutai, internationalist professors of Tokyo Imperial
University, the domestic enemy, are the ones who nourish,
teach, and lead judicial and administrative officials. I
repeat this crucial fact here and appeal to my countrymen.”
All the essays in this volume had run in Genri Nihon in
the previous several years. Thereafter, too, Genri Nihon put
out a special issue on “the Imperial University Revolution
Problem” (September 1938), lining up articles criticizing
Tōdai, beginning with Minoda’s “Tokyo Imperial
University’s Scholarly Inability to Govern Itself,” as well as
an issue, “Proclamation of an Imperial University
Revolution” (April 1939). In every issue, the attack on Tōdai
continued ringing the changes. The following speech by
Diet member Inoke Toshie, member of the Diet’s budget
committee, ran in the “Proclamation of an Imperial
University Revolution” issue; it drew on Genri Nihon essays
and is a plain-spoken précis of the Genri Nihon group’s
attack on Tōdai at this time: “The current state of affairs at
the imperial university is truly grave. Minister of Education
Araki may be thinking of purging Tōdai, but I can’t believe
that the number of pinko professors there has shrunk in
the least. People who have studied at this university take
the higher civil service exam administered by pinko
scholars and enter government service; many even enter
the Ministry of Education and become high officials. These
officials guide and supervise their subordinates, so even if
Minister of Education Araki wants to do things with the
correct ideas, he can’t. Nor is it at all the case that even
cabinet ministers are immune from bad ideas; there were
strange folks in the previous cabinet. In the current
cabinet, only Prime Minister Hiranuma and Minister of
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Education Araki are solid. I surely hope these two men
carry out their duties loyally.”
Tsuda: “Worse than the Emperor-Organ Theory”
It was just the same throughout as in the issue of the
emperor-organ theory: once the Genri Nihon group of
Minoda and the others decided on the target of their attack,
it sent its attack essays everywhere under the sun and did
everything possible to stir things up. It aroused its
members in upper and lower houses of the Diet to raise the
issue there; it incited the Home Ministry and the Justice
Ministry to prosecute formally—was it really right to allow
such books to be published? Even Tanaka’s Law and Religion
and Society that I talked about earlier: on the day the second
Popular Front Incident took place, Baron Mimurodo
Takamitsu cited the book in the Upper House and attacked
it, and it was immediately banned (details later, Chapter 9).
The Kawai Incident and the Tsuda Incident, which
became major issues at this time, both developed in that
manner. The former I’ll deal with later; here I’ll write about
the latter. Tsuda considered virtually all of Japan’s ancient
history, including the age of the gods, to be myths spun by
the imperial house to justify its political control. Beginning
with Studies in the Kojiki and Nihongi,8 his books shook the
foundations of the thinking of Minoda and the emperor-
centered people, so they reacted in the fiercest of ways.
They published an expanded issue of Genri Nihon with the
scary title:
THE TREASONOUS THOUGHT OF TSUDA SŌKICHI,
PROFESSOR, FACULTY OF LETTERS, WASEDA
UNIVERSITY, VISITING LECTURER AT TOKYO
8 Kojiki oyobi Nihon shoki no kenkyū (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1924).
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IMPERIAL UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF LAW: SCHOLARLY
CRITICISM OF THE ERASURE OF THE AGE OF THE
GODS AND ANCIENT HISTORY9
They introduced Tsuda’s arguments and were
censorious in the extreme: “In this way, regardless of the
truth or falsity of his contentions, Tsuda’s argument that
ancient history including the age of the gods is a
forgery—that is, his erasure of it—is disrespect of the most
evil kind toward the most august ‘imperial house’ that
‘created’ the Kojiki and Nihongi. It does not recognize the
existence of the earliest imperial ancestors.” The attack
goes on to compare this blasphemy with that of the
emperor-organ theory: the emperor-organ theory did
recognize the existence of the emperor, saying merely that
he was not the subject of sovereignty, yet the cabinet still
criticized it—“It indeed contravenes the principles of our
sacred kokutai.” But in contrast, “When it comes to this
argument of Tsuda, it rejects fundamentally and utterly
the historical facts of ancient history, including the age of
the gods, the very source of Japan’s kokutai, thereby erasing
the existence of Emperor Jimmu and the first fourteen imperial
forebears, and hence also the sacred meaning of the palace and
the imperial tombs. So this is a case of ideological treason
unprecedented in our history.”
Right-wing Students Storm the Classroom
The strange thing is that Studies in the Kojiki and Nihongi
had been published in 1924, all of fifteen years earlier. Since
9 RHM: In the original, part of the title, “The Treasonous Thought of Tsuda Sōkichi,” is
bolded in an unusual way. The background on which the letters rest is black, the
letters themselves are white. The final line is indented to demonstrate respect for its
first character: jin/kami (gods神). And with each mention of emperor or imperial
house in the following passage, Genri Nihon leaves a blank space immediately
preceding these terms, thus demonstrating respect.
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then, consistently, Tsuda had never hidden these
assertions. In fact, he had said the same things in another
book back in 1913. So why was it made an issue now?
Because it was one facet of the Genri Nihon group’s criticism
of Tōdai. Tsuda had become a Waseda professor in 1918
and held that position straight through to the time of the
Incident. In 1939 a new specialty was established in the
Tōdai Faculty of Law, “History of Asian Political Ideas,” and
he was invited to be the lecturer. The title of Tsuda’s course
was “The Political Ideas of the Early Qin [Chinese]
Dynasty,” so there was absolutely no connection to Japan’s
ancient history. But perhaps because Tsuda had gained
public attention, Iwanami Books decided in the spring of
1938 to issue an expanded edition of Studies in the Kojiki and
Nihongi, which had long been out of print.
The attack by Minoda did not begin immediately on the
book’s reissue. The initial attack from Genri Nihon began
from the point of view that Tsuda’s Asian ideas conflicted
with the concept of the new order Japan was trying to
create in Asia. And suddenly, in late December, when the
course that began in October was about to end, the Genri
Nihon group launched its concerted attack .
Even at the Faculty of Law there were some right-wing
students connected with Genri Nihon, and when they went
to the classes of professors likely to become the object of
Genri Nihon attack, they obstructed in all sorts of ways,
asking malicious questions and the like. This student group
came en masse to Tsuda’s final lecture. Maruyama Masao,
then an instructor assigned to assist Tsuda, accompanied
Tsuda to the lecture. Here is what he remembers:
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Maruyama: Tsuda said, “I'll stop here. Are there any
questions?” At that moment, hands went up in unison from
all sides. I think there were fifteen or sixteen questioners. It
wasn't that they had listened to the lecture and were reacting.
They had set it up, from the first. Intentionally taking the
occasion of this last lecture, they had come to make a
concerted attack. The ones clamoring were a bunch I doubt
had attended the earlier lectures. Some were from the Faculty
of Letters; some had clearly already graduated.
Nambara: Was Odamura Torajirō there, too? [Odamura
was a notorious right-wing student in the Faculty of Law. He
took his lead from Minoda and had attacked quite a few
professors.]
Maruyama: No. Odamura had already been suspended and
wasn't there…. But his buddies were—the Student Co-
operative Association that Odamura had organized with the
Shōshinkai10 of First Higher School as its core; it was a student
organization that took Mitsui and Minoda as its leaders.
These guys were members of it, beyond a doubt.
Fukuda: What questions did they ask?
Maruyama: I don't remember all of them…. “Japan is now
prosecuting the China Incident and is trying for national unity
in order to create a new moral order in East Asia. Despite that,
not to recognize the ethical ideas that traditionally have
linked Japan and China: isn't that to deny the foundation of
the New Order in Asia?” From the first, it was a campaign of
attack on Tsuda. I knew immediately it was the Co-op bunch.
But Tsuda responded scrupulously. It went on for fifteen
minutes—when one questioner was finished, another and
then another kept asking the same sort of question. Finally,
I jumped out of my seat, stood in front of the dais, and said,
“Questions like these aren't scholarly questions. Professor
Tsuda has gone to great pains to give these lectures for the
177 | university of massachusetts amherst libraries
Tōdai Faculty of Law. It's impolite to ask him questions that
have nothing to do with his lecture.” And I put my arm around
Tsuda and led him to the Faculty Lounge.”11
But fourteen or fifteen students followed and stormed
noisily into the lounge, saying, “We’ve got more questions.”
Good-natured man that he was, Tsuda answered questions
there, too.
10 RHM: The name of this student organization approximates “society of true believers.”
11 Kaikō Nambara Shigeru.
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Maruyama: I sat next to Tsuda, and the bunch took seats
around the table, hemming us in. It was students plus
outsiders. Then a prolonged kangaroo court began. In brief,
Tsuda's stance was fundamentally the Marxist view of history
and not compatible with the spirit of clarifying the kokutai.
Tsuda said no, he didn't think the materialist view of history
was scholarly and responded for all he was worth. But their
goal from the first was accusation, so there was no way they'd
buy it. They were saying things like “The spirit of the Jinnō
shōtōki was such and such…”12 It went on for more than three
hours…. It was endless, so I said, “Professor Tsuda, there's no
point in a conversation with such fanatics. Let's get out of
here.” And by main force I dragged him out. They didn't
obstruct us by force, as I'd expected, but jeers followed us.
I don't remember this, but afterwards Tsuda spoke of the
moment in these words, “You wrangled with those guys.” I was
hot-headed then, so I might have given that impression… But
the next day, an account of that last lecture appeared in the
Imperial News. The all-out attack of that bunch, with Minoda
in the lead, had started.
Nambara: And as soon as the course at Tōdai ended, in
February 1940, Tsuda's main books were banned. And in
March he was indicted under Article 26 of the publication law
for profaning the dignity of the imperial house and so on.
This was just about the time of the Kawai trial, and it was
the same sort of incident, so we decided to bring the two into
contact and gathered at Iwanami Books and compared
notes…
Maruyama: While Tsuda was in Tokyo, I apologized to him
for the trouble he'd encountered in the incident, “If you'd never
come to the Faculty of Law, you'd probably have been fine…”
Silently, he smiled and nodded. He didn't say explicitly that
that was the case, but I think he thought so.
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In fact, this incident did arise because Tsuda came to Tōdai
and caught the eye of Minoda, who was already confirmed
in his hatred of Tōdai; had Tsuda stayed at Waseda, it never
would have happened.
The Alliance For a Tōdai Purge
Right after he published the special expanded issue of
Genri Nihon attacking Tsuda, Minoda put together an
“Alliance for a Tōdai Purge” made up of one hundred and
forty influential figures from various worlds who had been
cooperating with Genri Nihon for some time. It included
nineteen members of the Diet, among them people who
had been active at the time of the issue of the emperor-
organ theory, famous military men, and major right-wing
figures.13 The alliance issued a proclamation “On the
Erasure of Ancient History, including the Age of the Gods,”
and called Tsuda’s essay “an authentic erase-Japan, erase-
Asia argument” that “destroys the foundation of the
kokutai.” It argued that those who brought “this person who
embraces these evil ideas” from Waseda University and
made him lecturer at the Tokyo Imperial University should
take responsibility for their action and said: “This alliance
appeals to the sense of responsibility of cabinet members
for advising the emperor—Prime Minister Abe, the Home
Minister, the Justice Minister, the Minister of
Education—and calls the attention of Army and Navy
officials, demanding that they deal quickly with this issue
and carry out a resolute, fundamental, and thorough
12 RHM: Jinnō shōtōki is a work of the fourteenth century by Kitabatake Chikafusa; it deals
with the imperial lineage and in the nineteenth and twentieth century became a favorite
text of right-wing nationalists.
13 RHM: Tachibana lists Diet members Kikuchi Takeo, Mimurodo Keikō, Inoue Seijun,
Iida Kōnan; military figures Hayashi Tetsujūrō, Tatekawa Yoshinaga, Kashii Kōhei; and
right-wing figures Toyama Mitsuru, Iwata Ainosuke, Imaizumi Teisuke.
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reform of education. It demands further that those who
have recommended and encouraged Tsuda’s writing and
research—university officials, the publishers, the Ministry
of Education, Japan Library Association, and Japan
Academy—come forward and take responsibility.” It called
upon officials and public opinion to rise up, as in the
Emperor-Organ Incident, and denounce Tsuda history. It
distributed this proclamation to 5,000 influential figures in
all fields, got much reaction, and printed the reactions in
Genri Nihon:
• “This speech tries to erase ‘Japan.’ People rotten to the
marrow are impossible to redeem. I’d like them placed
beyond the pale of ‘the Japanese.’” Army Brigadier
General.
• “Unspeakable. It should not be allowed. Tōdai too needs
major purge.” Diet member.
• “If this were Germany, it’s certain he’d be deported
immediately and his books burned.” Former Diet
Member.
• “Must be crazy. Send him to the asylum at once.”
Kawashima Kanji.
• “Of course Japan is the land of the gods. Whether here
or abroad, we cannot tolerate foolishness that ignores
this brilliant history of 2,600 years in the slightest.”
Poet.
Other literary figures also commented.14
Against the background of voices such as these, the
14 Tachibana lists, among others, Hagiwara Sakutarō and Kataoka Teppei,
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Alliance for an Imperial University Purge issued demands
of the government, one after the other, requesting that the
Home Minister ban Tsuda’s books, that the Justice Minister
take immediate legal action, that the Minister of Education
strip Tsuda of his professorial rank and his degree.
The renovationist faction within the Faculty of
Economics and the right-wing nationalist forces outside
were apparently not linked organizationally, but they had
deep ideological ties. All through these years, Tōdai was
harassed both from within and from without.
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7The Great Purge of the
Faculty of Economics by
Hiraga Yuzuru, Battleship
President
In which the author discusses the Hiraga Purge (January 1939),
the Draconian measure that ended the factional fighting within
the Faculty of Economics. He traces the purge’s roots to the
presidency of Nagayo Matarō and the strategizing of Tanaka
Kōtarō. Given the virulence of Kawai Eijirō’s critique of the
military, it’s no surprise that Kawai was purged. What is
surprising is that the purge removed as well the leading
“renovationist” on the Faculty, Hijikata Seibi—this despite the
fact that on the surface at least, both President Hiraga and
Minister of Education Araki were his ideological allies. Thirteen
(of nineteen) members of the Faculty of Economics were purged or
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resigned in protest. The Hiraga Purge was then and remains today
an issue on which opinion divides sharply.
Day after Day of Headlines
A great many incidents intertwined chronologically in
those three years: the Yanaihara Incident in 1937, the
Faculty Group Incident (the arrest of Ōuchi) and the ban
on publication against Kawai in 1938, the Hiraga Purge and
the Tsuda Incident of 1939. These incidents were so many
and so complex that try as you can, it’s virtually impossible
to make the ins and outs easy to understand. This chapter is
mainly about the Hiraga Purge. Let me state at the outset:
it followed a more complicated course than did the other
incidents, so it’s particularly difficult to understand, and
there are many aspects we still don’t understand.
But historical truth lies in complexity. To put it
differently, the truth of history is very hard to grasp. On any
number of issues the judgment of history is still pending,
but for the Hiraga Purge more than any of the others,
historical judgment varies with the historian. The critics
call it the rash act of a military officer-president who
understood neither the value of scholarship nor the raison
d’ètre of the university; those who praise it say it saved
Tōdai. Without the Hiraga Purge, the Faculty of Economics
would probably have been destroyed, and the trouble would
have spread, with profound consequences, to the Faculty of
Law, too.
Regardless, no contemporary Tōdai event shocked the
eyes and ears of the world more than the Hiraga Purge.
The Faculty of Economics came close to complete ruin. Day
after day the newspapers ran headlines and reported
events as they happened. They reported everything, even
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what was discussed at Faculty Meetings and University
Council meetings—a first in Tōdai history.
I’ve already laid out the bare facts of the Hiraga Purge,
but let me summarize. At the time, as a result of
complicated factional struggle, the Faculty of Economics
had become dysfunctional. In December 1938, succeeding
Nagayo Matarō, twelfth president of the university, Hiraga
Yuzuru (formerly dean of the Faculty of Engineering)
became thirteenth president. The conflict within the
Faculty of Economics seemed at an impasse; fed up and
in blaming-both-sides fashion, Hiraga fired the bosses of
the two opposing factions.1 Assistant professors and
instructors submitted their resignations in protest and left,
one after the other. The first to be fired were Hijikata, of
the Hijikata faction, and Kawai, of the Kawai faction. The
third faction in the three-headed Faculty of Economics was
the Ōuchi faction. Shortly before, in the Faculty Group
Incident, its members— Ōuchi and the others—had all
been arrested; with those arrests and the Yanaihara
Incident just before, the faction had dissolved. The Hiraga
Purge and the events before and after brought a sudden
end to the factional fighting, and factional conflict, the
chronic curse of the Faculty of Economics, vanished as if it
had never existed. (Remnants of the factions remained, but
they no longer had the strength to fight as factions.)
Still, the most crucial thing that university autonomy
protects is the status of professors. The fundamental
principle of university autonomy is that the hiring and
firing of professors was the sole prerogative of faculty
1 RHM: The term kyūshoku休職means (temporary) suspension from duty, but in these
cases the “suspension” was permanent from the first. Note Tachibana's use of the
phrase “have their heads,” which I have translated as “firing.”
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meeting, so even if the president wants to fire a specific
professor, he can’t. The momentous Hiraga Purge was the
exception to all exceptions in the history of the university.
It was an act of President Hiraga, and Tanaka, dean of
the Faculty of Law and Hiraga’s brain trust, was sitting
right at his side; so everything went according to proper
legal form. But it was a series of break-through tactics,
carried out in total disregard of previous customary
practice, main force in the extreme. There was major
debate in the Faculty of Law, hours long, over its legality
and appropriateness, and one influential professor went
to the president and argued that Hiraga should take
responsibility for having caused great chaos and resign.
President Nagayo’s Plan to Dissolve the Faculty of
Economics
From the day the Hiraga Purge was carried out, there
were a great many news reports about it, but most were
merely superficial factual reporting and then comment,
and the story behind the story did not emerge in full clarity.
The sources for the story behind the story were too few. For
example, virtually all the conditions that were the context
of the Hiraga Purge (the strife in the Faculty of Economics,
the Yanaihara Incident, the Ōuchi Incident) had arisen in
the presidency (1934-37) of Nagayo Matarō, and the most
important primary source there is his diary; but it wasn’t
published until 2002. Until then, the most well-known
contemporary appraisal of President Nagayo was Ōuchi’s
comment criticizing Nagayo’s unsteadiness at the time of
the Yanaihara Incident: “Nagayo was a very well-
intentioned person, but he offered no resistance to
pressures from within or without and in the end was
unable to formulate his own judgment or carry it out; he
went one way, then the other, and wound up complicating
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things. Not only did he forfeit trust within and without
toward the university and himself, he also fell sick on that
account, resigned, and died of illness. He was an eminent
scholar, and a good person, too; but as university president,
he was a failure.”2 Nagayo became the very model of a poor
president.
But read the whole diary, and you’ll find that in each
situation Nagayo ponders deeply and acts prudently. It’s
Ōuchi’s evaluation that’s mistaken. As one bit of evidence,
consider this passage I’ve already noted when he was
agonizing over the Yanaihara Incident: “It’s bad if the
entire university is abandoned to the currents of the times.
We can’t paint it all the single color of patriotism, of the
military cliques. When no one who embraces liberal ideas
can become a university professor, the university’s freedom
of scholarship collapses.”
At the time, Nagayo heard about the situation from
various quarters and knew that behind the problem lay the
factional antagonism in the Faculty of Economics that had
put down deep roots some years earlier. He wrote in his
diary: “November 27, 1937. Saturday. Clear. Internal unrest
in Faculty of Economics has its origins at deep level in
existence of rival barons. In future, too, strife will continue.
Unless we carry out major organizational change (for
example, splitting present two faculties—law and
economics—into three—law, administration, and
commerce), starting from scratch again with hearts and
minds and jettisoning the petty in interest of some great
common objective, there won’t be any fundamental
improvement.” Coming up against the deep-rooted strife
2 Daigaku no jichi (Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1963).
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within the Faculty of Economics that he was virtually
powerless to do anything about, Nagayo thought that to
eradicate the problem he might have to reconfigure the
Faculty totally. I think this— the need for radical
change—is the source of the Hiraga Purge.
Not all that much time elapsed between the Yanaihara
Incident, when Nagayo made these comments in his diary,
and the Hiraga Purge—just about a year. In that one year,
thanks to the Ōuchi and Kawai Incidents, the strife in the
Faculty of Economics grew even more bewildering. That
year was also the year the Sino-Japanese War became a
quagmire and Japanese society moved, at an accelerating
pace, onto war footing. In the Faculty of Economics, too,
one more major axis of confrontation was added—that
between those who supported the drive toward a war
economy and those who opposed it. The factional
opposition became all the more difficult to uproot.
In concrete terms, a group leaning strongly to
nationalism (the renovationist, Japanist-economic,
controlled-economy faction) emerged from the Hijikata
faction and one part of the Kawai faction, and it became
difficult for that faction to make peace with Kawai, who
continued his fierce critique of the military, nationalism,
and fascism. The major reason lay here: after 1938, the
majority—it had been made up by the Kawai faction and
the Hijikata faction—fell apart, most of the Kawai faction
joined the renovationist faction, and Kawai himself moved
closer to the Ōuchi faction. There was an additional reason
for moving closer to Ōuchi—the consciousness of
defending university autonomy. I’ll treat that later.
The procedures of the Faculty Meeting of the Faculty of
Economics distinguished two types of measure: measures
that could be decided by simple majority, and measures
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that required a two-thirds vote. Important personnel
matters required a two-thirds vote. That is, important
personnel matters could not be decided so long as a hard-
line “anti” faction controlled one-third of the votes. This
was the biggest reason the stalemate in the Faculty of
Economics continued: important matters simply could not
be decided. The longer the stalemate went on, the more
attractive the idea of cutting the Gordian knot—that
drastic, even radical, measures were the only way to solve
the problem. This background made radical solutions such
as the Hiraga Purge more palatable.
The Design for the Hiraga Purge
It’s not clear precisely who got the idea for the Hiraga
Purge or when or how, who worked that idea up in what
way, then turned it into reality. But it’s possible the concept
emerged during President Nagayo’s term in office. The
Hiraga Purge was carried out on January 28, 1939: on that
day, without any decision by the Faculty Meeting of the
Faculty of Economics, Hiraga forwarded directly to the
Minister of Education his decision to fire Hijikata and
Kawai. That is, he submitted a so-called formal report (of
which more later). Hiraga had been inaugurated president
on December 20, 1938, so he’d been in office only a month.
But in that period he had taken all the steps necessary to
carry out the purge.
In concrete terms, he had convened a University Council
and reached an understanding that he had carte blanche to
solve the strife in the Faculty of Economics, that the
president had the authority to take “the appropriate action
at the appropriate time.” Similarly, he had convened a
deans’ meeting and struck an understanding that the
president was in sole charge of the final decision to resolve
the “strife in the Faculty of Economics.” Further, he had
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met with the Minister of Education (General Araki Sadao)
and from him too got sole discretion.
At the time, the biggest issue the Faculty of Economics
faced was Kawai. Kawai’s four books had all been banned,
and from the right wing came fierce attacks: how can this
anti-kokutai, virtually communist, liberal scholar be a Tōdai
professor? From the Ministry of Education, too, came
pressure to punish Kawai. But punishment meant
following legal procedures. Punishment had to be for a
reason. If Kawai had engaged in criminal activity that
infringed criminal law, that would be reason for
punishment (suspension or firing). But in that case the law
(the higher civil service code) provided that punishment
follow indictment by the authorities. Did the fact that his
books had been banned constitute such a reason? Normally
not. The act of writing books that merited proscription was
not itself a crime. Even at this late date, there was still that
much freedom of speech.
To find a reason to punish Kawai, Hiraga created a
committee of inquiry and had it investigate Kawai’s four
proscribed books to see whether it could find sufficient
reason to strip Kawai of his status as professor. The
committee was made up of six people in all: the deans of
Law and Economics and the two delegates to the University
Council of each of these faculties. The conclusion they
issued after reading his four books was the very vague
statement, “In his method of expression and way of
thinking, there are aspects that are not appropriate for a
professor and cause misunderstanding among the general
public.” So far as his being unfit to be a university
professor, that’s it. But with this report as sole basis, Hiraga
submitted a formal report to the Minister of Education that
Kawai should be fired, and Kawai was fired. Imperial
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university professors were imperial appointees, so their
status could be changed only by order of the emperor.
Specifically, that power was exercised by order of the
Minister of Education, and there was a stipulation that the
Minister of Education act in accordance with the formal
recommendation of the university president (a
recommendation with attached explanation of the
situation). The formal recommendation of the president
normally accorded with the decision of the appropriate
faculty. But in this case that step had been skipped. That
fact gave rise to the charge that the Hiraga Purge was a
punishment carried out by main force in the extreme, the
exception of all exceptions.
Virtually all the professors who resigned in protest at
the Hiraga Purge were from the Faculty of Economics. But
Kawai’s friend Rōyama Masamichi resigned from the
Faculty of Law, too, on the grounds that such a purge was
not justified and should not be carried out. He wrote an
essay, “The Tōdai Purge and My Frame of Mind.”3 There
he points out that the committee of inquiry was not
appropriate: “To investigate the intellectual content of the
problematic books, the president, acting in great haste
right after the New Year’s holiday, established an ‘expert’
committee made up of six members in all, the deans and
the University Council representatives of the Faculties of
Law and Economics. He chose this as the way for the
university to investigate, for the first time ever, the
appropriateness of a professor’s ideas that ‘spontaneously’
had become an issue with the public. … Are these members
truly the appropriate experts to examine Kawai’s writings?
3 “Tōdai shukugaku mondai to watakushi no shinkyō,” Bungei shunjū, May 1939.
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Were they experts, those who happened at the time to have
become dean or representative? They held chairs in
commercial law, civil law, diplomatic history, history of
economics, accounting, and insurance. It’s crystal clear
that deans and faculty representatives are proposed for
office to handle administrative or official business, not to
investigate scholarship and ideas. … To put it in extreme
terms, that is a structure best suited to functioning in
secret, in the dark.”
The make-up of the committee was problematic, so the
conclusion it reached was problematic. The vagueness of
its conclusion was also problematic. But its conclusion held
that there were “issues of appropriateness,” so the
president pressed Kawai to retire voluntarily. Kawai
refused, so he was called before the committee and given
the opportunity to defend himself. Still, the final
conclusion was that there were “inappropriate” aspects, so
having issued Kawai a final notification, the president
made his formal recommendation to the Minister of
Education that it was appropriate to fire Kawai. Thus, after
becoming president, Hiraga had proceeded, one by one,
with all the formal steps so he could say he had done
everything possible. Simply completing all these
procedures takes easily a month, so after becoming
president, Hiraga had no time for the tedious business of
first investigating the situation and then working out an
appropriate solution. The outline for the Hiraga Purge had
already been completed before Hiraga became president,
that is, during Nagayo’s presidency. While the university
was responding to the events of 1938, the options boiled
down to this as the only possible policy.
Nagayo’s Distrust of Hijikata
Nagayo’s distrust of Hijikata is clear in his diary, so let’s
193 | university of massachusetts amherst libraries
follow it there. The arrest of Ōuchi happened at the
beginning of 1938. At that time there was a clash between
Hijikata, who argued that Ōuchi should be fired—before he
was indicted—and Nagayo, who held that it was not right
to fire him before he was indicted. In the course of the
dispute, Nagayo’s distrust of Hijikata grew. For example,
in his diary for February 22, 1938, he writes (I summarize):
Hijikata said that Ōuchi was clearly a Marxist, that he
wanted the Faculty Meeting to discuss Ōuchi’s ideas, that
these ideas were inappropriate for a professor, that a
decision should be rendered. I argued it should not. Not
only was it not proper to discuss a professor’s thought,
there were differing points of view and no unity in public
opinion or in opinion within the university; so if you were
so rash as to discuss someone’s thought at such a time
and render a decision, “You only stir things up needlessly
and increase public and university unrest.” During the
argument, “Hijikata lost his composure and continually got
excited.” I suggested it was okay to discuss the Ōuchi issue
in the Faculty Meeting, but not to vote on appropriateness
or take other steps: “Ōuchi is a Tōdai professor. He’s not
merely a professor in the Faculty of Economics. His tenure
differs from that of an instructor; it involves the president
directly.”
The distinguishing characteristic of the Hiraga Purge
was that the president intervened directly and—on an issue
of professorial status, which essentially should be handled
in Faculty Meeting—went over the head of Faculty
Meeting, assembled reports himself, and, based on them,
submitted a formal recommendation to the Minister of
Education. The idea arose here that the president has such
authority and on important personnel issues should
exercise it. Nagayo writes: “In normal times faculty
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appointments are decided by each faculty, and hiring and
firing are done with the president’s sanction; but so
important an issue as this is a matter for the entire
university, not simply the faculty directly affected. All the
faculties and particularly the president feel profound
responsibility and have an interest; it calls for careful
consideration and no mistakes in dealing with it. When the
Faculty of Economics can’t come to a decision, it’s natural
that the president step in. Moreover, now it’s become an
issue not simply for the Faculty of Economics but for the
entire university.” This passage concerns the issue of
Ōuchi, but later, using this logic, Hiraga developed what
became his model of presidential leadership: if need be,
even if Faculty Meeting does not agree, the president can
intervene by main force and submit a formal
recommendation to the Minister of Education.
In June Nagayo thought up a “fundamental solution.”
According to it, the factions undertake sincere and
thorough negotiations and make mutual concessions. This
is a “fundamental solution” that can only be called
optimistic, but what’s fascinating is that suddenly, in the
proposal’s final lines, there appears the radical plan that
all should resign: “7. If all else fails, resignation of entire
Faculty of Economics; president takes responsibility. In
this case, study ways to rebuild the Faculty.” There were
these words in explanation: “The persons responsible if
things don’t work are the president and all Economics
professors.… In Economics, factional fighting hasn’t ended
for years, and Faculty can’t govern itself. Examples
plentiful. That is underlying source of problem. … Punish
only one group, and there will never be peace.” A second
characteristic of the Hiraga Purge is that when two
competing factions fight over what is right, don’t
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investigate which side is truly right and declare that side
the winner; if useless fighting continues, both sides are to
blame. Using that rationale, punish both sides. That idea
likely originates here. In short, if you find one side guilty
and castigate it, that side stores up a grudge and you can’t
hope for future peace. So punish both sides—a very
Japanese solution!
A memo on a separate sheet of paper left in the diary
includes several radical solutions:
If Economics absolutely can't govern itself and strife
continues, abolish Faculty of Economics and set up second
track within Faculty of Law.
Try for peaceful solution… If the above is absolutely
hopeless:
a. I assume responsibility and seek reconsideration on part
of Economics.
b. Blame all Economics professors. At this point I, too, of
course take blame.
In August there is this entry:
For several months I've been pondering a purge of Faculty of
Economics. … It's clear that if we don't purge Economics, forces
will continue to denounce the university. Ponder
considerations.
Two proposals—
a. Leaving Economics as is, force several retirements. In this
case, start by demanding all professors submit letters of
resignation.
b. In finding worthy successors, selection crucial. To that
end merge temporarily with Faculty of Law.
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Moroever, at this time, as a result of an exchange of
opinions with Tamba Shigeteru, dean of Engineering,
Nagayo left the following in a memo:
a. Voluntary resignation of five men (Ōuchi, Hijikata,
Honiden, Tanabe, Kawai).
b. Resignation of all professors.
The second is naturally easier to manage. It's for different
reason (inability of Economics to govern itself) than Ōuchi
issue.
Step by step, a solution emerges that approximates what
actually happened in the Hiraga Purge. Hiraga was the next
dean of Engineering after Tamba, and Hiraga then became
president; so it’s likely of course that on this issue he
consulted both Tamba and Nagayo. In Nagayo’s diary the
day after Hiraga’s becoming president was decided, there’s
this note: “Morning: Hiraga comes to call; spent an hour
discussing in detail the true state of affairs on several
pending issues, projects, and the like.” It would be only
natural if the “true state of affairs” discussed “in detail” at
this time included the proposals I’ve mentioned.
After the Hiraga Purge, Nagayo wrote: “I rejoice that thus
Faculty of Economics issue has come to end of chapter.
With changes in conditions and with support of public
opinion, difficult problem calms down for present, thanks
to President Hiraga; for me, too, a great delight. … Even
if method is open to criticism, for Hiraga that’s okay;
important that right man was in right place at right time.
After sober reflection Hiraga did what he believed best.”
Nagayo compared it with what he himself had done as
president: given those conditions and his health (halfway
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into his presidency, Nagayo developed inflammation of the
inner ear, was hospitalized, and wasn’t able to perform his
duties fully), he himself couldn’t have done other than what
he did. He wrote: “Since last spring I too had felt keenly
the need to reconstruct Economics and had studied various
proposals; the method President Hiraga chose this time
was among those proposals.” It’s clear from the previous
quotations that this was in fact so. In short, when things
reach such a pass, there are few conceivable solutions. The
issue is to choose a course of action and carry it out
resolutely. On this latter point of carrying it out resolutely,
the military president, the “battleship god,” was able to do
what Nagayo couldn’t.
Moreover, Nagayo wrote the following review of the
entire situation: “Taking the larger view, under the
influence of the crisis of the times, Tōdai encountered one
difficult problem after another. Yanaihara, Ōuchi, Kawai,
and so on: none had done anything that in normal times
would merit resignation; as professors, all were excellent in
ability and scholarship; in Economics they were of the first
order. That they were all forced out was on account of the
crisis, and that the renovationist clique got all stirred up,
too, was on account of the crisis (ever since the Manchurian
Incident, and especially since the outbreak of the China-
Japan War). Those of a liberal tendency and the clique that
burned with ‘consciousness of the state’ departed from
traditional relations of deep amity, and each side presented
a united front.” This could well be a backward glance from
when the war was already over; but it’s from 1939, shortly
after the Hiraga Purge. This alone shows that Nagayo was
really quite a man, that he could see the larger picture.
Battleship President
I’ve mentioned Hiraga earlier, but let me introduce him
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once more. Hiraga was born in 1878, the son of a naval
officer, and entered the Tōdai shipbuilding. He got his
commission while still in school; before graduation he had
become a naval lieutenant, junior grade. After graduating,
he continued building warships at the Navy’s arsenals in
Yokosuka and Kure. Right after the outbreak of the Russo-
Japanese War in 1904, he went abroad to study shipbuilding
at the British naval college. England learned the lessons of
the battle of the Japan Sea (May 1905), when the Japanese
Navy under Admiral Tōgo sank 35 of 38 Russian warships,
and was developing faster ships with greater firepower
(this development raised the curtain on the era of big ships
with giant cannon—the class of battleships called
dreadnoughts). Hiraga studied this development in detail
and, after returning to Japan, became the leader in Japan’s
battleship construction. From Mutsu and Nagato to Musashi,
Japan’s most important battleships all were designed by
Hiraga, and Hiraga became known as the “battleship god.”
From early on, Hiraga served concurrently as adjunct
faculty member of Tōdai’s shipbuilding program, and he
recruited the brightest students one after another to be the
Navy’s “commissioned students.” Basically, all the Navy’s
ship-building officers were Hiraga’s disciples (or disciples
of his disciples). In later years, Hiraga transferred from the
Navy to the university (his status changed from adjunct
to regular faculty), and he became dean of the Faculty of
Engineering. Ōuchi issue arose just then, and the
University Council (composed of all the deans plus two
representatives from each faculty) was convened to
consider whether it was proper to fire Ōuchi before he was
indicted. There Hiraga’s statements caught people’s
attention, and after Nagayo resigned, he became a
candidate to replace Nagayo.
199 | university of massachusetts amherst libraries
Tanaka Kōtarō, at the time dean of the Faculty of Law,
was right-hand man and advisor during both the Nagayo
and Hiraga presidencies. In the symposium University
Autonomy, Tanaka quotes the records of the University
Council and says: “Next Hiraga made a noteworthy
statement. He was then dean of the Faculty of Engineering
and later, as you know, president. ‘Hiraga: It’s a most
regrettable climate, the tendency of late to jump to the
arbitrary conclusion that someone is “anti-state.” Deciding
that a university professor is anti-state is very serious and
calls for care. If in actions and intent someone is anti-state,
he should be dealt with; hence the time to ascertain the
facts in this case is after a decision by the judicial officials.’”
This University Council was convened to consider whether
to fire Professor Ōuchi, arrested in the Faculty Group
Incident, before he was indicted; Hiraga took the position
that it was not right to do so.
Tanaka’s Support of President Hiraga
Tanaka thought very highly of Hiraga’s statement. In the
symposium he says, “At the time, I thought Hiraga an
extremely strong, dependable person.” And in the election
that followed Nagayo’s resignation, Tanaka became a key
figure in luring Hiraga into running. After Nagayo
resigned, the Faculty of Law came to think that given the
nature of the issue pending (how to handle Kawai), the next
president should be conversant with legal and economic
scholarship and with the state of affairs in the two faculties.
Tanaka tried first to entice Yamada Saburō, an eminent
predecessor in the Faculty of Law who had been president
of Seoul University. In the election, Yamada received good
support in other faculties and received the most votes. But
Yamada absolutely refused to accept. Here is Tanaka: “He
said he wasn’t the right person, that in particular he was
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unable to deal with the Kawai issue, and refused to accept
the position. Rumor had it that when Kawai married,
Yamada had served as matchmaker. … Even without that
connection, Yamada’s character made it a distasteful task,
and I think he avoided it intentionally. In short, he was
elected president but declined ‘resolutely.’ So then we had
to vote again…”
Hiraga was the next candidate Tanaka lured: “We of the
Law Faculty came to think Hiraga was the man. His
statement on the Ōuchi issue at University Council on
March 22 remained vividly in my mind, and whoever was
president simply wouldn’t be able to weather the crisis at
that time unless he had convictions, bravery, and
decisiveness: that was my thought…. In persuading
colleagues, I remember saying, ‘Well, if it took Yamada
Saburō ten minutes to understand something, it might
take Hiraga thirty minutes. But once it’s explained to him
and he understands, he’s reliable and will surmount any
difficulty and make it happen.’”
Tanaka worked with great ardor, but the crucial Faculty
of Engineering was unmoved. They considered “battleship
god” Hiraga a person of national-treasure class. Most felt
it was inexcusable to make such a man stain his closing
years with demeaning work and that he himself probably
didn’t want the job. So Tanaka met personally with Hiraga
to ascertain whether he was willing. Hiraga didn’t say
clearly yes or no, but Tanaka got the sense he’d do it (Hiraga
had said he’d think about it).
When Tanaka conveyed that sense to the Faculty of
Engineering, it too finally got serious. The Faculty of
Engineering included lots of important people, so when it
got serious, it had clout. The result of the election was that
Hiraga came in first and was elected. But Hiraga didn’t
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accept the job immediately. For ten days he talked seriously
with each of the deans about the problems and opinions
of their faculties. Tanaka: “Since I knew him from before,
from his time as dean, we could talk easily. I think all the
deans tried hard to persuade him. Nasu Shiroshi was a
Faculty of Agriculture representative on the University
Council, and he and I set out together and worked to
persuade Hiraga. Since the Faculty of Law had connections
to the issues in the Faculty of Economics, Hiraga was very
concerned about my views as dean. He called me and said,
‘Meeting you, I hope to make up my mind; what do you
think about relations with the Ministry of Education?’”
Hiraga appeared to feel it wasn’t worth it if he was being
asked to continue fighting the Ministry. “On that issue I
said if something was right even though it was the Ministry
saying it, then cooperate; I hadn’t the slightest objection.
In short, in dealing with issues, do things that were on
the right track and made sense in terms of university
autonomy, but if they didn’t, then don’t. If they made sense,
then work with the Ministry as harmoniously as possible.
Hiraga seemed relieved.”
When things got to this point, Hiraga decided to become
president. Given these circumstances, it was natural that
Tanaka become Hiraga’s brain trust, his font of wisdom.
In other words, Tanaka was the one who sketched out the
Hiraga Purge. It was also Tanaka who said that in dealing
with the Kawai issue, begin by creating Tōdai’s own
committee of inquiry and have it make its own evaluation
of Kawai’s four proscribed books. It was also Tanaka who
thought of dealing with Kawai and Hijikata
simultaneously, in the form of blaming both sides:
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Saying the university must defend its autonomy to the
utmost, I turned to the issue of how to deal with Kawai. I
recommended, “On the issue of whether to fire Kawai, the
university itself should decide. It would be appropriate first
to set the issue on the proper track, establish a committee,
investigate fairly and objectively whether Kawai must pay the
price, and based on that report decide university policy.” And I
added, “The reason the Kawai issue has become this large, it's
crystal clear, is the machinations of some on the Economics
Faculty, and the university can't ignore that. If you take up
Kawai only, it's truckling to the times, and university
autonomy will be damaged; so you've got to take up these two
issues together. Not only that. It's the professor who wants to
topple Kawai who really needs to be purged, so I hope you
take that course.” When I said that, Hiraga said, “This is a huge
problem; it demands careful consideration.”
“The professor who wants to topple Kawai” was, of course,
Hijikata. But it wasn’t all that easy to punish Hijikata at the
same time as Kawai. To quote University Autonomy again:
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Tanaka: On the factional issue, Kawai had to pay the price.
But another major professor and several of his followers were
responsible, too. In particular, that professor bore
responsibility. These two were unable to co-exist peaceably in
the Faculty of Economics. Hiraga had to do something. But at
the time it was very difficult to punish an Economics professor
who was riding the wave of the times …. The Ministry of
Education had absolutely no problems with that professor. To
deal with him required decisiveness on Hiraga's part.
We in the Faculty of Law thought that it wouldn't do to
invoke the factional issue among the reasons for punishing
Kawai, sacrifice Kawai right off, but let the boss of the
opposing faction go scot-free…. To use the vernacular, it had
to be “a curse on both your houses”—dealing with both at
the same time. You couldn't give the public the impression
you were sacrificing Kawai but, fearful of the times, letting
the other side go untouched. Wasn't it better for both sides
to pay the price at the same time? That was my advice to the
president.
Wagatsuma: So that means you helped Hiraga resolve to
act. “Tanaka's low-down conspiracy”—that's what a certain
professor wrote.
Suekawa: He wrote that?
Wagatsuma: Yes indeed. Not only that. There's criticism
even now. But I think that in the context of the university as a
whole, Tanaka was right to help Hiraga.
Hijikata’s Counter-Attack
The “certain professor” in whose book the phrase
“Tanaka’s low-down conspiracy” appears is Hijikata, and he
writes that Tanaka was the behind-the-scenes mastermind
of the Hiraga Purge. In Tales of the Academic World,4 Hijikata
writes as follows of Hiraga’s request that he resign:
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Suddenly on January 29, a phone call from the president:
come to his office at 11 a.m. Half-foreseeing that what was to
come had come, I went to the president's office, and it was a
request, “I'd like to ask that you take responsibility for the long
years of strife in the Faculty of Economics and submit your
resignation.” I responded, “What do you mean, responsibility
for the strife?” He responded, “In government agencies, it's
normal in such cases not to state the reason.” Moreover: “Don't
speak of this to anyone. We need the help of others in
rebuilding the university.” I thought to myself, this guy may
be clever at designing battleships, but he thinks in frightfully
bureaucratic terms. He doesn't even recognize the difference
between the university and other government agencies. I
said, “I have no intention of resigning, and I'll answer
categorically once again: I can't follow your request that I
speak to no one.” (This was so that I could consult with
Honiden and Tanabe, who had acted in concert with me.) And
I left.
At that time Hiraga also said, “It's the desire of professors
of the entire university that you leave the university.” That this
was a bare-faced lie is crystal clear from the fact that when
this notification of resignation became known, professors,
assistant professors, lecturers, and instructors from the
Faculties of Law and Economics—thirteen of them, all at one
go—submitted their own resignations, and from the fact that
there was a bitter fight in the Faculty of Law.
As Hijikata declares here, when he was notified of his
resignation, he immediately notified his confederates. His
confederates gathered one after the other at Hijikata’s
4 Gakkai shunjūki: Marukushizumu to no kōsō sanjūyonen (Tokyo: Chūō keizaisha, 1960).
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home, and the talk turned quickly to resignation en masse:
“When I reported that I’d been asked to resign, my
colleagues gathered quickly at my home. Among the
professors, Honiden, Tanabe, Nakanishi; among the
assistant professors, Hashizume, Yūmoto, Watanabe,
Yanagikawa; instructors Naniwada, Takamiya. Of course,
reporters from all the papers rushed to my house, and it
was a scene of utter confusion and great agitation. …
Indeed, those who assembled urged in unison that I not
resign; we’ll fight it to the end. And they decided that they
too would resign en masse. That I coerced them to
resign—that’s a bare-faced lie. In the first place, I wasn’t
that powerful…. The next day the people who had gathered
at my house the previous evening approved their letter of
resignation and carried it themselves to President Hiraga’s
house. At Hiraga’s house, Hiraga himself didn’t appear, but
a maid came out, said ‘Thank you,’ and accepted the letter
with a smile.”
In the next day’s paper banner headlines read
TŌDAI FACULTY OF ECONOMICS FACES RUIN
13 FROM BOTH FACTIONS RESIGN EN MASSE
and there was a very long article complete with
photographs. In The University Disease,5 Takeuchi Yō depicts
vividly the state of affairs that night at Hijikata’s house:
5 Daigaku to iu yamai: Tōdai funjō to kyōju gunzō (Tokyo: Chūō kōron shinsha, 2001).
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The entryway of the Hijikata home was filled to overflowing
with shoes. Reporters jammed in to hear the declaration to
be issued. Two rooms were used, with the intervening sliding
doors removed. The cigarette smoke was dense.
Hijikata's father-in-law Hijikata Yasushi, soon to turn 80,
was also encamped. His white hair flowing, he ranted left and
right in his usual loud voice, “The university's truly a disgrace.
The Ministry of Education, too, is a disgrace…. The idea of
chasing out a Japanist professor who denounced Communist
Party elements! Absurd! Astounding!” The two Hijikatas and
all the members of the united renovationist faction, it goes
without saying, prided themselves on being crucified patriots:
“It's the renovationist faction that's up to the crisis, so the
government, of course, and popular opinion, too, should be
sympathetic to it.”
At 8:30 p.m. Professors Honiden, Tanabe, and Nakanishi sat
in chairs and standing behind them were assistant professors
Yūmoto, Watanabe, Yanagikawa, and Hashizume, and
instructors Naniwada and Takamiya. Honiden, a big name in
the renovationist faction, angrily read out the declaration.
“We've just come from the president's house, where we
submitted our resignations.” Flashbulbs went off one after the
other. Reporters copied the declaration down in their
notebooks.
The newspapers covered the activities of both Hijikata and
Kawai factions, but the Hijikata faction was far larger; up
till then, press coverage of the Kawai Incident had been far
greater, but from that day on the coverage of the Hijikata
faction grew by leaps and bounds. In the symposium,
Tanaka says, “Hiraga carried out the purge of the Faculty
of Economics at the same time as he dealt with Kawai.
And public attention turned away from the Kawai issue and
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moved completely to the purge of the Faculty of Economics.
Kawai must have felt lonely…. He was a sacrifice in the
cause of university autonomy, but attention shifted to the
purge of the Faculty of Economics, and public attention to
Kawai grew very, very sketchy.”
That day’s flashy group picture of the Hijikata faction
had an underside readers didn’t know about; Arata wrote
as follows: “The renovationist faction published its
declaration and photograph, the group full of energy,
flaunting its unity. But pull back the curtain, and a
different picture emerges: They had assembled because
Hijikata had summoned them; once they were there, press
photographers had been called all of a sudden to
photograph the scene; and then they read aloud a
declaration that had been prepared ahead of time…. Pull
back the curtain, and in reality the renovationist faction
was surprisingly unpopular. Photo and declaration cost
them the sympathy they might have gotten otherwise. They
didn’t get the support of the Tokyo newspapers or of the
students, of whom they’d had hopes. People showed
sympathy for the reasoned statement Professors Kawai and
Yamada issued but didn’t make an issue of it. That’s how
eagerly people awaited the purge of the Tōdai Faculty of
Economics.”6
Emotionally, Minister of Education Araki must have
sided with the renovationist faction. But this was what was
fascinating about the Hiraga Purge: at the denouement,
the professors of the renovationist faction submitted their
resignations en masse, and for that very reason Araki turned
his back on them completely. Tanaka: “Minister Araki was
6 “‘Hiraga Shukugaku’ monogatari.”
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very angry with the professors of the renovationist faction.
Professors going on strike? The idea! Outrageous! And he
wound up swinging all his support behind President
Hiraga. In the meantime, Hiraga too had gone to Araki, had
a friendly chat that lasted all of four or five hours, and got
his consent. Without Araki’s support, he simply couldn’t
have done what he did. When you think about it, Araki
didn’t support the people of the renovationist faction, that
is, the right-wingers who were swimming with the tide. For
the people of the renovationist faction, that was completely
unexpected. This was Minister Araki’s traditionalism:
professors shouldn’t go on strike….”7 Because Minister
Araki supported Hiraga completely, the Hiraga Purge was a
success. And under its military president, Tōdai afterwards
committed itself deeply to Japan’s war footing. As I
described in Chapter 3, the merging of military and
university advanced steadily under President Hiraga.
The Purge: Bold Decision or Foolish Act?
Judgments of the Hiraga Purge depend on one’s point
of view and vary widely. For example, Tanaka, who was
Hiraga’s right arm and poured his energy into the purge,
praised it uncritically: “Hiraga’s defense of university
autonomy continued thereafter… To pass judgment here
on Hiraga: there have been few presidents like Hiraga in
the past, and none can be expected in the future—that’s
how great a president he was.”
And even Ōuchi, who criticizes him for firing Kawai,
gives him high marks overall: “Kawai’s firing was
unfortunate for the university. Was Hiraga able to stop
the damage there because he was the kind of person he
7 Daigaku no jichi.
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was? Or had he carried out the purge simply because he
was a military man? It’s hard to discuss this objectively.
Still, he did get rid once and for all of Hijikata and his
faction—Tanabe and Honiden—who, hiding behind the
aegis of the military, had so trampled on the freedom and
autonomy of the university; it was a decisiveness
unprecedented in the history of the university. I say ‘the
kind of person he was’ because I esteem greatly the fact
he fired these people; in fact, without a doubt his act
contributed to the reestablishment of Tōdai’s autonomy
after the war.”8
But Nambara Shigeru, professor in the Faculty of Law
(and later fifteenth president of the university), gave him a
very low grade: “He was sincere, a samurai-like person who
got things done. However, he was, after all, a military man.
It’s regrettable that he didn’t understand the university. He
differed from us in respect for university autonomy and
academic freedom. Perhaps he wasn’t one to look with far-
seeing eye into the future. I can only think that in this case
he acted imprudently.” Nambara simply could not make his
peace with the purge, and he went alone to Hiraga’s home
and said: “I well understand your distress. However, some
things can’t be undone. Now that things have got to this
point, if you really have the interests of the university at
heart, please resign.”
8 Daigaku no jichi.
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8Hijikata, Darling of the War
Economy, Falls from the
Heights
In which the author focuses on Hijikata Seibi, chief target of the
Hiraga Purge, detailing Hijikata’s connections outside the
university—to Japan’s Kwantung Army in Manchuria and, via
his wife, to the higher reaches of Japan’s establishment. Hijikata’s
influence was such that the Minister of Education felt it necessary
to get the emperor’s okay before Hiraga proceeded with the Purge.
The author also cites evidence that Hijikata’s academic reputation
rested on the work of his students and researchers, work that he
presented as his own. The chapter concludes by returning to the
Purge itself and the questions that remain.
Thirteen Resignations
In protest against the Hiraga Purge, thirteen faculty
presented their letters of resignation. They included nine
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members of the Hijikata faction, three
professors—Honiden, Tanabe, and Nakanishi, four
assistant professors—Hashizume, Yūmoto, Watanabe, and
Yanagikawa, and two instructors—Naniwada and
Takamiya. The other four who resigned were members of
the Kawai faction: Professor Yamada, lecturer Ōkōchi, and
instructors Kimura and Yasui.
At the time, the Faculty of Economics had only nineteen
members, including instructors (but not counting those on
research leave). Counting Kawai and Hijikata, fifteen
faculty left; so had that situation held, the Faculty of
Economics might have collapsed totally. The Asahi ran an
article with the headline, “TŌDAI FACULTY OF
ECONOMICS ON VERGE OF RUIN” and reported: “The
students are stunned. As soon as the turmoil ended, the one
thousand-plus students of the Faculty of Economics were
struck dumb by the unprecedented resignation of thirteen
professors, assistant professors, lecturers, instructors.
Final exams are pending, but the faculty to administer the
exams have all departed, and students are deeply worried:
‘Will I be able to graduate?’ Blessed by the inflation caused
by military procurements, all three hundred and fifty
graduates have already found employment, but even they
worry and worry: what will happen? Almost all the
professors of the required courses have left, rapidly, leaving
only four, including Dean Maide; next month the office
staff must schedule next year’s courses, and it’s anyone’s
guess what will happen.”
The Great Purge People Had Known Was Coming
There were doubts about how many of the thirteen who
submitted their resignations were serious, and considering
the fact that later quite a few agreed to retract their
resignations, it appears not a few in both factions took that
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action because, urged on by their comrades, they had gone
too far to back out. Unchanging (at least outwardly) in the
suddenly changed situation, President Hiraga accepted the
resignations and had no second thoughts. To a certain
extent it was predictable that professors would resign en
masse. In fact, in the previous spring, right after Hiraga
became president, wild rumors circulated that he might
punish both Kawai and Hijikata at one go, and both men
had consulted with their factions about what to do if that
happened. It hadn’t taken long for both factions to arrive at
the tactic of resignation en masse.
In October of the previous year, four of Kawai’s books
had been banned, including Critique of Fascism and The
Crisis and Liberalism, and beginning about then both
President Nagayo and the Ministry of Education had been
urging him to resign. Kawai continued resolutely to refuse,
and he and those around him expected that he’d be fired
at any moment. According to Kawai’s diary, in the previous
October his disciples (Yamada, lecturer Ōkōchi, instructors
Kimura and Yasui) had already agreed that if that
happened, they’d resign en masse.
For Hijikata’s part, he hadn’t anticipated so early that he
too would be fired along with Kawai. In The Events are Long
Past,1 he calls it “a completely surprise attack.” Even if it
wasn’t a complete surprise, until shortly before it actually
did happen, Hijikata never dreamed it would. The Ōuchi
group had collapsed with the Faculty Group Incident.
When Kawai too was brought to bay with the proscription
of his books, the “early Kawai faction” had dissolved, and
more than half had joined Hijikata’s faction to form the
1 Jiken wa toku nari ni keri.
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renovationist faction. Hijikata must have thought that
riding the current of the opening of hostilities (the Japan-
China War), the renovationists finally ruled the roost both
in the world at large and at Tōdai. Hijikata’s sense of his
firing was that he was merely collateral damage. He writes:
“In fact, Kawai’s status was at issue in the Ministry of
Education and in the world at large, and it was hard for
Presidents Nagayo and Hiraga to fire Kawai alone. So
Hiraga decided as a last resort, using the convention of
punishing both sides, to fire me, the head of the opposing
faction, at the same time as Kawai, and dreamed up this
‘gross breach of university order,’ whose meaning is utterly
unclear, and slapped it on me.”2 In essence, he was done
in for the sake of the “curse on both your houses” formula.
Later Rōyama, who resigned from the Faculty of Law to
protest the Hiraga Purge, wrote:3 “Several days (after new
president Hiraga assumed his post), I heard from a certain
quarter that he had been presented a proposed solution to
the Economics problem that made Kawai and Hijikata, the
two opposing factions within the Faculty, responsible for
the strife and hence the reason for punishing both sides.
Again, I heard the rumor that the president felt it necessary
to rebuild the Faculty of Economics and was even selecting
the people to replace the professors of the renovationist
faction—that is, he was apparently preparing a large-scale
purge.”
These rumors reached Hijikata’s ears, too, and long
before the firing, the Hijikata faction had decided how it
would react. In Days in Academia4 Hijikata wrote as follows
2 Jiken wa toku nari ni keri (Tokyo : Keizai Ōraisha, 1965).
3 “Tōdai shukugaku mondai to watakushi no shinkyō,” Bungei shunjū, May 1939.
4 Gakkai shunjūki: Marukushizumu to no kōsō sanjūyonen (Tokyo: Chūō keizaisha, 1960).
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about January 29, when he was summoned by the president
and asked to resign: “For me, who had had a premonition
that something might happen after Hiraga took office, an
uneasy month or two passed… I went to the president’s
office with the half-premonition that the worst had arrived…”
(Italics added). He clearly did have a premonition about his
firing. I quoted briefly from it earlier, but if we use the same
source to reconstruct the back-and-forth between Hijikata
and Hiraga in the president’s office, it is as follows:
“I want you to take responsibility for the many years of turmoil
in the Faculty of Economics and resign.”
“What do you mean, responsibility for the turmoil?”
“In government offices in such cases, it's standard practice
not to specify the reason.”
Hiraga added: “Don’t tell anyone about this. I need the
cooperation of others in rebuilding the Faculty.” Hijikata
replied: “I say again: I don’t intend to resign. I can’t accede
to your request not to talk to anyone.” Hijikata had already
agreed with his colleagues to talk about this issue, so he
couldn’t not speak of his give-and-take with Hiraga. “This
was so I could consult for the time being with Honiden and
Tanabe, who had been acting in concert with me. And next
day, by phone, I reaffirmed my intention not to resign.”
I’ve already told of Hijikata’s account, that when he
returned home, the renovationist faculty had all heard the
news and showed up one after another, encouraged each
other, and wrote out the notice of their joint resignations.
They had agreed beforehand on that response to the firing.
For his part, too, President Hiraga had foreseen that
resignations en masse might emerge from the like-minded
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groups around both Kawai and Hijikata, and those around
Hiraga speculated—“Who’s going to resign?”—and named
names. When all the renovationist faculty went to the
president’s house to deliver their resignation, a maid came
out and accepted the document with no more than a smile
and a “Thank you.” That was because Hiraga had
anticipated that development.
Who Was the Target of the Hiraga Purge?
Among those who resigned, some submitted their
resignations thinking that in the nature of things they
would be talked out of it, but Hiraga offered no dissuasion.
Still, even Hiraga apparently hadn’t thought there would
be thirteen resignations, threatening the very existence of
the Faculty of Economics. At the time, it’s said, Hiraga was
somewhat consternated, but he never tried dissuasion.
That was probably because the prime goal of the Hiraga
Purge lay in felling the renovationist faction. In a sense, it
was fortunate that the professors and assistant professors
of the renovationist faction all resigned en masse.
In the emeritus symposium, there’s the following
passage, and reading it, you understand clearly that felling
the renovationist faction was Hiraga’s primary objective:
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Andō: Rōyama wondered, Did he really do it to fire the leader
of the renovationist faction? And threw Kawai in for balance?
Or was it a curse on both your houses? …
Kimura: The target was the renovationist faction. To fell the
renovationist faction. Kawai had become a bit of a burden to
the university. He was a target of the prosecutor's office, so
he had become an issue the university had to deal with one
way or another. But it was the renovationist faction he really
wanted to force out.
Arisawa: The folks in the renovationist faction he wanted to
fire resigned on their own?
Wakimura: It was only Hijikata he wanted out, but the
renovationist faction people who gathered at Hijikata's home
said, Let's all resign, and they did.
The aim of the Hiraga Purge was to cause both Hijikata
and Kawai to resign; by jumping in on their own, these people
broadened and escalated matters, made it impossible to stop
with that bare minimum.
Andō: According to the newspapers of the time, it came out
that E. alone submitted not a resignation but an inquiry about
resignation. But as Kimura said, felling the renovationist
faction was what actually happened.
The “E.” in this last passage is Hashizume (banking,
currency), the spy H. who appeared in Chapter 4.
Hashizume had connections to the Home Ministry’s
Metropolitan Police and to the military, so he had become
one of the key figures in the renovationist faction. From the
time punishment was about to fall on Hijikata, Hashizume
had argued forcefully that to fight it, the renovationist
faction should resign en masse, and he pulled everyone
along with him. But when in the end punishment did fall
on Hijikata and everyone gathered at Hijikata’s and wrote
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out their resignations, he said, “I wrote mine at home and
brought it,” and pulled out an envelope. That’s the only
reason he didn’t write his resignation together with the
others.
But in fact what was in the envelope wasn’t a notice of
resignation but merely an inquiry about resigning. Because
it was merely an inquiry, Hashizume’s return to the
university was a simple matter, and he took charge of
rebuilding the Faculty of Economics. He was promoted to
professor that same year, 1939. He started a specialization
on controlled economy that became his responsibility.
From 1944 to the end of the war he served as dean.
I’ll have more to say about the role Hashizume played
in the Hiraga Purge, but let me write a bit more about the
views that emerged in the symposium:
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Andō: Takeda, you became an instructor right after the Hiraga
Purge. What was your impression?
Takeda: It was before the Hiraga Purge that Minister of
Education Araki broached the problem…of the general
elections.… According to Hiraga, both left and right could
become the cause of disorder, and the right was making
connections outside the university—not merely within the
university, but in the nature of things with the outside. Its
source was the Faculty of Economics. And several people
around Hiraga thought that something had to be done, and
the result took the form of “a curse on both your houses,” of
firing the heads of both factions in the unrest—isn't that what
happened? That was my reading of events after the fact.
At the time we didn't really know.
Kimura: My own reading is close to that, by and large.
Yamada: …The renovationist faction had connections
outside the university. The aim was somehow or other to
eradicate it, but if you did only that, then there'd be trouble. So
it took the form of blaming both sides, including Kawai.
Kimura: It's as you say. The goal was to get rid of the
renovationist faction. But unless you found some other
reason for firing the renovationist faction—you could say it
had connections with the outside, but the channels were
secret, so that wasn't patent. So that wasn't a firing offence.
That's where this “blame both sides” logic comes in. It
happened there was constant pressure from the Ministry. It
happened those people were here. Isn't that why it was “blame
both sides”?
Hijikata’s Influence
Yamada’s statement, that if only Hijikata was fired,
“there’d be trouble”—what did it mean? At the time,
Hijikata was closely connected with the powers that be, a
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major figure such as people today can hardly imagine. Even
if they know Ōuchi’s name, today’s young people probably
wonder, “Hijikata Seibi—who’s that?” But at the time,
Hijikata was a far more famous economist than Ōuchi. For
example, in 1928 the publisher Kaizōsha lined up famous
people like Kawakami Hajime and Fukuda Tokuzō to write
the forty-seven volumes of Economics: Collected Works,
Marxist in lineage. In the original plan, Ōuchi wasn’t asked
to write even one of those volumes. Later, when the revised
edition ran to sixty-three volumes, he was asked to write
one.
As if in competition with the Marxist collection, the
publisher Nihon hyōronsha lined up Koizumi Shinzō and
others and published the non-Marxist Contemporary
Economics in thirty-one volumes, edited by Hijikata Seibi.
In this collection, the non-Marxist economists of the Tōdai
Faculty of Economics—Kawai, Honiden, Hashizume, and
others—each wrote one volume. The same year that book
came out, Hijikata also published Studies in Japanese
Economy, in three volumes, 1,700 pages in all. This was the
age of the one-yen book boom, one yen per book, but
Hijikata’s three leatherbound volumes cost all of thirty yen
(in today’s terms, about $800).
At the time, Hijikata was without doubt the top man
in non-Marxist economics. And he wrote books of theory,
one after another, attacking head-on the Marxism that at
the time was rapidly becoming powerful. Right after the
Manchurian Incident, he was invited by the Kwangtung
Army to visit Manchuria; once Manchukuo was established,
through the good offices of staff officer Ishihara Kanji,
central figure for Manchuria policy, he became an advisor
on economic matters. His economic specialty originally
was finance, so it was the economics of running a country.
221 | university of massachusetts amherst libraries
It was economics from the viewpoint of how best to
increase state power, and from that point of view he
lectured for years on economics at the Army accounting
school. So the Army’s officers who specialized in economics
were all Hijikata’s disciples. That was one reason Hijikata
became close to the military.
At the Faculty of Economics, Hijikata served twice as
dean, from 1933 to 1936 and from l937 to 1938. During the
China-Japan war, at a time when the Japanese economy
was shifting rapidly to war footing, he became a leading
economist and played a central role in pulling the Faculty
of Economics over onto the side of the renovationist forces.
In The Events Are Long Past, Hijikata speaks with pride of
his own activity at this time: “During this period, under the
pressure of the crisis, the war economy became a hot issue,
and all parties emphasized the inevitability of a controlled
economy. Moreover, in that connection, there was
discussion of ‘Japanist economics,’ then ‘Imperial Way
economics’…and from time to time I too wrote magazine
articles on controlled economy or Japanist economics. I
pride myself, of course, on having been the first person
in Japan to argue for a ‘controlled economy.’ … In 1932 I
also published an essay ‘On an economic General
Headquarters’… In 1936, right after the February 26
Incident, I was invited by NHK to broadcast ‘Talks on
Controlled Economy.’”
As the Japan-China Incident developed into full-scale
war, the Japanese economy went onto a war footing, and
the economy became more and more controlled. When the
first Konoe Cabinet was formed in 1937, it created an
Emergency Capital Regulation Law, and a system of
currency control was begun where capital flowed
preferentially to military-procurement industries; this was
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the beginning of the rapid militarization of the economy.
The transformation of the Japanese economy into a
controlled economy proceeded apace; in 1939 a price-
control law was enacted, and commodity prices were
controlled totally.
1939: that’s the year the Hiraga Purge took place.
Mainstream economics was changing to become the world
of the renovationist faction, which had been advocating
a war economy, a controlled economy. For Hijikata, its
leading light, it was springtime. These conditions lay
behind Yamada’s statement that you couldn’t deal only
with the renovationists.
There was another reason not to mess with him: Hijikata
had ties to an influential family high up in Japan’s
establishment. Hijikata was born Machida Seibi but took
the Hijikata name when he married. His father-in-law
Hijikata Yasushi was a scholar who rose to be dean of the
Tokyo Imperial University Law School, predecessor of the
Tōdai Faculty of Law; he was a major scholar of civil law and
English law and one of the founders of Chūō University.
After retiring, he became a member of the Upper House
and was active at the time as an influential Diet member, a
noisy Conservative. The day Hijikata was fired, his father-
in-law encamped at the Hijikata mansion, formerly his own
residence, and each time someone arrived, he shouted
insults: for example, “Why on earth punish the most
outspoken opponent of the communists?” Thereafter
Hijikata Yasushi also raised the issue of Hijikata’s firing
in the Upper House and ridiculed Minister of Education
Araki: “He’s a lousy minister!”
Hijikata Yasushi supported Hijikata Seibi in every way,
but soon thereafterwhile on a tour of inspection in China
in May 1939, Yasushi died. Thereafter Seibi crashed to
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earth—partly because in the Hiraga Purge he’d lost his
position as Tōdai professor. He even lost the post of first
dean of the Japanese-Chinese Library in Shanghai that had
already been promised him, and thereafter he served until
1964, after the end of the war, as professor on the Faculty
of Law of Chūō University. But he never regained the
reputation he had enjoyed earlier.
In the end, the era in which Hijikata’s star shone most
brightly was the time just before he was caught up in the
Hiraga Purge. The years after the war were the golden age
of Marxist economics, so those lionized were precisely the
Marxists whom back then Hijikata had tried with all his
power to destroy, and virtually no one paid attention to
Hijikata as an economist. His memoir The Events Are Long
Past, written in 1964, ends with this complaint:
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With the Hiraga Purge, our anti-Marxist faction was
destroyed. And with defeat in the war, Ōuchi's Marxist faction
celebrated; with Occupation policy playing a role, it rushed
back to Tōdai and expelled the remaining members of the
anti-Marxist faction—Kitaoka, Nakagawa, Yūmoto, Araki,
Watanabe. Not only that, but after the defeat, the majority
of economics-related chairs in universities throughout the
country came to be held by Marxists. Even under Conservative
Party cabinets, Ōuchi served as chair of the social security
system's council, and long-time Marxist Arisawa held many
important posts—chair of the medical system council,
member of the atomic energy commission, and so on and so
on. As for people like me, none of us was given the chance
to publish in newspapers and magazines with a circulation
over 10,000. Even if we were able, barely, to publish books
(textbooks were a different matter), we could get no more
than at best several thousand readers. They say there's free
speech, but the opportunity to publish is extremely unfair.
Riding the current of the day, our adversaries write one-sided
stuff in books and mass-circulation magazines and distort
historical fact: that's the current situation. The events are long
past, “gone with the wind”—I'd like to forget the whole thing
once and for all. (Italics in original.)
Even the Minister of Education Hesitated Before Firing
Hijikata
To return to the story: the following passage from the
symposium indicates how influential Hijikata was back
then. The speaker is Andō: “Several years ago, before Araki
Sadao died, I met him at a panel discussion, and even at
ninety, the guy was some politician; looking at my card,
he said, ‘You’re in the Faculty of Economics? When I was
Minister of Education, Hijikata and the other fascists there
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caused trouble. What are they doing now?’ [Andō laughed.]
It amazed me to hear those words from the mouth of Araki
Sadao. Then Araki said: ‘We treated Kawai poorly. And
Maide is dead now, isn’t he?’ He knew everything. And he
said: ‘I’d respected and trusted Hiraga from long before, so
I left things to him. But when it came to forcing Hijikata
out, there was going to be criticism from outside, so we
reported every single thing to the emperor and got his
sanction.’” Even so famous and influential a military
politician as Araki thought that he couldn’t meddle lightly
with Hijikata and reported to the emperor; only after
getting the emperor’s approval did he proceed with the
firing of Hijikata. Imperial University professors were
direct Imperial appointees, but not every firing was
reported to the emperor.
How carefully the firing of Hijikata was handled, even at
the upper levels of government! At the time of the Hiraga
Purge, Maide was dean of the Faculty of Economics and
Hiraga’s right-hand man. To hear his testimony is to
understand better:5
5 “Keizai gakubu sanjūnen no omoide.”
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Then it became a matter of filing the written
recommendation on Kawai's firing; at the same time,
following the original plan, the president set about firing
Hijikata. Hijikata had given rise to the renovationist
movement, etc., and must take responsibility for plunging the
Faculty of Economics into chaos. And at the same time as
Kawai's firing, Hiraga recommended Hijikata's firing to the
Minister of Education. First, Hiraga met with Minister Araki,
showed him the plans for the reform of the Faculty of
Economics, and spoke of Kawai's punishment. The minister
gave his consent in a few words. Next, when President Hiraga
brought up the issue of Hijikata and said, I'm going to fire
him, too, and I'd like your consent, Araki seemed greatly
surprised. That was natural. Because at least in spirit, Araki
supported the renovationist faction. After discussing various
points, Araki said, Let me think about this; I'll reply in a few
days. His consent was a matter of life and death for the
president; he'd determined to resign if Araki said no. And of
course Hiraga had said that the entire responsibility was his,
but I too owed it to him to share his fate. Yet this was a very
important issue for the Minister of Education, too, so the
answer didn't come and didn't come. For the president, too:
he'd been promised an answer within days, and it hadn't
come… The vice-minister came to make apologies. I can't
forget even now the nervousness and unease I felt at the time.
Hiraga had inquiries made. Finally, much later than
scheduled, Araki's answer came: Do it Hiraga's way. I think it
must be because at the time Hiraga became president, Araki
had said to him, I'm putting the university in your hands.
You've got carte blanche; do a good job. But for Araki there
was very great danger that firing Hijikata would spark major
opposition from the right wing, so I think he had a hard time
deciding. As a matter of fact, once the president had his
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answer, he wrote up the firing of Kawai and Hijikata as per
plan. When he did, the renovationist bunch met at Hijikata's
home, consulted, and the professors, assistant professors, and
instuctors, from Honiden and Tanabe on down, decided to
resign en masse. They meant it as a threat.6
The success of the Hiraga Purge depended solely on firing
Hijikata, on whether the powers that be went along, and
both Hiraga and Maide had staked their own jobs on firing
him. At the time of the decision, precisely because Araki
knew firing Hijikata was such a big deal, he took the grave
step of obtaining the emperor’s sanction beforehand.
Araki’s reply to the university was probably so long in
coming because he followed that extraordinary procedure.
This is a bit of a digression, but let me introduce an
essay, “Dirge for Tōdai Economics Professor Hijikata Seibi,
together with an Autopsy on an Academic Salt Mine.”7
Reading it, you understand immediately just how deep-
seated the antagonism was between the Marxist and anti-
Marxist economists on the Faculty of Economics. As I
mentioned earlier, at this time Hijikata was producing one
major book after another. This essay states that they
weren’t his own work but were produced in a slave-labor
factory he’d set up:
6 Friends of Economics, double issue commemorating the death of Maide Chōgorō.
7 “Tōsei gakusha katagi VI: Teidai kyōju Hijikata Seibi hakase ni sasageraretaru
banka—awasete gakkai kangokubeya no kaibai,” Bungei shunjū, October 1929.
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Today Professor Hijikata is the darling of the day. Publishers
offer him royalties of 25% and come to his door day and night.
Hoping to get a mere ten pages of manuscript, magazine
reporters search him out like spies. Big capitalists invite him
to the Industrial Club, and the government ardently desires
to make him an advisor to the Finance Ministry, the Ministry
of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture. And
at the university? Students fight for seats in the famous
professor's course….
In quick succession, bewilderingly fast, Hijikata produces
book after book. Readers too must be surprised to learn that
from first book, Fundamental Concepts of Finance, to latest,
Lectures on Finance, he has written nine books. Moreover, all
are large tomes, most noticeably the 1,700-page Studies in the
Japanese Economy. If you add them all up, the page count easily
exceeds 5,000. The first one came out in 1934, so that means
1,000 pages per year. Prodigious, isn't it! …
Readers probably have their doubts. He writes close to
1,000 pages per year. In addition, virtually every month he
writes for newspapers and magazines. Not only that, but if
you check the citations in his books, Hijikata's reading in a
year probably exceeds 10,000 pages. Speaking purely in
physiological terms, how is it possible for one human being to
produce so much work?
An Academic Salt Mine!
In one corner of Hijikata’s property is a detached
building, and there a dozen instructors are jammed in. On
any given day, they are busy conducting research,
searching out statistical data, drawing up charts, even
reading German-language books.
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Hijikata's German isn't very good. Rather, to be precise, he
doesn't read German at all. So he has his corps of instructors
read, sometimes write out the gist, sometimes translate
necessary passages. I don't really need to say it, but this
appears as ‘by Hijikata Seibi,’ and in the notes such-and-such a
book is cited, this edition, this page, as if the professor himself
in fact had read it, and in the text, the translated theory is
set out grandly: who said this quotation, complete with
footnotes.
Let's proceed. An instructor writes an essay. Virtually
without change, Hijikata Seibi's name is added as author, and
it gets sent to a magazine. Several instructors write, one doing
each section, and the sections are put together, and that
becomes a book. What's on prominent display in the
bookstores is touted as the work of Hijikata Seibi.
In short, the instructors are Hijikata’s ghostwriters. That’s
the secret of how Hijikata can write so much. The writer
of this essay reports specifically, exposing concrete details
and naming the instructors: this book—wasn’t it written by
so-and-so? This essay—wasn’t it written by so-and-so?
Afterwards, thanks to Hijikata’s pull, the instructors
whose names are given become assistant professors at
Seoul Imperial University, professors at Hōsei University.
And the article makes clear that those instructors work
straight through, from nine in the morning to five at night,
get paid from 20 yen a month to at most 40 or 50 yen a
month (in terms of today’s cost of living, $500 to $1,300)
for their work. When that work appears as a book written
by Hijikata, royalties accrue to Hijikata in 1,000-yen
increments (in today’s values, 1,000,000 yen [$13,000]).
Hijikata continues to produce books by such methods, and
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the author calls him “a businessman, an entrepreneur.” He
concludes: “Factory-owner Hijikata Seibi, businessman
Hijikata Seibi. entrepreneur Hijikata Seibi. Impressive! But
labor conditions are somewhat better in today’s factories,
which are governed in some fashion by labor law. So
Hijikata’s workplace: what is it? What on earth is it? It’s…an
academic salt mine!”
Clearly, this essay was the work of someone extremely
unhappy with Hijikata’s methods and privy to the inner
workings of the Faculty of Economics. In fact, this essay on
Hijikata was the sixth in a Bungei shunjū series—“Today’s
Scholars.” Each month the series took up famous
professors of the Faculty of Economics, one after the other,
and, dripping with sarcasm, revealed their secret shames.
There was something shocking each month in these
exposés; they were famous at the time. Among the
information revealed was the give-and-take in Faculty
Meeting, which supposedly shouldn’t leak out; with each
issue a search for the wrong-doer was carried out, but he
wasn’t found.
In fact, the author was Ōmori Yoshitarō (former
assistant professor in the Faculty of Economics), who had
been forced out of Tōdai in 1928 in the aftershock of the
March 15 Incident and was an independent scholar. Ōmori
knew virtually all the instructors and graduate students in
Hijikata’s salt mine; that’s why he was able to reveal so
much inside dope. From his time on the Faculty of
Economics, Ōmori burned with extraordinary bellicosity
toward the anti-Marxist Hijikata, and he published here
and there essays that criticized Hijikata scathingly (not,
like this one, journalistic pieces but essays in economic
theory). Famous among them is “Militant Materialism.”8 In
Fifty Years, Ōuchi wrote about it as follows: “At the time,
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Hijikata’s reputation was very high in the Japanese
academic world…. Ōmori wrote this essay criticizing
Hijikata from stem to stern—the famous ‘Militant
Materialism.’ This noted essay for a while brought Ōmori
great literary fame; in acerbity and the cleverness of its
calumny, it was superior to Kushida’s essay. Kushida’s was
the heavy acerbity of a provincial; Ōmori’s was the acerbity
of a clever city kid. And Hijikata, who until the day before
had been sky-high, was brought very low.”
In fact, Ōmori wasn’t the only one attacking Hijikata at
this time: “When Hijikata’s Theory of Economic Life came out,
Maide said quietly that the Marxian theory of value that
Hijikata critiqued wasn’t Marx but a straw man Hijikata
had invented. Hijikata got angry and rebutted him. Not
only did his tone gradually become more violent, but his
argument became more and more confused. Then those
rebuttal essays were collected and became Hijikata’s
Denunciation of the Marxist Theory of Value (1929). Kushida
Tamizō spoke up and denounced Denunciation. … In its
fierceness, Kushida’s essay was like Marx. He treated
Hijikata as an ignorant child. … Yamada wrote a major
essay criticizing Hijikata.” Maide, Kushida, Yamada and
others—virtually the entire Ōuchi group—attacked
Hijikata, the major figure in the anti-Marxist camp.
Hijikata thought that these attacks were all at Ōuchi’s
direction, so he loathed Ōuchi. Between the Hijikata and
Ōuchi factions there was deep-seated factional opposition
on personnel matters. At its base was a fierce theoretical
battle between the Marxists and the anti-Marxists, such
8 “Materiarizumu-miritansu,” Kaizō, February 1927.
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that each side tried to demolish the other completely, and a
consequent fierce psychological antagonism.
Inconsistent Rationales for the Firing
Why fire Hijikata in the Hiraga Purge? The stated
rationale was his responsibility for being too engrossed in
factional fighting and plunging the Faculty of Economics
into chaos. The Council on Tenure of Higher Civil Servants
is convened to rule on issues involving higher civil servants.
The Prime Minister chairs it, and it consists of top-drawer
government legal figures. It made the final decision on the
Hijikata firing, and in its files the rationale is as follows:
“…said person at a time of ideological turbulence tried to
expel from the university unpatriotic ideas, gave rise to
fighting with one faction of his colleagues, and impulsively
took the wrong methods and brought dissension to the
Faculty; he had a very bad influence on student discipline…
He invited chaos within the Faculty and doubts in the world
at large. Hence it is necessary at this time to take action
against said person to relieve him of duty.” The passage
“tried to expel from the university unpatriotic ideas” points
to the fight with the Marxists. Clearly recognizing that fight
as the cause, Hijikata himself said: “In my view, this fight,
too—which was termed factional fighting within the
Faculty of Economics and which resulted in my being
forced to shoulder half the responsibility—was ideological
war against a domestic enemy. I fought on the rationale
that Marxism was misleading the young and endangering
the country. Of course, in addition to the purely ideological
in this battle, factional issues were intertwined—that’s
true; but the main issue was ideological. In short, it was a
battle between Marxists and anti-Marxists.”9
But if you say the factional fight was the real reason for
punishing Hijikata, and if, as earlier indicated, the Hijikata
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penalty was punishment along the lines of “a curse on both
your houses,” then there’s something weird. If it was “a
curse on both your houses,” then both sides have to pay the
same penalty. Both sides in the fight—Marxists and anti-
Marxists—must be punished.
But in the Hiraga Purge the Hijikata faction and the
Kawai faction were punished; the Ōuchi faction didn’t get
punished. This was because at the time of the Hiraga Purge,
the Ōuchi faction’s principal figures were in prison and
had no way even of knowing what had happened. In the
symposium, Arisawa speaks as follows: “In December my
preliminary interrogation had begun; I was in Sugamo
Prison. I had absolutely no idea what the situation was.
Before the examination began, the preliminary judge
entered the room carrying a newspaper that said everyone
had resigned and said, ‘Professor, it’s the end of the Faculty
of Economics!’ So I asked, ‘What do you mean, the end?’ Bit
by bit, as he read the newspaper, he explained it to me. But I
didn’t know why it had happened. He said, ‘Professor, what
about you?’ So I said, ‘I’ll have to think about whether I too
resign.’ The examining judge was shocked and said, ‘Please
treat this conversation as if it never happened.’ Thereafter
he told me nothing. So at the time I heard only a tiny bit
and knew nothing of the rest.”
The two sides punished in the “curse on both your
houses” were not Hijikata and Ōuchi, but Hijikata and
Kawai. Something else is strange: although the stated
rationale for firing Hijikata was the factional fighting, the
stated rationale for firing Kawai wasn’t. The rationale for
firing Kawai, still on file in the Council on Tenure of Higher
9 Jiken wa toku narinikeri.
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Civil Servants, states: “Said person, as stated earlier, rejects
state ideas and contravenes Japan’s kokutai concept, in
private discusses revision of the constitution idly, and
publishes views that would destroy civic virtue; moreover,
in teaching this, he has overstepped his limits as professor.
Further, it is known that said person is now under
investigation by officials from the prosecutor’s office.
Consequently, it is very damaging from the standpoint of
education to allow said person to remain in his current
position. It is necessary quickly, as in the recommendation,
to order him relieved of his duties.” In short, the rationale
for firing Kawai is Kawai’s ideas. The reasons listed are
“rejects state ideas,” “contravenes Japan’s kokutai concept,”
“in private discusses revision of the constitution,” “destroys
civic virtue,” and the like, so this is the very essence of
thought suppression. There’s no shred here of factional
fighting, so it can’t be “a curse on both your houses.”
In fact, this issue of the stated reason for firing Kawai
is the biggest enigma of the Hiraga Purge. What don’t we
know? There were differences between the stated reason
for firing Kawai carried out on the authority of the
president within the university (properly speaking, that
stated reason should have been forwarded intact in the
recommendation to the Minister of Education) and the
stated reason the cabinet appended at the time it
forwarded this issue to the Council on Tenure of Higher
Civil Servants (properly speaking, the stated reason should
be identical to what the president forwarded to the
Minister of Education). Properly speaking, these rationales
should be consistent, but in fact they weren’t; we don’t
know how the differences arose or who rewrote the
recommendation.
Sparks from the Uproar Leap to the Faculty of Law
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This inconsistency has been a major issue ever since. The
stated reason the university officials gave at the time of the
firings was released to the press by university officials, and
both of those fired, Kawai and Hijikata, responding to the
information the reporters had, spoke in detail about why
they were fired. So it’s all there in the newspapers of the
day. Moreover, the result of the deliberations of the Council
on Tenure of Higher Civil Servants was also released to
reporters, and in response to questions in the Diet,
Minister of Education Araki set out its content in detail.
So it appears in the Diet record. There were also news
accounts. So the inconsistency was noticed immediately
and considered strange. Beyond finding it strange, not a
few people then and now thought this was the most
important of all issues, an issue that went to the very root
of university autonomy.
What’s the issue? As I’ve said many times before now,
the root of university autonomy is the principle of “faculty
autonomy,” that all issues important to the university
(among them, personnel issues involving professors) are
decided solely by Faculty Meeting, and outside interference
(mainly, by the state) is rejected. Since the Meiji era, the
famous issues of university autonomy that have caused
university riots are all the same in essence, although the
specific problems differ with each issue. When state will
and university will collide, which takes precedence? How
much precedence? The autonomy of Faculty Meeting—how
far should its mandate be recognized? The state’s power to
compel—to what degree can it bind the university?
There have been many fierce collisions between the two,
and each time they collide, a scheme is drawn up to save
both the state’s honor and the university’s honor;. Thereby
a range of practices has come into being. One of these
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practices is that the authority in personnel matters
involving university professors, who are direct appointees
of the emperor, belongs formally to the emperor’s
sovereign power (the right to appoint officials). The
emperor exercises that authority in accordance with the
advice of the Minister of Education. The Minister of
Education exercises his advice in accordance with the
written recommendation of the university president. And
the written recommendation of the university president
is based on the decision of the specific Faculty Meeting.
According to this practice, Faculty Meeting’s decision and
emperor’s exercise of his sovereignty are connected by
direct line (formal identity is maintained). Thereby both
the essence of Faculty Meeting autonomy and the honor
of the state are salvaged—the supremacy of imperial
sovereignty, and the formal authority of the Minister of
Education over the university president. Minister of
Education Araki had been unhappy with this practice and
had tried to steamroller his own university reform through,
abolishing the election of university presidents and making
university presidents discretionary appointees of the
Minister of Education. But thanks to the deft resistance
and schemes on the part of the university—ending the
system of election by professors and making it a
recommendation system—the practice was defended in
essence, the principle of university autonomy maintained.
The important thing here is whether throughout the
process—from Faculty Meeting, via president and Ministry
of Education, to the exercise of the emperor’s
sovereignty—the formal decision stays the same. In this
matter of whether to honor this practice lies a most
important point: in this process, as in the game of
telephone, it’s important to “add nothing, leave nothing
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out, change nothing.” But in the firing of Kawai, very
clearly, the stated reason underwent major change. It’s not
clear where that change was made: at the president’s level?
At the Ministry level? If there’s no objection if such change
is made—no matter at what level, then an essential part
of universal autonomy goes completely missing. If that
happens, no matter what decision Faculty Meeting makes,
the president can issue a written recommendation
inconsistent with that decision, and no matter what
recommendation the president makes, Ministry officials
can hand down a decision inconsistent with the president’s
recommendation. Here, in the Hiraga Purge, is an issue
that goes to the very essence of university autonomy.
But in the Hiraga Purge, there’s a still more important
issue relating to university autonomy. President Hiraga’s
decision to fire both Kawai and Hijikata was handed down
in the absence of a decision by the Faculty Meeting of the
Faculty of Economics—in terms of university autonomy,
that decision should be the most important. That is, the
Hiraga Purge was pushed through by trampling on the
principle of faculty autonomy that is the basis of university
autonomy. It was a firing of professors that was the
exception of all exceptions. This trampling on the principle
of university autonomy shook the Faculty Meeting of the
Faculty of Law to its foundations and led finally to Tanaka
Kōtarō’s resignation as dean. The turmoil in the Faculty of
Economics had spread beyond the Faculty of Economics
into the Faculty of Law.
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9Tanaka Kōtarō, Guiding
Spirit of the Hiraga Purge,
Beset on All Sides
In which the author focuses on Tanaka Kōtarō, whom he credits
as the mastermind behind the Hiraga Purge. He traces Tanaka’s
stellar career—Tōdai professor of law, Minister of Education,
Supreme Court justice, judge on the International Court of Justice.
Tanaka, a Catholic, specialized in international law, a fact that
set him on collision course with the right-wingers around Minoda
Muneki. The national-essence people equated Japan’s war in Asia
with their domestic agenda to “clarify the kokutai,” and Tanaka
opposed both. The chapter concludes with an account of Tanaka’s
battering during the purge at the hands of his colleagues.
Tanaka’s Glittering Career
Tanaka Kōtarō, Dean of the Faculty of Law, enticed
Hiraga into being university president and generated the
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grand design of the Hiraga Purge. Moreover, at the time
of the Purge, Tanaka was sitting at Hiraga’s right hand,
supporting him all the way. In this sense, Tanaka may have
been the true protagonist of the Hiraga Purge. So let’s say
something more about Tanaka.
Today what ordinary people remember about Tanaka is
solely his postwar career. It was so glittering that merely
writing a bit about it shocks people. First, in the immediate
postwar period Minister of Education Maeda Tamon asked
Tanaka to become Chief of the Bureau of Education while
he was still a Tōdai professor (at the time it was possible for
a professor to be simultaneously a Ministry official). Chief
of the Bureau of Education was a post newly established
in a Ministry of Education that sought a fundamental
rethinking of education, and it oversaw the whole range of
educational administration: from primary and elementary
schools to universities and specialist and technical schools.
For a while after graduating, Tanaka had worked in the
Home Ministry, and in those years Maeda had been
Tanaka’s superior; they had a relationship of deep trust.
Tanaka burned with zeal for educational reform and
thought that with Maeda as his boss he could accomplish
whatever he wanted, and there were conditions within the
university that made the university inhospitable, so he
transferred from the university to the Ministry of
Education. It’s a bit of an aside, but the conditions that
made it inhospitable contribute to an understanding of
Tanaka’s character, so let me touch on them.
At the end of 1945, the last year of the war, an issue arose
regarding the promotion of Assistant Professor Yasui
Kaoru, who taught international law at the Faculty of Law.
This was the same Yasui Kaoru who after the war became
secretary-general of Gensuikyō and was spectacularly active.
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Tanaka opposed his promotion fiercely. Not only Tanaka
but also Yokota Kisaburō, the chief professor of
international law (and later a third-generation justice on
the Supreme Court). The reason for their opposition was
the same: they didn’t trust Yasui. In Nambara Shigeru
Remembered,1 there’s this passage:
Nambara: …The first reason was Yasui's opportunism. There
was no coherence about him; his ideas had no internal
consistency. Sometimes he was neo-Kantian, and just when
you thought that he was enamored of the Soviet Union, he'd
praise the Nazis. At that time his legal position was quite
national-essentialist or Greater East Asian… The criticism was
that you couldn't get away with that.
And then another reason: since the essay that earned him
promotion to assistant professor, he'd produced almost no
scholarly writing…. Moreover—it's strange to call it extra-
university work, but—that's all he was doing….
Tsuji: At that time “extra-university” meant military, didn't
it? … I heard the rumor that he had connections to the military,
to the young officers; how true was that?
Nambara: Yes, that was certainly one reason for opposing
him.
Maruyama: …He was also involved in Konoe's New Order.
So when it came to promoting Yasui, both Yokota and Tanaka
thought that the forces of the times were very strongly at work
in the background, that the Ministry of Education and the
military were pushing strongly.
Postwar people have virtually only the image of Yasui Kaoru
1 Gensuikyō原水協—Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. Nambara
Shigeru kaikoroku.
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as leader of the peace movement and secretary-general of
Gensuikyō, but earlier there was another Yasui Kaoru. In
fact, when the war ended, Yasui was investigated for his
words and deeds and barred from public office.
Tanaka and Yokota said that if Yasui was promoted to
professor, they’d resign, and they went around persuading
other members of the Faculty Meeting to vote no. In
response to their lobbying, some professors said, “To
promote Yasui and make Tanaka and Yokota resign would
be like exchanging lead for silver.” But many professors
considered their methods threatening and highhanded
and reacted negatively. Faculty Meeting approved Yasui’s
promotion. At that time in the Faculty of Law, there were
few who like Tanaka and Yokota were finicky about those
who truckled to the wartime order (since its founding the
Faculty of Law had traditionally been close to power), so
it may be only natural that many professors curried favor
with the establishment.
Tanaka and Yokota had been absolutely sure they
couldn’t lose, so they had announced that they’d resign if
Yasui was promoted; but when in fact Yasui was promoted,
they were really in a fix. Some people (virtually all the
assistant professors) smoothed things over, and both
Tanaka and Yokota stayed on, but the situation wasn’t a
comfortable one.
Hawkish Postwar Supreme Court Justice
To return to my tale, Tanaka became Chief of the
Education Bureau and exerted all his energies on education
reform. According to Tanaka’s My Resumé,2 the cause most
on Tanaka’s mind at this time in regard to education was
2 Tanaka Kōtarō, Watakushi no rirekisho (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1961).
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to take education out of the hands of the Ministry officials
and restore it to educators, people with actual experience
educating and studying about education. And he had the
following aspirations: “In addition to purging militarism
and extreme nationalism from education ideals, my chief
aspirations were for education to be independent, that is,
liberated from the control of central and regional
educational bureaucrats, for basic reform of teacher
training, which had suffered, and for better treatment of
educators.” In Tanaka’s time as bureau chief and then as
Minister of Education, postwar Japan’s new educational
structure basically had its path mapped out.
In 1946, when the first Yoshida cabinet was formed,
Tanaka (he was then fifty-five) became Minister of
Education at the personal request of Yoshida. Tanaka
thought that primary school had killed the army (by
turning it into a organization in which one obeyed only
when watched and resisted passively otherwise) and that in
the same way teacher-training schools were the root of evil
in Japan’s education. Pouring his energy into abolishing
them and establishing the 6:3 system, he created the basic
educational law, the schools’ education law, and so on.
In April of the following year, 1947, the first election to
the House of Peers under the new constitution was held,
and Tanaka ran, unattached, in the nation-wide division.
His supporters were many and varied, and he received
much volunteer support from Catholics and students of
Sophia University and Chūō University, and even though
he spent far less than the legal limit, he was elected easily.
(He came in sixth in the nation-wide division. He won the
most votes of any Tokyo candidate.)
Once elected, he assembled Diet representatives who did
not belong to any political party, formed the Fresh Breeze
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Association, and wrote its charter. Pursuing middle-of-the-
road politics and leaning neither left nor right, the Fresh
Breeze Association became the largest faction in the House
of Peers. In the Upper House he served as chair of the
Education Committee (and later as chair of the Education
and Culture Committee). Halfway through his term in
office, in 1950 (he was 59), he was appointed to the Supreme
Court and served over ten years as Chief Justice. During
that time, he participated in the Court’s verdicts in many
famous cases…. Some of his judgments were majority,
some minority; but he was a classic justice of the hawkish
wing. Since he continued to make bold and honest
statements, he was subjected to sharp criticism from the
reform camp. Although hawkish, he was a person of deep
conviction, and at the core of his convictions was a firm
Catholic faith. Since before the war, he had been strongly
anti-communist, but at the same time he reacted with
unusual force against the right wing national-essence
believers, too. During the pre-war and war years, Tanaka
fought them most fiercely. The Hiraga Purge was part of
that fight.
The Soul-Searching Behind Educational Reform
Why did Tanaka throw himself into the world of
educational administration and, rising to become Minister
of Education, exert all his energies on educational reform?
Because he had thought long and hard during the war
about why Japan had gone wrong and felt that the heaviest
onus of all lay on education. Right after the war, shortly
before becoming Minister of Education, he wrote
“Education and Worldview,”3 and his feelings are exhibited
3 “Kyōiku to sekaikan,” Chūō kōron, April 1946.
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clearly in a passage at the beginning of it: “People generally
are beginning to realize that everything stems from
mistakes in education. The nation hoped for what it should
not have hoped for…began a war it should not have begun,
ruled the peoples of the colonial territories by methods that
should not have been permitted, and fought until just
before final catastrophe a war it should have brought to an
end. Fortunately, people of good will have begun to reflect
that these crimes and misdeeds have their origin,
ultimately, in years of misguided education.”
In the period right after the war, there was continuous
and vociferous argument over the true cause of the defeat:
the technological gap, the lack of national power (economic
power), an unfavorable international environment, the
poverty of our politics… But for Tanaka these arguments
were all unimportant details. He wrote: “The true cause of
the defeat lies in the fact that we started a war that basically
should never have been started, a war impermissible from
an ethical standpoint. That is, the true cause of the defeat
lies squarely in the ethical shortcomings of the people. The
issue is of a moral character.”
From this point of view, the “search for the cause of the
defeat” was misguided. Why? To the extent that one
thought in terms of searching for the cause of the defeat,
it meant that had we won the war, there would have been
no soul-searching. But even had we won the war, the very
act of having gone to war was the mistake: “It’s not the
case that we are bad because we lost the war. If a war lacks
justice, even victory is a disgrace. Win or lose, we fought
when we should not have fought, so we acted unjustly and
must be ashamed. We are ashamed before the Allies and
before all humanity, but we must also be ashamed before
truth and before God. At this time we must remember in
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particular the words Fiat justitia pereat mundus (Let justice
be done even if the world perish).4 Up till now, our
education—the education of the past fifteen years, of
course, but farther back, education since Meiji—did not
permit that way of looking at things.” From its very
beginnings when Japan set out as a modern state, Japan’s
education was able to nurture only people who could not
think about things from this point of view, only people
unable to speak out.
With the string of incidents that arose in the years after
the Emperor-Organ Incident of 1935, Japan began to rush
headlong toward a war order: the February 26 Incident,
the start of war with China (that period coincided precisely
with the Hiraga Purge). And because Japan’s educational
system produced only such people, it became impossible
for anyone to say a word against the forces—the alliance
of the military and the right-wing national-essence
people—driving us to war. In that period Tanaka Kōtarō
came under the heaviest attack from Minoda Muneki and
the right wing national-essence people: that’s a topic for
later.
Let’s return to Tanaka’s sterling postwar career. In 1960
Tanaka retired from the Supreme Court at the mandatory
age, and immediately on retiring, as if it had been waiting
for him to retire, he was awarded the Order of Cultural
Merit.5 The citation for the award read: “His contribution
to the progress of commercial law. His establishment of
4 RHM: The Latin phrase was in use in the 16th century and (in slightly different form)
was the motto of the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I. Immanuel Kant used it in
Perpetual Peace (1795): “Let justice reign even if all the rascals in the world should
perish from it.”
5 RHM: One of Japan's highest cultural awards, voted on by the cabinet; it has been
declined only rarely (novelist Ōe Kenzaburō in 1994).
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an original philosophy of law grounded in natural law. His
contribution to the development of modern legal studies
with books such as The Theory of International Law.” Soon
thereafter Tanaka was elected Japan’s first judge of the
International Court of Justice, was sent to the Hague in
Holland, and served for nine years. Four years after
returning to Japan, he died at the age of eighty-three. At the
funeral at the National Academy, Nambara Shigeru (first
post-war president of Tōdai; at the time president of the
Academy) said in his eulogy: “In your lifetime you climbed,
one after the other, the highest peaks of life.” What a
career!
“World Law” vs. “Clarification of the Kokutai”
At the time of the Hiraga Purge, this glittering resumé
came within a whisker of crashing to earth. My Resumé
contains the following passage about the day Ōuchi Hyōe
was arrested in the Faculty Group Incident: “As soon as
I heard from reliable sources that Ōuchi’s arrest was
imminent, I went with Takagi Yasaka to the private
mansion of his friend, Minister of Education Kido Kōichi
and requested that Kido do everything possible. … While we
were talking, a phone call came from Ōuchi. It was word
that the police were making their raid. We returned to the
university thinking there was nothing we could do now.”
The problem was something that happened on this same
day, after they returned to the university: “While we were
eating, reporters arrived. I thought they were there about
Ōuchi, but it was about me. It was the news that my Law
and Religion and Social Life6 and Theory of World Law had been
attacked by rightwing members at a plenary session of the
6 Hō to shūkyō to shakai seikatsu (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1927).
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House of Peers.” On the morning of the day Ōuchi was
arrested, Baron Mimurodo Takamitsu, member of the
House of Peers (earlier he had attacked Minobe on the
emperor-organ issue), attacked Tanaka, dean of the Faculty
of Law, by name, asking whether he understood the kokutai.
Mimurodo addressed himself to Minister of Education
Kido: “There’s a man named Tanaka, dean of the Faculty of
Law, who does not understand the kokutai.”
In what context did this question arise? When you read
the transcript a bit before Mimurodo’s question, it’s clear
that there’s a direct connection with the emperor-organ
issue. “Recently, under the positive influence of the times,
bad ideas are gradually being eradicated, and it’s certain
we are moving gradually in a good direction under spiritual
mobilization, even on the clarification of the kokutai that
we—with what slight influence we possess—have been
calling for. However, it is only moving in the right
direction, isn’t complete yet, and to be specific, bad still
lingers in places, a school of thought that comes from the
emperor-organ theory.” In short, he attacked Tanaka as a
university professor who had drunk from the Minobe
stream and gone against the kokutai. “What is it that he
says? His book is titled Law and Religion and Social Life; on
page 132, he writes, ‘It is wrong to cause the entire nation
to worship at shrines.’ He is a professor at an imperial
university. He is dean of the Faculty of Law. On page 130 of
his book: ‘It is wrong to cause the entire nation to worship
at shrines.’ And on the next page he writes, ‘It is not right
that the state gives shrines special benefits different from
other religions.’ With what frame of mind does he write
these things? … Again on page 145 he writes, ‘In short, the
best policy is to abolish the custom of having primary
schools pay group visits to shrines. To decide that shrines
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are the state religion and compel obedience is to make the
nation servile, to prevent the healthy development of the
nation’s spiritual life.’ And so on. This is the kind of thing
he writes. I say again, the writer is Tanaka, dean of the
Faculty of Law at Tokyo Imperial University, established by
the state.”
To go back a bit: three years earlier, in 1935, Minoda
Muneki joined hands with Mimurodo and a bunch of
members of the House of Peers to denounce Minobe’s
emperor-organ theory. The emperor-organ issue gradually
developed into the movement to clarify the kokutai, and
“clarify the kokutai” became a slogan that swept the field.
After the February 26 Incident, the right wing and the
military lined up the attack phrases for people they didn’t
like—“anti-kokutai,” “counter to the kokutai”—and hinted at
the use of force, and they were able to stifle most speech.
The basic thinking of Minoda and the Genri Nihon group
was that law faculties of the imperial universities
(including both Tokyo and Kyoto) were the source of the
evils ruining contemporary Japan, leading society in an
anti-kokutai direction; unless these were crushed, Japan
wouldn’t recover. Having tasted victory in the Takigawa
Incident and the emperor-organ issue, Minoda then
attacked professors of the Tōdai Faculty of Law, one after
the other.
If we sample Genri Nihon, headlines such as these
appeared in virtually every issue of this period:
IMPERIAL UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF LAW SHOULD
BE SHUT DOWN!
ERADICATE THE IDEAS OF MINOBE AND SUEHIRO!
FIRE PROFESSOR YOKOTA IMMEDIATELY!
TŌDAI PROFESSOR YABE TEIJI’S REFUSAL TO
RECOGNIZE SOVEREIGNTY
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TŌDAI PROFESSOR KAWAI’S INTERFERENCE IN
THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
CHINA’S ‘ANTI-JAPAN’ EDUCATION AND THE ‘PRO-
COMMUNIST’ MOOD OF JAPAN’S IMPERIAL
UNIVERSITIES
In addition, Professors Yabe, Miyazawa, Rōyama and
Kyōto University Professors Tanabe, Sasaki, and others
came under occasional attack. Among the Tōdai professors,
Tanaka came in for especially fierce attack.
It began about 1928, soon after Law and Religion and Social
Life was published in 1927, and the denunciation by Baron
Mimurodo in the House of Peers that I cited earlier was
a virtual replay of the attack on Tanaka that Minoda
reiterated from then on. As had been the case in the
emperor-organ issue, when Genri Nihon and the House of
Peers members joined hands, what resulted,
fundamentally, was a play written and staged by Minoda
Muneki.
After the publication of Theory of World Law in 1934, the
attack on Tanaka became qualitatively fiercer. The very
advocacy of something like world law, they thought, was
anti-kokutai. Published by Iwanami in three volumes
between 1932 and 1934, Theory of World Law was Tanaka’s
magnum opus. As soon as it appeared, it received high
praise in the field; in 1935 it won the Asahi Prize. It was
reported to be the provisional winner also of that year’s
Emperor’s Award of the Japan Academy, but then the fierce
attack of the Genri Nihon group began, with waves of
protest falling on the Asahi, so talk of the Emperor’s Award
died out.
This was a most ambitious book. It examined the
concept of world law—at the time, still not established
internationally—thoroughly and from many angles. Why
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did Tanaka set his hand to this field? Basically his field was
commercial law. Commercial law included one sector that
developed in order to facilitate commercial transactions
among different countries, ethnicities, cultural blocs. That
sector was quite close to world law. In the field of
international private law that is part of commercial law,
world law (maritime law, air law, sea trade law) was already
germinating to allow international trade and international
markets to function smoothly. (In the world of bank bill
law, here and there a movement was beginning toward
establishing unified world law.)
Moreover, at this time various international laws arose
to smooth relations among states, and a legal world of
international public law was coming into existence. So
analyze and organize the important basic legal concepts
making up the world of international private law and
international public law and extract the universal human
legal concepts common to all state law: do that, and
reorganize the whole, setting everything in its proper place.
Might one be able to construct along these lines a world
of world law that would make it possible to turn universal
human society into a single legal community? This world
of world law transcended states and nations. On the one
hand, looked at realistically, all existing law presupposed
and made use of actually existing laws and states and
nations. But it was foreseen that henceforward the
interdependence of human societies, their solidarity,
would grow deeper and deeper, and that an age would
surely come that called for all human societies to be
brought under one universal legal structure (unified world
law). This book considered the possibility of such world
law, what sort of thing it would be, and examined where
its limits were likely to be. Also, it argued in detail such
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things as how to reconcile statism and internationalism,
nationalism and international humanitarianism. It was a
pioneering work with no parallel worldwide.
Hearing such ideas today, most people will respond
quickly, “Of course. Makes sense.” But at the time
confrontations between countries were severe, and wars
had already broken out; it seemed that in the future, too,
the fires of war would spread. Many people dismissed
world law as an illusion that ignored the forces of the age.
And from another direction entirely, the national-essence
people like Minoda criticized it sharply, calling it nonsense.
The issue was the source of law (the basis, the origin
that makes law law). World law must be law that applies
universally to human society, so it’s only natural that its
source, too, must be universal to human society. Thus, the
sole conceivable source of law is the concept of ‘natural
law’—the legal principles that all human beings,
transcending race and culture, can be convinced are
essential and the workings of reason. If you seek the source
of law in God or the like, it is the reality of the world that
peoples worship different gods; so unified world law can’t
emerge. In Theory of World Law, too, much space was
devoted to examining natural law as foundational.
But for the national-essence folks, this is nonsense.
Why? Because in Japan the source of law can only be the
emperor. Of course, the emperor is the source of law in the
case of imperial decrees, which are the emperor’s orders. In
the case of positive law that the Diet creates, the emperor
exercises the actual lawmaking as part of his sovereignty,
and the Diet merely cooperates (Article 4 of the Meiji
Constitution). Laws become laws only with the emperor’s
sanction, and both their promulgation and their carrying
out are done on the emperor’s orders (Article 6). In short,
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the source of all law in Japan can only be the emperor.
That is what the constitution established. And if you ask
where the constitution comes from, it was an authorized
constitution created by the emperor and granted to his
subjects. Here too the emperor is the source of law. And
where did the emperor get the constitution? In the Meiji
Constitution, the words “imperial proclamation” echo like
an incantation, and they indicate its origin; thereby it
becomes something granted by “the sacred spirits of the
imperial ancestors.” In short, the source of law in Japan can
only be the emperor and his ancestors (their spirits).
But in Theory of World Law Tanaka states clearly that in
the age of world law that will someday arrive, “one must
think of the world as the standard for the human legal
order,” so when that day dawns, the old theory of law based
on states and peoples “must be overturned.”
More “Treasonous” than the Emperor-Organ Theory
This is what Minoda pounced on. In “State and
University,”7 an essay critiquing Tanaka Kōtarō, he
attacked: “He infringes the emperor’s august will that is
sovereign over the state and that establishes law, and he
does not recognize the basic spirit of Japanese
constitutional law, which must follow the august imperial
will. He announces his lawless and treasonous intent to
‘upend’ and ‘destroy’ our kokutai, constitution, and law from
the foundation up. Because it takes as the origin and source
‘worldism, universalism,’ which fundamentally does not
recognize sovereignty and racial spirit, Tanaka’s theory
should be treated as more anti-state, more anarchist than
the emperor-organ theory. Even though that theory
7 “Kokka to daigaku,” Genri Nihon rombunshū.
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considers the emperor to be an organ, it still recognizes
sovereignty, national sovereignty.” Tanaka’s Theory of World
Law is lawless, treasonous theory incomparably worse than
Minobe’s emperor-organ theory. This attack on Tanaka is
the same in tone as the attack on Minobe’s emperor-organ
theory, and because it started in unison in both Diet and
right-wing media, too (Minoda also ran the Imperial News,
and there were other similar right-wing media), the
Emperor’s Award of the Japan Academy became
unthinkable.
Not only that. Tanaka came close to being murdered by
extremist right-wing military people stirred up by
Minoda’s fierce attack. In 1941, just before the outbreak of
the Pacific War, talk arose of exchanging professors with
French Indochina (which Japan had occupied) as cultural
interchange between Japanese and French Indochinese
universities. Tanaka would go from Japan, and a French
archeologist would come from French Indochina to Japan.
According to My Resumé, this was the story:
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Having inquired about the experiences of a professor the
previous year, I prepared several draft lectures in French and
made plane reservations. One week before I was to depart, the
bureau chief of the Information Agency said he wanted me
to cancel the flight. I had become one of the Army's marked
men. Reports came in that the army on the spot was angry
that I was coming and would not guarantee my safety. The
then-commander in French Indochina was Chō Isamu, a
daredevil officer who later died in battle in Okinawa.8 This
fellow, it was said, had “rubbed people out,” so I had a close
shave.
I was a believer in world law and a Catholic, so I was on the
military's blacklist, and police spies did tail me. I sometime
imagine that had the war lasted another three or four
months, I'd not be alive.
Things had come to such a pass that after Minoda’s attacks
began, Theory of World Law, newly out, was treated just as
if it had been banned and didn’t appear in stores. It was
only when it was reissued after the war (1947) that everyone
could read Theory of World Law. In the preface to that
printing, Tanaka writes as follows:
8 Chō was a violent right-wing officer who belonged to the Sakurakai and was elected chief
of the shock troops in the 1931 “October Incident”—an attempted coup d’etat that misfired.
tokyo university and the war | 256
Fifteen years have passed since I published the three volumes
of this book. Volume I appeared in 1932, the year after the
outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. It stirred up the statist-
nationalist camp—at that time they had begun to poke their
heads up—and became the object of attack from that quarter.
In the spring of 1935, when this work was awarded the Asahi
Prize, this attack became all the more intense, and the
ramifications affected the Asahi; moreover, it caused problems
for senior colleagues who had shown support for this work.9
Since then and down to the present day, in disregard of the
progress of the times and despite the fact that the hopes and
resonance of the scholarly and public worlds for this work had
been demonstrated, it has been as good as out of print.
Crazed howls that I was unpatriotic were heard even in
academic circles. But otherwise, as soon as it was published,
there were more than a few friendly critiques by scholars in
the field…. Amid all this, the China Incident broke out and
developed into the Pacific War, and given the torrent of
divinely-inspired statism, this work seemed on the surface of
things to disappear from the scholarly world.
Embarked on and continued in disregard of the demands
of reason, the war met its providential end, and the political
and intellectual worlds did an about-face. Like the public, this
work enjoyed freedom and daylight for the first time. Today
we can discuss world law and a world state without fear. A
state of affairs we could only dream of ten years ago—no,
three years ago—is now reality.
In this preface to the re-issue, Tanaka clearly takes honest
joy in living in an age in which world law and a world state
9 TT: Those who had recommended this work for the Japan Academy prize also came under
attack.
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can be discussed freely. In Theory of World Law he foresaw
that a “court to handle world law independent of state
sovereignty” would someday appear. And that court had
in fact appeared: the International Court of Justice
(institutionally speaking, it was born in 1945, at the same
time as the United Nations; Japan became a member in
1953). He surely never dreamed that twelve years after this
work’s reappearance, he himself would head to Holland to
serve as judge on that court.
Tanaka’s Critique of Minoda
Let’s return to our story of the age in which advocating
world law meant being virtually a traitor. In 1937 two essays
were published in quick succession in Genri Nihon: “Tanaka
Kōtarō’s Crafty Anti-Kokutai Thought and Intent” and
“Tanaka Kōtarō’s Fundamentally Anti-Japan, Resist-Japan
Thought.”10 The sudden increase in the ferocity of the attack
on Tanaka was because that year he became dean of the
Faculty of Law: for the right-wing national-essence folks,
Tanaka’s name recognition increased, and he became a
great target.
Shortly before, Tanaka had written in an essay in Shisō:
“I don’t think there’s a particular shortage of the kokutai
concept in the contemporary world of ideas.” Since the
emperor-organ issue, no one had tried to attack the actions
of Minoda and his friends—let sleeping dogs lie; but
Tanaka criticized them head-on. In his essay Tanaka had
also written: “The communist phenomenon has waned for
a while; at such a time, as if taking on the entire nation,
clarification of the kokutai is raised as a political slogan
and asserted as concrete state policy. But it’s inconceivable
10 RHM: “Tanaka Kōtarō-shi no inken naru han-kokutai shisō ishi,” “Tanaka Kōtarō-shi no
genriteki hai-nichi kō-nichi shisō.”
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that the kokutai has become so unclear that its influence
has to be spread to the educational system. Nevertheless,
one group of politicians and people with a finger in politics
takes for granted that the kokutai is not clear or at least is so
unclear that it’s necessary to start a clarification movement.”
(These italics were added by Minoda when he quoted it.)
The right-wing national essence-people of the time were
running around saying, “Clarify the kokutai!” In response,
Tanaka spoke heresy. Or rather than heresy, he tried to
bring the argument back to the factual level: did such a
degree of non-clarity about the kokutai exist? Unable to
respond effectively, Minoda wrote this essay, menacing
words without meaning–“[Such an objection] is truly
treacherous and lawless.” In short, from beginning to end
this essay displays Minoda’s usual forte of fault-finding,
barking and biting, stringing insults together and heaping
abuse. Like Minoda’s other essays, it does not withstand
close reading.
In reading Genri Nihon of this period, I noticed that the
September 1937 issue that carried “Tanaka Kōtarō’s
Fundamentally Anti-Japan, Resist-Japan Thought” ran a
declaration by Genri Nihon with the title:
THE SACRED IMPERIAL SPIRITS: THE WILL TO
CLARIFY THE KOKUTAI
THE IMPERIAL ARMY: ACTION TO CLARIFY THE
KOKUTAI11
This was the first issue to appear after the Incident at
the Marco Polo Bridge, and this proclamation shows clearly
how Minoda and his ilk saw the China Incident, how they
characterized this war. Reading it, you understand the
11 “Jinrei wa kokutai meichō ishi de ari: Kōgun wa kokutai meichō ishi kōdō de aru.”
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fundamental mode of thinking of the right-wing national-
essence people of the time, and you understand the
extremes of meaning of the “clarification of the kokutai”
they were advocating at the time. I’ll analyze it later, but
first let me quote the text:
It's a well-known fact that the cause of the China Incident
is China's Guomindang government, the Soviet Union's
international Communist Party, and the anti-Japan will and
propaganda linked to them. Anti-Japan means resist-Japan,
and Japan means not only territory but Japan's kokutai
tradition and spiritual culture. So “Japan” is the “Japanese
kokutai,” and “anti-Japan” is “resist the Japanese kokutai.”
For this reason, the object of the Imperial army's
chastisement is this will to resist Japan's kokutai. The
“righteous” war of the Imperial army is a war “to clarify the
kokutai.” …
The “Imperial ancestors” that defend Japan, land of the
gods, represent the “will to clarify the kokutai,” and for
subjects, the “way of the gods” that follows the will of the
gods is “the way of the loyal subject.” The kokutai is that all
Japanese are subjects, except for—let it be said with due
reverence—his majesty the emperor. Hence, the Japanese
ethic is “the way of the loyal subject.” Moreover, democratic
government with sovereignty in the people and Marxist
communism, its offshoot, are the objects of the Imperial
army's chastisement; in reality, the “China Incident” is a “war
to clarify the kokutai” and crush the resist-Japan will that is
incompatible with this kokutai.
It’s a passage that’s quite impenetrable, and the meaning
is hard to grasp; but in short, the China-Japan War is a
war for the clarification of the kokutai. The China-Japan
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War is military action undertaken to crush the will to resist
Japan that is spreading throughout China. “Japan” equals
“Japanese kokutai,” so “resist-Japan” is “the will the resist
the Japanese kokutai.” The goal of the military action of the
Japanese Army (the emperor’s army) is to crush this will
to resist the Japanese kokutai, so it’s a war to “clarify the
kokutai.” The war to clarify the kokutai—up till then it had
spread within Japan—had been extended abroad: this is
what the China-Japan War was. The domestic enemies of
the war to clarify the kokutai were the “democratic concept
that sovereignty resides in the people” and “Marxist
communism.” In the foreign war to clarify the kokutai, the
enemy was China’s resist-Japan movement.
The Greater East Asian War Is “War to Clarify the
Kokutai”
In terms of the flow of history, Japan spread war to all
Asia, an extension of the China-Japan War, and fought “the
Greater East Asian War.” According to the previous logic,
this means that war to clarify the kokutai spread to all Asia.
The “Greater East Asian War” was war to clarify the kokutai
beyond the national borders. As is well known, the slogan
of the Greater East Asian War was “eight corners under
one roof.” Eight corners under one roof meant to place
all (the eight corners) of the earth under one roof; these
words express founding emperor Jimmu’s aggressive will
to advance eastward and bring all of Japan under his
control. By advancing eastward, Emperor Jimmu made all
of Japan one communal society; that these precise words
were used as the slogan for the “Greater East Asian War”
expressed the aggressive intent that in the same fashion
the Greater East Asian War would make all of Asia (and
someday the whole world) one communal society. And the
communal society it aimed for was a family community
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that looked up to the Japanese emperor at its apex. It was
the aim eventually to make all Asia, the whole world, into
a single emperor-system communal society. In that future
world emperor-system community, not only would the
reigning emperor be worshipped, but the imperial
ancestors since the first emperor’s descent from heaven
must be worshipped; so it followed that in every area
shrines to worship Amaterasu Ōmikami had to be
established.
This is why in various places in the countries Japan
occupied by war (including Manchuria), shrines to
Amaterasu Ōmikami were set up and the godhead of the
Ise Shrine divided: nowadays, few people know this. These
shrines were especially numerous in Manchuria—in all,
more than five hundred of them. The gods they worshipped
varied, but Amaterasu Ōmikami was by far the god most
worshipped. Katō Kanji, known as the “father of colonial
development,” set up shrines in all corners of Manchuria.
Katō was leader of the Mongolia-Manchuria Development
Board and head of the Young Men’s Patriotic Training
Institutions in Manchuria and Mongolia; he was a follower
of Kakehi Katsuhiko, Tōdai’s old Shinto scholar of emperor-
ism who preached “the way of the gods.” Under Kakehi’s
guidance, Iyasaka Shrines were set up at training
institutions, and the Mongolia-Manchuria development
officials who received training there were indoctrinated
with Kakehi-style belief in the emperor. In 1937 Kakehi
traveled to Manchuria, made a two-week tour to “pioneer
communities” all over the country, and taught belief in “the
way of the gods.” In 1938 Kakehi was invited to Manchuria
again by the Kwantung Army, went to Manchuria a second
time, and this time gave long lectures on “the way of the
gods” to the Manchurian emperor, Pu Yi. Pu Yi was
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influenced by Kakehi, and when he visited Japan, Pu Yi
made a pilgrimage to the Ise Shrine with a special mirror
brought from Manchuria and received a portion of the
spirit of Amaterasu Ōmikami to be worshipped as the
sacred dynastic founder of Manchuria. According to
Kakehi’s old Shinto, the religions of the entire
world—Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism—all
had their source in Japan’s ancient Shinto. So he appears to
have thought that if Amaterasu Ōmikami was worshipped
in Manchuria’s founders’ shrine, then the Manchurian
dynasty and Japan’s Imperial dynasty would be one in their
religion, too.
Such a unification of belief in imperial divinity between
Japan and Manchuria was considered a model to be
realized in the future in the Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere. The world of “eight corners, one roof”
that would be realized by the Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere would spread belief in imperial divinity
to all Asia, and a world of divine political rule would be
realized, with military control (Imperial army control) and
political control united in the emperor. The Greater East
Asian War, which would bring about that reality, spread
to all Asia, which meant the clarification of the kokutai was
spread to all Asia.
Seen globally, the belief in a divine emperor is no more
than one Asian people’s belief in its ethnic god, but the
radicals of right-wing national-essentialism of the time
used war to pursue their ambition to spread Japan’s
military and political sphere of influence to all Asia and to
make an ethnic god (the emperor) a world god. Making the
Japanese ethnic god the world god was the polar opposite
of what Tanaka attempted in Theory of World Law. He
sought to create a universal human society by discarding
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the thought of each people’s ethnic god as source of law and
seeking a more universal source of law elsewhere. Because
the polar opposition was clear to both sides, the war
between the advocate of world law, Tanaka, and the right-
wing national-essence people could only be a fight to the
finish.
Tanaka’s Defiant “Kill Me If You Dare!”
In the Hiraga Purge, Tanaka took the extreme tactic of
striking down at one go the Tōdai Faculty of Economics
renovationist bunch, starting with Hijikata. Hijikata and
the renovationist faculty group, he felt, were the same
breed of badger as Minoda and the right-wing national-
essence people, who in the Emperor-Organ Incident had
slaughtered Minobe and now had turned their fangs on
Tanaka himself and all the anti-fascist members of the
Faculty of Law. He felt acute danger: if he didn’t get them,
they’d get him.
Faculty Meeting of the Faculty of Law right after the
Hiraga Purge became its final battleground. Yoshimura
Sachio’s “The Tōdai Story, Part II”12 paints those meetings
as the climax of the Hiraga Purge:
12 “Tōdai monogatari II,” Nihon hyōron, April 1939.
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The Faculty of Law met six times about the purge and had a
truly horrendous time, even though that fact wasn't reported
clearly in the press. Even in the Law Faculty, some professors
had ties to the renovationist clique. Moreover, it's natural that
in a Faculty of Law people should argue this issue from the
standpoint of pure reason. In the gathering storm, voices rose
in favor of holding a faculty meeting to denounce “disregard
of Faculty Meeting.” But as dean of the Law Faculty, Tanaka did
not respond. [Tanaka's prime objective was to push through
the Hiraga Purge no matter what the cost, and although
voices calling for convening a faculty meeting to discuss this
matter increased daily in number, he did not respond and
did not respond.] The discontent became unsupportable, and
finally he did convene a meeting. No sooner had he done
so than rhetorical arrows came flying in unison against the
Hiraga Purge faction—Tanaka, Wagatsuma, and
Yokota—from Nambara, Yanaihara, Takayanagi, Kamikawa,
Suehiro, Ono, Sugimura, Hozumi, Rōyama: “Shame on you for
ignoring Faculty Meeting!” “Isn't the reconstruction being
carried out very much along party lines?” “Isn't the treatment
of Hijikata and Kawai extremely uncollegial? Aren't there
more moderate means befitting a university?” “The changes
in the recommendation—how on earth will that matter be
settled?” And so on. In this argument the opposition had the
upper hand numerically and won the battle logically, too;
Tanaka had few dependable defenders, and none of them was
a truly strong polemicist. Smeared in blood, Tanaka stood
alone.
Throughout these six sessions Tanaka was beaten to a pulp.
Leading the charge in this pummeling was
Nambara—Tanaka's close friend of thirty years—who pressed
cogently: “Dean Tanaka's current action absolutely cannot
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stand.” There were many times when even Tanaka, it is said,
could only turn pale, lips sealed, at a loss for a response.
The meetings were in fact awful; even Nambara speaks of
what happened as follows:13 “… The meetings of the Faculty
of Law at the time were something. Late into the night,
under the electric lights, we argued about the Hiraga
Purge. Tanaka supported the action of Hiraga and spoke
out for it. Instantly, strong opposition came from
Suematsu: personnel matters of the university are to be
decided in Faculty Meeting, and actions infringing that
principle can’t be justified. Hozumi, too, spoke in
opposition, albeit elliptically. Most of the senior professors
were opposed. But some spoke strongly in defense and
supported Tanaka, and some agreed with the dean and
supported him silently. As always, I was a party of one and
argued that in terms of university justice, at least, the
method of this solution was a mistake. … I remember
raising my voice in anger.”
What made Nambara angry? “The Tōdai Story, Part II”
records the give-and-take as follows: “Tanaka
thought—‘I’m the one, of course, who’s defending Tōdai in
the larger sense. If we don’t carry out the purge, scholars
will be stripped away from Tōdai, one after the other. In
that sense, I’m the defender of Tōdai, and you fellows are
merely defending the autonomy of one small faculty.’ But
this idea was destroyed utterly and completely. Nambara
arose and counter-attacked: ‘I don’t want to be protected
at the cost of jettisoning university autonomy. If we can’t
13 Nambara Shigeru kaikoroku.
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defend university autonomy with Faculty Meeting and
recommendation as our shield, then we should all share
Kawai’s fate and resign. Tanaka: how could you!’ That
statement was the last word.”
Normally, if you’re spoken to like that, it’s time to give up
the deanship of the Faculty of Law; but in order to defend
the Hiraga Purge, Tanaka resolutely refused to quit:
The day the fourth faculty meeting ended, the professors the
lecture hall disgorged at dusk reflected: “We're flabbergasted.
We can't believe he's so gutsy! The issue's been argued out,
and he's been utterly and completely defeated, and he still
won't quit. He thinks: I can't quit so long as quitting might
have a negative impact on the Hiraga Purge. His attitude: say
whatever you want! Here I am, spread-eagled, at your mercy:
‘Kill me if you dare!”’ Assistant professors who couldn't speak
at the meeting thought: “Tanaka's bold tenacity is far more
interesting than the argument.”
From first to last, with Tanaka spread-eagled in Faculty
Meeting and defiant—“Kill me if you dare!”—the opposition
swarmed and sliced away at him and beat him thoroughly
with the whip of pure reason or, if they were members of the
renovationist faction, the club of sympathy. Then thinking
“Tanaka must be dead,” they stop slashing at him and pull
back. And Tanaka, who by all rights should be dead, springs
back up, smiling defiantly, and starts once again to restate
his argument. Again they slice away at him and again leave
thinking he's dead, and again he gets back to his feet.
This happened six times, and Tanaka outlasted six
thorough Faculty Meeting thrashings.
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10
The Small-minded
Makeshifts of Maide
Chōgorō, Dean of the
Deadlocked Faculty of
Economics
In which the author shifts his focus to lesser and less-distinguished
actors in the Purge drama. At the height of the Purge, Tanaka
Kōtarō resigned as dean of the Faculty of Law, and that
resignation quieted unrest among the law professors. The main
attack on Tanaka (and on the Purge itself) was that the Purge had
overridden standard personnel procedures, so the author describes
relations among Faculty Meeting, University Council, Dean’s
Council, university president, and Minister of Education. He
devotes considerable time to the case of Ōuchi Hyōei and the effort
to block his firing. In the process, Maide Chōgorō, dean of the
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Faculty of Economics, comes in for special, unflattering attention
as a Marxist economist who during the war “jettisoned Marx.”
Rōyama Masamichi’s View
Among the professors of the Faculty of Law, Rōyama
Masamichi (administrative law; after the war president of
Ochanomizu Women’s University) was the only one who
objected to the whole process of the Hiraga Purge and
resigned in protest. He published the details in “The Tōdai
Purge and My Frame of Mind.”1 Rōyama was a close friend
of Kawai Eijirō, so the main thrust of his criticism was
the irregularity of the punishment of Kawai. Kawai was
charged with the inappropriateness of the ideas in his four
banned books—Critique of Fascism, Principles of Social Policy,
The Crisis and Liberalism, and Second Student Life; he was also
charged with and punished for his responsibility over many
years for the deepening strife in the Faculty of Economics.
Up till then, both in law and in custom, the procedure in
cases of professors prosecuted on ideological grounds was
to wait until they were actually indicted before discussing
the matter in Faculty Meeting and then firing them. (Even
Ōuchi Hyōe, arrested in the Faculty Group Incident, was
fired only after he was indicted.) But this time those
procedures were not followed. Without submitting the
issue of Kawai’s punishment to the other professors
beforehand, the president and those around him made the
decision virtually in secret and forwarded the
recommendation to the Minister of Education. What the
recommendation contained was never made clear in
precise detail. Rōyama demanded of Tanaka Kōtarō, dean
1 “Tōdai shukugaku no mondai to watakushi no shinkyō,” Bungei shunjū, May 1939.
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of the Law Faculty and advisor to the president, that before
forwarding the recommendation from the president to the
Minister of Education, he convene Faculty Meeting and
explain affairs, but even that request was blocked. Tanaka
said he would speak in private but not in Faculty Meeting.
Moreover, if Kawai was to be blamed for the strife in the
Faculty of Economics, Rōyama asserted, Maide Chōgorō,
dean of the Faculty of Economics, was also likely
blameworthy, but that issue too was never answered
(eighteen days later, Maide resigned voluntarily). Rōyama
didn’t go so far as to call for Maide to resign as professor;
but given that Maide had stirred up such great strife, he
must take responsibility as dean and resign as dean. Such
was Rōyama’s argument.
Kawai had foreseen that he would receive some sort of
punishment and requested, “If my head’s going to roll, I’d
like it to roll on the ideological issue.” But although
university officials formed a committee of inquiry and
investigated Kawai’s writings, they were unable to discover
sufficient reason merely on the ideological issue for his
head to roll. Nevertheless, said Rōyama, the Ministry of
Education was clamoring for Kawai to be punished quickly,
so there was nothing for it but to add another vague
reason—his responsibility for the strife in the Faculty of
Economics—and punish him. That was not right.
These were the main points of Rōyama’s disagreement
with the punishment of Kawai, and he asserted that the
punishment of Hijikata was even stranger. At least in
Kawai’s case, the committee of inquiry had summoned the
professor himself and given him an opportunity for a
statement and defense, but Hijikata was never given such
an opportunity. Rōyama wrote:2 “In the case of Hijikata,
the Deans’ Council had decided everything, including
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punishment, based on evidentiary materials presented by
Deans Maide and Tanaka solely in the Deans’ Council and
then made its recommendation to the president. It did not
ask for Hijikata to be present or even offer him an
opportunity to explain his actions. Law professors take
government by law, or at least respect for the law, as the
golden rule; particularly for them and for people related
to a Faculty of Law that preaches in class and in writing
the historical and cultural meaning of the guarantee of
individual rights, these extraordinary procedures are truly
unacceptable…. But no matter how problematic that action,
how in the world can you take people who have served the
university for long years before becoming imperial
appointees [full professors were imperial appointees] and
punish them in a secret court without giving them
opportunity to speak? Moreover, Maide had played the role
of prosecutor in that secret trial, and for many years he
had been in the faction opposed to Hijikata—not only does
Maide know nothing of the chivalry of the warrior, but he
deserves to be called cowardly…. On the above points, the
Faculty Meeting of the Faculty of Law had argued at white
heat; the stifling atmosphere in the room was
overwhelming. I, too, was not completely cool but excited.”
Rōyama’s points were well taken.
Even Tanaka Had Tears in His Eyes
At the Faculty Meeting that discussed the punishment
of Kawai and Hijikata, the argument was stormier than
ever before. And the Faculty Meeting’s opinion that was put
together in the end regretted the action President Hiraga
had taken. Nambara speaks as follows:3 “Indeed, there was
2 “Tōdai shukugaku no mondai to watakushi no shinkyō.”
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a lot of argument, and we developed at long last the final
agreement of Faculty Meeting. Everyone cooperated or at
least consented. First, ‘The action President Hiraga took
was extremely regrettable,’ and here the opinions of my
colleagues and I were included. But since the disposition
had been announced, it was already a fait accompli, so at
that stage there was no way to go back to the status quo
ante; so we passed a resolution, ‘In rebuilding the Faculty,
please exercise full prudence.’ With that Tanaka left Faculty
Meeting and went to the administration building. There
the Deans’ Council, led by the president, was waiting to
hear what Faculty Meeting had done. As soon as he saw
the Faculty Meeting resolution, Hiraga got very angry. He
stated that if the Faculty of Law said his action was
unacceptable, he’d resign…. Even Tanaka, too, was
speechless. Still, he tried hard to persuade Hiraga and,
questioned by Hiraga, said that when Hiraga said he’d
resign, he—Tanaka—had shed tears for the first time.
Tanaka wasn’t the sort to shed tears. Really calm, no matter
how he’s criticized or judged, he can take it objectively and
think about it. No matter how stormy the discussion, he
never turns red in the slightest; he remembers in detail who
said what.” Tanaka had never once shed a tear in public but
cried for the first time. In his memoir, he writes as follows
about this scene:4
3 Kikigaki: Nambara Shigeru kaikoroku (Tokyo: Tōkyo daigaku shuppanbu, 1990).
4 Ikite kita michi (Tokyo: Ōzorasha, 1997).
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Criticism focused on me and on the president. The reason:
personnel affairs were supposed to be decided by Faculty
Meeting. But the fact that the president went against custom
and set up a committee and dealt with the matter infringed
faculty autonomy; the actions of the dean of the Faculty of
Law, who had advised the president, were all the more
inexcusable. Fierce attacks arose. Virtually all those who were
as old as I or older were of that opinion…. It wouldn't do to
implicate the president; so I kept silent, let them talk, and
tried simply not to give in. But the attacks on the president
became fierce. If there was no way to vent, the good name of
the Faculty of Law would be damaged, so various proposals
were discussed, and the result was a statement to the effect
that “The action of the president is regrettable, but the matter
has been decided and there is nothing to be done; so at this
time we hope he will push on with the reconstruction of the
Faculty of Economics.” … As soon as he read that, Hiraga
turned red: “If the Faculty of Law takes that attitude, then I
don't want this job any longer.” I had thought the president
was broadminded enough to live with this, so I hadn't
expected him to take this attitude. Probably the phrase “The
president's attitude is regrettable” resonated strongly and was
unbearable for his straight and simple heart. … I didn't know
what to say to the president by way of excuse. I myself
admired Hiraga whole-heartedly, and I had done what I did
believing truly that it would help him, but when I thought
that the result might be his resignation, I could think of
nothing to say and felt bitter. I, of course, but the other deans,
too: we were unable to say a word and sat there in silence.
Then, saying I wanted to think about the options…I left the
room.
Tanaka then rushed by taxi to the home of his colleague
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Wagatsuma (civil law). There, with Satō Kanji of the Faculty
of Agriculture, one-time acting president who was close
to Hiraga, they talked late into the night and worked out
a counter-plan. If Hiraga resigned, they were in trouble.
“While we were talking, at about two in the morning, the
course I myself should take gradually became clear. The
next day I convened an emergency Faculty Meeting. There
I announced my decision to resign as dean. When I said
that, suddenly, the atmosphere that prevailed among some
of my colleagues lightened up. Seeing that, I thought the
anti-Hiraga fever, too, was surprisingly simple—it was, in
essence, anti-Tanaka fever. So if I resigned, the storm
against Hiraga would die down, too.” In fact, with Tanaka’s
statement that he would resign as dean, the unrest in the
Faculty of Law all of a sudden eased. The dean of the Tōdai
Faculty of Law resigning in mid-term for a reason other
than illness: such a thing had never happened before.
The Birth of the Shōwa Research Group
What became of Rōyama after he resigned from the
Faculty of Law? He moved to the Shōwa Research Group,
in which he had already participated for several years. The
Shōwa Research Group was a policy think tank created by
Gotō Ryūnosuke (at the time, director of the Greater Japan
Youth Association), who had been a classmate of Konoe
Fumimaro’s all through First Higher School, then Tōdai.
He created it for Konoe, who it was thought surely would
someday become prime minister, by assembling talented
individuals broadly from various worlds. It began its
activities in 1933, and then expanded quickly just before the
first Konoe Cabinet was formed in 1937; in 1939 it had more
than 130 participants.
Those who joined the Shōwa Research Group were many
and varied—friends of Konoe, social democrats and
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liberals, renovationist bureaucrats, former Marxists,
journalists, financiers, and the like. It pursued its research
via task forces on world policy, Asian politics, the Asian
economic bloc, cultural issues, political trends, economic
conditions, labor, foreign policy, and the like. The fruits of
this research appeared as several hundred papers—public,
private, secret; they were distributed widely.
Rōyama had been a member of the Shōwa Research
Group since its founding, and in his official role, he had
worked to compile the papers. Rōyama was the key figure
especially in what became one central Konoe policy—the
“East Asian community.” After the formation of the Konoe
Cabinet, dizzyingly busy days continued, so nothing suited
Rōyama better than to resign from the university and
become his own man. Many other Tōdai professors took
part in the Shōwa Research Group.5
If we correlate the Tōdai unrest with political events,
the Popular Front Incident arose during the first Konoe
Cabinet, and the Hiraga Purge arose in the following
Hiranuma Cabinet. In terms of Ministers of Education, it
was the era of Kido (the Konoe cabinet) and Araki (the
Konoe and Hiranuma cabinets). It was an age of upheaval:
the China-Japan War began. It was an age of great social
turmoil. In politics, the Konoe Cabinet was formed, and the
new structure movement and the movement to form a new
political party both began. Finally, the mobilization of the
entire society was in process.
Had such academic turmoil arisen in the old days,
students would have been drawn into it, and great riots
would have taken place; but at Tōdai nothing at all
5 Tachibana mentions Nasu (Agriculture), Yabe (Law), Ōkōchi (Economics).
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happened. Why not? Because in the war boom, students
of the Faculty of Economics were in great demand, and
apparently all of them were settled psychologically. In
“Student Kaleidoscope,” Ijūin Hitoshi writes:6 “Even in this
day of the purge of the Faculty of Economics of Tokyo
Imperial University, the students are lying absolutely low.
There are likely other reasons, too, but most important is
that just prior to graduation the students lack interest.
Some say such students are cold-hearted, but from the
students’ point of view, the resignation of five or six
professors may no longer be a major issue…. It’s not the
strange gloomy negligence of the depression of two or
three years ago. From what I hear, class attendance is good
everywhere, and students are particularly avid about
military studies. In some universities, the history of
military tactics and the like are very popular…. It goes
without saying that intellectually speaking, they may
already be completely secure in their mindsets. Marxism,
which for a while caused problems for the officials, has
no great allure for today’s students, and one doesn’t hear
much talk even about movements on the right. That’s how
times have changed. The China War, the national spiritual
mobilization, and the military-procurement boom have
done it. That’s my opinion.” Having considered the
conditions of the day, let’s return once more to specific
scenes of the great dispute at Tōdai.
The Origins of University Council Intervention in
Faculty Decisions
I think I’d better explain first about the Dean’s Council
to which, when summoned by the president, Dean Tanaka
6 “Gakusei bankakyō,” Chūō kōron, April 1939. “Ijūin Hitoshi” is a pseudonym.
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of the Faculty of Law returned. At that time the Deans’
Council had before it the issue of whether to recognize
President Hiraga’s irregular action as the will of the
university. The Deans’ Council itself was not the organ that
decided formally the will of the university. That formal
organ was the University Council. The University Council
was made up of two representatives from each faculty and
the dean of each faculty, so one third of the members
overlapped with the Deans’ Council; but the highest
decision-making organ throughout was the University
Council, not the Deans’ Council. The Deans’ Council was an
informal organ; organizationally, it had no specific powers.
But in the course of the Hiraga Purge, the Deans’ Council
gradually assumed a large role. The legal process in the
Hiraga Purge went as follows: In the first University
Council (January 10, 1939) after Hiraga became president,
he declared that he himself would deal with the strife in
the Faculty of Economics; he received its okay when he
said he would consult fully with the two deans concerned
(Economics, Law) and with the University Council
representatives of those two faculties. First, he set up a
committee directly under the president to investigate the
content of Kawai’s banned books (it would also deliberate
on punishment; the president alone had the final decision);
as members of the investigating committee, he chose Dean
Maide and the two representatives from the Faculty of
Economics and Dean Tanaka and the two representatives
from the Faculty of Law.
The investigating committee issued its conclusion in two
days (Kawai “lacked prudence as a professor”), the
president accepted it, and adding as a reason the strife
within the faculty, he recommended that Kawai resign
(January 12). Kawai refused, so the president alone having
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the final decision, he asked the opinion of the seven deans
(January 17). There, the opinion emerged forcefully
(especially from Deans Tanaka and Maide) that it was
unfair to fire Kawai alone, so Hiraga decided to fire both
professors, and beginning January 18 he consulted with
Minister of Education Araki along those lines. From then
on, the informal Deans’ Council of seven (with the
president alone holding the power to decide) became the
equal of the University Council and the central arena of the
Hiraga Purge.
Customarily, the University Council did not speak on
professorial personnel matters within the separate
faculties, but the sole exception was a major dispute over
whether a Faculty Meeting had made the right decision.
That was in the Faculty Group Incident of February 1938,
the first meeting of the University Council after Ōuchi and
the two assistant professors, Arisawa and Wakimura, were
arrested. Hijikata was dean of the Faculty of Economics
at the time, and he thought his own radical clique had a
majority in Faculty Meeting; so first at Faculty Meeting, he
tried to fire Ōuchi before he was indicted (in terms of legal
procedure and regulations, firing followed indictment, but
the Ministry of Education demanded firing before
indictment). However, Hijikata’s proposal failed, five votes
to six.
Up till then, an alliance of the Hijikata and Kawai
factions formed a majority in faculty meeting, but on this
issue Kawai swung his support to Ōuchi, so the vote
flipped. In the March University Council meeting held after
this meeting (the University Council usually met once a
month), the issue of firing Ōuchi before he was indicted
was argued, and it became the biggest University Council
dispute ever. According to the records, at the start of that
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meeting, then-president Nagayo said the following, and
when you read it, you’ll understand well the relative powers
on professorial personnel issues of University Council,
Faculty Meeting, and president:
On February 1 three people of this university were
arrested—Professor Ōuchi and Assistant Professors Arisawa
and Wakimura; that is a matter of deep regret. What the
university should do about this incident of course is to be
decidedultimately on the responsibility of the president; but the
issue has become a matter for the entire university, and I know
that some members of the University Council wish to express
their opinions, so I have decided to consult with the University
Council. But at the start let me set out the following two
points:
1. There is no precedent for University Council deliberation on
the fate of professors and assistant professors, but given the
seriousness of the case, I have thought it proper as president
first to solicit the opinions of the University Council. It should
not set a precedent for the future.
2. The opinions today of each of you individually will be of use
to the president; they are not the settled opinion or vote of the
University Council. (Emphases added.)
It is clear from this statement how exceptional it was for
the University Council to debate the professorial personnel
of any faculty. And it is affirmed at the start that even if the
University Council discussion does extend to the issue of
professorial personnel, that does not bind the authority of
the president (the right to make a recommendation to the
Minister of Education).
At that University Council meeting, Dean Hijikata of the
Faculty of Economics brought up again the proposal to fire
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Ōuchi that had been voted down at Faculty Meeting,
arguing eloquently and forcefully. First, he spoke of the
account of the incident he had himself heard directly from
the top police official and the bureau chief of the Special
Police. In the Popular Front Incident, it had become clear
that the Faculty Group (in addition to Ōuchi and the other
two, eight others were arrested nation-wide) formed an
auxiliary of the national assembly of the Japan Proletarian
Party, which had been exposed as a communist
organization and was illegal under the Peace Preservation
Act, and he explained various factual matters. Moreover,
as background, Ōuchi taught public finance fundamentally
from a Marxist standpoint, and it was an unacceptable
theory, “adopting the class-state view of Marx and Lenin
under clever make-up and denouncing the state, offending
against the kokutai, and scorning the state.” The fact that
many arrested Tōdai students had carried on communist
activity for years was due to the fact that Ōuchi and the
others spread these ideas. Hijikata requested his
immediate firing.
In response, Maide (then a Council representative, later
dean) stood up and argued that Ōuchi’s theories have
formal similarities to Lenin’s, but if you check closely, the
content differs: for example, Kawai recognizes class
elements in the functioning of the state but does not adopt
Marx-Lenin’s class-state concept. He added, “If Ōuchi had
anti-kokutai theories or actions or anti-war thought or
action, then they should be attacked, but that is not the
case.” He opposed firing Ōuchi. Next to rise was Nasu
Shirushi, representative from the Faculty of Agriculture. It
is not possible to fire even an ordinary bureaucrat before
he is indicted; doesn’t a university professor enjoy the same
protection? Ōuchi’s books have been used as texts for many
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years, and there haven’t been any problems; have his
opinions changed suddenly only recently? At the Ministry
of Agriculture, too, Ōuchi has worked and contributed
since 1935, and at the time of his appointment, it was
concluded after examining his fundamental works that
there was nothing untoward in his speech or actions.
Moreover, no single Agriculture student has had his
thoughts changed for the worse by Ōuchi’s lectures, and
all of them are now serving the country well in Japan or
in Manchuria. So he supported Ōuchi. Nasu had been
dispatched to China and had rushed back to Japan by plane
for the sole purpose of attending this University Council
meeting. He had made it back just in time, and he delivered
a fiery speech; it was great theatrics.
Next to rise was Imai Tōshiki, representative from the
Faculty of Letters. He said that the most important rule for
subjects of the state was to respect the laws of the state,
so according to the law, punishment should follow
indictment. Moreover, if Ōuchi were so bad an anti-state
person, shouldn’t the entire Faculty of Economics feel
responsible for having made such a person a professor and
all resign?
Then Tanaka, dean of the Faculty of Law, rose. He
pointed out that up to the present, Dean Hijikata had run
the Faculty of Economics in concert with Professor Ōuchi,
who was a Council representative; if Ōuchi were such an
anti-kokutai person, why had Hijikata worked with him up
till now? Moreover, the true value of the university existed
precisely in competition among fellow scholars holding
differing theories, so Hijikata shouldn’t criticize Ōuchi’s
theories on the sly but argue them out in public.
Thus in the University Council, one after the other, the
members who spoke criticized Hijikata and supported
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Ōuchi; so even though the University Council was to take
no decision and issue no conclusion, the prevailing
sentiment was obvious, and the firing of Ōuchi could not
take place before he was indicted. I want to say here that
these University Council speeches were lined up carefully
ahead of time. The crucial figures in that lining-up were
the speakers I’ve introduced—Tanaka (Law), Maide
(Economics), Nasu (Agriculture), and Imai (Letters). Two
or three other professors spoke as well.
Clandestine Meetings in Support of Ōuchi
That fact was kept secret for a long time, but it was
revealed at last in 1984 in an article, “The Tōdai Faculty
of Economics Incident and Imai Tōshiki.”7 The pamphlet
was published by a group of history buffs from Nagano
Prefecture (Imai Tōshiki was from Nagano). The author
was Hayashi Kentarō, a disciple of Imai in Western history
and after the war 20th president of Tōdai. At the time of the
incident Hayashi was an assistant in Western history:
7 “Tōzai keizaigakubu jiken to Imai Tōshiki,” in a pamphlet entitled Imai Tōshiki.
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I don't keep a diary, so I can't give precise days and times, but
we're dealing with the late-1937, early-1938 period. When
evening came, Maide and Ueno of Economics, Tanaka and
Takagi of Law, and Nasu (Agriculture) met frequently in Imai's
study in the stacks and engaged in clandestine discussion.
The study was in the rear of the stacks, and in front of it was
the instructors’ room; people coming to see Imai necessarily
had to go past it, so there's no mistake about this memory
of mine.… We'd be told ahead of time that there would be
a meeting in this back room, and the meetings sometimes
lasted very late, so we took turns and waited until they ended,
then cleaned up afterwards.
Of course, we didn't know what went on in the meetings in
the back room, but sometimes after the meeting ended, we
burned documents on Imai's orders, and sometimes Tanaka
and Takagi made fair copies of important documents. And
Imai sometimes spoke quite candidly of the situation to us
young men, so we knew pretty well the situation in the
university and Imai's firm resolve. In any case, in the outside
world at the time, the right-wing tide was overwhelming, and
it was very difficult and dangerous to oppose that current, so
we braced ourselves and kept a close eye on Imai's activity.
And we knew that Imai had his resignation written out should
things fall apart.
The secret talks in this research room were not known in
the outside world and today aren't covered even in the
records, but there is one important document from then that
survives today…. This is something I found among documents
in a drawer in the desk Imai used in the research room…
From internal evidence, this document was likely drawn up
before the February 23 meeting of the Faculty of Economics.
There is no indication to whom this document was
presented—perhaps the president. Thus, Imai pulled
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together and organized the basic points and arguments
agreed to at that meeting; we can surmise that it's a sort of
action plan for those who had gathered. The speeches in
University Council March 22 took place exactly along these
lines.
The pamphlet then published Imai’s memorandum in its
entirety. When we compare it with the record of the March
22 University Council meeting, indeed, all the speeches in
that meeting were worked out meticulously in advance.
The Hijikata group met on its own repeatedly to plan
tactics; the side opposed to it, too, held its own secret
meetings and planned its tactics. Precisely because of such
planning, it was possible for Nasu of Agriculture, who was
off in China, to rush back by plane to attend the meeting.
There’s a strange episode in this pamphlet, “The June 29
[1938] extraordinary meeting of the Faculty of Economics.”
At the time Professor Araki Kōtarō was to study in Europe.
With him away, the votes in faculty meeting would be
evenly split, 5-5, between the Hijikata Faction and what was
left of the Ōuchi and Kawai factions. That way they’d decide
nothing; so Maide, dean of the Faculty of Economics,
proposed that in such cases the chair (Maide himself) cast
the deciding vote (such an arrangement was customary),
and he won unanimous approval on condition that it didn’t
include personnel issues.
Once this resolution passed, Maide suddenly had the
assistant professors leave the meeting and proposed a
resolution impeaching Hijikata.
The reasons:
1. In speeches and in a gathering of December last year,
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after the Yanaihara Incident, Hijikata had incited the
students.
2. He did the same thing to this year’s entering students.
3. He leaked the results of Dean’s Council meetings to the
Imperial University News.
4. At the time of the mass resignation of the Economics
Alumni Association officers, he leaked Faculty Meeting
matters to students.
5. Via the newspaper he announced to students that
there was an anti-war atmosphere.
6. In December he wanted to publish in Nihon hyōron an
essay criticizing Kawai’s theories.
And so on.
It’s not clear what Maide’s goal was, but probably he
wanted to strike fear into Hijikata’s heart and constrain his
future activities.
In Tales of Academia: My Thirty-plus Year Fight with
Marxism,8 Hijikata writes that this was a preliminary
skirmish in the Hiraga Purge:
8 Gakkai shunjūki: Marukushizumu to no kōsō sanjuyonen (Tokyo: Chūō keizaisha, 1960).
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The attempt somehow to get me had been underway, as we
learned later, about a year before the Hiraga Purge. The
attempt at Faculty Meeting on a day in June 1938 to punish me
somehow for “trampling on university regulations,” as “the one
responsible for unrest within the Faculty,” revealed something
of that connection. What day it was I haven't a clear memory
now, but it was during the monsoon season, stiflingly hot and
sticky. After the ordinary business of the Faculty of Economics
meeting was finished, Dean Maide said there was one other
item and asked everyone to stay. I wondered what it was; the
topic was “Hijikata's trampling on university regulations.” I
heard afterward that Maide and Ueno had already proposed
it to the University Council and been rejected; they were told
that such matters should be handled first by Faculty Meeting.
So now they had brought it before Faculty Meeting. The
content of that proposal was nonsense, to the effect that I
had already chased out Yanaihara…and Ōuchi [at the time
Ōuchi was under arrest] and Kawai were next. If you ask what
evidence they had of this, a certain student had made secret
allegations, or I had talked freely at a certain meeting; if you
asked the name of the student, they replied they couldn't
reveal it—indeed, for me it was an exceedingly strange and
malicious prosecution with no hard evidence. … This meeting
continued late into the night, and the lights turned Yasuda
Auditorium bright. Had there been a vote, what would have
been the result? Probably…an even split, but in the end the
meeting ended indecisively, without voting. Thinking about it
afterwards, I realized this was the first skirmish of the Hiraga
Purge; the preparations for saying and writing things that
weren't so and attacking me, I surmised, had been going on
already for quite a while.
At the time the votes were indeed evenly split, and Maide
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planned to cast the deciding vote as chair, but Kawai
opposed that, saying it wasn’t a good idea to use this
procedure to attack a fellow-professor, so the vote was
called off, and the discussion ended inconclusively. In the
interim between the Ōuchi issue and the Hiraga Purge,
strange actions like this—filled with conspiracies and the
most extreme trickery—arose simultaneously in various
places.
Did Maide Render Meritorious Service to the Purge?
Note well: Tanaka drew up the written appeal in Ōuchi’s
case to present to the March meeting of the University
Council and took it to President Nagayo (up to that point,
President Nagayo had been disinclined to convene a
University Council meeting about the issue). Tanaka took
the lead throughout in the discussion at the meeting.
Tanaka played a key role thereafter in the unrest over the
university reforms of Minister of Education Araki (from
July 1938 on). Tanaka was the driving force throughout the
Hiraga Purge. Without Tanaka’s multifarious activities, the
events that brought on this university crisis would surely
have been impossible to surmount. Some people
overestimate the activity of Maide at the time of the Hiraga
Purge and consider Deans Tanaka and Maide to have been
Hiraga’s two arms; some even evaluated him as did Ōuchi
Hyōei: “If there had been a demon-king in the courtroom
of the Faculty of Economics, he’d have given Maide the
Distinguished Service Cross for most meritorious service
in the purge army.”9
But if you gather all the evidence, Maide’s role wasn’t all
that great. Yoshimura says:10 “The two, Tanaka and Maide,
9 Keiyū 33-4 (commemorative issue in honor of Professor Maide Chōgorō). RHM: Emma
was a sort of St. Peter, deciding not Heaven or hell but which hell people went to.
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are called the purge’s twin deans. But in fact Maide was a
weak-willed dean utterly dependent on Tanaka. The day he
angrily handed in his 13-page letter of resignation, a report
from one quarter brought the news—‘The renovationists
are going to sue Maide for libel.’ It caught Maide by
surprise, and he betook his corpulent, out-of-shape body
to Tanaka’s office and said, face red: ‘The renovationist
faction is charging me. I made slurs against Hijikata when
I tried to get Faculty Meeting to impeach Hijikata and
failed, and they could be considered libel. What should I
do?’ Tanaka replied calmly, ‘Forget it. Faculty Meeting isn’t
public, so it can’t be libel—“to ridicule a person in public…”’
Then, smiling, ‘But if they ever do sue you, I’ll be your
lawyer.’ Relieved, Maide was on the way out the door, and
Tanaka said to him, ‘Hey! Get a grip on yourself! Hang on!
Don’t weaken!’”
Yamada Fumio, who resigned his Tōdai professorship
in the wake of the firing of Kawai, criticized Maide more
sharply. He writes:11 “When Ōuchi was arrested in February
of last year, the renovationist faction took advantage of
the opportunity, and its attacks on Ōuchi were very sharp.
Neither Maide nor Ueno ever demonstrated fearlessness
in response…. They had neither the courage nor the fervor
to respond off their own bat to the fierce attacks of the
renovationist faction; it was as if, given the environment,
they regarded the firing of Ōuchi as inevitable. Further,
they showed absolutely no trace of great acumen in
expressing eloquent, reasoned opposition to the firing. It
was Kawai who showed the two how to stand in reasoned
10 “Daini Tōdai Monogatari,” Nihon hyōron, April 1939.
11 “Keizaigakubu mondai no shinsō,” Kaizō, March 1939.
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opposition, who took a decided stance against the
immediate firing of Ōuchi. Before then, the two professors
had treated Kawai normally as enemy; they probably were
surprised that he was so principled. They were even
shocked…. In the end, the two, Maide and Ueno, girded up
their loins and resolved to defend Ōuchi.”
That is fact. The fundamental structure of the clash of
factions in the Faculty of Economics up till then had been
Ōuchi faction vs. “renovationist faction plus Kawai faction.’
So when the Ōuchi faction splintered (or was thought to
splinter) with Ōuchi’s arrest, the renovationist faction (a
confluence of the Hijikata faction and the Kawai faction)
took heart, as if the world was their oyster, and the remnant
Ōuchi faction (Maide plus Ueno) grew depressed and lost
utterly its will to fight. When you apply the vote totals of
Faculty Meeting on the model of the clash up till that time,
the “renovationist faction plus the Kawai faction” had six
votes and the Ōuchi faction five, so it appeared that the
Ōuchi faction would go on losing forever.
But the Kawai faction split, and chucking its history till
then, the remaining Kawai faction (Kawai plus Yamada)
swung its support to Ōuchi on this issue because defending
university autonomy came first. Hence it was called the
pure reason faction. So the remaining Kawai faction plus
the remaining Ōuchi faction defeated the renovationist
faction, six votes to five. Only full professors could vote
in Faculty Meeting, so the change of the votes in favor of
Ōuchi that took place on Ōuchi’s arrest was in fact only
minus one. Add the remaining Kawai faction (Kawai and
Yamada), and it became in fact a reversal—plus one. Kawai
saved Ōuchi. Later, at the time he left the university in the
Hiraga Purge, Kawai told a press conference: “The thing
I’m happiest about in my nineteen-year university career
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is that I was able to shield Ōuchi—to whom I was opposed
academically—in the final year…. That gave me, as scholar
and as human being, even deeper satisfaction.”
Maide Chōgorō, Ingrate
It’s clear now that this was Kawai’s true feeling. But since
the struggle up till then between Kawai and the Marxists
including Ōuchi had been so fierce, the Marxist side didn’t
accept Kawai’s words and deeds at face value. Ōuchi, in
particular, who was already in prison, didn’t know
anything about Kawai’s later actions, so until the end, he
was able to give Kawai only a chilly evaluation. Even in Fifty
Years an Economist, which Ōuchi wrote in his last years, he
said merely this: “Even close up, one couldn’t grasp his true
intent accurately. That’s how political this man was. But
what was clear was that from the first…Kawai absolutely
feared Marx, and because he feared him, he warned himself
to steer clear of Marxism… In fact, in my whole life I had no
opportunity to speak with Kawai on scholarly issues. Hence
in intellectual terms, too, he had no influence on me. But
we entered Tōdai in the same era with similar resumes and
breathed the same air, so I always observed with interest,
at a distance, his patrician nature, self-righteousness, and
heroism.” Kawai fought so hard in defense of Ōuchi, but
there’s no trace here of gratitude.
As for Maide, far from showing gratitude to Kawai,
Maide even tried to bring him low. This is Ōuchi:
“According to what I heard from reliable sources, last fall
at the time of nominations for president, at first Yamada
Saburō was a candidate. Maide visited Yamada to say he
should become a candidate; once he became president,
Maide wanted him to fire both Kawai and Hijikata but
suggested that if it was impossible to fire Hijikata, then
Kawai alone should be fired. Yamada didn’t want the
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presidency if the presumption was that he would fire
professors, so in the end he didn’t accept.” In the election
after Nagayo’s resignation as president, Yamada was the
first person elected. Soon after being elected, Yamada said
he wasn’t up to the job and resolutely declined to become
president, and behind that decision lay this exchange with
Maide.
Maide became dean of the Faculty of Economics after
Hijikata quit as dean thanks to the votes of the remaining
Ōuchi faction and the remaining Kawai faction. For this,
Maide showed absolutely no gratitude. So he did nothing
even when firing Kawai became a topic of discussion in
Faculty Meeting. Angry, Yamada wrote this: “In this way,
both materially and morally, the two—Maide and
Ueno—had an infinite debt to Kawai in the Ōuchi and
Kawai cases. If they felt that debt, when the Kawai issue
arose, shouldn’t the two of them first of all have taken the
initiative to support Kawai, both from pure reason and
from friendship? In my contact of more than half a year
with these two, they lacked courage and had little soul, so
I didn’t expect them to risk their jobs in support of Kawai.
But when Kawai became an issue, was it unreasonable to
expect something as passive as expressing opposition to
firing?”
Maide did absolutely nothing for Kawai. It may be only
natural, but Kawai’s appraisal of Maide was very low. In his
diary for 1938, when the Kawai issue reached its final stage,
he wrote as follows:
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November 9: Talked with U. [Ueno] and M. [Maide] for several
hours and pressed them to the hilt, but came to hate M.'s lack
of guts.
November 11: In the evening talked with M. and U. M. asked
me to kill the Chūō kōron essay. I refused but argued with M.
a bit and thought M. a worthless fellow with no courage. I
thought, this guy will come to a bad end.
November 18: Had dinner with M. and thought him more and
more a worthless fellow. Talking with someone like him, I'm
out of my element. I'd better not do it again.
In Nagayo’s diary, too, the appraisal of Maide is low.
Nagayo’s account after the June 7, 1938 University Council
meeting: “Maide and Ueno are both perfectly honest and
extremely simple; they are too ready to blame everything
on the crimes of the Hijikata faction, don’t consider the big
picture and the source, are too ready to believe one-sided
observations and unsubstantiated rumors, lack coolness, and
on the contrary arouse opposition.” After the August 12,
1939 meeting between Minister of Education Araki and the
university: “[Maide] jumps from the renovationist faction
as cause of the Economics unrest to the Ōuchi issue and
offends the officials. I couldn’t stand to listen and scolded
him…. Maide uses the worst and most nonsensical
language, and even if he himself means to be serious, he
doesn’t take the time or place into account—absolutely
foolish.”
This very low evaluation is in part because Maide was
in fact an extremely poor talker. He was so inarticulate
that it was a hindrance in his teaching. Ōkōchi writes this
recollection: “Everyone went to class and had to take notes
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on Maide’s lectures. But his manner of speaking made
note-taking impossible. A bit ago Kimura used the term
stuttering, and it may have been a stutter; in any case, it
was not a manner of speaking that allowed note-taking. At
some points he’d speak very slowly, and at other points he’d
speak at great speed; fast or slow, there was no steady pace,
and it caused great problems for students taking notes. I
too had a very difficult time. Sometimes he stammered. At
some points he paused at the dais. The students waited
with bated breath for him to resume. Trying to make his
lecture go smoothly, he sweated profusely and his face
turned bright red, and knowing this, the students strained
for all they were worth, and they too turned bright red, and
both they and he sweated.”
The Economist Who Jettisoned Marx
What caught my eye in Ōkōchi’s essay was that an
edition of Outline of Theoretical Economics, Maide’s opus
magnum, appeared in 1945, when the war was at its fiercest,
that its contents differed subtly on such points as the labor
theory of value (the expression of a quite critical if not
negative attitude toward the labor theory of value) from
the postwar (1948) Revised Outline of Theoretical Economics,
and that therein one could sense the trend of the times.
Ōkōchi commented, “On reflection, I couldn’t suppress an
ominous feeling.”
The labor theory of value is the central concept of all
central concepts at the basis of Marxist economics.
Moreover, as I’ve said, the Ōuchi faction had deployed all its
energies to crush Hijikata, who rejected the labor theory of
value, and had treated him as an absolute idiot. The labor
theory of value was the theme of the debate that enshrined
the victory of Marxism. In that grand argument Maide had
opposed Hijikata head-on and made his reputation as the
293 | university of massachusetts amherst libraries
young economist who defeated the then-famous Hijikata.
The 1945 edition meant that during the war Maide had
recanted his own theory.
I found a copy of the 1945 edition of Outline of Theoretical
Economics in a used bookstore, and indeed Ōkōchi was
right. In its preface (italics added): “For this reason, I do not
accept the various views that overemphasize the economic,
in particular, the materialistic or the economic determinist view of
history. Consequently, of course, I resolutely reject making
the state social organization one-sidedly the product of
economics, making it basically a class product; but I am
also unable to affirm the liberalism or individualism that
would reject state political involvement or role in the
economy absolutely and universally.” In fact, the preface
proclaims that he jettisons Marxist economics and
materialism and historical materialism (also liberalism and
individualism). In the text Maide writes: “In short, the labor
theory of value is mistaken in not recognizing the difficulties
inherent in it, in particular ignoring or slighting the
activity of entrepreneurs and the productivity of capital;
moreover, when we consider the worldview or view of
society that lies behind it, it is an arbitrary, skewed, class object
that differs fundamentally from my own experience, and
I am wholly unable to accept it.” Here he declares distinctly
that he completely jettisons the labor theory of value. In
short, at this time Maide not only discards Marxist theory
lock, stock, and barrel but also attacks its worldview and its
view of society as being an “arbitrary, skewed, class object.”
It is an apostasy so complete one wants to say, “Stop! You
don’t have to go that far…” Reading this pathetic prose, I
remember the passage in Kawai’s diary, “M. too has no guts
and is worthless. His type will come to a bad end.”
In the memorial issue of Friends of Economics, his disciple
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Suzuki Kōichirō (at the time of the commemoration, he
was dean of the Faculty of Economics) indicates an
“understanding” of Maide’s apostasy: “But in the difficult
wartime conditions of the time, to defend the
independence of the faculty was, I think, no ordinary
accomplishment. Moreover, at that time the Ministry of
Education demanded that Maide himself fire the one
liberal professor on the pretext of the earlier value
argument with Hijikata. Reminiscing about this time,
Ueno says Maide was a ‘living corpse,’ and that must have
been Maide’s frame of mind, too. In that frame of mind,
Maide endured much humiliation, but together with Ueno
he achieved the major task of preserving the independence
of the faculty.”
But during his time as professor, Kawai got greater
pressure from the officials, and it didn’t stop with mere
warnings. In fact, even after he lost his job, he never
changed his theory and dismissed the idea by saying that
nothing he’d taught his students was mistaken. Even after
the long legal trial—from first court appearance to last,
four years—and to his dying day, he did not change his
tune or become a “living corpse.” When we take this into
consideration, Suzuki’s defense of Maide sounds like
special pleading.
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Kawai's Shrewd Plan:
“Either Not Guilty or a
Heavy Sentence”
In which the author focuses on economist Kawai Eijirō. Arrested
in 1939 and purged from Tōdai, Kawai died in 1944. The author
traces Kawai and his “gargantuan” appetite and energies from his
teens through his years at Tōdai; only very late in life did Kawai
learn that his thyroid was to blame for the appetite (he had Graves
disease). The author describes Kawai’s ambition to be a man of
action, not merely an intellectual, praises him for his outspoken
criticism of Japan in the war years, and speculates on the counter-
factual question: what if Kawai had survived the war?
Intellect, Emotion, Will: The Works
To return once more to the great strife in the Faculty
of Economics of 1938-39: this time I’ll write about another
major actor: Kawai Eijirō. Up till now I’ve touched any
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number of times on Kawai, but there is much still to write.
I don’t have the space to deal with it all, but I’ll pick the
important things. What I’ll discuss now is Kawai the man.
In the history of Tōdai in those years, he’s not only an
important figure, but a fascinating one. His life is
fascinating in that it is dramatic, but more than that, for his
character—intellect, emotion, will: the works. Especially
now, when more than sixty years have passed since his
death, the meaning of his life has become clearer than ever.
First let me compress the flow of time before 1939:
1920 (twenty-nine years old). Becomes assistant professor,
Faculty of Economics. In 1926, after three years of study in
Europe (England, Germany), becomes full professor at the age
of thirty-five.
1932-33 (forty-one to forty-two years old). Second European
stay (in many countries including the Soviet Union, but
mainly Germany). Studies mainly Marxism. On the scene
when in Germany the Nazis become the lead party and Hitler
seizes power. Holds strong misgivings about world conditions
as fascism raises its head.
1933 Immediately after returning home, develops lively
career speaking and writing. Quickly becomes darling of the
press. Then for six years until 1939, when he is indicted in the
publication ban incident, Kawai's writings command
attention.
1936 (forty-five years old). Dean of the Faculty of
Economics. From here on, the Faculty of Economics strife
continues, involving Kawai, Hijikata, and Ōuchi factions, right
up to the Hiraga Purge of 1939. In that purge Kawai is fired.
The later data I’ll list chronologically:
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1939 (forty-eight). January: the prosecutor's office begins
investigation in the publication ban incident. February:
indictment. Preliminary hearing begins. July: open trial
begins. Defense lawyer: Unno Shinkichi. Special counsel:
Kimura Takeyasu.
1940 (forty-nine). February-March: writes the 500-page For
Students in less than a month, publication rushed in June.1
Astonishing sales (22,000 copies in two months). Publishes
four books. This year's income breaks previous high, up to
about 30,000 yen (in terms of today's cost of living, about
$750,000). Able to pay for both heavy court costs and
daughter's wedding. October: first judgment—not guilty.
Even Kawai himself, resigned to being convicted, shocked.
Prosecution immediately appeals.
1941 (fifty). March: appeal begins. April: Appeal to the Nation,
completed all the way to the bound-copy stage before
publication is stopped. This year publishes three other books,
but this is last year publication is possible. What he writes
hereafter gets no paper ration and can't be published (reissue
of earlier books also not possible). What he writes remains
in manuscript form and is published only after the war. May:
diagnosed with diabetes, hospitalized briefly. October: guilty
verdict at appeal trial. Immediate appeal.
1942 (fifty-one). July: diagnosed with Graves’ disease.
1943 (fifty-two). June: appeal rejected (Supreme Court).
From here on health fails rapidly. Income cut off, he begins
to have trouble making ends meet; disciples raise funds, plan
research institute. First heart attack.
1944 (fifty-three). January: research institute established.
February: death from heart attack brought on by Graves’
disease.
This chronology shows that Kawai died astonishingly
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young. His youth—Kawai was in his energetic
forties—enabled him to surmount the tempestuous era
after 1933.
Gargantuan Appetite
Among the disciples of Kawai’s very late years were two
women, Akiyama Kiyoko and Doi Michiko. They have left
a record of Kawai’s last years. Popular with women, Kawai
established a monthly “Day for Meeting Women” and met
with all the women who wanted to see him. Akiyama and
Doi write: “The members of the group were mainly from
the teacher-training schools of the day—Girls’ Higher
School,2 Japan Women’s University, the women’s section
of Meiji University; in addition, some women Kawai knew.
The topics…first the news of the war and criticism of it,
next each person’s reflection on books Kawai had written,
then the problems of life, employment, love, reading,
education, trips, and the like—all sorts of problems. Issues
were raised, such as ‘What makes a person distinguished?’
and each person had to respond.”
Akiyama and Doi, who were then students at Girls’
Higher School, joined the group at Kawai’s home
beginning about 1938 and were favorites of his. For two
months in the last year of his life, he even tutored them in
Kant’s philosophy. Their diary-style account became Record
of the Words and Deeds of Kawai Eijirō. 3 Here is one passage
quoting Kawai: “If something like this is going to happen,
I think now’s the very best time. A few years from now I’ll
be over fifty; you’ve begun to decline and don’t have the
1 Gakusei ni atou, Nihon hyōronsha, 1940.
2 Jokōshi, later Ochanomizu University.
3 Doi Michiko and Akiyama Kiyoko, “Kawai Eijirō: Genkōroku, IV,” Kawai Eijirō zenshū VIII:
gappō 17.
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energy to start something new. In your forties, you’re still
strong. And in your thirties, after all, you still aren’t your
own person. They say you come into your own at thirty, but
at thirty you’re still not ready. Yes, the latter part of your
forties is the very best time.”
How robust was Kawai in his forties? In “Kawai Eijirō’s
Life and Thought,”4 Kimura Takeyasu writes the following:
In his youth Kawai was robustness incarnate. He was on the
short side—5’2”, but he was congenitally sturdy. From his
thirties on, he gradually gained weight—not fat but muscle;
he appeared hard, rocklike. His complexion was ruddy, his
eyebrows bushy; from behind large thick glasses for
nearsightedness, his eyes gave off a penetrating gleam; his
nose was high, his thin lips always set, determined.
From his thirties into his forties, he and others all
acknowledged his good health: he almost never had to see a
doctor; he didn't even catch colds. In his thirties and forties,
he led a very busy life—it defied description. He himself
considered the daily life of a professor utterly irregular and
normally worked through the night once or twice a week.
Even on the other days, he normally went to bed at two or
three in the morning. As a tradeoff, he was late getting
up—nearly noon. Despite this extreme irregularity, he was
never tired, and when he went to bed—even at dawn—he
fell immediately into a deep sleep; even after two all-nighters
in a row, his voracious appetite—he ate enough breakfast for
two people—never suffered at all. So he had the utmost
confidence in his own health, and although those around him
urged him to take care of himself, he never listened.
4 “Kawai Eijirō no shōgai to shisō,” in Shakaishisō kenkyūkai, ed., Kawai Eijirō: Denki to
tsuisō, Tokyo: Shakaishisō kenkyūkai shuppanbu, 1948.
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Indeed, the young Kawai was filled with astonishing vigor.
His disciple Inoki Masamichi says that if you don’t
understand that, you simply don’t understand Kawai: “If
you overlook Kawai’s robust physicality and the explosive
vitality behind it, you absolutely can’t understand Kawai’s
militant liberalism. On this point Kawai is much closer to
Fichte than to Kant or Hegel. ‘If the righteous is scarcely
saved, what will become of the ungodly and the
sinner?’5—that was Kawai’s stubborn belief. That’s why he
scorned and despised timid people, those who won’t say
clearly yes or no. Kawai never was serene, perfect; the fact
that he was an active, imperfect, daimonic fighter rests first
of all on this. Indeed, his appetite was daimonic; he ate two
and a half pounds of beef in less than no time, virtually
without chewing. Tangerines and the like—without even
peeling them, he threw them down his throat the way a frog
devours mosquitoes or flies.” Kawai’s daimonic appetite
did not weaken even in later years after his health had
broken down; in his diary for May 1942, he writes: “Took a
walk; returned after an hour. Cutlet and rice, two bowls of
noodles, two bowls of rice—even for me, a stomach-full.”
Journal of an Agonizing Struggle with Illness
Kawai was once the very picture of health, but beginning
in the latter half of his forties, he suffered from diarrhea
and other physical problems; it may have been brought on
by the stress of the strife in the Faculty of Economics, which
began at that time. From Kimura Takeyasu’s account:
“After 1939, when he was chased out of the university, his
physical problems began to be obvious even from the
5 RHM: English Standard Version (2001). The quotation is from 1 Peter 4:18, which is itself
an elaboration on Proverbs 11:31. A difficult passage: “even the righteous” barely merit
salvation, and the “evil” not at all.
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outside. The body that until then had been fatter than
normal now was extremely thin; his suits hung on his
frame. His cheeks sank, and the circles under his eyes grew
dark; his hair turned white and thinned. Only his
penetrating gaze reminded one, barely, of the old Kawai.
After he appeared in court in his first trial, the press
described him as ‘the haggard Professor Kawai,’ and he was
displeased; but even if in spirit he was not at all haggard,
in the flesh everyone could see he was indeed haggard.
Because he appeared very languid in the trial of the appeal,
Defense Counsel Unno finally had him admitted, half by
force, to Keiō Hospital.” He was hospitalized for about ten
days (May 1941), and in addition to diabetes, he was told his
digestive track had been damaged. They said that was the
cause of his lengthy bouts of diarrhea.
In the hospital they stopped the diarrhea and the rest,
and for the time being he regained his health, but in early
1942 various physical ailments surfaced; he even had heart
trouble. Notations that he wasn’t feeling well appear
frequently in his diary:
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May 5: Tried to take an afternoon nap but couldn't sleep;
perhaps because my stomach's a bit off, I can't be upbeat…I'd
really like to be healthy.
May 31: Was supposed to leave for Ōmi today, but I didn't
feel well this morning, so I stayed in bed. Felt like not going
out but decided to get up.
June 3: Felt very bad this morning; pulse racing. Utterly
wretched.
June 4: This morning felt fine. If I'm like this, I'm back to
normal. But when I weighed myself at the bath, I was
astonished: 105 pounds! I once weighed 156!
June 8: This morning heart racing.
June 10: Supper long in coming, and I was very hungry….
Well, for the present, have to put health first. Before I entered
the bath, my heart was racing.
June 12: I'll note what I've noticed about my health. My
digestion's very good. But my torso is thinner, and my ribs
show; when I sit, I get tired—is it because the bones of my seat
are bare of flesh?
June 18: Last night pulse very high; this morning, too; so
didn't go to St. Luke's Hospital this morning and spent the
morning in bed.
Feeling that his pulse was abnormal, he had himself
checked at St. Luke’s, but they said there was nothing
wrong with his heart. His lungs, too, were okay, and there
wasn’t any protein or sugar in his urine, so they said they
thought it was nervous exhaustion. So he stopped
worrying. But in fact it wasn’t normal.
In his year-end “Recollections of 1942,” he wrote:
“Tsurumi Yūsuke was concerned, so I had Dr. Takemi Tarō
check me out and learned I have Graves’ disease. Now that
I think about it, it probably started seven or eight years
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ago. Once I knew and was being treated for it, I improved
gradually, and after Karuizawa I was almost better. I am
thin, and my face is gaunt, but my life is no longer in
danger.”
“I’ll Become a Doer,” Not a Pundit
Tsurumi Yūsuke, famous author and politician, was five
years older than Kawai, and he and Kawai were both on
the Debate Team at the old First Higher School. The Debate
Team had particularly strong ties across classes, and from
student days on, Kawai was very close to Tsurumi; the
friendship had deepened during Kawai’s time in New York
for the Ministry of Agriculture and in his Tōdai professorial
days in Europe, and they were close all their lives. Because
of this close friendship, Tsurumi knows best how energetic
Kawai was. For example, in New York in 1918:6
6 Tsurumi, “Kōyū sanjūsannen,” in Denki to tsuisō.
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Kawai's modus operandi after he got to New York was a wonder
to behold. He had made preparations in Baltimore, so he had
made up his mind, scientifically as always, who he would
meet and just what he would see in New York. As always, he
had importuned Americans quite brazenly for interviews.
Day after day he met people, had appointments with them
and ate with them, exchanged opinions, collected material.
His productivity back in Japan was the fruit of this hectic
activity in New York.
But at the time I was its victim. Kawai had unbounded
energy and absolutely never took into account that his
companion might be sleepy. On the way back after finishing
the day's activities, he often dropped by my hotel to talk. This
was after his evening appointments, so it was at least eleven
p.m. and sometimes twelve; for a couple hours thereafter he'd
report on the day's activities, then leave.
Or in Berlin in 1932:
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I had lost my seat in the election of 1931 and was traveling
abroad, so the next year but one I went to Berlin, and Kawai
came to visit. And the upshot was that he insisted on teaching
me social policy, and he barged in on me every day, like a tutor,
and lectured me completely and eloquently on everything in
his 1931 book Principles of Social Policy. He taught me a year's
university course in barely one week. One time it lasted from
eleven in the morning to eleven at night…
And when the lecture ended, he'd say, “Let's take a walk,”
and urging me on, he'd set out for a cafe. Drinking coffee late
into the night, Kawai would carry on a cheerful conversation.
When that ended and we left the café, he'd say, “It's still early,
so how about a walk?” and we'd walk up and down Berlin's
Kurfürstendamm. The summer dawn came at three or four,
and when the sky began to brighten, he'd say, “Well, let's go
home and turn in,” and we'd come to the road on which he
lived, and he'd go.
I too was pretty strong and self-confident, but those nights
with Kawai about did me in. His ability to do all-nighters was
astonishing. When he wrote manuscripts, he had the energy
to write all night and produce 20,000 words. That resulted in
an over-confidence in his own constitution and finally, I think,
led that healthy person to an early death.
Kawai was a person of unlimited energies, but these
episodes indicate that he was also astonishingly egotistical.
Indeed, once he made up his mind, he took absolutely no
account of the convenience of others and would push and
push and push. In “The Latter Days of Professor Kawai,”7
Ishigami Ryōhei writes of the following episode: “One
7 “Bannen no sensei,” in Shōgai to tsuisō.
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evening I got a phone call from Professor Kawai, so I went
to see him right away, and he immediately broached the
subject of marriage. ‘Please marry Miss X. If you agree, I’ll
send a telegram tonight, and I’ll set off tomorrow to make
the arrangements.’ The woman was a complete stranger
to me, and there were only two hours left until he’d send
the telegram; astonished at Kawai’s proposal, or aghast,
I was in a bind. So I spoke of my current situation and
argued heart and soul that I absolutely couldn’t accede to
his proposal; but Kawai set forth ardently the benefits of
marrying this woman and urged me to agree. I got angry
and argued back.”
Marriage isn’t something to be decided on so simply. In
the end, Ishigami held firm, and he learned later that at
precisely that time the woman in question had agreed to
marry someone else. Had Ishigami said yes, Kawai would
have been in a real fix. After introducing this episode,
Ishigami says, “It was both Kawai’s strength and his
weakness that once he got an idea, he pushed it to the limit
and couldn’t rest until he had convinced the other person.”
Indeed, Kawai’s life was studded with tragicomedies that
stemmed from this fierceness of conviction.
To return to my story, Tsurumi, who knew Kawai well at
the peak of his energies, met Kawai again in 1942 after a
long interval and was shocked at how he had changed: “A
scant year before his death, I received a visit from Kawai,
the first in a long while, and I was stunned by how his
appearance had changed. I thought: this isn’t normal. And
I urged him, then accompanied him, to see a doctor I
trusted. That exam was quite different from the
examinations the other doctors had made. Before, they’d
told him it was nervous exhaustion. But from Dr. Takemi’s
examination, Kawai learned he had Graves’ disease,
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without doubt. As a result of that treatment, his appetite
increased, he slept better, and he gained weight. I thought
he’d soon be completely well.”
Indeed, the fact that Kawai had Graves’ disease explains
it all: his limitless energy, his fearsome ability to get things
done, his stunning intellectual productivity, the fierceness
of his convictions, his extraordinary appetite. In Graves’
disease the body produces too much thyroid hormone
(which governs one’s level of mental and physical activity),
causing both body and mind to become hyperactive. So the
person is able to be several times more active than normal
people, but at the cost of metabolism several times higher
than normal. Hence he eats several times more than the
normal person.
According to the doctor’s explanation, this condition is
as if a steam locomotive’s firebox always got several times
the normal amount of coal and ran continually at top speed:
at some point, something inside will break down. When
that breakdown hits the heart, the result is a fatal heart
attack induced by Graves’ disease. Dr. Takemi, who was an
expert on the circulatory system, would have encountered
many patients of that type, so he was able to diagnose it on
the spot. But the average internist of the time didn’t know
much about Graves’ disease. In addition, today’s exam
techniques hadn’t been developed (doctors today can tell
immediately from blood and urine tests). And if there was
any doubt, it was hard to add tests to confirm the diagnosis.
And if there were symptoms of other diseases, there was a
strong likelihood of incorrect diagnosis, as had happened
with the doctors at St. Luke’s.
Be that as it may, once Dr. Takemi diagnosed Graves’
disease, he likely prescribed rest (both physical and
mental), but that is what Kawai was least able to stick to.
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Tsurumi writes: “In February 1944, hearing suddenly of his
death, I simply didn’t believe my ears. I couldn’t grasp it.
But later I learned that secretly he went against his doctor’s
admonition and neglected his health. Dr. Takemi had
warned him not to work too hard, yet spurred on by his
burning love of learning, he continued down the earlier
path of monastic diligence and finally collapsed amid his
books.”8
“Monastic diligence”? Kimura writes of his habits:9 “After
the pace of the trial slowed, rather than relax, he began to
study even more fiercely, shutting himself up in his study
at least ten hours a day, reading and thinking and writing,
absorbed, not taking a moment’s rest. His mind was so
absorbed in scholarship that quiet times with his family
stopped, too; even at mealtime he was elsewhere, and if his
wife or son spoke to him, he responded off the point. It was
above all the attitude of one utterly in thrall to the scholarly
muse. When those around him, concerned, advised rest, he
responded that of course he’d take care from then on; but
if the admonition became persistent, Kawai, who normally
didn’t exhibit strong emotions at home, would burst out
in unexpectedly harsh language: he knew full well how bad
overwork had been for his health, but in his own present
life, scholarship was his sole raison d’être, and if scholarship
were forbidden him, he’d rather die.”
Kawai’s death, a heart attack brought on by Graves’
disease, was truly sudden. At the time, those disciples who
looked up to Kawai as their life-long teacher gathered twice
a month in the Kawai home for a study group, the Blue Sky
8 Tsurumi, “Kōyū sanjūsannen,” in Denki to tsuisō.
9 “Kawai Eijirō no shōgai to shisō.”
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Club. The participants were a core group of those in Tokyo
whose names have already come up many times—Kimura,
Tsuchiya, Inoki, Seki Yoshihiko, Ishigami Ryōhei, Shiojiri
Kōmei—plus disciples from outside Tokyo who appeared
periodically: dozens of people in all. “The meetings began
with one person giving a paper, and then discussion
focused on the paper; Kawai himself read papers on such
topics as Kant, the philosophy of Nishida, and idealism.
He was always at the center of the discussion, and in the
company of his young disciples, he usually spoke in a loud
voice and discussed vigorously. When the discussion was
over, the topic moved to genial chatter. Tsuchida Kiyoshi,
who as a reporter for the Asahi was up on the news of the
day—the war and politics and economics, joined in and
presented the latest news, and so the whole group learned
in concrete detail about war advances and retreats and the
urgency of Japan’s crisis, and they grew more deeply
anxious. Based on Tsuchiya’s reports, Professor Kawai
knew what was going on, added his harsh criticism of the
crisis, and often let slip insightful opinions. But no matter
how worth hearing Professor Kawai’s opinions were, he
couldn’t carry them one step outside his study, the meeting
place of the Blue Sky Club.” (At the time Kawai’s
movements were under surveillance by the Special
Police.)10 The meetings of Kawai and his disciples,
centering on the Blue Sky Club, continued without
interruption all through the trial and through the war, but
because his death came so suddenly, none of his chief
disciples was present when he died.
“Turn the Radio Off!”
10 “Kawai Eijirō no shōgai to shisō.”
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Those present when Kawai died were his family and
Yoshida Shōgo, a Tōdai graduate who happened to be
visiting at the time. A paymaster captain on short-term
duty with the Navy, Yoshida was about to get married and
had invited Kawai to be guest of honor at his wedding. That
night they were consulting on the arrangements. Yoshida
writes of his memory of that day:11
As always, Kawai had a calm face and smiled and asked this
and that about my recent doings. Immediately I noticed that
he had become gaunt, cheeks sunken, somehow lifeless, so
when I asked, anxiously, he replied, “I've not been well since
returning from Hakone.” … It seemed he had not recovered
entirely from Graves’ disease.
Kawai said he was listless but thought it was beriberi; then
we talked of the shortage of food, the war, and the air raids….
Eventually we turned to the issue of my wedding, the main
subject of the day, and I answered Kawai's shrewd questions.
…
Suddenly: “Ah, I feel ill.” Then: “Excuse me a moment.” He
stood up and left the room. Shocked at the unexpected
development, I could hear his voice from the other room:
“Spread out my bedding! Turn off the radio!” Then a long
silence and a period of uneasiness!
Some time later I heard his wife's voice phoning urgently.
Right after that, suddenly, impossibly, Kawai's screams struck
my ear. I jumped up, in a rush, and ran out to find a doctor. …
When I returned from seeking a doctor, it was only to confirm
futilely that there was no need for a doctor.
11 “Gosaigo no yoru,” Zenshū XV, Gappō 5.
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Tsurumi continues the earlier passage about learning of
Kawai’s death this way: “It was a great regret for me.
Because if he had been a bit more prudent, had shown
more restraint with his scholarship, today [1948] he could
have been enormously active as one of the great leaders of
a Japan in disarray.” Tsurumi says this because he knows
well that Kawai’s secret ambition lay in that direction. In
May 1919, on Kawai’s return to Japan, Tsurumi spoke these
words to Kawai: “You can become a Bentham or an
Edmund Burke. Coming back to Japan, please work hard
and achieve greatness.” Tsurumi meant a first-rate scholar
or critic, but his words didn’t sit well with Kawai. Tsurumi
writes:
Kawai looked greatly displeased: “I will become a man of
action.” He wouldn't become a critic like Edmund Burke. I
think he meant an actual politician like Gladstone or Wilson.”
That was Kawai's mindset at the time. After returning to
Japan, he created Japan's first labor law bureau and took over
its operation himself, and in the future as a politician who
held that progressive stance, he'd fight for the welfare of the
Japanese masses. He burned with such sky-high ambition. So
when he finally set sail from Seattle, he sent me a letter and
spat out this fierce fighting spirit: “I have the feeling Japan is
waiting for me.” Those were brave and tragic words.12
“Japan Will Lose Taiwan and the Ryūkyūs, Too”
At the time, Kawai burned with ambition. But things
didn’t work out the way he expected. Returning to Japan,
Kawai immediately clashed with his superior at the
12 “Kōyū sanjūsannen.”
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Ministry of Agriculture and, after publishing his letter of
resignation in the press, left government employ and
sought his next arena of activity in the academic world.
His first attempt to become a man of action foundered,
but after his time as university professor, Kawai dreamed
once again of becoming a doer. He was chased from the
university in the Hiraga Purge, hauled before the court in
the publication ban incident, and even barred from
publishing his ideas. Yet despite all this, Kawai’s spirits
were high. Why? Because Kawai clearly anticipated Japan’s
defeat in the war and foresaw that his own debut would
come in the great social unrest that would occur after the
defeat.
In “Militant Liberal,”13 Inoki Masamichi’s memoir of
Kawai, there’s the following: “At the time the China-Japan
War broke out in July 1937, Kawai intuited that the worst
had come and foresaw long ahead of time the situation
we face today [1948]. In the very midst of the North China
operation, for reasons of his own, he inspected the
battlefield. I think the militant spirit inside him wouldn’t
let him rest. At the Industrial Club in January 1938, right
after returning from North China, he gave a speech on the
crisis. In it, he alarmed the roomful of entrepreneurs by
saying, ‘As a result of this war Japan will lose Manchuria
and Korea, of course, but also Taiwan and the Ryūkyūs.’ I
still remember how shocked I was on hearing this from my
uncle, who was in the audience. My uncle said, ‘Those in
the audience thought, “Kawai really goes to extremes. Most
university professors don’t go to extremes but generally
wind up just about right. Kawai’s liberalism is dangerous
13 “Riberarisuto-miritanto,” in Kawai Eijirō denki to tsuisō (Tokyo: Shakai shisō kenkyūkai
shuppanbu, 1948).
313 | university of massachusetts amherst libraries
thought—it preaches extremes and confuses people.” So
much for ‘winding up just about right’! Seven and a half
years later, everyone knew that Japan had tumbled into the
pit of hell, just as Kawai had predicted.” It was a shock
that at that time in the Industrial Club, the very summit of
Japanese capitalism, anyone said openly anything so bold.
This speech’s lead was that “As a result of this China-
Japan War, Japan will plunge into war with Great Britain
and the United States;” it made clear his view that war
with Great Britain and the United States was inevitable.14
Kawai’s Appeal to the Nation was printed and bound before
being banned by pre-publication censorship. In the page
proofs included in the Collected Works, there is the following
clear statement: “The fate that is impelling us onward a
step at a time is a danger truly unprecedented in Japanese
history. … The world conditions surrounding Japan, I feel,
have already driven Japan into an inescapable dilemma. …
In today’s Japan, there are two roads ahead, and only two.
What are they? The first is the fate of Germany in the fall
of 1918.” Kawai explains in detail the result after World War
I, when Germany accepted defeat and signed the Versailles
Treaty: “Its territory was lopped off on all sides,” and it was
also made to pay astronomical reparations. Even if all the
German people sweated for decades, they could not pay
the reparations, and Germany fell into a state from which
it couldn’t recover. Kawai writes: “We must not think of
the fate of Germany after the last Great War as if, like a
fire on a distant shore, it bears no relation to us. … Japan
took the first step in the Manchurian Incident of 1931, the
second step in the China Incident [1937], and the third step
14 Inoki, “Kaisetsu,” Vol. 14 of Kawai's Zenshū.
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with the German-Italian-Japanese military alliance [1940].”
If you conclude an alliance such as this with one side in
Europe in the midst of a hot war already under way, “in the
eyes of England and the United States, Japan is no different
from Germany in the last Great War, and they clearly see
Japan as a disturber of world peace. … From the point of
view of the Japanese people, we are not yet fighting Great
Britain and the United States as enemies, but Great Britain
and the United States already consider Japan an enemy
country and psychologically are at war with Japan.”
Asking what it means “to be at war with Great Britain
and the United States,” he writes of the time in 1918 when
he himself visited the United States and remembers
witnessing with his own eyes as President Wilson on a
large stage addressed a great crowd: “All of the several
thousand in the audience wept and sobbed. … He was a
leader not only politically but also morally. As I watched
that scene, I thought, ‘There may come a time when this
country and my native Japan go to war, and at such a time
it will not be easy to have this leader and this crowd as
enemy.’”
Kawai wrote the same thing he’d said in his talk at the
Industrial Club: in the end, launching the China Incident
had set Japan on the fateful path to unavoidable war with
Great Britain and the United States. If you start war with
a country like the United States, it’s wholly unwinnable.
Ultimately, Japan will lose all its overseas territories and be
driven into national bankruptcy. When we think of what
actually happened thereafter, we needn’t explain that it all
happened as Kawai predicted. Kawai had a shockingly
acute eye.
Looking Ahead to Post-war Activity
The speech before the Industrial Club was bold, but he
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said even bolder things in private. For example, his widow
Kuniko writes,15 “He never said anything hopeful about the
trial; only once—I can’t remember when—he said, ‘I hope
the verdict is innocent; if not, I hope for a jail sentence,
the longer the better.’ When I asked him why, he answered,
‘After the war Japan will be in major disarray, so the longer
my sentence now, the greater my voice then.’”
In fact, he said the same sort of thing more clearly to
his disciples. For example, Seki Yoshihiko writes:16 “When
I was about to leave for active duty on Borneo, thinking I
might not see him again, I went to Professor Kawai’s house
to take my leave, and he said something to the effect that
I shouldn’t worry about Japan after the war because he
would work to the best of his ability…. He foresaw the end
of the war. He told of his thought after the verdict at the
court of appeals: ‘I believe I’m innocent, but if I’m found
guilty, I hope for imprisonment, not a fine. The harsher the
sentence, the more weight my words will have after the war
when I speak to foreign countries.’ Because I kept these
words in mind, I wasn’t worried when I went off.
“There hasn’t been a day since I was demobilized that
I haven’t thought, ‘If Kawai were alive today….’ If he were
alive today, we can imagine from the above comment, he
wouldn’t simply have returned to the university but would
have been active politically. But at the same time I have the
feeling that today too he’d have had bad things said about
him and might be surprisingly unwelcome in Japanese
society.”
It’s fascinating to speculate: what if Kawai had lived into
15 “Otto: Kawai Eijirō,” Chūō kōron, Jan. 1950.
16 “Onshi Kawai-sensei,” in Denki to tsuisō.
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the postwar years? People have given various answers to
that question. Many think he’d surely have gone into
politics. Fundamentally, Kawai’s political ideology was
socialism of the non-Marxist stripe—in other words,
European-style socialism. So in terms of the existing
political parties that arose in postwar Japan, he’d be right
Socialist or close to the Democratic Socialist Party (perhaps
today’s Democratic Party). Kawakami Jōtarō, long-time
postwar leader of the Socialist Party, was a close friend who
at First Higher School belonged to the Speech Club with
Kawai, and his son Kawakami Tamio attests that he let slip
before he died, “Had Kawai lived into the postwar years, he
might have become chairman of the Socialist Party.”
Had he lived and gone into politics, isn’t it likely that his
fearsome vitality would have altered the postwar political
scene greatly? As is well known, in the political world right
after the war, the Marxists regained all their power, and
among political party factions, the Communist Party and
left Socialist Party saw their strength surge, but the right
Socialist Party didn’t flourish. The right Socialist Party had
no true leaders, and the base of the right Socialist Party was
the ridiculous labor union leaders of the prewar era—the
“corrupt” bunch—and the politicians’ organizations of
establishment socialists with links to those labor union
leaders; their image was very bad. It paled in comparison
with that of the Communist Party group who had spent
eighteen years in jail and the Socialist Party’s Popular Front
group that burned with indomitable spirit and fought
gamely.
When it came to comparing favorably with the group
that had spent eighteen years in prison, there was no one
among the socialists who measured up to Kawai—well-
known and burning with fighting spirit. Had Kawai set
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out into the political world, he would have burnished his
resume of struggle and wielded to the full his gift for
political action, his fighting spirit, his vitality, his logical
ability, his tactical ability and immediately become a
political leader beyond compare among the socialists.
There is even the possibility that in 1947, in the political
developments at the time the Katayama Cabinet came into
existence, there might have been a Kawai Cabinet instead.
Warning Against a Revival of Marxism
In Appeal to the Nation, one of the political developments
Kawai predicted as possible in the Japanese political world
after the war’s end was the rebirth and expansion of the
Marxists. In Germany after World War I, the Communist
Party rose in revolt, the German Revolution took place, and
Imperial Germany was upended. The same thing was likely
to happen in Japan—Japan’s Communist revolution and
the overthrow of the emperor. That development was what
he most cautioned about in postwar Japan, so he argued
that steps must be taken now to prepare against that
eventuality. If you think of political developments right
after the war, this again was right on the money. In 1950
when the Cominform criticized the Japan Communist
Party’s path of peaceful revolution, the mainstream of the
Communist Party turned to armed revolution, and secret
organizations were created to prepare for armed struggle;
many young men dreamed of revolution and joined.
What should one do in a chaotic era? Kawai had
considered that early on. I wrote above about how he
gathered his disciples and formed the seminar, Blue Sky
Club; part of the background seems to have been that
Kawai wanted to use that group to launch himself into
politics. Tsuchiya Kiyoshi writes of the Blue Sky Club:17 “It
was Kawai who named our group Blue Sky. It was the
tokyo university and the war | 318
symbolism of the Young Japan Party, and in Kawai’s mind,
undoubtedly, there floated the image of Disraeli of years
past standing at the head of the Young England Party. In
notes left out on a shelf at the time of his sudden death,
he had written of his hopes for a single great people’s
movement: ‘I’d like to embark on work that would give full
rein to my own powers—careful planning, decisive action,
true insight.’ This too hints at Kawai’s frame of mind
toward the postwar disarray. Of course, there’s no way of
knowing what sort of plan that would have been. But had
the torch of Kawai’s idealism, liberalism, and individualism
been held high, it surely would have evoked a sympathetic
reaction in the great hopes of the young people who
shouldered the reconstruction of the homeland. What an
enormous loss his death was for advancing democratic
revolution!” When no one else was thinking realistically of
Japan’s defeat, Kawai had already thought ahead to how
to shape political conditions after the war. For that reason
Kawai had even calculated that losing in court and being
sentenced was an advantage. If you think of how much
respect the Communist Party headquarters group
garnered after the war on emerging from their eighteen
years in prison, this calculation was surely accurate.
Tsuchiya writes: “Early on, Kawai foresaw the outcome
of the Pacific War. And he embraced for himself a keen
sense of post-defeat mission. For the four or five years he
was banned from the university, his world was restricted
to the narrow confines of his study and the occasional trip,
and as for contact with people, our meetings of the Blue
Sky Club of disciples were virtually it. But in the midst of
17 “Kokō rinzen taru bannen,” in Denki to Tsuisō.
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this, Kawai never lost his deep interest in reality, and his
judgment and insight were extremely accurate. In June,
1943 the sentence of fine was confirmed at the grand court
of appeal, and with the death of Admiral Yamamoto (April
1943) and the Japanese withdrawal from Attu and Kiska
(May 1943), the war situation was worsening by degrees.
Concern showing on his face, Kawai said, ‘The war’s already
lost. I believe I’m absolutely innocent. But if I’m found
guilty, it’s better if it’s several years of hard labor than if
it’s a fine. Because in the future, when Japan has lost, if
I’ve been sentenced harshly by the military and the
authoritarian government, my voice will be that much
more effective in pleading Japan’s case to the Allied
Powers—they’ll pay more attention to me.’ At the time, I
didn’t understand what Kawai was saying, but now when
we really need a politician of vast intelligence and strong
convictions able to recover Japan’s independence in today’s
fierce international standoff, I feel keenly for the first time
what Kawai must have been thinking.” Had Kawai’s
calculation been entirely on the mark, today’s Japan might
have become a European-style socialist country. Kawai had
so much potential that even that possibility seems
conceivable.
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12
The Popular Front Against
Fascism and Kawai Eijirō
In which the author returns to the Genri Nihon assault on Tōdai,
most noticeably on Kawai Eijirō. The authorities used the
Comintern’s adoption of Popular Front tactics (1935) and Japan’s
war in China as pretext to crack down on dissent. Kawai
continued his criticism of Japan and refused to allow his books
to go out of print (the authorities had hoped he would agree). In
October the authorities acted to ban Kawai’s four books. Direct
pressure on university president Nagayo proved unavailing, at
least in the short term. The author suggests that Kawai’s defense
against the charge that he backed the Popular Front was
disingenuous.
Criticism of Liberalism
On February 1, 1938 Professors Ōuchi, Arisawa, and
Wakimura were arrested. This, the second Popular Front
Incident (or Faculty Group Incident), became the occasion
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for all-out attack on Kawai by government officials and the
right wing. At the time of the emperor-organ issue, Diet
member Ida Iwakuzu had been in the vanguard of the
attack on Minobe, and on February 16, in a plenary session
of the House of Peers, Ida stood up once again and raised
the university issue—why this evil omen at Tōdai? He
traced its roots for nearly three hours, from morning into
afternoon, spanning the lunch recess; his long-windedness
was part speech, part question.
Ida asserted that having been taken over by the “anti-
fascist Popular Front struggle” under the direction of the
Comintern, Tōdai had betrayed the kokutai and become a
den of liberalism, democracy, and anti-statism; word for
word, his speech echoed assertions Minoda had developed
earlier in Genri Nihon. In fact, at virtually the same time
as this speech, Genri Nihon published State and University:
A Scholarly Critique of the Democratic, Anti-State Thinking of
the Faculty of Law of Tokyo Imperial University,1 assembling all
of Minoda’s attacks on Tōdai up to that point; this speech
was taken from that book. In the speech Ida named Kawai,
Suehiro, Yokota, Tanaka, Miyazawa, Yanaihara and used
direct quotations from their books to attack them. And he
did attack: “Two Tōdai faculties—Law and Economics—are
the Popular Front ‘on parade.’” “In fact, the Tōdai Faculty of
Law and the Faculty of Economics are the den, the training
ground, the research institute of the anti-statists.” The
attack on Kawai was particularly tenacious, holding that
the third-stage liberalism Kawai espoused (the first stage
was liberal laissez-faire; the second, social betterment)
aimed at the realization of socialism, and charging that
1 Kokka to daigaku: Tōkyō teikoku daigaku hōgakubu no minshushugi mukokka shisō ni taisuru
gakujutsuteki hihan, Tokyo: Genri Nihonsha, 1938.
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it was only a hair’s-breadth away from communism. The
society it aimed for was the same; the difference lay merely
in Kawai’s rejection of violent revolution and the
dictatorship of the proletariat. Kawai said, “In Japan, too,
providing it abandons violence, the Communist Party
should be permitted political activity,” and Ida deemed that
inexcusably pro-communist. Moreover, Kawai’s sharp
criticism of statism, advocating its liquidation and
collapse, was anti-kokutai ideology absolutely irreconcilable
with Japan’s kokutai, which was an absolutist structure of
sovereign-nation unity centered on the emperor.
Kawai described his own ideas as idealistic social
democracy, and the Comintern’s new Popular Front tactic
emphasized joining hands with social democrats and
liberals to form an anti-fascist united front: the chief
enemy was statism, so form a united front on that single
point, anti-statism. It was precisely anti-statist social
democrats such as Kawai who were in accord with the
Comintern’s thrust, and the liberalism, democracy,
socialism that Kawai preached were now the breeding
ground of communism. Tōdai, where such a professor was
serving as dean (in fact, Kawai had stepped down as dean
in mid-1937), had become the headquarters of the Popular
Front; the highest university of all was now the “national
headquarters of the Popular Front.” Ida’s rhetoric was
heated: now, in the war in China, officers and men were
carrying on the battle immersed in water eighteen hours
out of twenty-four, so at such a time it was not permissible
that in universities at home, Popular Front ideology was in
full flood.
As I mentioned earlier, Kawai was famous as an anti-
Marxist, so much so that the Ministry of Education had
sent him on lecture tours to higher schools throughout the
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country to spread anti-Marxism; so up till then, it was
wholly unthinkable that anyone apart from the radical right
like Minoda Muneki would dare label Kawai a communist
sympathizer. But with Ida’s speech of February 1938, voices
criticizing Kawai’s liberal ideas surged up. Of course, only
two weeks earlier, three Tōdai professors—Ōuchi, Arisawa,
and Wakimura—had been arrested, so the speech took
place soon after the most earthshaking event in Tōdai. The
assertion that two faculties—Law and Economics—had
become the headquarters of the Popular Front made the
man in the street think, Yes, of course!
International Politics and the Popular Front
In content, Ida’s speech was a carbon copy of the charges
Minoda Muneki had been making, but its impact was
incomparably greater. Genri Nihon reached only a very few
readers, but Ida’s attack on Kawai made headlines in the
general press.
DENUNCIATION AS REACTIONARY: THING OF THE
PAST
“I AM MISUNDERSTOOD”
PROFESSOR KAWAI SADDENED BY DENUNCIATION
This three-line, four-column headline speaks eloquently
of the swift change in Kawai’s standing. “Denunciation as
reactionary” referred to the denunciation higher-school
students had showered on him when the Ministry of
Education had sent him out as an instructor to lead people
into the right way. The denunciation of Kawai had swung
from left-wing cries of “Reactionary!” to right-wing cries of
“Popular Front!”
With the Popular Front Incident of December 1937, the
official policy for controlling the left changed dramatically.
Up till then, the structural sine qua non for invoking the
Peace Preservation Law was advocacy of changing the
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kokutai or refusal to recognize private property; so only
members and sympathizers of organizations affiliated with
the Communist Party (that is, affiliated with the
Comintern) were subject to control. Their crime: the intent
to pursue an illegal goal. But the 7th World Congress of the
Comintern (1935) had adopted the Popular Front tactic, and
from that time on, even Marxists of the non-Communist
type (the Rōnōha), who up till then had not been the object
of control, became linked to the Comintern through the
Popular Front and were subjected to control under that
rubric. Thereafter officials used the Popular Front concept
adroitly, broadened the Comintern connection to include
non-Marxist socialists and social democrats, and seemed
to think that all of a sudden they could cast their net even
over people they deemed insolent for words and actions
inappropriate in time of crisis. And they apparently tried to
make Kawai their greatest symbolic target. Kawai believed
in socialism, but what was nearest his heart was social
democracy on the order of the English labor movement; he
was about as far left as today’s Japanese Democratic Party.
Moreover, he always stated publicly in regard to Marxism
and the Comintern that he was clearly “anti-.” But it was a
reality of the European Popular Front movement that the
Comintern did reach out to that part of the left. Depending
on country and party, there were successes and failures;
but that the Comintern reached out is fact. As officials came
to understand that fact, they claimed that they had to
extend oversight, too.
For the officials, this was convenient. Why? In Kawai’s
case, it was clear he acted from an anti-Comintern
standpoint, so they hadn’t been able to pull him in under
the “intent to pursue an illegal goal” often invoked under
the Peace Preservation Law. But if they pushed the Popular
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Front logic, they could bring him under control. Kawai’s
continuing speech and action—criticism of the military,
fascism, totalitarianism, statism, support for university
autonomy, and the like—were an annoyance; now that
increasingly stringent control had shut down the activities
of the Communist Party and the activities of the Rōnōha,
Kawai was likely the target the officials most wanted to
control.
The Popular Front did not exist as a concrete
organization in Japan, but Ida’s speech was an attempt to
ensnare Kawai in the Popular Front in the broad sense,
as vague ideology. For all its wordiness, if you read the
speech carefully, it’s hard to say what the point was; its
exact meaning was shrouded. But in attacking Kawai he
did use the words Popular Front repeatedly, and the
implication was that Kawai’s thought, not to mention his
very existence, was Popular Front-ish.
It’s clear from the following episode that the key words
‘Popular Front’ were at the root of the official attack on
Kawai. At the time, Kawai’s publisher Nihon hyōronsha had
issued most of Kawai’s work; Ishidō Kiyotomo was head
of its publishing division, and in an essay entitled, “At the
Time of the Blacklist,”2 he writes as follows. In 1937, with the
beginning of the China-Japan War, strict thought control
came into effect, and the Books branch of the Home
Ministry established a “Friendly Gathering about
Publications” that brought together representatives of all
the publishers. There officials “set out the guidelines for
policing publications and explained publication bans and
other punishments.”
2 “Hakkin no koro,” Newsletter accompanying Vol. 3 of Kawai's Collected Works Kawai Eijirō
zenshū, 24 v., ed. Egami Teruhiko (Tokyo : Shakai Shisōsha, 1967-1970).
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Its second meeting took place on December 15, 1937. That
was the day that throughout the country over four hundred
people were arrested at one go in the first Popular Front
Incident. “In conjunction with the ‘Popular Front’ arrests
conducted on the same day, the secretary of the
Metropolitan Police Board lectured on ‘The Current State
of the Popular Front.’ Here for the first time the policy was
made clear that from then on, no matter what their point of
view, those who shout ‘Down with fascism!’ would be considered
sympathizers of the Comintern movement and subjected to
control. [Emphasis: Tachibana] … The Comintern’s united
anti-fascist front had been active since 1935, but the Home
Ministry initiated its tough stand in 1937 because in that
year the anti-fascist United Front movement was at high
tide internationally; what worried me most of all was the
likelihood that Kawai’s Critique of Fascism would be targeted
for frontal attack.” As here, the sudden heightening of
official alarm about the Popular Front at the time was
because the Popular Front movement (the united anti-
fascist front) was succeeding in some places, and officials
worried that its influence would spread to Japan. In 1936 in
France the anti-fascist Popular Front grabbed power, and
in Japan too there were special issues of journals—in Kaizō,
“The Popular Front and Japan,” in Chūō kōron, “The Birth
of Japan’s Popular Front.” Nosaka Sanzō and Yamamoto
Kenzō, who had been in the Moscow Comintern, wrote a
joint “Letter to Japan’s Communists,” calling on
Communists to cease their schismatic activity and join the
Social Mass Party. Under this impetus, activities of the
united Popular Front picked up, and in the general election
in 1936 the Social Mass Party gained thirteen seats, going
from five seats to eighteen; in the general election in the
following year, 1937, it gained again, to thirty-seven seats.
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These events alarmed officials. Moreover, in response to
heightened anti-fascist activity internationally aimed at
German and Japanese military acts in Asia and Europe, the
Japan-Germany Defense Agreement was concluded in 1936
(it was broadened the following year to include Italy). As its
name indicates, this was an anti-Comintern pact; it aimed
to suppress state-level Comintern activities centered on the
Soviet Union and included various agreements to suppress
domestic Comintern anti-fascist united front activity in
the signatory states, to exchange information, and the like.
Kawai Rejects Publication Ban
As far as influence on Japan is concerned, the creation in
China of an anti-Japanese people’s United Front was hugely
important: the Chinese Communist Party accepted the
directive of the Comintern, stopped for a while its fight
with the Guomindang, and proposed a policy of national
unity to fight off the Japanese invasion that had spread
from Manchuria into China proper; This was the greatest
factor that turned the China-Japan War into a quagmire.
Three countries—Japan, Germany, and Italy—had been
designated enemies of the international anti-fascist
Popular Front, so when the war began, those involved in
the Popular Front movement in Japan were considered to
be cooperating with the enemy, secret colluders. Until the
general election of April 1937, there had been movement in
Japan, too, in the Popular Front direction; but after the July
incident at the Marco Polo Bridge, that movement came
to a dead stop. That was a direct result. Because of the
intensification of the wartime order, officials exercised
strict control over all such movements (all anti-war words
and deeds). The climax came with the Popular Front
Incident at the end of 1937 and the Faculty Group Incident
at the beginning of 1938. Strong pressure on Kawai, too,
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began as one aspect of that broader trend (except that
Kawai belonged to the faction actively cooperating with
the war). But it’s not the case that the movement to ban
his books began right after Ida’s speech. Ishidō writes as
follows: “After the May meeting broke up, I was directed
to stay behind and was approached by three officials for
a ‘consultation’ at the bureau chief’s small side table. The
thrust: couldn’t we voluntarily stop printing Critique of
Fascism? Neither publisher nor author, I thought, wanted to
cease publication, and when I asked why they were making
an issue of it, they answered that the book had no specific
passages whose content infringed the publication law, but
there was strong pressure from a certain quarter, and if
they did nothing, they feared something untoward might
happen to Kawai, our ‘respected teacher.’” “A certain
quarter” was of course the Army.
After the February 26 Incident, only Kawai—in “Critique
of the February 26 Incident”—had criticized the army
directly and eloquently.3 Nor was that the only time. Shortly
thereafter, Torinaka, chief of Chuō kōron press, came to visit
and said he’d like someone to write a “Letter to the
Military.” At first, Kawai declined—“I’d better mind my
own business…” but later changed his mind and wrote “My
Thoughts on the Crisis.”4 This was far longer than the first
essay and once again criticized the military sharply. As
Tsuchida writes,5 “He developed his argument at length,
eloquently and scathingly, bitterly attacking the military’s
forcible intervention into politics.” This essay later was
included in the book The Crisis of Liberalism; along with the
3 “Ni-niroku jiken no hihan.”
4 “Jikyoku ni taishite kokorozashi o iu.”
5 “Kaisetsu,” Vol. 12 of the Collected Works.
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three other books, it was banned a year and a half later (in
October 1938). Reading it today, I’m astonished that back
then so biting a book was allowed to stay in print for a
year and a half. And when the four books were banned,
Tsuchida writes, “It’s clear that Kawai’s resolute critique of
the military and attack on statism, especially in The Crisis
of Liberalism, greatly exercised the military and right-wing
forces.” As in the above passage from Ishidō, Crisis of
Liberalism, too, evoked a bitter reaction among the military,
so the army suggested that the press let it to go out of print
voluntarily. Later, when these two books were banned, the
stated reason for banning them was that they were
“propaganda for socialism and against the military.”
Superb Insight
Why did the military react so strongly against Critique
of Fascism? Because in that book Kawai analyzed Japanese-
style fascism and sharply criticized the fact that its most
important characteristic was that the military formed its
core. Unlike European fascism, which arose spontaneously
as a political movement of civilians, the Japanese
military—from the very first, an institution whose
existence was guaranteed by the constitution—put down
roots firmly in the very heart of power. Moreover, via the
right of supreme command, it was an institution directly
subordinate to the emperor, so its power was incomparably
greater than that of all other governmental organs. Because
of the right of supreme command, the military could not be
checked by government or by Diet. All in all, it is a superb
analysis: when such an organization is central to and
impels the fascist movement, it “submerges itself in the
political machinery and can advance its goals by directing
that machinery.” In other words, Kawai feared that the
military would highjack the entire state structure from
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within. Japan’s politics had already reached that stage: the
Five Ministers’ Council and the Inner Government Council
were created with the military as members, and they
become mechanisms for deciding important state-political
issues—they are, he argues, fascism’s first appearance.
Meanwhile, advancing further, fascism is not content to
enter only one sector of power; it may come to seize all
power. Neither in the Manchurian Incident nor in the May
15 Incident had fascism reached that point, and in those
incidents steps were taken quickly to restore order; but at
that point, fascism “became conscious of its own power to
terrorize the entire governmental apparatus.” In Japanese
society, “it is considered impossible to root out the
disasters of fascism, so instead the hope comes bubbling up
that ‘the military’ will carry out social reforms.” As a result,
“carrying the people’s hopes,” the military may decide to
“topple cabinets.”
Along about here, when you think of subsequent political
developments, you realize how insightful this narrative
truly is. Though this book appeared in 1934, long before
the military toppled cabinets using the system that only
active-duty generals could serve as Army Minister, before
the February 26 Incident arose, before the Tōjō Cabinet,
when the military controlled the entire country, he had
already foreseen those developments.
Later, when the publication ban trial began, Kawai
reread Critique of Fascism to prepare for it and at the time
reflected in his diary (March 18, 1939), “If I do say so myself,
it’s well-written and I admire it.” In fact, read today, it
compels admiration: “Amazing that he was so clear-eyed
back then!” But at the time, in 1937, as we saw earlier in
Ishidō’s account, officials still hadn’t reached the point of
prohibiting publication highhandedly, trying instead the
tokyo university and the war | 332
underhanded method of asking the press to suspend
publication voluntarily.
Ishidō immediately reported the request to Kawai. Had
he gone along with it, perhaps the prohibition of all four
works the following year wouldn’t have happened. Ishidō
probably communicated that implication to Kawai, but
Kawai refused firmly: “That same evening I reported the
request from the Books Section to Kawai. He said the
following. He still believed what he’d been communicating
to his students up to now was accurate. Voluntarily ceasing
publication was equivalent to admitting it had been
mistaken, and as scholar and as educator, he absolutely
couldn’t do that. The Home Ministry has the power to
forbid publication—that’s their decision, and it’s out of his
hands.” Kawai added: “The previous year the prosecutor’s
office had communicated confidentially to the Tōdai
Faculty of Economics that if Yamada and Ōmori resigned
voluntarily, the prosecutor wouldn’t arrest them. At the
time there were various opinions within the faculty; I
argued they shouldn’t resign. If they stayed in their
positions to the bitter end, their colleagues could fight
alongside the two in defense of academic freedom. If,
however, they offered their resignations, I argued, it would
weaken that fight, and despite his verbal promise, the
prosecutor would surely arrest them… In the end the two
submitted their resignations, were arrested, and Faculty
Meeting couldn’t do a thing.”
The two men were Ōmori Yoshitarō, whose resignation
was sought in the March 15 Incident in 1928, and Yamada
Moritarō, who was questioned in 1930 for infringing the
Peace Preservation Law by giving financial support to the
Proletarian News. Even though he resigned, Yamada was
arrested and indicted, as Kawai indicates; but Ōmori was
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neither arrested nor indicted. Until he was arrested in the
Popular Front Incident in 1937, he stayed out of public
office, continuing to speak and be active. But Kawai did
think the thoughts he mentions, so later, when on the issue
of publication prohibition he was urged strongly by
presidents Nagayo and Hiraga to resign, Kawai himself
refused adamantly to engage in such ambiguous,
“Japanese-style” dealings and did not resign. So the issue
worsened steadily, and in the end in the Hiraga Purge, he
shared the fate of Hijikata and the others. After telling this
story, Kawai said to Ishidō, “Integrity is more important
than stratagems.” Kawai was able to stick so strongly to
his principles because by the time he came to write this
bitter essay, he had long since foreseen the worst possible
outcome for himself and had hardened his resolve and
resignation.
In “My State of Mind of Late,” written on January 6, 1939,6
when he was virtually cornered by the Hiraga Purge (he was
placed on administrative leave on January 31), he writes,
“The difficulties within the faculty began soon after my
return to Japan in 1933, and when I reread today the diary
I’ve kept since returning, I think it’s unbelievable I’ve lived
in such a place! I’ve thought also that I should chuck it
all and lead a solitary life. Moreover, since the Minobe
Incident and the February 26 Incident, my diary shows
repeatedly that I’m resigned to the worst, so that’s why
I’m so calm now. None of this started today; it’s all a
crystallization of the last several years.”
Kawai began criticizing the military in his “Critique of
the May 15 Incident,”7 but in fact on the day of the May 15
6 “Sakkon no shinkyō.”
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Incident, he was studying in Germany and learned of the
incident only from newpaper reports. He wrote “Critique of
the May 15 Incident” for the Bungei shunjū issue of October
of the following year, 1933. Perhaps because it wasn’t
immediately after the incident, he wasn’t under much
strain in writing it. He writes in his diary: “October 3. Last
night finished ‘Critique of the May 15 Incident’ for Bungei
shunjū. 70 pages. It’s a bit dry, and I’m not satisfied. With
that, and thinking that it may well stir up some
unpleasantness, I was a bit nervous. But once I’d finished it
and soaked in the tub, I felt relieved, as if I’d gotten a load
off my chest.”
On the way home by ship from Europe, he had reached a
certain state of resolve and resignation. Of course, he was
urgently determined and tense when he wrote “Critique
of the Minobe Issue.”8 In April 1935 in “On the Minobe
Incident,” he wrote as follows:9 “I left Europe, and on the
ship coming home, I thought: I’ve lived forty-three years,
I’ve lived pretty much as I liked, selfishly; no matter when
death comes, I’ll have no regrets. I felt all that again the year
before last when thinking about Japan while I was sick. I
felt it again in October 1933 when I wrote “Critique of the
May 15 Incident.” So now I’ve already crossed that bridge.
Then an incident arose before my very eyes involving my
close friend Minobe, and the peripheral conditions,
conditions threatening complete collapse, were completely
different from before.”
At first he refrained from acting, thinking he shouldn’t
rush to take the lead on what was another faculty’s
7 “Go-ichigo jiken no hihan.”
8 “Minobe mondai no hihan.”
9 “Minobe jiken ni tsuite,” Zenshū 20.
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business. But one month passed, then two, and the all-
important Faculty of Law took no action at all. When he
met his friend Rōyama and asked about things in the
Faculty of Law, he learned that the Faculty of Law was a lost
cause; no one was about to do anything. At last, thinking,
“There’s no need for me to wait any longer, and it’s been
fruitless to wait till now,” he holed up in his Hakone lodging
and at one fell swoop wrote three manuscripts: “At Hakone
I took a day’s break and started writing without haste. I’d
never before taken such care in writing a manuscript; while
I was writing, the administrative sanction [against
Minobe] was decided on, and there was the threat of legal
punishment, too; on the train back to Tokyo, I saw (in the
newspaper) an account of Minobe’s state of mind, and with
the various stresses, my mood darkened. That night I wrote
the next installment of Economic Comings and Goings first,
then rewrote the first part of the Chuō kōron piece, then
completed Economic Comings and Goings, and next morning
I handed both in. On the 11th I was more exhausted than I’d
ever been after pulling an all-nighter. Once I got home, I fell
into a deep sleep, and in the morning I was fine. On the 12th
I contacted the Imperial University News and it took me all of
six hours, from one to nearly seven, to write twenty pages;
they were more detailed and polished than ever before.
With that I had got down on paper what had been bouncing
around in my mind for more than a month.”
The Greatest Ideological Battle Since Meiji
Before writing these manuscripts, Kawai had had
doubts. after writing them, too, doubts were his fate. A
minor matter: he was only 45, and he still had two years to
go before his pension kicked in. A major matter: he could
conceive of various dangers to himself:
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The first danger…was the menace of thugs. The second was
getting fired by government or university. No matter what,
without conceding a thing, I'll push forward. No matter what,
I'll never resign. At the same time I have to think about
causing trouble for close colleagues. If I resign now in
discouragement, nothing will happen. Rather than that,
better to hold fast for even a little and fight….
As for the possibility of violence, I'll go over that with the
family. If I'm fired, I'll keep silent for a year or so, study as I have
up till now, and observe the situation quietly. Then it still won't
be too late to make plans for the long haul.
What I must do now is first of all never concede or evade.
But on that score, I've got confidence in myself….
He worried because his opponent this time around was
Minoda and his ilk and the band of right-wing state-
essence believers around them, and they included
dangerous and unpredictable folks. (In fact, Minobe had
been beaten up by thugs.) Unlike academic battles, this
confrontation required a certain resolve and resignation:
fully aware of this, Kawai rose to the struggle. At the same
time as “Critique of the Minobe Issue,” Kawai said the
following:10 “A certain intellectual who rejects the emperor-
organ theory would go further and purge liberalism and
individualism from our thought world, and that’s an
ideological battle we haven’t had to fight since the Meiji
era; he says this is the first step of the heralded Shōwa
Restoration. In this sense, shaking himself abruptly free of
the argument over the rights and wrongs of the emperor-
10 “Minobe mondai no hihan,” Imperial University News; “Kaikaku genri to shite no shisō
taikei, Chūō kōron.
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organ theory, he declares war across the entire intellectual
front. I want to accept his challenge.”
Kawai’s “certain intellectual” is of course Minoda, the
central figure in the attack on the emperor-organ theory.
Minoda ranked this as the greatest intellectual battle since
the Meiji era and, as if possessed, fought desperately to
uproot all liberalism and individualism.11 It took
considerable resolve to fight him, and Kawai volunteered
for the fight with these thoughts: “What will be is for fate to
decide. I don’t have the young man’s vigor of my twenties,
nor am I an old man in my fifties or sixties; now I’m forty-
five— truly a good age. For fifteen years the university has
let me do the research I wanted to do. I’ve been fortunate
on many scores. If someone like me doesn’t speak up now,
who will? I’ll leave the rest to fate and wait with a smile,
cheerfully.”
A Resolve Reached at the Time of the February 26
Incident
When Kawai had criticized the February 26 Incident, too,
he’d done so having resolved and resigned himself. Here
I’ll cite his mindset that day from an essay he wrote the
following year:12
February 26 one year ago remains etched deeply in my
heart even now.
11 RHM: The Japanese term ‘possessed’ here is a homonym for Minoda's personal name.
“Crazy Minoda” is what his antagonists often called him.
12 “Ninirokunichi no omoide,” Zenshū 17.
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My university work was finished, so I thought once the day's
Faculty Meeting ends, I'll set off on a trip and do some work,
and in the morning, carrying my suitcase, I got into a
jinricksha. Snow was falling steadily. The jinricksha man said
General Watanabe had been assassinated, but for a moment
Watanabe's name didn't register….
Inside the train I heard no news. After I got into a taxi at
Shimbashi, roads were sealed off in every direction, and at the
palace barbed-wire barricades had been strung up, and rifle-
bearing soldiers were standing: seeing that, I became more
and more aware of how big this incident was….
The incident we'd foreseen since the May 15 Incident had
finally come. My mind turned solely to the question, what
will become of Japan now? But encountering such a big event,
your thought process is hazy, and things don't come into
focus. …
Snow was still falling. As I watched the scene outside the
window, I was thinking only, what will become of the
university now? What role should I play now?
After the meeting ended, I went back to my office and
thought: set out now on the trip as planned? Or go home? …
The car made slow progress on the snowy roads. Inside the
car I thought of various things. People in my kind of position
probably won't suffer direct damage, but there'll likely be
pressure on my pen and tongue. The time has finally
come—unwilling to submit, I'll surely meet the fate to which
I've resigned myself earlier.
Kawai settled in an inn on the coast near Odawara and
read Yokomitsu Riichi’s Family Council and a biography of
Rosa Luxemburg. And finally he wrote this: “Rosa planned
a left-wing revolution and met her cruel death in the street.
The same kind of violent revolution is being carried out
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around me as I read her biography, and several anti-fascist
politicians have been slaughtered. As I thought of distant
Germany and pondered close-at-hand Japan, my eyes never
left the dark sea outside my window.” From then on, he
reconciled himself to the possibility that he too might meet
a death like Rosa’s.
He sometimes felt that personal danger was closing in
on him. For example, there’s this in his diary for August 17,
1938: “In August a telegram came from M. [Maide] and I
left for Tokyo; I sensed danger nearby. It was a bit like the
end of last year and February this year. I’ll follow reason
without fear or hesitation. And if I die in the process, it will
be the doing of fate; but it’s also the case that sticking to
principle is the only way I can survive.”
“The end of last year and February this year”: the phrase
refers to the mass arrests of the Popular Front Incident and
the Faculty Group Incident. This was the time when large-
scale military collision broke out between Japan and Russia
at Zhanggufeng (Japan’s dead and wounded: 1,400); at the
drop of a hat, true war might have broken out between
Japan and Russia. Maide had sent the telegram worried
that the moment war broke out, the army or right-wing
thugs might attack Kawai in the name of the ‘emergency.’
After the Faculty Group Incident, there was sharp
disagreement within the Faculty of Economics on whether
Ōuchi should be fired before he was indicted, the
renovationist (Hijikata) faction arguing yes, what was left
of the Ōuchi faction saying no. In that confrontation, the
Kawai faction swung its support to the Ōuchi faction, with
which it had been sharply at odds up till then. Maide of the
Ōuchi faction became dean and stiffened Faculty Meeting
and the University Council against acting against Ōuchi
before he was indicted. This change in Kawai’s mindset led
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him to clasp hands with the Marxists, to whom until then
he’d been opposed, in order to give priority to anti-fascism;
so in conception, it was precisely the same tactic as the
Popular Front. But what counted more for Kawai was the
consciousness now of defending academic freedom and
university autonomy no matter the cost. He sensed danger:
these great principles were at risk; if you were a university
person, they must be defended above all else. They alone
must be defended at all costs—even letting bygones be
bygones.
There’s an essay Kawai wrote at the time,
“Crisis—University—Professors.”13 In it, he says there are
only three reasons that justify stripping a university
professor of his status:
1. If he speaks or acts against the kokutai;
2. If he actually commits an illegal act; and
3. If he offends against the ethical code of the academy.
It’s absolutely wrong to terminate a professor for any other
reason. Moreover, even in those situations, the status of
the professor should be changed by autonomous university
decision of the faculty, and he argues forcefully that
“interference by extra-university forces—for example, the
government or an ideological group—should be barred.”
Why is it necessary to reject even governmental
interference? Basically, the university should not be
subordinate to the government because the university is
in the position of leading the government. “The duty of
university professors is not to cooperate with the
government but to criticize and lead the government.
13 “Jikyoku—daigaku—kyōju,” Nihon hyōron, April 1938.
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Moreover, their duty is not to design state policy
themselves but to educate and train the people who design
state policy.” A faculty bunch (the renovationist clique) had
emerged, centered in the Faculty of Economics; unsettled
by the China War that had just begun, it took the lead in
urging cooperation with state policy.
This essay denounced them sharply. Kawai called them
the “crisis clique”: “Their minds are overwhelmed by the
very size of the crisis, and they have forgotten the essence
of the university.” Research in the university should not
be overwhelmed by immediate short-term phenomena but
must have as its goal inculcating in future administrators
the ability to think of things in a longer time frame.
What university people should do now is not dream up
state policy before being asked, but teach the students “to
set the eternal against the contemporary, theory against
reality,” to teach “the theory essential to recognize reality”
and “the philosophy necessary to critique the present.”
“Taking advantage of the crisis mood,” groups seized by
“the hope that this is our chance to destroy university
autonomy” have appeared inside the university and outside
and seek to interfere in university autonomy. But Kawai
stated firmly that the university “must never yield even one
step” to these types. Kawai criticized outside folks such as
Minoda and Ida, who in the name of emergency intensified
the attack on the university, and the forces inside the
university that tried to act in concert with the outside
forces.
Diet Members and the Right Wing Apply Pressure on
the University
Kawai referred repeatedly to the activity of forces
outside the university because after Ida’s speech in the
House of Peers, that activity came out into the open. In
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the same way as at the time of the Minobe emperor-organ
issue, the same bunch began to strengthen
communications among themselves, narrow the target to
Kawai, and demand that he be fired. On August 26 these
folks descended en masse on Tōdai president Nagayo. In
Nagayo’s diary is the following entry:
Meeting with group of right-wing Diet members.
10-12:15 Meeting in the University Council Hall
Sakikata, Mimurodo, Ida, Inoue, Nakahara.
Minoda and several others had come, too, but as per last
night's agreement with Ida, I had them wait in a separate
room.
But even counting only the Diet members, there were five
people, and Minoda Muneki himself came along. Ahead
of the meeting, the Diet members had sent to Nagayo a
long message signed by a hundred sympathizers from all
fields (politicians, military men, media figures, right-wing
activists; the same list soon became the Alliance for a Tōdai
Purge), along with other attacks on the university. Its
content was cut from the same cloth as Minoda’s essays
and Ida’s speech: in essence, Tōdai’s scholarly atmosphere
is spreading communist-sympathizing Bolshevik ideas to
all Japan, so let’s clean it up.
One passage linked Kawai with the Popular Front and
criticized him specifically: “There are social democrats
(Kawai Eijirō) who continue to speak out in favor of joining
hands with communists, standing together in a Popular
Front, and destroying statism.” This sentence owes its
existence to an essay by Odamura Torajirō, at the time a
student in the Faculty of Law and later professor at Asia
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University: “Courses at Tōdai Law and Student Ideology.”14
An expose about the instruction he received in the Faculty
of Law, it evoked great public response (among the right-
wing public). At the start of this essay he writes, “April 20,
in opening remarks to the ‘Social Policy’ course for which
he is responsible in the Faculty of Law, Professor Kawai
Eijirō said, ‘It’s a mistake that the Marxists have heretofore
considered the liberals as enemies.’ Then, in fiery tones,
‘Now is the time we (that is, liberals) must join hands with
the Marxists and together as a Popular Front lob shells at
the right wing.’ He says this in class any number of times,
but such statements are quite unproblematic in the entire
university, of course, but even in the Faculty of Law, where
one might expect objection.” Odamura makes it seem that
Kawai praised the Popular Front in class. Genri Nihon, the
Imperial University News, and the whole range of right-wing
media quoted this account time and again. Criticism of
“Kawai of the Popular Front” grew in volume, and in the
end voices began to call for the Ministry of Education, too,
to fire Kawai. The Ministry of Education began to take
steps, inquiring the facts of Nagayo, and then suddenly, on
October 15, the Home Ministry handed down the decision
to ban publication of Kawai’s four works. Thereupon the
pressure of the Ministry of Education (demanding his
resignation) grew stronger still, and University officials
moved to fire Kawai.
The matter got this far because the student Odamura
was in fact a leader of Tōdai’s right-wing student group,
and once this essay appeared, he did active
propagandizing—for example, he sent off copy after copy
14 “Tōdai hōgakubu ni okeru kōgi to gakusei shisōseikatsu,” Inochi, September 1938.
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to famous people in all fields (government officials, the
military, the right wing). The course of events is very closely
similar to the time when the emperor-organ issue spread
quickly—Odamura looked up to Minoda as mentor, and the
same people cooperated this time, too.
In his diary for the day after the visit of the Diet group,
Nagayo noted that right-wing students led by Odamura
had barged into the president’s office with the petition that
he fire all professors who were conducting education
sympathetic to Bolshevism and clean up Tōdai’s academic
atmosphere. All of this activity was planned. In Nagayo’s
diary for August 26, the day he met with the Diet members,
there is this: “Inoue Kiyozumi asked silly questions—for
example, why isn’t the university producing results? I
didn’t take him seriously.” He didn’t deal with Inoue head-
on. Soon, at the end of this unreal give-and-take, Ida said
he wanted to hear President Nagayo’s frank opinion of this
petition, so Nagayo said firmly: “I won’t respond one by
one to the various issues, but I am absolutely unable to
tolerate the last phrase—‘The source of the propaganda
sympathetic to Bolshevism domestically is the Tōdai
Faculty of Economics; in light of that fact, how can we
subjects of the empire accept that situation in silence?’ In
the past sixty years the Tōdai Faculties of Law and
Economics (Law in particular) have sent tens of thousands
of graduates out into the world. The world knows that in
all areas of society these people (several prime ministers,
countless cabinet ministers, and so on and so on) are
making their contribution to the state and have labored
honorably to construct today’s Japan. As president and with
respect for these predecessors, I find it inappropriate to
abuse Tōdai with these criticisms. Even if in the past, a
few professors have caused problems, I am totally unable
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to accept these words directed at the Tōdai Faculty of Law.
For the honor of Tōdai I reject these words.” It was “You
folks keep criticizing Tōdai, saying that Tōdai has ruined
Japan, but has any other university contributed as much to
the state or accomplished as much in constructing today’s
Japan?” When he said this, forcefully, Ida responded, “I
quite agree,” and then, “A president who didn’t get angry
wouldn’t be a good president. Let’s bring the formal
meeting to a close. Thank you for your time.”
Nagayo did treat them coldly, but the very fact that the
president received the protest of the right wing and held
this kind of meeting was a first in Tōdai history; nor is there
any later example. How was this meeting received within
Tōdai? Yabe Teiji, professor of politics at the Law Faculty,
wrote this in his diary:
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August 25, 1938
According to a radio report I happened to hear, tomorrow
the Ministry of Education and the president will meet, and the
fact that Minoda Muneki's name was mentioned makes me
unhappy in the extreme. More and more, news of madness15
drives out sanity….
According to the evening paper, the group meeting with
the president to present its opinion is not the Ministry of
Education but Mimurodo, Kikuchi, Ida, Inoue, and others—all
of them notorious. But the president is the biggest imbecile of
all for meeting with them in the first place…
According to the newspaper, five members of the House of
Peers—Ita, Kikuchi, Mimurodo, Inoue, and Nakahara—met
today with the president, the dean of Letters and the dean of
Agriculture. It is shocking to hear from the dais of the House
of Peers that the university forms a Popular Front with the
Communist Party, is anti-Japan, hates Japan, and that the
president exchanged words with these crazy people who
spout crazy words.
To report on the results of this meeting, the Alliance for
a Tōdai Purge rented Hibiya Public Hall for a “Report of
Interview with Imperial University Officials—Lecture
Meeting to Criticize the Atmosphere of the Academy;”
according to an announcement from the sponsors, it drew
a large audience of 2,800. According to “Notes from the
Editor’s Desk” in the October 1938 issue of Genri Nihon, this
lecture meeting went virtually unreported by the major
newspapers. It said that was because most news reporters
15 RHM: ‘Madness’ here and the repeated use of ‘crazy’ later in this diary are plays on
Minoda's given name: kyō (crazy) is a homonym for kyō, the Chinese reading of the
character mune of Minoda Muneki.
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of the major newspapers were leftists who graduated from
universities where the academic atmosphere was
sympathetic to Bolshevism. To prove the lecture meeting
was truly a great success, Genri Nihon ran two photos of
the meeting. Judging by these, it does indeed appear to
be well attended. Had the Tōdai uproar aroused serious
interest in the world at large? Or was this an era in which a
great many movers and shakers were right-wingers? By the
way, this huge crowd included Maruyama Masao, assistant
professor in the Politics section of the Faculty of Law. At the
direction of Nambara Shigeru, he had gone to check things
out.
Odamura’s Testimony: True or False?
Did Kawai in fact say in class what Odamura reported?
As this issue became more serious, the perplexed Kawai
said he had never said any such thing in class, that it was
all Odamura’s fabrication. His claim was believed, and
Odamura was punished by being placed on indefinite leave
from the Faculty of Law. But I have my doubts about
Kawai’s version. Maruyama Masao was Odamura’s
classmate and took Kawai’s “Social Policy” course during
the same semester. He spoke as follows about this matter:16
16 Kikigaki Kaikō Nambara Shigeru.
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Fukuda: Even in Kawai's own memoir he reflects that he was
aware that fascism was the enemy, so the tactic should be to
join hands with the Marxists as soon as possible to oppose
fascism. His own principles never changed, but he picked the
wrong time to oppose fascism.
Maruyama: In the course “Social Policy” I attended as a
third-year student, too, the biggest mistake of Japan's
Marxists was to view liberalism exclusively as enemy and
focus entirely on attacking it; basically, they should have
cooperated with liberalism against fascism. Making an enemy
of the liberalism it should have formed common front with
against fascism—that was Japan's Marxism: he said so time
and again.
In fact, this is the same as his thinking about the Popular
Front and matches pretty well Odamura’s memory.
Moreover, among things that Kawai wrote at the time,
there are several passages that deny the Odamura report,
but none is a fundamental refutation, and they are all
strangely inarticulate. The “explicitness, clarity, firmness
of tone” that he always used to squelch an opponent in
debate are almost completely absent. His chief evidence
is the assertion that operating from his own clear
fundamentals he wouldn’t be likely to say such a thing.
There is only un-Kawai-like evasion cleverly organized as
refutation. So—setting aside the issue of whether he
actually said the words Popular Front that Odamura
cited—I think he must have said something that could well
be interpreted that way. Whether or not he actually used
the word in that context, it’s indisputable that Kawai’s
thinking at the time had become Popular Front-ish.
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Hiraga's Tōdai: Flourishing
under the Wartime Order
In which the author explains his decision to make August 15, 1945
the end point of his series and explores the other—patriotic—side
of Hiraga’s Tōdai: how it flourished during the war. He contrasts
the tragic fate of liberal arts students with the far happier future
of students in science and engineering and describes Tōdai’s role
in the military-industrial complex—budget, courses, military
presence on campus. He quotes from the patriotic speeches Hiraga
himself gave to the students. The author concludes with
consideration of Listen to the Voices from the Sea, the classic
collection of writings of student-soldiers, and thoughts on the
falsification of history.
My Own End Point: August 15
For some time I’ve planned to make August 15, 1945 the
end point of this series. But I’m writing non-sequentially,
so in terms of content, I’ve already made it to August 15
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a number of times. This is a people-centered history, and
when I was writing about Ōuchi or Hiraizumi or the other
currents, I extended my remarks into the postwar era.
From long ago, from my youth, I’d harbored the greatest
doubts about how the war began and how it ended. On
August 15, 1945, I was five years old, and I’ve virtually no
memory of what it meant, but I do remember clearly a
strange scene: many adults gathered in the Japanese
quarter in Beijing, sitting in rows of chairs, listening
intently, in stony silence, to a voice on the radio.
Of course, there are perfunctory explanations from
many quarters about the causes of the war, and I’ve read
a good many of them. None of them quite convinced me.
But when, in writing this series, I came to think I pretty
much understood, the resolution formed in my mind to
stop with August 15. If I’ve gone back and forth in time
while writing about Tōdai during the war, it wasn’t because
the endpoint wasn’t clear; rather, I’ve been like an airplane
circling lazily over a prospective landing site, checking out
the topography.
Tokyo Imperial University and the Postwar Tōdai
Why do I place such importance on August 15? Because
on that day Japan changed fundamentally. Japan took the
official stance that it accepted the Potsdam Declaration on
condition that the kokutai be maintained (this was the
Japanese side’s understanding; the U.S. side’s
understanding is another issue), but that is a formalistic
argument. Japan’s kokutai changed fundamentally.
In Japan before August 15, only the emperor possessed
absolutely free will. For the rest, all Japanese were subjects
absolutely obedient to the emperor. Japan was a country
that had only emperor and subjects. According to Uesugi
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Shinkichi,1 the emperor’s absolute control was Japan’s
kokutai:
• “Japanese subjects have the primary duty of obedience
to the emperor. Obedience to the emperor is Japan’s
kokutai.”
• “All things come from the emperor; sovereignty resides
solely in him.”
• “The emperor’s will is supreme; all wills within the
country obey it… There can be no will that resists the
emperor’s will.”
This was the essence of Japan’s kokutai. The emperor alone
possessed free will; the people had absolutely none. They
could only obey.
But once Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, the
will of that absolute emperor became “subject to” SCAP
(Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General
Douglas MacArthur), so Japan’s kokutai changed
fundamentally. After that day, both the emperor and the
Japanese government had to obey all the many orders
MacArthur issued. At the same time, the structure of Japan
after the Occupation ended was to be decided by the will of
the entire Japanese people, freely expressed (as was explicit
in the Potsdam Declaration). From a land in which the
emperor alone was sovereign, Japan became a “democratic”
country in which the will of the entire people ruled. This
was a fundamental change in the kokutai.
Such fundamental structural change had taken place
only a very few times in all of Japanese history—when in
1 Kokutai seika no hatsuyō (Tokyo: Rakuyōdō, 1919).
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ancient times the clan system first gave rise to an emperor
system, or when the Kamakura shogunate arose and
control by court nobles changed to control by samurai
clans. In modern times the only comparable change is the
Meiji Restoration. In 1868, the return to imperial
government meant that the curtain fell on the seven
hundred years of samurai rule since the Kamakura
shogunate, and an era began of pseudo-ancient direct
imperial rule. With the promulgation of the Meiji
Constitution in 1889, the quasi-ancient emperor state at
one leap became a modern constitutional state, the Great
Empire of Japan.
In 1945 the curtain fell on this Great Empire of Japan.
When the Great Empire of Japan disappeared, the imperial
university disappeared with it. Tōdai changed from the old
Tokyo Imperial University to the new Tokyo University and
continues to exist to this day, but between the two lies a
huge discontinuity in structure and in personnel. Between
the old Teidai and the new Tōdai, the very raison d’être of the
university is different. In the imperial university, the raison
d’être of the university was clearly stated in the Imperial
University Act: to conduct research “crucial to the state”
and educate human talent crucial to the state. The
university existed for the sake of the state (the empire).
But for the new university under the new constitution,
the education of human talent for the sake of the state is
not the primary goal. That is only secondary. The university
exists primarily for the sake of individuals who wish to
receive an education. The old university was an educational
organ the emperor had established for the glory of the
empire, to fulfill the needs of the empire; the new
university is an educational service organ created to fulfill
the desire, based on Article 26 of the Constitution, that
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the people have the “right to receive an education
correspondent to their abilities.” It exists primarily to fulfill
the educational desires—for a course of study, for
research—of the students who pass the entrance exam and
matriculate; it is not an educational organ the state created
with the primary object of advancing a state good.
Again, according to Article 23 of the Constitution,
“Academic freedom is guaranteed” faculty who teach
students; “freedom of study,” “freedom to publish scholarly
theory,” “freedom to teach,” “freedom [of students] to be
taught” are guaranteed one hundred percent. Hence, the
great prewar collisions between state and university that
arose again and again over academic freedom—the subject
of this book—no longer arise. August 15, 1945 is indeed the
end of the Meiji state. It is fitting that this series, too, which
began with the making of the Meiji state, end in 1945.
Emperor and University
In retrospect, one of the protagonists in this series was
Tōdai, and another was the emperor. When I say the
emperor was a protagonist, I’m talking not about
individual emperors—Meiji, Taishō—but about emperor as
system, emperor as kokutai. In order to underline that
relation, the title of this book is Emperor and Tōdai.2
The Meiji state was in essence an extreme emperor-
centered state. Collisions between Tōdai and the state, too,
arose solely about issues of the emperor (kokutai). “Revere
the emperor” was the central ideology of the Meiji
Restoration. Its basic idea was to return the fundamental
structure of the state from samurai politics centered on
the shogunate to direct imperial rule, as in ancient times.
2 RHM: The title of Tachibana's Bungei shunjū series that became the book The Emperor
and Tōdai was “My Tōdai” (“Watakushi no Tōdai”).
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The 1868 proclamation of the restoration of imperial rule
epitomized this court coup d’état. In this sense, the Meiji
state was born with emperor as ideological backbone, and
with the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution, a country
emerged that institutionalized that ideology.
This was the emperor system, modern Japan’s kokutai
that held fast until 1945. In Japan before World War II,
the contradictions involved in the emperor system erupted
time and time again on kokutai issues. Finally, in the guise
of the movement to clarify the kokutai, and as if they had
carried out a virtually bloodless coup d’etat, emperor-
centered people more radical than the emperor (the right-
wing ultranationalist extremists) created a structure that
controlled politics, the social structure, and national
sentiment. After the China War and in conjunction with
the military, they created a totally mobilized state. This was
Japanese fascism under military leadership.
In the era of Taishō democracy, the modern
constitutional aspect of the Meiji state had progressed to
the point of cabinets formed by the political parties. But
it died in mid-course: the May 15 Incident was the end
of party cabinets. The kokutai was changed once again,
temporarily. Via the right of supreme command in the
express provision of the Meiji Constitution, the emperor
should have had absolute control over the military. But the
military ran amok time after time—the Manchurian
Incident, May 15, February 26, the China War—and was
beyond control by the emperor. Running amok bred
running amok; in the end, it led to the declaration of war
against England and the U.S. In deciding to end the war (by
using his right of command over the military), the emperor
recouped his ability to control affairs. Until that imperial
decision, the fundamental structure of Japanese politics
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reverted from direct imperial rule to an age of samurai
government by a shogunate—the army. If we set the
beginning of the army’s running amok at the Manchurian
Incident, this period lasted fourteen years. Incidents
symbolizing this era of rapid change arose repeatedly with
the university as stage. These were academic freedom
issues that pitted state against university; in a sense, it was
inevitable that this series of events arose in this era. The
university is the modern element of the Meiji state, and the
state order that tried to turn back the clock rejected the
university.
Why did the Meiji state create universities? The goal of
the Meiji state in its early period was to advance the
creation of “a modern state as quickly as possible that will
be able to treat with the advanced countries of Europe on
an equal basis.” The university was an educational organ to
import all knowledge and technology necessary to that goal
and to teach them to the Japanese people; moreover, it was
also an organ to nourish the human talent to enable Japan
constantly to replicate and to develop that knowledge and
technology in Japan.
In the case of Japanese universities, not only was the
university system itself an import, but the knowledge and
technology taught there were entirely imported (including
the fields of arts and letters—law, economics, philosophy,
literature, history). The university tended to be an
emporium, a general store, for imported “Western
knowledge.” “Western knowledge” was half of the early
Meiji slogan of civilization and enlightenment—“Japanese
spirit, Western knowledge.” The “Japanese spirit” part was
not integrated smoothly into the university curriculum,
which focused on “Western knowledge;” except for
Japanese history and Japanese literature, it was as good
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as missing. The right-wing ultranationalist folks harbored
great dissatisfaction with this state of affairs in the
university, and from the early Meiji era on, they sought
university reform. As basis for their argument, they
invoked repeatedly the unhappiness the Meiji emperor let
slip when he made his inspection of Tōdai in 1900: don’t
teach only disciplines infected by the West; teach more
about Japan and Japanese culture.
Despite the right-wing attack, the university’s focus on
Western civilization in actual instruction changed not at
all. But the right wing deployed political power to try to
change it by force. The first confrontation was the incident
of 1881 involving the suppression of New Theory of the
Kokutai, by Katō Hiroyuki, first president of Tōdai. The
argument at the time over what Japan’s true kokutai was
and what it should be developed in grander form in the
Emperor-Organ Incident of 1936. In the 1881 incident, Katō
bowed to pressure and let the book go out of print, but the
structure of the university itself changed virtually not at
all. The content of textbooks did change, in virtually token
ways; the fundamental structure of university education
was left untouched.
But the ultranationalist people, represented by Minoda
Muneki, were just as dissatisfied, and the sparks that
caused that dissatisfaction to explode were the Takigawa
Incident at Kyoto University and the Emperor-Organ
Incident at Tōdai. This time their political power threw the
university for a loop and furthered their ideas. After the
Emperor-Organ Incident, the attacks of the right-wing
national-essence people became an across-the-board
assault, and all Tōdai professors with left-wing or liberal
tendencies came under attack. In the face of this attack,
the university retreated and then retreated some more. The
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tide of the times swung, and Japan fell under the control of
the extreme right wing and the military.
The Grim Fate of Liberal Arts Students
Here I’ll say a bit more about the relation between Tōdai
and the war. Many people have this image of the wartime
university: that the campus fires went out when students
were mobilized and left for the front. But at Tōdai, no
matter what the fate of the liberal arts students, that was
not true of the students of the sciences and, in particular,
engineering. In a sense, Tōdai flourished as never before
in its history. In fact, no solid research has been done
concerning the actual state of mobilization and call-up at
Tōdai. Basic information—how many students were
mobilized, who died in battle—is not readily available.
The “departure of the students for the front” was in fact
merely the end of the student deferment system, so
students returned to their hometowns and took their
physicals. If they passed, they were called to the colors
immediately, to designated units, and sent to the front or
to other places of duty. (Their status as students did not
lapse; they were treated automatically as being on leave.)
In essence, the students whose deferments were ended
reverted to the status of individuals of draft age and faced
the military as loyal subjects. In bureaucratic terms, there
was no provision for the university to intervene for them,
so there are no university records to indicate their
subsequent fate.
But that situation was not acceptable, so for the first
time beginning in 1993, on the 50th anniversary of the call-
up of students, a five-year inquiry was conducted, and its
results became the huge tome, Tōdai’s Student Call-up and
Student-Soldiers.3 This volume contains all the available data,
but since so much time had elapsed, there was nothing
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to do about missing records; as the editors state time and
time again, the study was not necessarily satisfactory.
To cite a few noteworthy statistics from this volume, the
call-up of students tilted overwhelmingly against students
of the liberal arts. In August 1944 the student enrolment
was 8,798, of whom 3,157 had their deferments rescinded
and entered the military. Listed in numerical order by
faculty, here is the result (the figures in parentheses give
the ratio of those called up to the total number of students
in that faculty):
Law: 1,433 (66.8%)
Economics: 846 (70.91%)
Letters: 648 (54.96%)
Agriculture: 162 (25.71%)
Engineering: 32 (2.49%)
Engineering II: 17 (1.34%)
Physical Sciences: 12 (2.6%)
Medicine: 7 (1.7%)
Those sent to the battlefield came overwhelming from the
liberal arts; science students had their deferments
continued and overwhelmingly remained in Japan proper.
(Of course, science students too were forced to cooperate
in the war in various ways—as mobilized labor, mobilized
scientists, mobilized researchers.) In war deaths, too, the
liberal arts students formed the overwhelming majority. Of
1,307 student war-dead, 937 were liberal arts students.
Why this heavy tilt to liberal arts students? As the war
progressed, it became clear that there were far too few
3 Tōkyō daigaku no gakuto dōin, gakuto shutsujin (Tokyo: Tōdai shuppanbu, 1998).
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technicians in Japan to support military production, so to
the extent possible, science students were protected for
future use. How inadequate were the human resources?
Even in 1939 there were 90,000 job openings for 12,000
new graduates; thereafter, free choice for businesses was
outlawed, and under the mobilization law, the future of
new grads was entirely under state control. Given this
situation, young scientists were left virtually untouched
despite the war. That the Japanese economy was able to
rebound rapidly after passing through the immediate
postwar economic confusion owed greatly to the activities
of this technical manpower that had been left untouched.
By contrast, the fate that awaited the liberal arts students
sent to the front was harsh and tragic. Not only were there
many war dead, but most of them died as members of
special attack units. Special attack raids began formally in
the battle of Leyte in October 1944, one year after the call-
up of students; the loss rate was extraordinarily high, so
the units had to be replenished constantly. So to a shocking
extent the special attack soldiers were made up of those
given accelerated training. The called-up students were
best suited for accelerated training.
Here is the explanation from the Tōdai volume: “First
was practice in take-off and landing, and for the individual
trainee there was a total of about thirty minutes a day in the
pilot’s seat; virtually all soloed, the quick ones within one
week, the slower ones within two weeks…. Both Army and
Navy pinned their hopes on minds flexible enough to hold
up under such frighteningly fast training and accustomed
to abstract thinking; higher-school grads qualified and
were trained as pilots.” In The Call-up of Students Ninagawa
Jukei writes: “The one-way pilots of the special unit raids
are calculated at 1,316 in the Army, 2,033 in the Navy—a
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total of 3,349; 40% were officers. Of the 632 Army officers,
about 70% (449) were military cadets and pilot cadets; of
the 769 Naval officers about 85% (655) were naval cadets or
called-up students.”4 The figures demonstrate how many
called-up students served in the special-attack units.
Thus, the university’s liberal arts students were sent to
the front and died in large numbers; by contrast, science
students increased in number. In particular, in order to
address the shortfall of technicians, Engineering II was
established at Tōdai specifically to train technicians for the
war. That faculty was established from scratch,
engineering courses increased in number, and student
numbers jumped. The Tōdai volume depicts Tōdai at the
end of the war as follows: “In 1944 new-student enrolments
were: Law 654, Medicine 199, Engineering I 509,
Engineering II 421, Literature 360, Sciences 196, Agriculture
224, Economics 404—a grand total of 2,957 students.
Compared with earlier figures, there was no decline. Those
actually on campus in 1945 numbered 12,131. Insofar as
concerns the structure of the university, its organization,
and its numbers, Tokyo Imperial University did not
contract during the war; it expanded steadily.”
The Wartime Structure President Hiraga Created
The man who expanded Tōdai so rapidly during the war,
focusing on the sciences and engineering, was President
Hiraga of the Hiraga Purge. Hatano Isamu’s The Modern
Japanese Military-Industrial-University Complex5 is a major
work that makes full use of Tōdai’s vast “Hiraga archive”
(donated by Hiraga’s surviving family and others and
4 Gakuto shutsujin: sensō to seishun (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1998).
5 Kindai Nihon no gun-san-gaku fukugōtai (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 2005).
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totaling some twenty large cardboard cartons), and it
depicts in detail how great a role Hiraga played in Tōdai’s
wartime expansion. Hiraga is most famous as naval
architect—“Battleship god”—and as the president of the
Hiraga Purge, who dealt with the chronic strife in the
Faculty of Economics by taking decisive action, firing at
one go Kawai and Hijikata and thirteen faculty members
belonging to one side or the other. But read Hatano’s book,
and it seems that Hiraga’s true historical role in Japan at
that time lay far more in creating a great military-
industrial-university complex and making Tōdai the
technological center of Japan’s wartime order. Based on the
advice of the Scientific Council and the Scientific Research
Group, the country handed out vast research monies via
Ministry of Education research grants to all the sciences;
government financial involvement led the way in setting
research priorities. Even today, the framework Hiraga
created is still in effect as the basic mechanism of Japan’s
governmental policy to encourage science.
Everyone involved in science today knows that virtually
all of Japan’s grants for fundamental scientific research are
disbursed via this framework (Ministry of Education
scientific research grants), and the total sum has grown
to 183,000,000,000 yen (the 2004 budget [roughly $2.4
billion]). This framework is an extension of the framework
Hiraga created in 1939. The Tōdai Centennial History says
this: “In the Shōwa era, along with the advance of total war
mobilization, various policies were followed to encourage
scientific mobilization; Tokyo Imperial University formed
one link in that chain. The establishment of Ministry of
Education scientific research grants resulted in the
infusion of vast research grants into Tōdai.” It specifies,
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with detailed figures, the changes in those research grants;
the sums are breathtaking.
Earlier, as similar state grants to encourage science,
there had been Science Research Encouragement Funds.
From 1931 to 1938—the eight-year period—the sum total
was a scant 47,000 yen [roughly $25,000]; but in the two
years 1939-1940 the Scientific Research Grants set up in 1939
suddenly handed out 500,000 yen [$250,000]—a quantum
leap. Moreover, the sum increased yearly: in the one year
1943, 550,000 yen; in 1944 1,850,000 yen [$900,000]. The
increases skyrocketed.
How did such vast research sums come about? The
mobilization law was enacted in 1938, and mobilization was
born; it decreed that in time of war (including the 1937
China War), all human and material resources could be
mobilized simply by state order. Not merely resources: all
businesses were included. Businesses included the service
industries—transportation, communications, finance. Not
only that, but the order included the education and
training carried out in the university and the tests and
research carried out in research facilities. Under this law,
all these activities were subject to mobilization in wartime
or quasi-wartime. Modern war requires the support of
science and technology in every sense, so as the war
progressed, the mobilization of science and of research
came to be regarded as all the more important. In 1940 the
guidelines for scientific mobilization were established by
cabinet order, and the Planning Agency (the cabinet office
that controlled national mobilization) became the focus,
taking charge of the mobilization of science.
In 1942, when the battle of Midway took place and the
bitter fight for Guadalcanal was continuing, that structure
didn’t fill the bill, so the military and the university
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established direct ties. In the October “Consultation on
New Weapons” convened by the Army Ministry, ten
professors took part; Tōdai, too, was represented, and the
records attest that agreement was reached on new
weapons—anti-tank, anti-air, anti-sub weapons, and
methods of detecting enemy air attack.
University research commissioned by the army grew
steadily. In August 1943, as the war situation grew steadily
worse, the cabinet approved “Emergency Urgent Measures
for Scientific Research.” It went so far as to state the
“clarification that scientific research should have the one
absolute aim of prosecuting the war.” (Italics added.) At the
conference of presidents of imperial universities convened
in response to the emergency act, it was decided that
“Scientific research in the universities and other scientific
research institutes has as its sole absolute goal the
prosecution of the Greater East Asian War, and we pledge
to cooperate in furthering it.” Basic research, which the
universities had prized before then, was set aside for the
time being, and it was resolved to direct resources
preferentially to “research that contributes directly to
increased military strength.” The crucial act in the
centralization of political control in the Meiji Restoration
was the “return of the fiefs [to the emperor],” which took
place in 1869. Drawing on that parallel, scientists termed
this great change of 1943—tying the goal of scientific
research directly to the war—the “return of research.”
To encourage research that related directly to the war,
even the “instruction of students” that constituted the basic
duty of the university was temporarily neglected. In fact, in
August 1944, very late in the war, a plan was created—“The
mobilization of student knowledge”—whereby 1,000
students, sophomores and up, were mobilized; on the basis
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of cooperation among Army, Navy, Military Procurement
Office, and Health Ministry, they were sent to military-
goods factories, research institutes, hospitals, and the like.
In short, when it got to this point, all scientific researchers
had to set aside everything else and concentrate on military
research of immediate value.
What were the results? According to the same book, in
the Tōdai earthquake research center, even so famous an
earthquake scientist as Hagiwara Takahiro, later director
of the center, addressed topics such as “a mechanism to
record the vibration of torpedoes and bombs,” “the
measurement of the velocity of rocket bombs,” “the
construction of stabilizers for airplanes.” The other
professors at the earthquake center had similar
assignments: “rocket bombs,” “tracer-bullet casings,”
“rotary cylinder bullets,” “bullet-proof construction.”
This is the way things were even in the earthquake
research center, so in other research facilities of the Faculty
of Engineering, it was military research ‘on parade’: in the
electrical engineering branch, “electric wave night
surveillance systems;” in the practical science branch,
“phosphorescent bodies used for night-time heat-ray
surveillance;” in the practical science oil engineering
branch, “Vitamin B for submarine protection;” and in the
practical physical chemistry ordnance branch, “waterborne
explosives” and “methods of dampening sound waves
aimed at submarines.” Moreover, studies in using a
powerful magnetron to produce “lethal rays” were also
conducted (it’s said they got as far as killing rabbits).
As this sort of direct military research came to be carried
out steadily in the university, research money from the
military flowed directly to the various parts of the
university. For example, in sectors with deep relation to
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military technology, such as the airplane research institute,
the money sometimes was greater than that from the
Ministry of Education’s research grants. The more the war
progressed, the more research funds came flowing into
Tōdai’s various engineering branches from various
channels. As mentioned earlier, both the rapid increase in
faculty positions and the increase in special courses in
every branch of the Tōdai Faculty of Engineering arose
from this increase in research funds. By the late stages of
the war, the union of Tōdai and military advanced still
further. Several Army and Navy branch research centers
were established within the university; in March 1945, there
were nine of them. That’s how closely Tōdai and the
military merged.
Hiraga was not forced to be the banner-bearer for this
sort of military-industrial-university complex. He himself
thought that such a structure was absolutely necessary to
achieve victory in this war. The Modern Japanese Military-
Industrial-University Complex writes as follows: “In the
military-industrial-university complex and Hiraga, who
embodied it, there were two facets. These were nationalism
and internationalism, coexisting and yet in opposition.
Hiraga undoubtedly was a military person in essence, even
though by training he was a technician; his creed was
vehement nationalism and loyalty to the emperor.” The fact
that Hiraga was vehemently nationalistic and loyal to the
emperor is expressed well in many of the formal addresses
he made as president. For example, at graduation in 1940
he said, “The China War has already gone on for two and
a half years, and the emperor’s forces are fighting hard on
land and sea and in the air, garnering sparkling victories….
Those bright deeds of arms are truly unbearably moving,”
and foreseeing the day when students would head for the
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battlefield, he said this: “However, most of you, I think, will
be called up in the not too distant future into the emperor’s
forces and will bear the honor of entering the forces and
departing for the front. At that time, it goes without saying,
you will leap up; as your ancestors sang, ‘Today I go to serve
as the humble shield of the emperor; I shall not return.’”
The Shōwa Emperor Visits Tōdai
In October of 1940 the emperor made an imperial visit
to Tōdai, his first such visit in twenty-two years. Hiraga
was his host and greeted that day with the profoundest
emotion. As he left his house that morning, he “said to his
family, ‘If anything untoward happens, I’ll throw myself
from the roof of Yasuda Auditorium.’”6 The emperor was to
be protected to the utmost and venerated boundlessly, and
Hiraga was ready to die for that belief. When Hiraga spoke
of the emperor, he was the very epitome of an emperor-
worshipper.
In his convocation address in 1941, he took exactly the
tone of the right-wing kokutai people of the day: “When we
ponder the matter reverently, our country has been ruled
for 10,000 ages by one family of emperors, in succession.
The basic meaning of the relation between emperor and
subject is eternally clear; that’s why during that time our
country has been filled with warm feelings, as between
parent and child—‘Righteousness between emperor and
subject; love between parent and child.’ … This is why our
country is a family-state; it is the essence of our kokutai,
without peer in the world.” The essence of the kokutai lay
solely in the family-state—on that point he was fully in
sympathy, and he emphasized that at Tōdai, too, all faculty
6 Naitō Hatsuho, Gunkan sōchō: Hiraga Yuzuru (Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1987).
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and staff and all students must unite and become a
university where the whole school was one family.
In a speech on University Commemoration Day in 1942,
four months after the opening of hostilities, he began in a
tone that matched exactly that of the right-wing emperor-
ists: “In its meaning, as also in its conception and its
tactics, the Great East Asian War indeed has no parallel
in history. Today, under the august virtue of the emperor,
brilliant war gains are being realized….the nations are all
being set in their proper places; the people are all made to
live in peace. The great spirit of Japan’s founding is made
manifest to the world.” At the end he told the students,
“Etch on your hearts the grace of Imperial favor…always
serve the Imperial will, be fully conscious of the crisis, and
whenever the time comes when you are called up, head
for the battlefield in high spirits, having strengthened your
resolve to die for the empire… Thereby, I hope fervently,
you prepare yourselves to fulfill with reverence the
important duty that is laid upon you.” Thus he urged them
to steel themselves for war. It was quite as if he foresaw the
day the students would take the field.
Later Hiraga’s chronic tuberculosis worsened, and he
died suddenly on February 17, 1943; so the one who actually
saw off the students departing for war was his successor,
President Uchida Yoshikazu (a Tōdai graduate in
architecture). Hiraga was the first president to die in office,
so the first university funeral was carried out: over 2,000
students, faculty, and staff lined the route along the gingko
arcade from the Main Gate to the auditorium and saw off
the urn containing Hiraga’s ashes. An aside: at the request
of the Faculty of Medicine, Hiraga’s brain had been
removed and preserved, and to this day it sits in the
Specimen Room of the Anatomy Theater.
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The Truth About Listen to the Voices from the Sea
I haven’t got space to write in detail about the sending
of students to the front, but I will say a word about that
very famous book, Listen to the Voices from the Sea. As is well-
known, Listen to the Voices from the Sea is a collection of the
letters and papers of students who died in the war; it was
published first in 1949 by the Tōdai Cooperative Association
Press, then reprinted by Kōbunsha and by Iwanami Bunko
and is a best-seller boasting total sales of several million
copies.7 I too remember being deeply moved when I read it
as a child, and, and I saw the film version (1950, directed by
Sekikawa Hideo).
Since then it has come to light that the earlier editions
were in fact not faithful reproductions of the documents
left by the students who died in the war but that the editors
had edited them quite deliberately, even making deletions.
Iwanami Bunko’s new edition, published in 1995, claims to
be the “definitive edition” that restores all the deletions. I
went right out and bought it, read it, and compared it with
the old editions. I was astonished to discover that starting
with the opening sentence of the first student, Uehara
Ryōshi, it was quite different. The first sentence of the new
edition had been deleted from the earlier
editions—“Chosen for the Army Special Attack Unit that
7 RHM: There are translations of this book into English: tr. Tanaka Seitarō, Voices from
the Sea: Letters and Diaries of Japanese Students Killed in the War, Tokyo: Eihōsha, 1964;
and Midori Yamanouchi and Joseph L. Quinn, trs., Listen to the Voices from the Sea:
Writings of the Fallen Japanese Students, Tonawanda, New York: University of Scranton
Press, 2000. There is also a translation into French: trs. Suzanne Audrey and Jean
Lartéguy, Ces voix qui nous viennent de la mer: le Japon et ses morts, Paris: Gallimard, 1954.
There is even an English translation of Ces voix: The Sun Goes Down: Last Letters from
Japanese Suicide-Pilots and Soldiers, tr. Nora Wydenbruck, London: W. Kimber, 1956.
“From the sea” is only an approximation of the Japanese wadatsumi; that term goes
back to the 8th century and refers to the gods of the sea (of the water, the rain, and so
on). So its use in the title lends an animistic/religious patina to the subject.
Alternative translations might be Listen to the Voices of the Gods of the Sea, and Hark!
Voices from the Beyond.
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can be called the outstanding special attack unit of the
glorious fatherland Japan, I feel acutely that no greater
honor can come to me.”
The earlier editions have a preface written by Watanabe
Kazuo that states, “At first, I argued that it was ‘fair and
proper’ to include everything, even some short pieces that
were quite intemperately Japanist and at times came close
to glorifying war; but the people at the press didn’t agree
with me. Their rationale: it wouldn’t do to exert even the
slightest bad influence on the current state of society…. It’s
natural to take such influence into account, and we too
thought we couldn’t bear to publish these extremely painful
records; so we acquiesced in what the publishers wanted.”
Reading between these lines, you could see that the original
records contained passages that were “intemperately
Japanist” or “came close to glorifying war” and that they
had been deleted; but when I read that statement in the
earlier edition, I had absolutely no idea what, in fact, it
meant.
However, comparing the new and old editions, I saw
the specific deletions and knew, “Aha! Here’s what they
deleted.” To use the case of Uehara, a passage sharing the
ambitions of militarist Japan—“My ambition that the
beloved fatherland Japan would become a great empire like
the former British Empire was in vain”—was missing, as
was this passage: “Indeed, a friend said that special attack
pilots in the sky are merely pieces of machinery,
instruments. Instruments to do the steering, without
personality or emotion, of course without
rationality—merely metal pieces in magnets locked onto
enemy aircraft carriers. If you think rationally, it’s
unthinkable….it’s something that can be found only in
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Japan, land of spirit.” Such passages were cut apparently
because they were judged “Japanist” or “bellicose.”
But in my own opinion, it’s precisely when such passages
are included that we can call the documents true, materials
that allow us a peek into the true feelings of the people
of the time. Cutting here, cutting there on the arbitrary
scruples of editors of a later generation makes us see the
age through the rose-colored glasses of the editors. Odagiri
Hideo was one of the editors of Listen to the Voices from the
Sea, and in the afterword to the Kōbunsha Kappa Books
edition (1959-63) he wrote: “This book contains many
documents that record doubts and distrust and criticism
and despair about the war, rather different from the
average Japanese students of the day, who were wholly
mobilized and wholly indoctrinated—by elementary school
and university, family and newspapers, magazines, radio,
neighborhood associations—educated and shaped
militaristically and believed literally in the ‘holy war.’”
Explaining how the difference came to be, he discusses
the situation about which Watanabe wrote. At the time
Odagiri agreed with Watanabe in following the judgment
of the publishers, but as time passed, he came to feel it
had been a mistake. He gives these reasons: “There were
in fact a great many such passages glorifying [war], and
in order to examine the war experience across the board it
was necessary to include those passages, too. If you publish
them all, the relation between war and human beings, the
relation between militaristic education and the younger
generation, and so on—these relations become apparent,
their appalling inhumanity and misery all the more clear.”
Indeed so. To write this book, I’ve had to read many raw
materials, documents from that era, and virtually all that I
think represent truly the feelings of the young men of that
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day are militaristic in tone. If you don’t understand that,
you don’t understand the age.
So why such rewriting? Hosaka Masayasu’s The Postwar
History of “Listen to the Voices from the Sea” (1999) offers a
detailed investigation. To put it simply, the work of editing
Listen to the Voices from the Sea and the organization and
work of the association to commemorate the student-dead
that centered on this book were under very strong
Communist Party control and were one facet of the peace
movement directed by the Communist Party. Elements
thought not conducive to the promotion of the peace
movement (such facts as that most of the student-dead
were patriots, that they went to their deaths gladly for
country and for emperor) were deleted quickly. It
amounted to the falsification of history.
Who Falsifies History?
As I accustomed myself to documents of the time, I came
gradually to understand that that age was more right-wing,
more ultranationalist than our later generations think. It’s
not that there was a minority of right-wing
ultranationalists. It’s that to an extent unimaginable today
the ways of thinking and feeling of everyday people were
right-wing. They were emperor-worshippers. The theory
that the common people of the time were all duped, that
they were forced to say what wasn’t in their hearts, has
been spread widely after the war; there was a time when
it was considered the standard historical view. But that’s
not how it was. Virtually all the common people of the time
seem truly to have believed what today one can only think
of as extreme right-wing views. When I understood that, I
knew truly, at a gut level, what caused the war.
In this book I’ve written about the emperor and the right
wing in more detail than is usual in history books because
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I thought they were the key to unlocking the history of that
time. I was born in 1940. I was five when the war ended,
so I have virtually no real memories from that time. I’m of
the generation that received a purely postwar democratic
education from elementary school on, so I received no
militarist elementary education at all. Hence when I try to
understand that age, there are many aspects utterly absent
from my mother wit. They are all things that—had I been
of the same generation as those who were adults at the
time—I would have known instinctively.
What things? This passage from Tsurumi Shunsuke’s
Intellectual History of Wartime Japan8 is most helpful: “For
Japanese—I’m not saying all Japanese, but Japanese over
forty today [Tsurumi was speaking to a Canadian audience
in 1980]—memories of wartime are bad memories. They—I
include myself, so let me say we—have a strong latent
desire to bury these memories in the deepest, darkest part
of our hearts. We hate confronting memories of that time,
once again and head-on. On this point, there are
generational differences among Japanese. Some younger
Japanese educated after the war want to quiz their fathers
to learn exactly what they did during the war. When
questioned, a great many of the parents—at least, the
fathers—find they hate to reply. Investigating how they
remember the events of the war, how those memories have
been transmuted in their hearts into something else, how
they interpret them, how they express them offers one clue
to understanding Japanese culture.”
I’m already in my mid-sixties and belong, in Tsurumi’s
8 Senjiki Nihon no seishinshi (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1982; tr. [no translator credited], An
intellectual history of wartime Japan, 1931-1945, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1986).
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phrase, to “the younger generation educated after the war.”
I am among those “who quiz their fathers to learn exactly
what they did during the war.” But my generation has come
to feel frustration that no matter how we quiz our fathers,
we never get satisfactory answers. What I’ve finally come
to understand is that, as Tsurumi says, those of my father’s
generation don’t like to recall memories of that time, so
they either bury them deep in their hearts and don’t want
to remember, or they transmute those memories in their
hearts into something different; that’s how they have
conducted themselves in society at large. So the image of
that time that’s been handed down to our generation has
been skewed.
All along, consciously or unconsciously, the people of
that generation have practiced historical falsification.
Historical falsification is carried out by the left and by the
right. Falsification from the right has given rise to the
current issues of historical consciousness and of textbooks;
falsification from the left—this is merely one example—is
the rewriting of the Listen to the Voices from the Sea. (There
are many other examples of falsification from the left.)
Real history probably lies between the two falsifications.
To put it a different way, in a sense history and falsification
are doomed to be inseparable. History is essentially the
narrative of later generations. A narrative is inseparable
from the subjectivity of the narrator. Subjective narration
is inseparable from value judgment. For this reason, A.’s
sincere (or supposedly sincere) narration is B.’s
falsification of history. “Insincere narration,” “wholly
fictitious narration,” “narration with political coloring,”
and the like intermix, so when historical consciousness and
politics intertwine, they become exceedingly difficult to
unravel.
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In “The Declaration of War and the Dispatch of Students
to the Front,” Nambara Shigeru pointed out that like
individuals, whole peoples can commit crimes, and he
invoked the following episode.9 The historian Ranke was
asked by the king: in such a case, what should we do? Ranke
responded, “The whole people will have to suffer on that
account.” Back then, clearly, Japan committed the national
crime of starting the war. My generation was not directly
involved, but for some time to come, we will have to take
responsibility for the nation and go on suffering.
9 RHM: In the mid-18th century, Leopold von Ranke gave lectures on world history to
the future King Max of Bavaria. The king's question: “What should we expect of
Nemesis in history if not only the leading personalities but the people as a whole
commit national crimes and act unjustly.”
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14
President Nambara and the
Argument that the Shōwa
Emperor Should Abdicate
In which the author considers the war experiences of Tōdai’s
medical students and the memories of those who were on campus
and heard the emperor’s August 15 broadcast there. In contrast to
the vast majority of Tōdai people who were stunned and stupefied
by the defeat, one person stands out: Nambara Shigeru. The
author discusses several of Nambara’s postwar speeches and the
impact they had before turning to Nambara’s call for the Shōwa
emperor to abdicate at an appropriate moment. He concludes by
introducing the efforts of Nambara and a few Faculty of Law
colleagues to hasten the end of the war.
The War Dead of the Tōdai Faculty of Medicine
In the last chapter, I wrote that to this day, even after the
research of Tōdai officials, we still don’t where and how the
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called-up students died. A reader wrote me to report that
a five-year study by the alumni association of the Faculty
of Medicine turned up all the names of its war dead and
the places they died and that a memorial engraved with
all their names had been erected at the Yayoi Gate (across
campus from the Main Gate). I went to see it.
According to that study, the war dead of the Faculty of
Medicine numbered two hundred and thirty-two, and they
died in all the war zones: Manchuria and China, of course,
but also New Guinea, the Philippines, Guadalcanal, Burma,
Attu, Iwojima, Okinawa, Siberia. Medics had to go
absolutely everywhere. Simply by looking at that list and
at the map of the places they died, one understands
immediately how vast this war was. To my surprise,
twenty-one of the dead died in the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
In the course of research, the report says, “many painful
facts became clear.” The report gives the following
examples: “One of the men was a medic on Etajima [the
island in Hiroshima Bay that was the site of the Imperial
Japanese Naval Academy], and just after the atomic bomb
was dropped on Hiroshima, he followed orders, entered the
bombed area, and worked on the relief effort for several
days; he died after the war, having returned to school. A
second man, in Manchuria after the war ended, protested
sharply on the way out of Manchuria against the Soviet
army’s arrests of young women and was shot through the
heart on the railroad tracks; trains ran over his corpse.
There was also a doctor, recently graduated, last seen
operating in a field hospital in an Okinawan tomb just
before Okinawa fell.” Moreover, the writer of the report
reflected: “To have to listen to superficial comments of new
Japanese, who sing the praises of a peace (constructed atop
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the deaths of those who died in the war), in which they
have all the food they can eat, that these war dead are dead
merely because they chose to involve themselves in an evil
war, makes my grief for these classmates deeper and
stronger.”1 It’s a fact that both today and in the past, many
people voice such superficial words. These people are
Japan’s shame, as are the many people, both today and in
the past, who have no second thoughts at all about having
started the war.
At the opposite pole is Nambara Shigeru, Law professor
and first postwar president of Tōdai. The greatest trauma
of Nambara’s life was his powerlessness to prevent the call-
up of students. He spoke again and again of his feelings
at the time. First, let’s look at his memory of the send-off
ceremony conducted at Tōdai for the departing students
(November 12, 1943). Nambara did not attend the
ceremony: “On that day the entire university assembled in
Yasuda Auditorium for the send-off ceremony. President
Uchida read words of farewell. I simply couldn’t bear to
enter Yasuda Auditorium. … So I sat quietly alone in my
office, and at last, as they all left, I stood under the arcade
of gingko trees to see them off. In high spirits, I tell you,
they all went out the Main Gate. It gave me an inexpressible
feeling.”2 When the war ended, Nambara was dean of the
Faculty of Law. Soon after the war, there were second
thoughts about the wartime order, and the storm winds of
a series of internal purges arose and roared through Tōdai.
When that chaos had settled a bit, Uchida resigned in the
middle of his term, as was fitting. And Nambara garnered
1 Tōkyō daigaku igakubu sembotsu dōsōsei tsuitaku kikin saishū hōkokusho.
2 Kaikoroku.
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an overwhelming majority of votes and was elected
president.
Yasuda Auditorium: The Emperor’s Broadcast
Here let’s quote a bit about Tōdai right after the war
from the Centennial History:3 “At noon on August 15, 1945,
the Emperor’s broadcast announcing the end of the war
took place. On that day, the faculty and students remaining
on campus, from President Uchida on down, gathered in
the auditorium and listened. The Imperial University News
wrote, ‘With heads bowed, reverently, faculty and students
listened to the emperor’s voice; hearing his most important
words of concern for the people, his imperial solicitude, all
maintained silence and were swept by heartbreak.’ Then
‘President Uchida stood up, unable to wipe away copious
bitter tears,’ and made the following remarks: ‘Hearing
most reverently the imperial proclamation in the voice of
the emperor, even the humblest person is unable to hold
back tears of gratitude toward the emperor… In obedience
to the imperial proclamation, we must be united in
unquestioning obedience to his wish, fulfill our duties as
subjects calmly, press on with our vocation as
students…and reassure the imperial heart.’”
On hearing the emperor’s broadcast announcing the end
of the war, couldn’t the president of Tōdai have said
something a bit less objectionable? These lamentable words
of his first statement tell the measure of Uchida. A graduate
in architecture, he had succeeded Hiraga in March 1943 and
carried on unchanged the Hiraga line (the alignment with
militarism—“The entire university pledges unanimously to
repay the country with their deaths”). At the graduation
3 Tōkyō daigaku hyakunenshi.
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ceremony that was moved up to accommodate the call-up
of students, he could say this: “Our country today, united,
is striving to carry the holy war to a successful conclusion,
and [the fact that despite everything the students have
managed to graduate] is thanks solely to the infinite
benevolence of the emperor… Indeed, I hold the unshakable
belief that we will redouble our determination, pledging
with grateful tears to offer up our lives to the Empire.”
With the war over, what should Tōdai do? Immediately
after the emperor’s broadcast, the deans all gathered in the
president’s office to confer on the best policy for the future,
but they had absolutely no idea how to proceed. In their
haste, they simply decided on the obvious: “1. Instruction
will be continued as per usual. 2. There will likely be unease
among the students, so tell them ‘to apply themselves to
their studies calmly and with composure.’ 3. Wartime
research will be halted.” The very fact that this was all they
could decide is evidence of Tōdai’s stupefaction.
One of the students listening to the emperor’s broadcast
in Yasuda Auditorium was Ishizaka Kimishige, who later
became an internationally famed expert on immunization
and professor at Johns Hopkins University. He wrote: “The
faculty and those students then on campus gathered in
Tōdai’s Yasuda Auditorium to listen to the emperor’s
broadcast. Up until the previous day, we had thought,
‘We’ve only a few months more to live.’ Among our
classmates in middle school and higher school were some
who had died as special-attack pilots. I myself thought my
chances of dying were 99%, and I didn’t fight that fact. Told
suddenly that the war had ended, I had no idea what to do.
I was absolutely stupefied.” Everyone was stupefied.
Among a people so stupefied, the only person with a cool
head, able to offer guidance on what to do, day after day,
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was Nambara Shigeru, dean of the Faculty of Law. It was
only fitting that he should be elected the first postwar
president of the university. Before becoming president,
Nambara had been a great inspiration. Barely two weeks
after the defeat, Nambara wrote an essay in the Imperial
University News under the title, “The Destiny of the
University in the Postwar World—Advice for
Decommissioned Students.”
Nambara’s Historic Speech
Beginning the very first days after the war ended,
demobilized student-soldiers had appeared on campus,
one after the other. As I’ve said, students had been
conscripted with their status as students intact, so when
the war ended, they had the right to return to the
university. Like everyone else, the demobilized students
didn’t know how to think or what to think. The same held
true for ordinary Japanese outside the university.
Nambara’s essay was passed from hand to hand and had
the greatest influence on people of the day. Here’s how it
began:4
4 RHM: Full translations of this Nambara speech and the other speeches Tachibana
cites are available in Richard H. Minear, ed. and tr., War and Conscience in Japan:
Nambara Shigeru and the Asia-Pacific War (Lanham [Md.]: Rowman & Littlefield and
Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2011).
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August 15, 1945: what did that day mean for us? It was the
accursed “day of doom” in the glorious history of Japan, more
than 2600 years. We Japanese who had lived to see that day:
to what can we compare our resentment and great sorrow? It
was a day our country had never before known, a day of defeat
and surrender.
First, must we not face this reality squarely and, without
cloaking it vainly in some mystic mantle, accept fact, honestly,
as fact? The shock and bitterness we suffered are too deep, too
big…
But what can resurrect Japan from the ruins? It's probably
no different in any age, but for our country now, its territory
reduced, its armaments abolished, its industry most likely
sharply limited, it all comes down to scholarship and
education: that is axiomatic. Such being the case, the
meaning and mission of the university—the nation's highest
academic institution—have never been more important. …
Our true battle as scholars began the day the military laid
down the sword.
First, every one of us must become a person of free and
independent spirit. Where such people are born, a state
increases its inner toughness and becomes strong… We
needn't necessarily lament having too little land or too much
population. Where people of autonomous spirit dwell, the
world and nature will let themselves be reclaimed by them…
We were defeated, but we need not engage in the slightest
flattery or obsequiousness. Let us stand resolutely and walk,
eyes straight ahead…
Young people! Students! Have hope. Don't lose sight of
your ideals. Your ancestors never faced a more difficult time,
but then no age was ever assigned a more glorious task,
either.
Soon our comrades will return from the continent, from the
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islands of the South Pacific. The day isn't far off when they
will fill the lecture halls once again, burning with passion and
ideals for rebuilding the homeland and diligent in their
studies. However, when we think of those brilliant ones who
will never return, we are infinitely sad. They all fought and
died as warriors, bravely. They were warriors, but to their
dying day they never discarded their dignity as scholars. They
believed firmly and unswervingly that in the final analysis, it
is truth and righteousness that revive a country. …
For people living the reality of that age, these words of
Nambara’s were like manna; they took strong
encouragement from these words and remember this
statement of his even today.
In the immediate post-war age, Nambara’s words had
astonishing power and sank into the hearts of a desolate
people. Each time Nambara spoke in his official capacity,
what he said got big headlines. It’s inconceivable for those
who know only a much later day in which Tōdai presidents
have lost virtually all influence on society, but in that
chaotic era Nambara’s words had great power and guided
society.
Ishiguro Takeo, who entered the Faculty of Law right
after the war and later became an attorney, writes as
follows:
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Professor Nambara became president of Tōdai in the
winter of 1945, the year of defeat, and from then on
decommissioned soldiers returned one after the other to the
university. In the burned-out city of Tokyo, there was neither
food nor lodging, and though we had come back alive, albeit
in tattered military fatigues, we had no textbooks, no
notebooks. …
At just this moment in time, President Nambara delivered
his speeches, about once a month, in Yasuda Auditorium.
February 1946—Empire Day; March—ceremony for the
student-dead; April—University Founding Day and the
emperor's birthday; May—convocation for new students;
September—graduation. Each was aimed at the Tōdai
students, but the next day's newspapers all ran the texts in full
and reported on them, and they made a deep impression on
students, educators, and intellectuals across the nation. The
content of the speeches naturally varied with the ceremony
but bespoke Nambara's penetrating insights into the post-
defeat reconstruction of the homeland and the future destiny
of the nation; I remember he preached respect and yearning
for scholarly truth and the importance of building character,
with an emphasis on justice. …
Among his topics was “What Will Revive the Homeland,”
and a small volume of his speeches was published under that
title [Feb. 1947] and sold very well. I remember buying up,
with difficulty, dozens of copies, taking them home with me;
people thanked me, and we discussed it and agreed that a
new day had dawned.5
The First Postwar Celebration of Empire Day
5 Newsletter accompanying Nambara's Collected Works.
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If we pick statements that had a particularly large
impact, there is first of all the speech on Empire Day,
February 11, 1945. In the imperial proclamation issued at
the beginning of that year, the emperor had rejected his
own godhood. The emperor himself declared that the idea,
commonly accepted during the war, that he was a living
god was an “empty concept.” For those who believed firmly
that the emperor was a living god, this proclamation must
have been the greatest of shocks, and Nambara turned this
human-emperor statement into Japan’s religious
reformation.
In those days Nambara said continually that the greatest
cause that had driven Japan to war was the fact that the
Japanese people as a whole were not yet independent
spiritually. That was the reason Japan had followed
mistaken leaders blindly. What had to happen first of all
now was that each and every Japanese become
independent spiritually. In the history of Europe, the
Renaissance and the Reformation had made people
independent spiritually. But modern Japan had
experienced no comparable development. To rebuild Japan
after the defeat, Japan too needed those two elements, and
the emperor’s human-emperor statement would serve as
that religious reformation.
During the war virtually all Japanese had venerated the
emperor as a living god and offered up to him everything,
even their lives. It was as if the people had all become
fanatic emperor-worshippers. With the end of the war,
fanaticism departed, and free speech blossomed. “Human-
emperor proclamation” equals “Japan’s Reformation”: this
analysis made even former believers in emperor worship
think, “Indeed, that is true.”
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The Asahi carried Nambara’s speech under banner
headlines:
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RISE UP, TO ESTABLISH HUMAN NATURE
STATUS QUO MEANS NATIONAL DOOM
After the Manchurian Incident, the militarists and state-
supremacists gained political control…the China War
occurred, the Pacific War was begun, and events led in the end
to today's catastrophe and collapse. Things got to this point
not only because of the distortions brought on by a few, but
also because of the people's profound internal shortcomings.
… The development of independent human nature, the
establishment of a consciousness of being human had not
taken place, so the Japanese people were fooled by the false
propaganda of the few and came to follow their lead blindly.
Seen in this context, the imperial declaration at the
beginning of this year has very great historical significance.
The emperor himself denied that he was a “living deity.”…
In the European Renaissance, religious reformation was
carried out; in the same way, Japan too must have religious
reformation. In Japan since the Meiji Restoration freedom of
religion has been guaranteed, but it is merely a form and not
integrated into the lives of the people. In Japan everything
collapsed with the defeat. Given this situation, what will
enable Japan to rise from the ashes? We have no alternative
but to create a new history.
Japanese history lies in the creation henceforth of a history;
it must involve a Shōwa Restoration in the true sense, a
revolution in the Japanese spirit itself. This is…an intellectual
religious reform of the people's essence.
If the Japanese people remain in this state of stupefaction
and exhaustion, what awaits us is the misery of slaves and
finally the doom of the nation. … Life or death? Eternal shame
or the recovery of freedom and independence? We stand now
at that crossroads. Which we choose is up to you.
387 | university of massachusetts amherst libraries
To this point, I’ve based myself on the articles in the Asahi
in order to see things as ordinary people of the time saw
them; but reading the original text, I learned that the
speech spoke of far greater things. Nambara gave this
speech with enormous fervor. He was keenly aware that
this was an Empire Day speech coming right after the
emperor’s proclamation that he was not a god. Formerly
in all Japan’s schools, from primary schools to universities,
Empire Day was celebrated with splendor. But this was
right after the human-emperor proclamation, and in 1946
virtually all schools canceled the celebration.
However, Nambara, who had only just become
president, celebrated Empire Day with fanfare: “At Tōdai,
too—at the time, it was still Tokyo Imperial
University—most people figured not to celebrate. But I said
the opposite. Our country’s first-ever defeat, the first
Empire Day thereafter—celebrate the national rite, but
give it a new meaning. I wanted to use it to proclaim within
and without the attitude of the university: what should the
university do? I proposed to the deans that we hold the
ceremony, and we agreed to do so. On that day we
celebrated the holiday boldly, in a big way: Hinomaru flags
fluttered at the Main Gate. Students packed Yasuda
Auditorium.”
In Nambara’s own words, here is what he said:
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I gave that speech the title ‘Creating a New Japanese Culture’
and called for the return of the nation's self-esteem, its
confidence. The historical issue—“Is it in fact the
2600-something-eth birthday?”—should await scholarly,
empirical analysis, but we shouldn't deny meaning to the
nation's myths, its traditions. The Japanese nation's
consciousness of a divine destiny and belief in the continuity
of the nation—what we might call the people's
individuality—should not be lost. A nation that loses its
individuality will die. At the same time, the psychological
shortcomings of the Japanese nation up till now—that each
person lacked the human consciousness of being an
independent person, the absence of a human ideal—led to
a unique concept of the kokutai and blind obedience to the
few and became the great fundamental cause of the current
war and the defeat. This situation calls for deep reflection.
The fact that feudal spirit and system still exist in our country
and society is the best evidence. Now is the hour Japanese
should carry out a Renaissance and then a Reformation. The
construction of a new Japan based on world universals, not
nationalism in the narrow sense, the people shaping itself as a
people and simultaneously as world citizens: shouldn't today
be Year One, when we set out on that course? That was the
intent with which I wanted to celebrate Empire Day, a sense
different from what had gone before. 6
Citing the original text but putting it in the simplest
possible terms, this is what Nambara said: Up till now, the
militarists and ultra-statists who controlled Japanese
politics had used Empire Day to take Japan’s national
6 Kaikoroku.
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myths and “misuse them, twist them, boast of the people’s
superiority, and propagandize that Japan has a destiny to
rule East Asia and indeed the world.” The slogan of the
Greater East Asian War—“the whole world under one
roof”—meant the construction of a world empire, that is, a
greater Japanese empire with the emperor at its apex. That
was “nothing else but a dogmatic chosen-people concept,
a vast delusion.” That mythical consciousness of the world
led to the war, led Japan to catastrophe. The era of
celebrating that sort of mythical Empire Day was over.
The emperor’s “human-emperor” proclamation at the
beginning of that year was “the emperor’s own liberation
from that sort of Japanese theology and from Shinto
upbringing, a declaration of human independence.” At the
same time, it was the liberation of the Japanese and
Japanese culture. Liberation from what? In terms of the
past, it was “liberation from Japanese theology;” in terms of
the future, it might also be called “liberation toward a new
‘universality.’” Why? Till now Japanese culture has been
shackled by something “national/religious,” but Japanese
culture has escaped and gained the foundation that will
allow it to become from now on a universal culture
understood broadly throughout the world. “The human-
emperor proclamation has provided the basis whereby the
people can simultaneously be a people and shape
themselves as world citizens.”
If you rethink Empire Day from this viewpoint, it should
no longer be a day to celebrate 2000-some years since the
mythical founding, but a day to celebrate the new birth of
a reborn Japan that has discarded that past. Today is Year
One of the reconstruction of the homeland. Our country’s
history is not in the past but in the future. Japanese history
will be built from now on. We have just begun the “‘birth of
tokyo university and the war | 390
a country,’ united and new.” The road to this reconstruction
of the homeland must be built atop a “revolution in the
Japanese spirit itself, the creation of a new national spirit.”
So we need to leave “the world of the Japanese spirit” in
the national and religious frame it has occupied till now
and enter the “world of universal human world religion.”
To that end, we must start a “spiritual revolution—internal,
intellectual, religious.” By passing through this spiritual
revolution, we must make it possible for “lives once
considered lighter than a feather and offered up to the
state” to “contribute through the homeland to world
humanity.” Via “the creation of a new Japanese culture and
the building of Japan as moral state,” Japan can contribute
to world culture and peace. Therein lies our nation’s
awakening and new life. “Our nation has committed
crimes,” but when we’ve reached that point, “it will be able
to recover its honor before the world.” “We become able to
rejoice at being born into this nation and to love this nation
boundlessly.”
Nambara concluded the speech this way: “If we remain
in this condition of stupefaction and exhaustion, what
awaits us is the misery of slaves and finally the doom of
the nation. If, on the contrary, you students come to your
senses and confront this situation with hope and self-
confidence, you’ll witness within your lifetimes the rise of
a people unembarrassed before the world. … Life or death?
Eternal shame or the recovery of freedom and
independence? We stand now at that crossroads. Which we
choose is up to your own free decision.”
This speech evoked a huge response. In Nambara
Recollected, there is this exchange:
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Fukuda: There was a large response, wasn't there?
Nambara: The press made it a lead item. It dominated the
metropolitan news pages—probably the first time in Japan
that a university president's speech got that sort of coverage.
All things considered, Japan as a whole back then was in a
state of utter chaos, so I think perhaps we can say it looked
to my speech for direction. I got a lot of mail in
response—sympathetic and encouraging letters.
The Spiritual Underpinning Nambara’s Speech Provided
The students who heard this speech as it was given were
greatly moved. Kubota Kinuko, Nambara’s last disciple,
reports she was unable to hear the speech that day herself
but asked about it from a disciple who did. It changed her
life:7 “Excuse my talking of personal matters, but my family
was huddled together—mother and children alone, with
no means of support. The defeat and the social chaos that
accompanied it were particularly tough. How to survive?
The suffering of daily life was one thing, but even more
than that, concern about the future weighed heavily, and
we continued to suffer—alternately despairing and
impatient. The long cold winter passed, and Empire Day
came round. At the time my younger brother was a student
in the Faculty of Medicine and came home from the
university ceremony. … His face alight with excitement, he
told me about the president’s speech that day. This was the
great speech known later as Nambara’s Empire Day speech,
“Creating A New Japanese Culture.” I was able to read it
in the newspaper soon after, and I, who was tormented by
7 Newsletter accompanying the Collected Works.
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all the uncertainty, found in it for the first time hope and
something to live for. How many times since then have I
reread that speech! My future and the reconstruction of
the people: they lay, I was told, in my own hands, and I
swore to the early spring sky that no matter how tough
things were, I’d make it through cheerfully.” She writes that
the people who listened to Nambara’s speech with these
emotions became the true motive force of Japan’s recovery:
“At the time, the Japanese were living an animal existence,
in utter confusion, having been plunged into a state of
exhaustion by the shock of defeat. In this speech Nambara
preached in fiery words of a new national spirit—a spiritual
revolution, internal, intellectual-religious. ‘Life or death?
Eternal shame or the recovery of freedom and
independence? We stand now at that crossroads. Which we
choose is up to you.’ So many people took encouragement
from those words, recovered strength and hope to live,
regained self-confidence as a nation! In a sense, it’s no
exaggeration to say that they became the motive force that
brought about today’s Japanese economic development.” In
Japan right after the war, this speech had the same effect as
Fichte’s “Addresses to the German Nation,” which in 1807
called on the German people to have pride and rebuild a
state that had been utterly and totally demolished by
Napoleon’s armies, forced to cede territory, and was in the
depths of destruction.
The speech at the ceremony of the emperor’s birthday on
April 29 evoked a similarly strong reaction. The next day’s
Asahi headlined it:
HE BEARS MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
DISTRESS OF EMPEROR SURMISED
It gave the following report on its content. Although it’s
clear that the emperor bears no legal or political
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responsibility, the emperor does bear moral responsibility.
He bears responsibility toward his ancestors—the
successive emperors before him—and toward the people.
But at the same time Nambara speculated that it is the
emperor himself who feels the responsibility most acutely
of all and on some future day, of his own volition, he will
accept that responsibility and abdicate: “It’s clear that in
this recent war the emperor bears no responsibility
politically and legally, but I suspect that the emperor feels
moral and spiritual responsibility most strongly toward his
ancestors and toward the people for the fact that such an
enormous war arose in his reign and plunged the people
into the terrible situation of total defeat, the first ever in
Japanese history. His ministers do not recognize
ministerial integrity and do not accept their responsibility,
but the fact that alone among them, the emperor has his
own consciousness of responsibility is an expression of the
country’s supreme morality and the reason we venerate the
imperial house as the heart of the people; from now on
the spiritual cornerstone in rebuilding the homeland rests
solely on this. He himself is fully aware of this, will bear
up quietly under the difficulties, and I conjecture that as
he leads this chaotic age of historic change toward
constitutional revision and beyond, if possible, to the
conclusion of a peace treaty, he will fulfill his own solemn duty.
The emperor’s spirit leaves me in tears.” 8
The Emperor’s Moral and Spiritual Responsibility
Nambara didn’t speak in a straightforward manner, so
his point may be difficult to grasp. But if you read this
speech with the emphases I’ve added, the emperor already
8 Asahi, April 30; emphases added.
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feels his moral responsibility in full, and that intense sense
of responsibility becomes the spiritual cornerstone of
Japan’s reconstruction. Moreover, in order to make that
responsibility clear, he will undoubtedly abdicate when the
peace treaty is signed or at some other occasion. Because
Nambara surmises this, his tears come unbidden. This is
what Nambara was saying.
The expression was roundabout, so even though this was
what he wrote, some may doubt whether that is its true
meaning. But that Nambara argued openly for the
abdication of the emperor was a fact well known to the
people around him. For example, there is this passage in
the autobiography of Abe Yoshishige, who at the time was
close to Nambara. Abe too thought that the emperor should
abdicate: “The emperor had issued the declaration of war
and ordered the people to fight even at the cost of their
lives; now, when everyone rejects the supposed meaning of
this war, there is no way he can escape that responsibility.
… Fortunately, the imperial house survived, but this has
been from first to last the thought I cannot banish from my
mind: in terms of the true relation between sovereign and
subjects, the emperor should abdicate.” For this reason, Abe
even went to the home of Senior Councilor Makino
Nobuaki to ask him to appeal to the emperor to abdicate.
In setting this episode down, he mentions that Nambara
was of the same mind: “Nambara Shigeru set out clearly
the argument in favor of abdication and talked to me, too.
Thus, quite recently, when there was a proposal for
Nambara to give a lecture in the emperor’s presence,
Nambara said he wanted to talk with the emperor one-on-
one; this was probably because he wanted to make that
argument to the emperor. Whether this idea of Nambara’s
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reached the emperor’s ear or not, talk of his giving a lecture
in the emperor’s presence came to an end.”
It does appear that it was Nambara’s intent to
recommend abdication to the emperor in person. In fact,
we don’t even need Abe’s account: Nambara stated clearly
that he thought the emperor should abdicate. He explained
first his reasons for going out of his way at Tōdai to
commemorate the emperor’s birthday:9 “Of course, even
then, too, the thought existed—as one university’s way of
handling the issue—of not commemorating the emperor’s
birthday. But I took it upon myself to hold the ceremony.
The motive was, first of all, to express the people’s esteem
for the emperor for his human-emperor declaration, to
offer heartfelt birthday congratulations. No emperor has
ever had to bear as tragic a fate as his highness, this
emperor. Soon after he was enthroned, the Manchurian
Incident broke out, and from then on came a succession
of wars. The young emperor had to bear both the May 15
Incident and the February 26 Incident. Then came the
Pacific War and defeat. During that time, from first to last,
he was at the center; indeed, he saved Japan from scorched
earth and ashes. That I thought merited sincere
congratulations from us as a university on the emperor’s
birthday. That sense is half, the first half, of the lecture I
gave on the emperor’s birthday.”
The other half, he said, lay in discussing how to think
about the emperor’s moral responsibility. That was because
of the reality that the Tokyo trial was finally nearing its
end.10 At the Tokyo trial, those sitting in the dock were the
9 Kaikoroku.
10 RHM: This is Tachibana's error. The Tokyo trial had only just begun; it delivered its
verdicts in late 1948.
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high officials who, under the Meiji Constitution, had the
“duty to advise.” They “advised” in order that the emperor
not bear legal responsibility. In all matters, they kept the
emperor from making subjective decisions but in his stead
made the actual decisions and advised him on the formal
decisions to hand down. In other words, they were the
people who were assigned to bear responsibility in lieu of
the emperor. The trial’s decision would be handed down
in short order. It would probably be one death sentence
after another. The question was how the emperor should
respond:
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As for the other half, the Tokyo military tribunal was about
to start. I wanted to state here, for myself, that legally and
politically the emperor bore no responsibility at all for the
war. I said here that the emperor had conducted himself
throughout wholly in accord with the constitution. And I
stated how much as an individual he had loved peace. … But
at the same time I surmised that the emperor himself felt
moral and spiritual responsibility. That was his statement at
the time of accepting the Potsdam Declaration: “No matter
what happens to me….” This was gut instinct on my part. With
that clue, it was not difficult to surmise that, to that extent,
the emperor—newly declared a human emperor—felt great
responsibility. Moreover, the fundamental cornerstone of
Japan's reconstruction undoubtedly rested on moral
responsibility, on the moral issue. That cornerstone needed
the emperor himself to set aright the relation between
sovereign and subjects.
In the final analysis, this was a problem for the emperor
himself to decide, but as a practical matter, I spoke of wanting
the cabinet ministers in particular to consider it in the near
future as a major point of integrity. This was the second half
of my intent in holding the commemoration of the emperor's
birthday.
The last part of this speech runs as follows: “At the same
time, we hope that at this historical turning point, in the
midst of tempestuous change and chaos, the emperor will
provide the foundation for the monumental task and, as
focal point of the nation’s moral and spiritual life, make
clear the emperor’s righteousness. In this way, I hope, the
spiritual bonds of the nation’s morality that have been
severed will be joined and this void in our brilliant history
filled. And having passed, it is true, through this great
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darkness, the emperor’s reign will become verily an age
when the daybreak of Shōwa turns into the full light of
day.” Here is the sense that at some future time the
emperor should abdicate (make clear the emperor’s
righteousness) and restore the trust between people and
emperor. If that didn’t happen, Nambara was saying,
wouldn’t the spiritual bonds between people and emperor
remain severed? If that didn’t happen, wouldn’t that
remain as a large, unfillable void in history?
This passage is very circuitous and difficult to
understand, but in Nambara Recollected, Nambara speaks of
the emperor’s war responsibility in very straightforward
language: “This speech was also my critique of what the
then conservative faction was saying: ‘one hundred million
souls repenting.’ At a time when the whole country is at
war, there’s no one without responsibility, even we who
have positions in the university, and the people—of all
classes. But even so, ‘one hundred million souls repenting’
is an evasion of responsibility: it means that no one takes
responsibility. In responsibility there is naturally a
hierarchy. Naturally, there is responsibility morally/
spiritually for primary school teachers as teachers,
university professors as professors, and especially the
emperor who represented the country. The emperor
himself actually said, ‘No matter what happens to me…’
I think this issue is one of very great significance. Isn’t
it an issue that still remains today? Above all, millions of
soldiers died in the emperor’s name. That is a problem. In
addition, one more point: in postwar Japan the concept of
political responsibility became very attenuated. This point,
too, merits thinking about. The issue of the source of
morality remains today as before. We must show that as
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Takagi says, ‘Power does not trump morality.’ Isn’t this
something all people of conscience agree on?”
The War-Ending Effort of the Tōdai Seven
In fact, this issue of the emperor’s abdication had already
been considered just before the war ended in the efforts
to end the war of seven Tōdai professors, among them
Nambara. The line that appears at the end of Nambara’s
statement—“As Takagi says, ‘Power does not trump
morality’”—is an expression stemming from that effort.
(Takagi was a central figure in the war-ending
machinations.)
Fukuda: At the time you seven professors were working to end
the war, had you already considered the abdication of the
emperor?
Nambara: Yes. We thought of it as the final step and
mentioned it to Privy Seal Kido. But in the last analysis this
was a matter for the inner circle, those close to the emperor,
the cabinet of the time. Because, after all, the emperor awaits
advice and proposals, and such a huge issue must be
announced as the emperor's own initiative.
Fukuda: I've also asked Takagi about this, and he says,
“Power does not trump morality—we want to have the only
source [of morality] demonstrated in this way; that is our
hope.” Was that an idea you held in common?
Nambara: That's something we'd long agreed on. Even
today, I think that feeling probably still lurks in each of our
hearts. It's an issue for future historians: which course would
have been better? I do think it's important for Japan's long-
term future.
As Nambara says, this issue remains today. The issue of
the war responsibility of the Japanese nation still hasn’t
tokyo university and the war | 400
been addressed. That’s why visits to Yasukuni Shrine by
Japanese prime ministers continue to be the most sensitive
problem in Japan’s relations with China and Korea.
Let’s leave talk of the war-ending effort for later, and
return to our story. The last line of “Advice to
Decommissioned Students,” which I quoted earlier, applies
to the student-soldiers. As we can see from that line, the
call-up of the students was Nambara’s single most bitter
memory. Accordingly, soon after becoming president,
Nambara himself presided over a “Ceremony for the Souls
of Those Who Died in the War or at Their Posts” (March 30,
1946). In his declaration at that ceremony, Nambara spoke
as follows:
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And yet at the outbreak of the war that followed on the long
war between China and Japan and finally sealed the nation's
doom, the atmosphere on this campus—despite the victories
in the opening phases—was grave rather than light, and you
were not stirred up. The children “piped to you, and you did
not dance.”11 … Because particularly those specializing in the
study of philosophy, politics, law, and economics knew too
well from the start how absurd and reckless it was. You simply
attended quietly to your own realm, your duties as students,
and that's what we teachers had advocated, taught you to do.
However, once your student deferment ended and you
were called up and, summoned to fight, you exchanged the
pen for the sword and set out solemnly on that brave path.
At that point, not one of all the students sought to evade his
duty as subject by refusing to offer his life, as did happen in
other countries. You all obeyed loyally the will and order of
the state. Were we who had long argued in favor of that
course right or wrong in doing so? I don't know.
But you were different from ordinary soldiers who knew
nothing. You were simultaneously soldiers and students. You
didn't fight aimlessly or with arbitrary and fanatical “absolute
faith in victory.”12 Although you were at odds, of course, with
the determination that the war, once decided on, “had to be
won,” you prayed above all for the victory of right and truth.
However, right and truth unfortunately were not on our side,
but instead on the side of England and the United States. It
was not simply that “might makes right;” it was the clear
“verdict of reason” in world history, and we had to receive that
pronouncement grimly amid the intense grief of defeat. …
When I think back, some of you came in great haste to
take your leave, saying you were off for the battlefield: that
was our final parting. How many times we have wept over
the letters you sent us, composed so earnestly at the front!
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… Occasionally we couldn't resist the impulse to call out your
names and plead your case to heaven and earth.
But in this war, such was the sacrifice our people had to
pay—sacrifice to atone for our nation's guilt. In place of your
fellow-countrymen, you stepped forward to pay it and went
with a smile to the land of the dead. It's as if you are speaking
to us. “Now is not the time to begrudge anyone or blame
anyone. Let the entire university, the entire nation unite and
set about the task of rebuilding the homeland. This is our
eternal, earnest prayer.” Yes, we must construct the homeland
anew atop your noble sacrifice. We must not let the homeland
die.
In short, the war was the national crime the Japanese
people committed, and the dead student-soldiers can only
be thought of as a sacrifice to atone for that crime.
The Great Tokyo Air Raid: Turning Point
I want to quote one more speech, the much later “You
Who Inherit the Legacy of the Students Who Died in the
War” (1963), at the ceremony commemorating the
twentieth anniversary of the call-up of the students. That’s
because there Nambara went into greater detail about the
line in his memorial speech, “Mourning the Students Who
Died in the War:” “Were we who had long argued in favor
of that course right or wrong in doing so? I don’t know.” He
stated: “But the doubts and apprehensions about the war
of most earnest students I knew were already serious even
11 RHM: Matthew 11:17. The topic is the unfriendly reception of John the Baptist, and Jesus
says (RSV): “He who has ears to hear, let him hear. But to what shall I compare this
generation? It is like children sitting in the market places and calling to their playmates,
‘We piped to you, and you did not dance; we wailed, and you did not mourn.’”
12 RHM: “Absolute faith in victory” was a wartime slogan. Nambara seems here to speak of
the Pacific War as primarily against England and the U.S., thus eliding Japan's China war.
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before the beginning of the Pacific War, from the time the
Axis Alliance was signed [September 1940]. At that stage,
as they awaited the time when they would all lay down
their pens and take the field, how could we respond to their
doubts and apprehensions about the war? How could we
counsel them?
“For us professors, that was the most bitter, most
difficult task in the whole war. I couldn’t say to them, ‘Act
according to your own consciences even if that means
refusing to obey the state;’ no, I didn’t say it. Had I said
that, I should first have stood up myself and criticized the
country’s war policy. On reflection, it may be that I myself,
out of cowardice, lacked bravery; but on the other hand,
down to the present I’m still uncertain that that was the
right attitude to take.”
Nambara was not a man of action, and particularly after
becoming a university man, he instinctively avoided
actions that had political coloration. Even when he
concerned himself with the unrest in the Faculty of
Economics, it never became public. After the Faculty of
Economics unrest, when Tanaka, Dean of the Faculty of
Law, took responsibility and resigned, many voices called
for Nambara to be his successor, but Nambara held firm
and did not yield. To stay in the ivory tower and continue
his research: that was Nambara’s personal wish.
These were his thoughts when he had to see off the
students who were being called up, and they led to the
reflection that “I was a coward and lacked courage.” On
March 9, 1945, succumbing to the thought that from now
on he ought to take a bit more action, he became Dean of
the Faculty of Law. And he embarked at the same time on
the surprisingly bold action of an effort to end the war.
Of course, had the war-ending effort been exposed at the
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time, it meant the danger certainly of arrest and possibly of
death. Yet fully aware of that danger, he undertook a plot.
There was one more element in the background when he
embarked on this bold act:13
The war was only getting fiercer. Then came March 9, and
now the exceptional time was at hand: I must undertake some
slight service. I think it's okay to say that was my mindset in
accepting the deanship. At the time, my thought was how
to stop the war. At least as the Tōdai Faculty of Law and in
our capacity as professors, wasn't there something we could
do, even in secret? I told no one, but I made that resolve and
accepted the deanship.
But it happened that the next day—March 10—was the
morning of the unprecedented great air raid. Virtually all
traffic stopped; trains were moving, barely, on only one of the
Tokyo lines. I got to the university, going as far as Ueno by
streetcar. On the way home, I walked as far as Mejiro. The
whole stretch from Hongo to Koishikawa was a burned-out
wasteland. The smell of gunpowder was still strong, and
corpses lay on the roadside, covered merely with straw mats.
… That air raid deepened my conviction, my deep emotion:
wasn't there something I—dean of the Faculty of Law—and
the Tōdai Faculty of Law could do, even if not in an official
capacity?
13 Kaikoroku.
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15
The Emperor Learns of The
War-Termination
Maneuvers of the Tōdai
Seven
In which the author tells of Nambara’s conspiracy with Takagi
Yasaka and others to bring about an early end to the war. He
discusses Takagi’s career as a pioneer in American studies, his
connection with Privy Seal Kido, and his attempt before Pearl
Harbor to forestall war with the U. S. What the professors
recommended in 1945 proved far more realistic than actual
government policy, and although Nambara concluded that their
efforts had been fruitless, the author argues that these efforts did
come to the emperor’s attention and hence had an effect. He
concludes—this is his final chapter, followed only by an
epilogue—with reflections on history as “double weave.”
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Nambara and Takagi
The book Verbatim: Recollections of Nambara Shigeru has
this to say about the war-termination maneuvers of the
seven Tōdai professors, of whom Nambara was one.
Nambara is speaking: “This maneuvering to terminate the
war we Law Faculty colleagues did completely on our
own…. Takagi, Tanaka, Suenobu Sanji, Wagatsuma Sakae,
Oka Yoshitake, Suzuki Takeo, and I. It required, of course,
extreme secrecy, so it had to be underground. It took plenty
of awareness and resolve on that point and careful
planning, so these acts would be buried forever. We
couldn’t leave records. We agreed among ourselves that it
would be covered up forever, that we’d act as if it hadn’t
happened.
“Among them, Takagi was my closest confidant, the most
important person. Takagi was a specialist in American
studies, and as a classmate of Kido Kōichi1 at Gakushūin,
Takagi was close to him, and like me he grieved at the
progress of the war; he had influence and was a kindred
soul. At first the two of us drew up the skeleton of the
idea and gradually expanded our numbers until there were
seven of us.” The seven gathered secretly in the Reception
Room on the second floor of the main library, pooled
reports and analyzed them, and discussed the officials they
should contact and who should do the contacting. The
central actors were Nambara and Takagi.
Takagi was born the second son of Kanda Naibu, Japan’s
most famous English-language educator. Kanda was a
baron, the first student sent to study in the U.S., who
1 RHM: Throughout the war, Kido was Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, closest advisor to
the emperor. Sentenced to life imprisonment at the Tokyo Trial in 1948, Kido was
released for health reasons in 1953.
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accompanied the Iwakura Mission in 1871 and stayed for
eight years. After returning to Japan, he was a professor
of English at Tōdai, Tokyo Higher Commercial, and
Gakushūin. Takagi studied at Gakushūin since middle
school and was a close friend of Kido Kōichi, later Privy
Seal. Takagi graduated from the Political Science division
of the Faculty of Law of Tokyo Imperial University, then
entered the Finance Ministry, serving for a time in the
banks division, then became an assistant professor in the
Faculty of Law. He studied abroad at Harvard, where he
earned his M.A. He had many acquaintances among
important government figures in Japan and the U.S.
Takagi appeared at the Tokyo trial as special counsel for
Kido. At that time he presented a sworn affidavit to the
court, and in it he wrote as follows: “5. Marquis Kido is a
lifelong friend. In 1871 his father and my father went to the
U.S. accompanying Mori Arinori. … He too has been greatly
influenced in his fundamentals by English and American
culture; in general, he leans to English and American
thought, so basically he is liberal… Beginning when Kido
was Minister of Education,2 I had countless consultations
on university issues and later as international relations
became more important, with the idea that it was one of
my duties to tell Kido what I thought based on my research
on the U. S. Every time we met in time of crisis, I advised
earnestly and spoke my opinion particularly on policy
toward the U.S. And after Kido became Privy Seal, I
continued to do so diligently.”
The Push into the Dutch East Indies Invited U.S.
Involvement in the War
2 TT: Kido was Minister of Education October 1937-May 1938, at the time of the
Yanaihara resignation, the Popular Front Incident, the arrest of Ōuchi.
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Takagi’s actions are substantiated by the Kido Diary and
the Documents Relating to Kido Kōichi presented as evidence
to the court. For example, in the Documents there is a long
position paper Takagi delivered to Kido’s home with an
attached memo, “The Hour is Already Late.” The date is
October 1941, two months prior to the opening of hostilities
between Japan and the U.S. “In this time of crisis I wish to
draw your attention in particular to two points. First, the
idea that if we seize the Dutch East Indies swiftly, England
and the U.S. will not embark on the road to armed
opposition is mistaken. This opinion is the basis for those
currently advocating an advance south and a hard line
toward the U.S., but if you sum up the reports from many
U.S. magazines and the like that I have recently got hold
of, the attitude of England and the U.S., especially after
the Atlantic Conference, is to abandon the policy of
appeasement and press on instead to a policy first of
economic war and then if necessary of armed conflict: on
this point there can be virtually no doubt. Concerning the
recent experience when the occupation of French
Indochina gave rise to so great a collision and to resistance, that
experience should serve as a good and significant lesson
at decision time in this critical moment…” [emphasis
Tachibana].
At the time, relations between Japan and the U. S. were
touch-and-go. When the Second World War began in
Europe in September 1939, the German Blitzkrieg swept
over Europe. France surrendered barely nine months after
the opening of hostilities. Japan proclaimed its non-
involvement in the European war; but when France
surrendered (June 1940), Japan used its advantageous
position (the alliance between Japan and Germany) to seize
control of Asia and immediately embarked on military
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occupation of French Indochina (September 1940). So long
as that involved only northern Indochina, the U.S. merely
protested forcefully; but when in June 1941 the occupation
spread to Southern Indochina, the U.S. considered it
contrary to international law and retaliated by freezing
Japanese assets in the U.S. It prohibited all oil exports.
England and Holland followed suit. The underlined portion
of Takagi’s memorandum—to so great a collision and to
resistance—points to these retaliatory measures. England,
the U.S., and Holland controlled virtually all the world’s
oil resources, and their ban on shipments to Japan meant
that Japan had only enough oil for one or two years. In the
face of the oil embargo, there arose in Japan the strong
contention that Japan should occupy the Dutch East Indies
and seize the oil. The judgment: if Japan acted with
lightning speed, England and the U.S. would not intervene.
Takagi’s memorandum argued that this point of view
was utterly mistaken, that it was inevitable that as soon as
Japan intervened in the Dutch East Indies, England and
the U.S. would go to war. That year U.S.-Japan relations
were troubled, and Takagi met time and again with Kido
and suggested policy toward the U.S. According to the Kido
Diary, Takagi met with Kido right before the opening of
hostilities four times. This was only one small part of
Takagi’s efforts to avoid the outbreak of war; during this
time Takagi worked for the easing of tension between
Japan and the U.S. not merely with Kido, but also with
Prime Minister Konoe, U.S. Ambassador Grew, Japanese
Ambassador to the U. S. Nomura Kichisaburō, and others.
His sworn affidavit contains the following:
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6. In late January 1941, at the time Ambassador Nomura
departed [for Washington], I presented my views on U.S.-
Japan relations to him, as I always tried to do at such a time…
I met with Kido and stated my views. Kido showed strong
sympathy. Later, I actually met more frequently with Konoe
than with Kido, and although my abilities were limited, as
one scholar I did everything I could to improve U.S.-Japan
relations.
In late May, in view of the international crisis that at the
time added to the tension…I advised Kido in particular. …
In August that same year, at the time of the sending of
the Konoe message, I too took part in planning the Konoe
proposal. Down to the present, I have been unable to shed my
regret that at the time we were unable, via the statesmanship
we attempted, to find a way out. Both before and after, I met
a number of times with Ambassador Grew, exerted my
unworthy efforts as a scholar for U.S.-Japan understanding,
and based on my opinion that was undergirded by those
contacts, I presented my sense of things to Kido.
The “Konoe message” of August was the proposal that
Japan and the U.S. hold a summit conference: regretting
the fact that U.S.-Japan relations were getting steadily
worse, and letting bygones be bygones, Prime Minister
Konoe and President Roosevelt would meet face-to-face
somewhere in the Pacific and try to solve at one go all
outstanding issues between Japan and the U.S. This Konoe
message moved President Roosevelt temporarily—“The
president praised Konoe’s message as ‘absolutely splendid’
and said he’d like to meet with Konoe for about three days.
Konoe says, ‘That moment was the closest Japan and the
U.S. came.’” That’s how important the Konoe message was.
And Takagi was among those who drafted it.
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Izawa Takio, elder statesman among Home Ministry
officials, was charged—should the meeting take
place—with boiling down the agenda for the two men; he
said, “The bottom line was that Roosevelt would have to
betray America 40% and Konoe would have to betray Japan
60%.” Izawa said to Konoe, “If you do this, it’s a foregone
conclusion you’ll be murdered.” Konoe replied, “It will be
worth it.” Which shows how anxious he was to proceed. 3
But the talks never happened.
In actual fact, it was only for a very brief moment, on
the occasion of this Konoe message, that Japan and the U.S.
showed an inclination toward rapprochement. Beginning
immediately thereafter, the hawks seized control of
national policy in both Japan and the U.S., and the situation
worsened, snowballing downhill toward the opening of
hostilities between Japan and the U.S. at year’s end.
Takagi was meeting frequently with Kido when this
Konoe message was sent. In the Kido Diary for this period,
there is a memo that is likely Kido’s recording of his own
thoughts. Reading it, we understand well what Kido was
thinking at the stage when it was touch-and-go whether
war between Japan and the U. S. could be avoided. We can
see that Kido took fully into account Takagi’s
proposals—his judgment of the tension between Japan and
the U.S. and the absolute need to avoid war:
• Oil: the Navy says it has oil for two years—a year and a
half if war breaks out. The Army says about one year.
• So to state the conclusion first, if the above is true, we
3 Yabe Teiji, Konoe Fumimaro (Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshinsha, 1952).
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have to say we are utterly unable to fight a must-win war
against the U.S.
• If we look for nearby sources of oil other than the U.S.
and Great Britain, there are only the Dutch East Indies
and Southern Sakhalin….
• If we invade the Dutch East Indies, the U.S. will enter
the war. If that is the case, even if we procure oil, its
importation over long distances under threat of British
and American submarines and carrier planes is very
dangerous, and it is exceedingly doubtful we can
achieve the anticipated result.
• If we miscalculate, it will be an alarming disaster, and
solely on the issue of oil, Japan will have no alternative
but to surrender.
• Turning to current conditions, to speak bluntly, our
national strength is weak, so we can’t have our way; the
surface conditions are different, but I can’t help
thinking that there’s no alternative to the resolve Japan
showed at the time of the Triple Intervention after the
Sino-Japanese War (1895).4
• That is, we aim for ten years from now and resolve to
persevere and be determined.
We should exert all efforts to do the following:
• adjust relations between Japan and the U.S. for the
4 RHM: As a result of its victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War, Japan achieved a
privileged position in Shandong, only to have Russia, France, and Germany intervene
and force Japan to disgorge the fruits of its conquest. Japan resolved not to take
immediate action, and within a few years, the “scramble for concessions” began, with
Germany establishing a position in Shandong similar to that Japan had been forced
to renounce.
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present in order to secure the necessary material
resources;
• domestically, make the advance South our ultimate goal,
and allow ourselves about ten years for the achievement
of this objective;
• build up heavy industry and the machine-tool industry;
• build up the artificial oil industry rapidly;
• expand distant sea lanes and shipping greatly; and so
on.
In short, there’s no alternative but determination and
perseverance (expanding national power in the meantime).
It’s all too clear to us today, knowing what really happened
in that war, all the way to horrific defeat, that at the time
this was the only correct policy choice. But at the time,
people thinking this coolly were in the minority; unable
to restrain the military and pulled along by an overly rosy
estimate of the situation, the majority rushed into war.
Opposition to Mediation by the Soviet Union
As I’ve said, the maneuvering to terminate the war was
carried out in total secrecy. It came to light at the Tokyo
trial. The defense presented evidence (Kido’s affidavit, the
Kido Diary, Takagi’s affidavit, etc.) to prove that Kido was
not a central promoter of war but until the very last had
searched for possible ways to peace, and that evidence
brought to light the fact that such maneuvering had taken
place. For example, in Takagi’s affidavit, there is the
following: “7. In May 1945, I consulted with Konoe and
several other political figures about terminating the war,
and after considering carefully what I’d learned, I paid a
visit to Kido on June 1 to present a peace proposal. There
was no difference between the marquis and me on the
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policy to pursue. I could see his determination clearly. He
thought that ‘a purge of the Army equals peace’….
“On July 31 I talked with Konoe at Karuizawa about the
urgent need to decide the official response to the Potsdam
Proclamation.5 I stressed acceptance of the Proclamation;
in turn, the prince suggested that I meet Kido and state the
same opinion.
“On August 3 I met with Kido and stated that we should
of course press on with a peace policy that took the U.S. as
opposite number.”
At the very end of the war, some Foreign Ministry and
Army officials who had begun to grope blindly for peace
planned to ask the Soviet Union to act as mediator. Their
plans got as far as opening talks at the ambassadorial level
and planning to send an emissary (Konoe) to Moscow. But
the Tōdai professors condemned the idea strongly. In
Nambara Shigeru Recollected, there’s this passage:
5 RHM: Meeting outside Berlin, the British, U.S., and Chinese leaders (the Soviet Union
was not at war with Japan) had issued the Potsdam Proclamation on July 26.
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Maruyama: What did you recommend?
Nambara: First, the timing of the termination of the war.
We were active from the end of March 1945 into April and
May [TT: actually, until August], and we thought the German
collapse would come in May. We thought that the German
surrender likely presented the best opportunity for a Japanese
peace proposal. At the latest, before the Americans landed on
Okinawa—we were agreed on that.
Second, how to make the war-termination contact with the
Allies. We thought it best to deal directly with the U.S. If that
proved absolutely impossible, Switzerland or some other
country would be okay, but make an offer to the U.S. through
a third party. To say it the other way round, avoid the Soviet
Union. We judged that it wouldn't do to complicate matters.
We discussed this thoroughly with Foreign Minister Tōgō, and
we had such a warm conversation that Tōgō himself asked if
we wouldn't please think about concrete methods.
The people favoring Soviet mediation believed that with
the neutrality pact between Japan and the Soviet Union in
effect and the two countries still maintaining diplomatic
relations, the Soviet Union—if asked—would serve as
mediator. But in fact, at the Yalta Conference in February,
the Soviet Union had promised to enter the war after the
German surrender, so that option simply didn’t exist. On
August 3, when Takagi and the others met with Kido for the
last time, Soviet troops were already massing on the border
between Japan and the Soviet Union in preparation for the
attack that came five days later, and it was already clear that
the Tōdai professors, not the Foreign Ministry officials and
Army officers who favored Soviet mediation, had made the
right call.
We know from other materials that when Tōgō, attracted
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by the Tōdai professors’ proposal, asked them to think
about concrete methods, he was really asking Takagi, Isn’t
there some way you can use your personal connections to
contact the U.S.? The Takagi affidavit continues: “The last
two or three times I visited Kido, I went with my close
friend Nambara, then dean of the Tōdai Law Faculty.
Nambara and I had virtually the same opinions on
domestic politics and international relations, so especially
after May, we favored terminating the war and repeatedly
went together to visit politicians.”
Immediately after these facts came to light in the
courtroom, the University News ran the headline:
ENCOURAGING TERMINATION OF THE WAR
‘UNIVERSITY REASON’
SEVEN PROFESSORS, INCLUDING NAMBARA, TAKAGI,
TANAKA
The article said: “The Takagi affidavit that is a high point
of the Tokyo trial makes clear how Professors Nambara
and Takagi of the Tōdai Faculty of Law offered advice on
the termination of the war, and how at the time of the
termination of the war, unexpectedly, Tōdai, citadel of
truth and reason, roused itself to action in the homeland’s
moment of danger, its practical action shot through with
academic fervor so befitting that reason.” The existence of
the war-termination maneuvering came to light at this
time, but even thereafter, in keeping with their original
promise “to bury this act forever,” those involved did not
come forward to speak of the facts. The facts were spoken
of in full for the first time in Nambara Shigeru Recollected
(1989).
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Maruyama: I returned to the university from my first
conscription in November 19446 and remember hearing from
you in very broad terms ideas about terminating the war….
You said that the only strategy to suppress the Army's do-or-
die resistance was to use the court and the senior councilors.
If the Army simply wouldn't obey, you said something about
there being no alternative to using the Navy's power….When
had you begun to have such thoughts and plans?
Nambara: …I broached it in concrete terms to my faculty
colleagues after becoming dean… There was a group of us
who lamented the war in the same way as I. As individuals
we gathered reports tirelessly, exchanged them in secret, and
studied them. …I thought, let's try gathering them
systematically.
This initiative developed into the meetings, mentioned
earlier, in the Reception Room in the library.
Maruyama: Did you meet regularly, on a given day?
Nambara: No. It wasn't regularly. It wouldn't do to attract
attention to the fact that all seven of us were meeting, so we
decided to meet three or four at a time…. The conclusions we'd
reached by collecting the most reliable reports possible and
analyzing them accurately we spoke of to Konoe first of all, to
the sympathetic senior councilors and cabinet ministers, and
to people who—though not in the cabinet—had influence.
The point of working on people in authority, as in
6 RHM: Maruyama was conscripted twice.
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Maruyama’s earlier statement, was that the only strategy
was to use the senior councilors and court and the Navy.
Maruyama: How did you approach the senior councilors?
Nambara: We divided them up, and each of us approached
sympathetic people in secret and appealed to them.
Generally, I went round with Takagi. To speak only of the visits
I remember, Konoe twice—once in his villa in Odawara we
talked for quite a long time. Another was Wakatsuki Reijirō.
The first time was a visit with Tanaka Kōtarō to his villa in
Izu; thereafter, we visited his Tokyo home two or three times.
Again, I received a call from Suzuki Takeo, and we called on
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Ishiguro Tadaatsu. Also
Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori, Privy Seal Kido Kōichi,
General Ugaki Kazushige—they were my chief targets.
Evidence of these activities of the Tōdai professors appears,
for example, in the Kido Diary for May 7, recorded in simple
fashion: “Three p.m.: once again to the office. Professors
Nambara and Takagi came. Consulted. The path ahead in
the war, etc.” Or on June 1: “2:30. Tōdai Professors Nambara
and Takagi came to my office; spoke of their opinions on
prospects for the war, policy in response, etc.” No matter
what the topic, the Kido Diary includes only simple notes of
this sort. As to the precise content of their war-terminating
maneuvers, the professors left no notes, and the senior
councilors who listened to their appeals left no true notes,
either. But it’s not the case that the content is unknown. We
do have a single document that dates from that time.
War-Terminating Maneuvers Even the Navy Promoted
That document is a memo left by Admiral Takagi Sōkichi,
former Chief of the Education Bureau of the Navy Ministry,
who on secret orders from the Navy Minister, Admiral
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Yonai Mitsumasa, had a hand in war-terminating
maneuvers at the end of the war. Takagi was one of those
targeted by the seven professors, and in his diary and the
documents appended to it, published in 2000, there are
two detailed memos from the time he was approached by
Nambara and the others. In Nambara Shigeru Remembered,
Nambara speaks of Takagi as follows: “At that time Admiral
Takagi Sōkichi was Yonai’s brain trust, so Takagi and
I—the two of us—met him three times and told him we’d
like the Navy to act. The Navy too was deeply worried, so
although in the end he took no action, Admiral Takagi saw
the larger picture unusually well for a military man. So he
understood what we said and kept things secret.”
In fact, at this time Admiral Takagi, too, was involved
in secret plots (from the dump-Tōjō movement to plans
to assassinate Tōjō), so even though he was approached
by Nambara and the others, he couldn’t respond. Later, in
the newsletter that accompanied Takagi Yasaka’s collected
works, Admiral Takagi wrote as follows: “From 1944 on, as
is well known today, Japan’s war situation had fallen into
the worst possible state, and people of influence who took
a comprehensive view of world conditions felt acutely the
need for Japan’s policy to make a 180-degree turn, from
prosecuting the war to searching for peace; but on account
of the terror tactics—Military Police, Special Police—of the
then government, it was an exceptionally dark atmosphere
in Japan. To express that view in word or deed was to risk
your life. In this atmosphere, I received a visit from
Nambara of Tōdai on June 8, 1945, and on June 15 Takagi
and Nambara visited my office at the Naval University.”
Admiral Takagi and Takagi Yasaka had met earlier.7
From 1938 to 1939 then-Captain Takagi Sōkichi held the
important position of Chief of the Emergency Research
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Bureau in the Navy Ministry. At that time he summoned
talent broadly from outside official circles and initiated a
sizable project to depict what the Navy’s (and by extension
Japan’s) grand design for the future should be. The project
was divided into six sections (focus groups) and assembled
sixty people—only the best and brightest of the day; at that
time the most influential member of the foreign policy
discussion group was Takagi Yasaka. The Navy took the
U.S. as hypothetical enemy, so American studies was
essential knowledge for naval officers, and Takagi’s
Introduction to U. S. Political History (1931) had long been
required reading. That’s how highly the Navy already
thought of Takagi Yasaka.
As part of their war-termination maneuvering, Takagi
and Nambara visited Takagi Sōkichi at the Naval University
on June 8 and 15: “At that time, citing the writings of former
ambassador Grew and Dr. Reischauer, the professors
emphasized that U.S. postwar planning was not thinking
about changing our kokutai root and branch and that we
should negotiate with the U.S. as direct opposite number,
that we should negotiate with Great Britain focusing on
respect for the imperial house, and that continuing the war
was not advantageous. Nambara made the point that the
Suzuki Cabinet wasn’t up to a courageous decision to
change state policy, so he hoped an Ugaki Cabinet would
emerge.
“On top-secret orders from Navy Minister Yonai and
Vice Minister Inoue in August 1944, I had encouraged
research and promotion of maneuvering to terminate the
war, but that was utterly secret even within the Navy; so
7 RHM: Despite sharing the surname Takagi, the two men were not related. The naval
officer took the name of the family into which he married.
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although I was thoroughly sympathetic to the concerns of
the two professors, I couldn’t take them into my
confidence.”
The True Relation between Sovereign and Subject in
the Imperial Declaration Ending the War
The memo of the June 8 meeting preserved by Admiral
Takagi contains as the professors’ analysis of the situation,
“Germany is done. The Soviet Union will swing to the
enemy side.” That is what happened. Moreover, concerning
the domestic scene, the memo states, “If the policy is to
be 100,000,000 glorious deaths,8 it will reach an impasse
at the kokutai, that grave issue.” And the following: “If it
comes to 100,000,000 glorious deaths, then in American
and British eyes, the imperial house will have served no
purpose; its continued existence will have no point. Seen
through Japanese eyes, too, we should listen to the voices
of ordinary subjects. It’s become a matter of what goes in
the emperor’s ear. If it’s to be 100,000,000 glorious deaths,
then resentment against the emperor will erupt. Distrust
abroad and at home will shake the foundations of the
kokutai.”9 Again, in terminating the war, the true relation
between sovereign and subject is crucial, and a draft
imperial proclamation to display the true relation
emphasizes these points: “I do not intend that our allies die
and our country fight on alone… For the sake of humanity…
To save the people from falling into great misery.” Again:
“Even though Germany lost the war, the culture of Kant,
Hegel, and Goethe endures. What will get Japan get back on
its feet?” There’s also this:
8 RHM: “100,000,000 glorious deaths” was a late wartime slogan touting the supposed
willingness of all Japanese to sacrifice their lives.
9 Takagi Sōkichi, Takagi Sōkichi nikki (Tokyo: Mainichi shimbunsha, 1985).
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5. The senior councilors, too, are considering termination of
the war. After the battle of Okinawa, we hope the Navy will
offer the emperor its tactical opinion on the direction the war
is taking.
6. After the battle of Okinawa, if the Navy reports to the
throne on the war's prospects, the senior councilors will act
accordingly.
And it mentions the sense the professors had gathered
from making the rounds of the senior councilors—that the
senior councilors, too, were already leaning in the direction
of terminating the war; that if the Navy took the lead, the
senior councilors would respond.
In the memo from the meeting of June 15, when both
Nambara and Takagi Yasaka were present, there are these
comments: “1. Since the beginning of last year [1944], in
discussing Japan, American draft plans for the postwar
world pay particular attention to the kokutai argument, to
wit:
• The central ideas of Grew et al. in the State Department
are relatively sound.
• The latest Reischauer editorial, too, likely reflects the
opinion of the State Department.
• Not changing the kokutai is virtually explicit.”
And then comes Takagi’s analysis specifically of the kokutai
issue. In essence, there are various opinions about this
issue in the U.S. domestically, but if we take the U.S. on
directly as opposite number and express Japan’s true intent
candidly, the basic thought of the core makers of Japan
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policy isn’t anti-emperor; so the discussion will
undoubtedly bear fruit.
What’s important here is the issue of moral justification
on the emperor’s side—why the decision to terminate the
war? “The Imperial House wishes to save the people from
further war damage, so if it orders a ceasefire, if it orders
peace, it is to save the situation.” The imperial
proclamation should stress that the decision to terminate
the war is not for the sake of preserving the emperor’s
status, but above all for the sake of the people, to avoid
further war damage to the people.
Another key point is whether the surrender is
conditional or unconditional and, related to that, the issue
of what happens to the emperor system. Here is Nambara:10
“In the matter of conditions for terminating the war, it’s
probably better not to insist on conditions—in other
words, we thought ‘unconditional.’ Our conclusion was
that it’s best to terminate the war as early as possible. As
to form, we thought it most desirable in Japan’s case that
it be the emperor’s decision—that is, via the issuance of
an imperial declaration. In the imperial declaration at the
time of his decision, the emperor should make clear to the
world and to Japan his own responsibility. The sense that
he should abdicate at an appropriate time after the end of
the war was there implicitly. But we did say let’s defend
the emperor system—we’d probably have to limit the
constitutional authority of the emperor sharply—but
defend the emperor system. We didn’t use the phrase
‘defend the kokutai,’ but we were saying, why not take that
position?” Defend the emperor system as system, but in
10 Nambara Kaikoroku.
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the war-termination proclamation have the emperor make
clear his responsibility. And have him abdicate at an
appropriate time. In addition, limit greatly the postwar
emperor’s power—this with an eye to the postwar revision
of the constitution.
As I explained in detail in the last chapter, Nambara had
long thought the emperor should take responsibility for
the war and abdicate at an appropriate time. That feeling
surfaced most clearly after the war when Nambara was
elected to the House of Peers and debated the new Imperial
House Law. Nambara found it strange that this draft law
contained no provision at all for the abdication of the
emperor, so he asked, What would happen in case the
emperor contracted an incurable disease? Or if as a free
individual he said he wanted to stop being emperor, what
then? Nambara argued as follows: “Should the emperor
encounter a grave incident and feel strongly his own moral
responsibility, and should he wish to say so even at the risk
of his position, the fact that that path is blocked, I think, is
equivalent to blocking such a supremely moral act on the
part of the emperor. What is the government’s position?”
This, of course, is to ask what would happen if the emperor
feels war responsibility and says he wants to stop being
emperor.
Further, Nambara made this clear statement:
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I have to think about this particularly in the context of the
recent war. It is clear from an interpretation of the existing
[Meiji] constitution that the emperor bears no political or
legal responsibility for the war. In particular, the people all
know full well that he more than anyone wanted peace from
first to last and that he took on himself the suffering of the
state. Nevertheless—no, for that very reason—we can
speculate that he must have felt the strongest spiritual and
moral responsibility toward his ancestors above and the
people below for the fact that the greatest misfortune ever in
the history of our country arose during his reign.
Now the people all are wading in the depths of material
and spiritual disaster. Most especially, wounded soldiers,
innumerable war refugees, and survivors of the millions of
war dead, fill our streets. They know that in the time of
military rule, the leaders were mistaken, but every last one
of them invoked the name of the emperor and fought and
suffered for the emperor. And beginning with the senior
councilors and close advisors, leaders all over the country are
facing death in harsh legal trials or are being purged. Still for
a while, during this period of extraordinary change and even
while being made to shoulder incalculable grief and sense of
responsibility under these conditions, it's the emperor who is
attending to national affairs all by himself.
Thus, Nambara’s point was that for the emperor’s sake, too,
there should be provision for abdication. But in fact no
such provision was made, and presumably also partly for
that reason, the Shōwa emperor did not abdicate.
The War-Termination Maneuvering of The Tōdai
Seven: Were They Themselves Satisfied?
To return to the story of the war-termination
maneuvering of Nambara and the others, they thought
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bringing about an end to the war was probably too much
for Suzuki Kantarō, then-prime minister and a Navy man.
The greatest obstacle to surrender was clearly the Army,
which trumpeted the final battle on the home islands and
100,000,000 glorious deaths. Thinking it would take a
strong cabinet with Army ties to bring about the
termination of the war, Nambara tried to entice Army elder
statesman General Ugaki Kazushige:
Ishida: Who went to see Ugaki?
Nambara: I went alone…. Something had to be done: he did
listen carefully to what I had to say, and we were in general
agreement…. Not simply Ugaki but Konoe, too: …we as
scholars truly grieved for the country…and had concluded that
this was the only possible route; they all agreed
wholeheartedly. Especially Wakatsuki was greatly moved and
showed full-blown sympathy—something had to be done, so
let's work together. All the people I paid calls on promised very
seriously to cooperate.
But in retrospect, May and June passed while we were
doing this….Time passed, right up to August 15. In other
words, in reality it was the dropping of the atomic bombs that
brought about the end of the war. When all is said and done,
what we did had no effect. Nothing more than our own self-
gratification—frankly, nothing more than that.
So because it produced only their own gratification,
Nambara’s own evaluation of their war-termination
maneuvering was quite low.
But was that really the case? I think it was not something
to be so modest about. To be sure, their maneuvering did
not become the occasion when events began to move
suddenly, amid general applause, toward an end to the war.
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However, if you look at the actual movement toward
ending the war that developed several months later,
elements that the Tōdai professors had thought of did come
to pass. For example: the Navy’s rising to the occasion and
working in cooperation with the court and senior
councilors to suppress the resistance of the Army; using the
form of termination via imperial decision, persuading the
people with the force of an imperial proclamation; ending
reliance on Soviet mediation and pinning hopes on direct
negotiations with the U.S.; putting no conditions on
surrender but accepting unconditional surrender. That the
actual process was so similar to what the professors
imagined means we can say that the work of the professors
had not a direct but an indirect effect, lingering like an
after-image in the minds of the important people.
At first I thought that, as Nambara said, their war-
termination maneuvering had had no real effect, that it
produced only their own self-gratification. But when I read
the Shōwa Emperor’s Monologue (1991), my thinking changed.
That’s because in its section, “The Argument over the
Potsdam Proclamation,” the emperor’s own words are
noted as follows: “The Foreign Minister says we can accept
this proposal [the Burns reply]; the Army says we can’t.
Kido’s position is that we ought to accept it. If I may add
a word to the argument at this time, Nambara, dean of
the Tōdai Faculty of Law, and Takagi Yasaka have visited
Kido and expressed the opinion that we had at all costs to
sue for peace. Again, Arita Hachiro11 had come to Kido to
tell him we had to sue for peace directly with the British
and Americans.… Thus, among the people the mood to sue
11 RHM: Arita had been foreign minister three times between 1936 and 1940.
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for peace had intensified.” The appeal of Nambara and the
others had reached the emperor’s ear. And it became one
reason the emperor moved conclusively to accept the
Potsdam Proclamation.
I said to myself, “Aha!” I thought I knew the basis of
the emperor’s words at the end of the war, at the time of
his second Imperial Conference decision. The first imperial
decision at the end of the war was handed down on August
9: “We accept the Potsdam Proclamation on the
understanding that the emperor system [kokutai] will be
maintained.” In responding three days later (August 12),
the Allies said nothing directly about the desire to maintain
the emperor system but simply reiterated the principles:
“From the time of surrender, the sovereignty of the
emperor and the Japanese government will be subject to
the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers,” and “The ultimate form of the government of
Japan will be decided by the freely expressed will of the
Japanese people.”12
The Japanese side split sharply in interpreting and
evaluating this reply. At the second Imperial Conference
(August 14) there was a clear difference between the
opinion of the Army—“It’s not clear from this whether the
kokutai will be maintained, so we need a second reply
making that explicit”—and the opinion of the Foreign
Ministry and Navy—“This is sufficient, so without
requesting a second response or doing anything to ruin the
talks, we should accept this reply.” The emperor’s second
decision was that this reply was sufficient.
At the time he issued the second imperial decision, the
12 RHM: This phrase was from the reply of Secretary of State Byrnes.
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emperor explained, “It’s not that I don’t understand the
views of those uneasy about whether this truly protects the
kokutai, but I believe firmly that this truly protects the
kokutai. I believe firmly this is the true intent of the
Americans.” This statement checked those who opposed
accepting the Burns note. But in fact the basis for his full
confidence was nowhere made clear. However, that basis
becomes clear when we know that the logic of the
arguments the Tōdai professors used in their war-
termination maneuvering was communicated to the
emperor. Takagi had emphasized these points. He
investigated closely what the U.S. officials of the time had
said up till then, explained which person had which
thoughts and how government opinion changes in terms of
political dynamics, that with people friendly to the emperor
system in positions of power, if now Japan approached the
U.S., the emperor system would undoubtedly be
maintained, but that if Japan involved the Soviet Union,
which opposed the emperor system, the emperor system
would be endangered. In time of chaos, a revolution might
arise.
It can only have been Takagi’s argument, reaching the
emperor via Kido, that gave the emperor firm confidence
that the U.S. side intended to maintain the emperor
system. There could be no doubt, given his birth and
personality, that Takagi was a firm supporter of the
emperor, and we can surmise that the emperor trusted
him. The fact that Takagi’s name appears in the emperor’s
statement I quoted earlier from the Shōwa Emperor’s
Monologue is, I think, the best possible proof.
Secret Support for the Emperor System from the U.S.
Side
In “My Proposed Amendment to the Draft Revision of
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the Constitution,”13 Takagi speaks of his own view of the
emperor as follows: “What is the essence of the emperor
system? To try to cover it in a phrase, the emperor system is
the system that in Japan emperors from time immemorial
have ruled with virtue and with the advice and assistance of
generations of Japanese; in a bit more detail, the emperor
himself doesn’t rule but in each age entrusts rule to bearers,
yet he continues of course to exist and rule as the lead
force spiritually and morally—this is our political system.
We can express this most simply with the words ‘sovereign-
people same rule’; it also should be called the product of our
people’s historical development stretching over the past
2,000 years, the central unique reality of our kokutai. This
form of state can also be comprehended in the words
‘sovereign-people one body.’”
This formulation is virtually the same as what the
emperor-centered believers put forward during the war.
Because that was his position, Takagi’s private
constitutional revision excluded popular sovereignty from
the new constitution, and if you were to ask people today,
they would be tempted to call it a substitute whereby
democracy was merely patched into the Meiji Constitution.
Takagi’s draft preamble began, “The Japanese emperor and
people form one sovereign-people body…’ and Article 1 says,
“Japan takes the emperor as head of state and is a peaceful
democratic state that takes the emperor as symbol of
national unity based on the will of the people.”
To listen to Takagi, that slight mismatch between Japan’s
conditional acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation and
the American response (the Burns note), which did not
13 “Kempō kaisei hōan ni taisuru shūsei shian,” Chosakushū 4. RHM: Takagi's two terms
are kunmin dōchi and kunmin ittai.
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address that condition, was an adroit policy of maintaining
the kokutai, created by exquisite political craftsmanship. (It
did not shout out ‘maintain the emperor system,’ but in
fact it did maintain the emperor system: it was a foregone
conclusion that if the Japanese people expressed their will
freely, the emperor system would be maintained.) Via the
Burns note, he said, the kokutai was maintained,
beautifully. As for the theory that August 15 brought about
change in the kokutai, that “subject to the control of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers” meant a
change in the kokutai, Takagi said that was nonsense: it
“completely ignored both the strenuous effort in which our
subjects had poured out their lifeblood and the cooperation
of sympathizers abroad.” In fact, concerning the line in
the Burns note that “the sovereignty of the emperor will
be subject to the orders of the Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers,” Secretary of War Stimson said later,
“The response of the Allies made no promise at all beyond
the condition already stated in the Potsdam Proclamation,
but at the same time, it stated that the sovereignty of the
emperor will be subject to the orders of the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers, and it accepted the status
of the emperor implicitly” (emphasis added).14 Indeed,
precisely in line with Takagi’s analysis, Japan policy-makers
in the U. S. had made the preservation of the emperor
system their basic policy.
Yet what would happen under their rule when the Allied
forces in fact came to Japan? That wouldn’t be known until
the time came. (In particular, would the emperor system be
maintained when the new constitution came into being?)
14 Gaimushō, ed., Shūsenshiroku.
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Even after the arrival of the Allies, Takagi took many turns
on stage—his English was excellent, and he had many
acquaintances in the core of the Occupation. He was fully
engaged at every turn, including constitutional revision.
Takagi’s talents were on full display especially in the
process whereby the symbolic emperor system was created.
For example, Takagi was deeply involved, along with Konoe
and the others, even in the very first stage of constitutional
revision. Nakamura Akira writes as follows in Who Created
the Symbolic Emperor System?:15 “With Takagi, Matsumoto
Shigeharu, and others, Konoe was in close touch with the
relevant diplomatic officials on the U.S. side—George
Atcheson and the others. When Konoe heard about the
fundamental policies of constitutional revision as planned
by the U. S. in late October of that same year [1945], Takagi
says, ‘In the car on the way to Hakone, deeply relieved that
the State Department did not intend harsh, high-pressure
non-recognition of the emperor system, Konoe let slip a
huge sigh—“Thank goodness!” It left an indelible
impression on me.’”
As before, the government brain trust too was worried
about the continued existence of the emperor system, and
when the Takagi group was shown by the U.S. side the
passage, “Head of the state [sic] should take action pursuant
to authority delegated to him by the constitution,” it
deepened their sense that the U.S. intended that the
emperor continue to exist.
As I wrote in the last chapter, Takagi—fervent supporter
of the emperor system, one of the planners of the postwar
symbolic emperor system—thought that the emperor
15 Nakamura Akira, Shōchō tennōsei wa dare ga tsukutta ka: ikitsuzukeru kisōsha no shisō to
shinnen (Tokyo: Chūō keizaisha, 2003).
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should take responsibility for the war and abdicate in order
to show that “power does not trump morality.” And in fact
Privy Seal Kido, too—Takagi’s dear friend and the
emperor’s closest advisor—thought that the emperor
should take responsibility and abdicate, which may or may
not have been the influence of Takagi. This surprising fact
came to light first in the late portions of the diary Kido
continued to keep in Sugamo Prison after October 1951,
after the signing of the peace treaty; in 1948 at the Tokyo
Trial he received a sentence of life imprisonment and
immediately began serving it.
It was Shōwa historian Awaya Kentarō who deciphered
this fact and announced it in the notes to Documents of the
Tokyo Trial: the Kido Kōichi Interrogation.16 According to him,
Kido had been saying to the emperor in person, since right
after the war, that he should abdicate. Kido did so too at
the farewell dinner the emperor held for Kido immediately
before Kido was arrested as a war criminal:
16 Tōkyō saiban shiryō: Kido Kōichi jinmon chōsho, ed. Awaya Kentarō (Tokyo: Ōtsuki Shoten,
1987).
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At this time of parting from Your Highness, I wish to say that
Your Highness bears responsibility for this recent war, and
when the Potsdam Proclamation has been completely carried
out—in other words, at the time of the conclusion of a peace
treaty—I think it is right that Your Highness take
responsibility toward your ancestors and toward the people
and abdicate…. With that act the families of the war dead
and the war wounded and the families of those missing in
action and the war criminals17 will feel some consolation, as
if they have received some recompense, and it should make a
very positive contribution to national unity centering on the
Imperial House. If that does not happen, the Imperial House
alone will not have taken responsibility in the end, and it will
leave a lingering unease, and I fear it may even become a
permanent source of evil. At all costs, even if right now such
action on Your part is not possible, if Your intention is leaked,
the positive impact on the people's hearts and minds will be
enormous. Even though now it is not my place to say this,
at an appropriate time I do hope Your Highness will act in
accordance with my thinking.
In October 1951 Kido communicated to court officials his
wish that they pass this on to the emperor. Thereafter, too,
any number of times, he recommended through
intermediaries that the emperor abdicate. Taking his loyal
advice, the emperor intended to abdicate, but MacArthur
and Prime Minister Yoshida feared negative political
effects for themselves and blocked that action.
Then when the emperor spoke at the 1952 ceremony
commemorating the peace treaty, at two or three places at
17 RHM: This is a reference to those leaders about to be tried at the Tokyo Trial.
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first in the draft of his speech there was the expression,
“I apologize deeply to the Japanese for responsibility for
the war,” but his advisors revised and revised, and such
expressions disappeared entirely; it became a sentence that
seemed as if it was about other people: “In particular at this
time I believe we should reflect deeply on past transitions,
be on our guard together, and deeply etch on our hearts
that the mistake not be repeated.”
The section of the draft that disappeared is the passage
that caused such a large reaction when it was published in
the July 2007 Bungei shunjū, “Draft of the Imperial Apology”:
“Earlier we lost the goodwill of our good neighbors and
caused trouble with the Allied powers, ending finally in
bitter defeat: the terrible torment has come to the extreme
we know today…. The suffering and distress of all my
people is truly a disaster unprecedented for my country,
and when I think of it calmly, my sadness burns like fire. I
am deeply ashamed before the world for my lack of virtue.”
In prison, Kido learned of the disappearance of the
apology to the people and sent Matsudaira Yasumasa,
Grand Master of Court Ceremony, this message: “The
emperor takes war responsibility and expresses it for the
time being in formal apology. His Majesty’s feelings should
be preserved as historical evidence. Constitutionally, he
cannot abdicate, but it is necessary to rectify the true
relation between sovereign and people. Otherwise, we lost
the war but did not acknowledge our fault, and
responsibility is zero; if it stops there, it will be a problem
for future history, too.”
Nambara’s speech in the House of Peers where he urged
the abdication of the emperor—we quoted from it
earlier—continues as follows: “Particularly for us
educators, from primary school to the university, who
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regard moral duty as holy, this is a grave issue. The war
has weakened our sense of responsibility, our sense of duty,
and the whole society shows signs of moral decadence; I
believe it is no exaggeration to say that the future fate of
the fatherland depends solely on whether we have a moral
and spiritual revival.” In today’s Japan the moral
senses—responsibility, duty, and the like—are flickering.
We can’t say it’s solely for this reason. Even so, we can’t say
for sure that it’s unrelated. In recent years, people speak
now and then of the absence among Japanese of historical
consciousness (of their obliviousness to the people’s
responsibility for the war), and I think that this issue also
plays a significant role there.
History as Double Weave
Using Tōdai as axis, this study has depicted over one
hundred years of this country’s history, and when I look
back, I’m struck by how this country has had to bear up
under an indescribably immense fate. If we compare it to a
novel, it’s like a stormy serial that leaves you in a cold sweat.
And yet it has its fascination, and in terms of its historical
main actors from time to time, it’s a serial too serious to
sum up as merely “fascinating.” Tōdai as university gets
both praise and blame, but in every age this university
continues to produce leading historical figures—in that
sense, it provides a very convenient stage on which to
watch history.
When you write history, the world seems to be a double
weave of discontinuity and continuity. Even in an age like
1945, when it seems there is great rupture in every facet
of society, if you look again from a slightly changed angle,
society in every aspect is continuous.
After all, history all relates to “now.” While I’ve been
writing of various eras, my thoughts have leapt any number
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of times to Japan’s “now.” In order truly to understand
Japan’s “now,” I’ve had any number of times to place “now”
atop that historical double weave—discontinuity and
continuity—and amend my view.
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Epilogue: The Day of
Defeat: For Japan and for
Tokyo Imperial University
In this epilogue the author describes the experiences in August
1945 of Tōdai students and professors. He reports the threat that
the American Occupation of Japan might requisition the campus
for its headquarters, a threat Tōdai parried adroitly. Ōuchi and
Arisawa, two former members of the Faculty of Economics, had
fascinating experiences, Ōuchi in the Bank of Japan in August and
Arisawa in the immediate postwar years of economic recovery. The
author concludes with further thoughts on the “double weave” of
history and a pessimistic view of Japan’s leadership in 1945 and
sixty years later.
The Emperor’s Broadcast, Heard in Yasuda Auditorium
In Chapter 14 I mentioned Tōdai on August 15. On
August 15 the professors and students still at Tōdai
gathered in Yasuda Auditorium and listened together to
the emperor’s broadcast. I quoted from the memoirs of
Ishizaka Kimishige, formerly professor at Johns Hopkins
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University. As I copied down those words, history suddenly
felt real. Some of those who witnessed that historic scene
are still alive and speak to us of history in the first person,
and when they do so, history changes. Ishizaka surely
wasn’t the only person there who is still alive today.
Thinking it’d be fascinating to find others and hear their
stories, I began to gather data.
Yet most of the students who were in Yasuda Auditorium
that day have died, and even if still alive, they are already
in their 80s; so there are issues of health and of memory,
and gathering the data isn’t easy. As I proceeded to check
the graduation lists of the various faculties, I learned that
a good many were still alive, but not many of those had
actually been at Yasuda Auditorium that day. To begin with,
liberal arts students—mobilized into the services or into
labor battalions—weren’t on campus. As for the students
of the science faculties, some had left the city from the
start, such as virtually all the students of Engineering II
(they were in Chiba). In some cases a faculty’s students had
been evacuated out of Tokyo. For example, mathematics
students had been evacuated to various spots in Nagano
Prefecture and at the request of the military were
calculating bullet trajectories and the like. Even the
faculties still on the main campus had seen labor
mobilization take most of their students, so many who
technically were still on the school’s rolls weren’t on
campus on that day at that hour.
Experimenting on Medical Students
First, let’s single out people who indeed did listen to the
emperor’s broadcast that day in Yasuda Auditorium. As we
know from the fact that Ishizaka was there, quite a few
students of the Faculty of Medicine were present. For
example, there’s Hosoya Kensei (1949 graduate, Tōdai
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professor emeritus). Hosoya explains why many medical
students were present:
We had matriculated into the Faculty of Medicine in
1945—about 160 of us. The largest war-year class. Ishizaka
was one of us. No entrance exam. We got in based on the
recommendation of the faculty of the old-style higher
schools. When we matriculated on April 1, we had first of
all three weeks’ labor service; then instruction commenced.
We proceeded at a frantic pace and in June completed the
basics: introduction to surgery, diagnosis of internal
diseases, emergency treatment, ob-gyn. We did all the
basics and were given accelerated training so that in
September we could be mobilized into the medical corps.
May, June, July, August, September—a scant five months.
The war, too, was in its final stages, so they wanted to
send as many medics as possible to the front—with an
accelerated five months’ training. The army was
trumpeting “the fight to the finish on the home islands”
and “one hundred million glorious deaths.” They needed
every last medic.
We really studied. Starting mornings at 8, ending at 4:30
or maybe 5. Some took no time off for lunch but simply
listened to lectures. Most worked through the night. There
might be an air raid or whatever, but the professors worked
through the night, too, so we had class. No one cancelled
class. Students stayed up all night and studied at the foot
of the stairs or wherever—didn’t matter. But there weren’t
any textbooks. We went to nearby doctors and borrowed
old textbooks that had survived the firebombings.
In class, we learned emergency treatment thoroughly:
for example, as soon as the all-clear sounded and people
emerged from the shelters, some fainted dead away, so at
those times you gave them lightly salted water to drink; or
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you could take the rubber tube of a stethoscope and fashion
it into a stomach pump.
He points to a burn the size of a nickel on the inside of
his left wrist.
Do you know what this is? This was a test of mustard gas
on live people. The army pushed through the development
of protection against mustard gas—“purple light,” “red
wave”—and did live experiments: they split the class up into
three groups: a “purple light” cohort, a “red wave” cohort, and
a third cohort that inhaled nothing. Mustard gas causes skin
blisters, so how to prevent that? That was the issue. And that's
why we still have the scars. Everyone in our class has these
scars on their wrists.
And on August 15, too, class started at 8. The
administration sent a notice at 11:30, saying that the emperor
was going to make a broadcast, so stop instruction ten or
fifteen minutes early. We were told to go to Yasuda
Auditorium and we went, but we couldn't get in, so we got
them to turn the large radio, used to listen for air raid
warnings, out the window, and we formed a circle on the lawn
outside the Pathology Lecture Hall and listened. Fifty or sixty
of us.
Listening to the emperor's voice, I thought, “I didn't die a
senseless death, thank goodness.” But what a wishy-washy
voice the emperor had! When the broadcast ended, we went
straight back to our studies. We'd been told beforehand that
“After the emperor's broadcast, we'll go right back to work,”
and that's what happened. The 16th and the 17th we did the
same. It was beginning in September that we returned to
normal, not accelerated, instruction, so we redid all of
anatomy and physiology.
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In 1999, Hosoya and his classmates produced a 50th
reunion book of essays. It contains memories of August 15:
On the morning of the day the war ended, I listened to the
Imperial Proclamation at Yasuda Auditorium. Some
classmates were crying, and the sense of prostration and
emptiness was strong. Professor Ogawa's histology lab on was
scheduled for that afternoon. I wondered whether he would
hold it on such a day and went to the lab; lo and behold,
the professor appeared on time, and without a word about
the Imperial Proclamation, directed us quietly, as usual. I
remember being struck once again—this is how a true scholar
acts.
—The late Nejime Shigeto, head of obstetrics and
gynecology at Yokohama General Hospital.
From Yasuda Auditorium some students did not go back to
class but headed for the Imperial Palace.
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We who at Yasuda Auditorium on the 15th had heard the
Imperial Proclamation ending the war headed for the
Imperial Palace—I don't know whose idea it was. It was a hot,
cloudy afternoon, leaden. When we got to the plaza in front
of the palace, we prostrated ourselves.
The war was over. In the evening, lanterns appeared here
and there in parts of Tokyo we had thought were burned out,
and we sensed the future wasn't entirely dark.
—Hirosawa Isakichi, former chief medical officer, Shizuoka
Prefecture.
In the internal medicine lecture hall, after a lecture on
diagnosing internal diseases, they told us there was to be an
important broadcast, so we gathered in Yasuda Auditorium.
Who was to broadcast and what he would say had been pretty
much rumored before the fact. It was no surprise that
afterward we didn't feel like going to class and hurried right
off to Nijūbashi in front of the palace. A whole lot of people
must have felt as I did, and they gathered in twos and threes,
most of them squatting on the gravel. I too approached
Nijūbashi, prostrated myself, and bowed my head. Sweat was
flowing because of the great heat, and tears were running
down my cheeks because of uncertainty about what would
happen now and wretchedness at being utterly powerless; the
gravel in front of me grew wet, turned dark.
—Fukuda Masatoshi, former professor of medicine, Ryukyu
University.
Some didn’t go to the palace but tried to return home.
Mishima Saiichi, who came from Awaji Island near Osaka,
wrote this:
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On August 15 the war ended. The stress we'd been under
disappeared—poof!—and I felt a sense of relief. For people
who had fought the war in deadly earnest, it was probably a
heartbreaking ending. I think they cried heartfelt tears, but
we had no such thoughts. Thinking there'd be problems if we
simply stayed in Tokyo, three or four of us who came from the
Kyoto area got together to see whether there wasn't some way
to get home. In the end, after two or three sleepless nights,
we were able to get train tickets. The train was full, and all the
people had large sacks on their shoulders, so we had to stand
for the sixteen or seventeen hours.
Once October arrived, a letter came from a classmate in
Tokyo: there hadn't been a single day off from classes at the
university, so come back quickly. It was a big shock that in
those chaotic days the professors had kept on lecturing.
Recently a friend showed me his notes from the August 1945
lectures of Professor Tsuzuki: even after the end of the war he
met his classes without a break, and the fact that among his
lectures was one on the atomic bomb gave me a very strange
feeling—I couldn't help feeling respect and awe for the
professors back then.
—The late Mishima Saiichi, dean of the Tōdai Medical
Faculty.)
Professor Kinoshita Mokutarō and the Air Raid Shelter
Another medical student in Yasuda Auditorium on
August 15 was Mannen Hajime, who was a third-year
student when the war ended and later Tōdai professor of
dentistry. Two days before the end of the war, on August
13, 1945, a red card—that is, a call-up notice—arrived at
the Mannen home. He was to report on August 17 to the
Yamagata Regiment. When he checked with his father, his
father said, “Don’t go right away. Let’s wait a bit and see
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how things develop,” and Mannen went to the university.
Mannen’s father was an army doctor, so he’d probably
heard reports that the end of the war was near. Mannen
gives this account:
Yasuda Auditorium had two floors—main floor and
balcony; I remember the main floor was packed. When I
entered the auditorium, there was a radio on the platform—a
radio and nothing else.
Inside the auditorium, faculty, staff, and students were all
mixed together. Several rows in front of me I saw Ogawa Teizō.
Ogawa was the Japanese authority on the brain and on
anatomy, and I was in awe of him. Later, after graduating,
I joined the brain research center and became his pupil. I
noted, “Aha, Professor Ogawa's up ahead,” but I've forgotten
who else was there. Inside the auditorium, it became very
quiet, indeed hushed; no one spoke. And then the Imperial
Proclamation of the end of the war was broadcast.
I didn't catch a good bit of it, but thinking, “Ah, we've lost the
war,” I raised my head and looked forward: Professor Ogawa's
shoulders were shaking. I thought, “It's hit him very hard, too.”
[What follows is summarized from conversations with
Mannen.] Ogawa had been a research fellow of the
Rockefeller Foundation just before the war, studying at
Northwestern University in Chicago, so he knew a lot about
the United States, and from early on even in his lectures, he
said, “This war is not an easy one,” meaning we can’t win.
Yet when the defeat actually came, even Ogawa appeared
deeply shocked.
Mannen speaks: “I too was full of ‘goddamns’ and
resentment. Many of my buddies, close friends, had died
in the air raids. That non-combatants had been made to
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suffer so—I couldn’t be indifferent about that. For example,
at the time of the great Tokyo air raid of March 10, I was
constructing a model of the brain of homing pigeons. I’d
remove a pigeon brain, slice it up in fine sections, and stain
it; I was taught the technique by assistants at the Tōdai
Brain Institute. The assistants were young women, two of
them; one was named Edogawa, and on the 9th she beamed
when she saw I had finally mastered the technique. As she
left that day, she said, “See you tomorrow.” Then came the
great air raid. On the morning of the 10th, worried about
the university, I went to see. At the Red Gate, I was shocked.
The buildings that had lined the road to school all the way
to Ochanomizu had burned down. The Nikolai Cathedral
and the cedars of Yushima Shrine, which up to then had
not been visible because buildings blocked the view—they
were in plain sight. Three or four days later, when I went to
the institute, a woman assistant said, “Edogawa-san hasn’t
showed up since the raid.” I was aghast. Edogawa-san
never did show up. Then, too, I muttered, ‘Goddamn!’”
After a while, when Mannen was making the rounds of
the medical offices, the air raid alarm sounded. He took
refuge immediately in a nearby air raid shelter: “Right
beside me a man was squatting awkwardly. His head was
large for his emaciated frame, and he was wearing a large
air raid hood to boot; he had on white woven gaiters over
his khaki civilian uniform. I knew immediately it was
Professor Ōda. Ōda Masao—he was a poet with the pen-
name Kinoshita Mokutarō. Mokutarō was taking deep,
calm breaths, absolutely still, eyes closed. The bombers
appeared to fly off eastward.”
The all-clear sounded. Mannen returned with a sigh of
relief to the dermatology office, and Mokutarō too returned
and plopped himself into a chair. Turning to Mannen and
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seven other students he asked them, “Done your
homework?” For Mannen, wiped out as he was by air raids
night after night, it was already a major achievement
simply to get to school; doing homework was out of the
question. They all hung their heads, and Mokutarō said, “A
time of crisis like this is precisely when you must do your
homework. Study hard, and you’ll have no regrets even if
you die tomorrow.1 Today that’s precisely our situation.”
And he continued, “You need to distinguish between
knowledge and wisdom. Knowledge increases without
limit so long as people carry on mental activity. But no
matter how much knowledge you accumulate, it’s only the
illusion of knowledge. That’s no good. For knowledge to
become useful, you need wisdom. But how study wisdom?
By getting to know the classics. The classics are packed with
the wisdom of the human race.” Having said this, Mokutarō
stood up and blew out of the room. “That scene is crystal-
clear even now. It’s the deepest impression from my
student years, and it served as a revelation for the rest of
my life, too.” Thereafter, no matter how busy he was,
Mannen continued to read the classics.
In 1943, the student deferment was lifted (it still held for
science students), and at the end of the year the draft age
was lowered to 19. “One day in the Faculty of Medicine’s
East Lecture Hall in the two-story wooden structure,
Mokutarō entered angrily and without saying a word wrote
on the blackboard, in large characters, three blocks of four
Chinese characters: ‘Superior doctors treat the state;
middling doctors treat people; inferior doctors treat
illness.’ Then he translated it into Japanese and spat out:
1 RHM: This is a loose quotation from the Analects.
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“There are institutions for treating the state, and it’s not at
all easy. But you students at least must aim to treat people.
In today’s world, there are only inferior doctors.” It was an
extraordinary attitude for a professor who was normally
calm and sometimes even cynical. I learned afterward that
at the time someone in the Army Ministry had said of the
Tōdai faculty, ‘There’s no need to teach medical students
difficult stuff—lectures, praxis, theory. It’s enough if they
know how to give subcutaneous and intravenous
injections, so graduate them and send them to the front.’
That’s what had made Mokutarō so angry.”
Even after he heard the Imperial Proclamation ending
the war, Mannen went to school virtually every day. “I well
remember August 30, MacArthur’s arrival at Atsugi Air
Base. It happened that one person in the group I was close
to was commuting from Saitama Prefecture. He said, ‘I’ve
got hold of some cooking oil. Why don’t you all come over
for tempura?’ We were all starving, so we were delighted and
headed for Saitama, caught a bucket full of crawfish, fried
them in deep fat, and washed them down with cheap saké.
It was then we heard on the radio the news of MacArthur’s
landing at Atsugi. At the same time, it was reported that
GHQ was considering setting up shop at Tōdai and so had
spared it from the air raids. Why choose Tōdai? Because it
was spacious, with room for parking. On hearing this, one
of the group grumbled, ‘That idiot MacArthur doesn’t know
the difference between college and garage.2 Inexcusable!’
But no one laughed. Drunk on the cheap saké, we could say
only, indignantly, ‘Goddamn! Goddamn!’”
Soon after that, on the afternoon of October 10, with
2 RHM: the Japanese transliterations and pronunciations of the two English words are
almost identical—カレッジand ガレッジ.
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the fall colors deepening, Mannen happened to go past the
clinical dissection theater. The door was ajar. Without
thinking, he pushed it open and looked in, and a dissection
was under way, with people crowded around the dissection
table. “The second floor of the dissection theater was a
balcony, and from there you could observe dissections.
When I looked, to my surprise there lay the body of
Mokutarō, and they were just sawing open his skull to
remove his brain. From seeing him in life, I had the
impression that his head was large, but the brain itself was
really large; I was amazed. The lab preserved the brains
of exceptional people—Natsume Sōseki and others. It
preserves Mokutarō’s brain to this day, and it was sheer
chance that I was among the witnesses.”
Crisis: Would Tōdai Be Requisitioned by GHQ?
It came up briefly in Mannen’s remarks that the
Occupation Army thought for a while about making the
Tōdai campus its general headquarters; that much is fact.
Consider the following exchange in the book, Nambara
Remembered.
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Fukuda: Did the U. S. Army give formal notice that it wanted
to requisition Tōdai?
Nambara: No, it didn't. … A place like Tōdai with large
facilities that hadn't gone up in flames—it's natural GHQ
should want to use it: that was communicated to us. In fact,
U.S. military men with Japanese officers as guides planned to
come and inspect the Tōdai campus, and reports were afloat
that MacArthur's headquarters would be located at Tōdai. At
the same time, technicians from the Tokyo regional office of
the Communications Ministry came and began to study how
to increase the number of telephones.
In haste, the Tōdai authorities appealed to the Ministry of
Education. They argued that the postwar reconstruction of
Japan had to focus on education, culture, and scholarship.
That being the case, Tōdai would be a most important core
institution of reconstruction, so it should not be
requisitioned. Moreover, during the war the government had
not stationed army or navy units on campus. It had not once
been used for the military purposes of the Japanese military,
they stressed, and the Occupation Army should give that fact
full consideration. Nambara remembers: “In the end, the
clincher was that during the war Tōdai had never let its land
and facilities be used for military purposes. That was a good
thing. … We held firm: should the U.S. do what even the
Japanese military had not?”
As Nambara states, during the war Tōdai had narrowly
missed being requisitioned by the Army. Here is Nambara
again: “That was just at the end of June (1945). Officers
from the Eastern Army—four of them, I think—came to
the university and said that for defense of the capital area,
Tokyo was to be divided into four sectors, with units
stationed in those sectors, and they wanted us to agree to
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the requisitioning of Tōdai and the placing of one sector
headquarters here. The headquarters would include 3,000
officers and men, so Tōdai was the only suitable place.”
Tōdai rebuffed the military’s demand on two accounts.
The first was that although the arts and letters students
had departed, the numbers of science students had greatly
increased; so there was no room on campus. The second
was the hospital. During wartime, the function of the
hospital was of even greater importance to society. Given
the mission assigned the Faculty of Medicine, Tōdai
couldn’t be evacuated. As I stated earlier, there were orders
from military headquarters to produce as many military
doctors as possible as quickly as possible. The Eastern Army
backed off.
Nambara Remembered records one other startling
incident at the end of the war. That is what Assistant
Professor Maruyama Masao went through at the end of
the war. Maruyama was called up in 1944 and at the end
of the war was serving as a private first class in the army
transport headquarters at Ujina, port city of Hiroshima. So
on August 6 he experienced the atomic bomb. Fortunately
he was at some distance from Ground Zero, so he survived,
and right after the war the following took place: “… I was
a PFC on the planning staff of the army transport HQ and
had been summoned by a lieutenant in the general affairs
section and told that the university had asked that I be
exempted from the call-up, but that in the end that hadn’t
been possible. But perhaps on that account, on the day after
the war ended, a staff officer called me into his office. He
said: I know your profession. I’m giving you absolute
freedom to speak, so I want you to give me a course on how
this war happened and what will become of Japan from
now on; for the duration you’re excused from other duties.
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So for a whole week I had to give lectures to that
officer—we were on either side of a desk. A PFC lecturing a
staff officer: officers who came to report to the staff smiled
wryly.”3
The Activities of Ōuchi, Who’d Been Forced Out of
Tōdai
There’s one person at the faculty level with unique
experiences to recount: former Professor Ōuchi Hyōe of
the Faculty of Economics. In 1938 Ōuchi had been arrested
in the Faculty Group Incident; in 1944, after a long trial,
he’d been found not guilty. Having tried unsuccessfully to
return to Tōdai, he cut off relations with the university and
for a while became a researcher at the Ōhara Institute for
Research. In April 1945, with the end of the war near, he
joined the Bank of Japan at the sudden request of
Shibusawa Keizō, then chair of the Bank of Japan;
Shibusawa had been a student in Ōuchi’s undergraduate
seminar. Ōuchi remembers:4 “It was in April of 1945, I’m
certain, that Inoue, trustee of the Bank of Japan (and now
vice chair) suddenly came to see me: Shibusawa wanted to
see me, had a request concerning some research. So I went
to the Bank and met Shibusawa…. Shibusawa said, ‘The war
is finally nearing its end. There will be many difficulties
after the war. I want to pick your brains about them.’”
The Bank of Japan had summoned an eminent scholar
of public finance and begun to prepare for the economic
chaos that would follow defeat. Ōuchi was given several
assistants and a room next to the Bank’s Research Division
3 TT: I've collected a great deal more information from witnesses to “Tōdai on August
15,” and there's room here only to state that fact. So I've set up a page “The Day Tōdai
Lost” on the Bungei shunjū website (http://www.bunshun.co.jp/Tōdai0815) to record
the experiences and thoughts of Tōdai students of the time.
4 Keizaigaku gojūnen.
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and began to study inflation. While he was engaged in this
study, August 15 arrived: “It must have been the morning of
August 15. On some minor errand, I entered the Directors’
Room at the bank. Doing so was not permitted normally,
of course. I’ve forgotten why I went in, but I did go in. A
board meeting was in progress. At that moment, a private
secretary entered carrying a single sheet of paper. He
presented it very respectfully, ‘This is the text of the
Imperial Proclamation of the end of the war that the
emperor will broadcast this noon.’ Board meetings were
conducted around a round table, and Chair Shibusawa took
the sheet of paper and read the proclamation…. At points,
overcome with emotion, he had to stop. And when he got
to the part—‘The thought of those officers and men as well
as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who
died at their posts of duty, or those who met with untimely
death and all their bereaved families, pains Our heart night
and day’—he was so overcome with emotion he couldn’t go
on. Forcing himself to go on, he swallowed his tears and
said, ‘What does ‘Gonai’ mean?5 Does it mean inside the
body?’ This scene is most vivid to me today.” Afterwards,
too, thanks to being in the bank, Ōuchi witnessed one
dramatic scene after another. For example, this happened
right after MacArthur occupied Japan: “Then—it was two
or three days after MacArthur landed, I think—when I went
to the bank, all the bank officers were confined to one room.
And soldiers of the Occupation army stood up and down
the corridor, bayonets drawn. Someone from the
Occupation army came to the Board Room in which they
5 RHM: The archaic Japanese term means literally ‘honorable inside.’ The official
translation renders it as “Our heart.”
455 | university of massachusetts amherst libraries
were being detained. Apparently the chief account books
were being carried in.”
Japan’s central bank had been put under the total control
of the Occupation army. The event symbolized defeat and
occupation. Following on this passage comes this
eyewitness account: “Something else astonished me. It was
the number of Bank of Japan notes issued in the two weeks
from the end of the war on August 15 to about the end
of the month. It was a torrent of 100-yen notes. The back
entrance of the Bank of Japan on the west side opened,
and trucks entered, one after the other. Onto these trucks
were loaded new wooden boxes, one after the other. The
100-yen notes in those boxes the bank had got ready at full
tilt since 1944. Where did those trucks go? Needless to say,
they went mainly to the Army and Navy Ministry and to
the Ministry of Trade and Industry. And the notes were
paid out to decommissioned military, military dependents,
factories producing military goods, and the financiers of
the military industries. They went to pay for guns and
airplanes that weren’t finished yet, of course, and
sometimes they were exchanged for checks the service
ministries had issued without vouchers or receipts. The
statistics show, too, that in those two weeks inflation
suddenly increased; reckless military expenditures—that’s
the sort of thing it was. Each day I went to work in the Bank
of Japan’s research room under which the trucks passed.
And I kept thinking, Inflation! Inflation!”
Thus began the horrendous hyperinflation of the
immediate postwar. 100 yen then was more than $1,000
today: unless you know that, you won’t grasp the enormity
of this episode. So the next problem was how to control
this inflation. Ōuchi created that occasion: “About October
10 a Japan Broadcasting Company man came to me at the
tokyo university and the war | 456
Bank of Japan asking if I wouldn’t do a broadcast… I asked,
“About what?” “Anything at all will do,” he said, “Anything
you want to say to the public.” Okay, so on the evening
of October 17, I made a 15-minute broadcast, ‘Assignment
for Finance Minister Shibusawa.’ The gist of the broadcast:
‘From now on inflation will grow larger and larger. It will
take reckless valor to check it. Half-hearted thinking won’t
cut it. Please take forceful action now. During the war, the
state incurred government debt of 120,000,000,000 yen
[$60,000,000,000] to companies producing military goods;
please cancel that debt now.’”
In short, to raise money for wartime military
expenditures, the government had used the Bank of Japan
to print mountains of government bonds. The money
thereby created had been spent like water on the industrial
world. And at the end of the war, the government paid
off that debt at one stroke, with no backing. The vast
expansion of currency that caused inflation, so there was
no alternative but to declare a halt to such payments. “The
cancellation I proposed of bonds that had financed military
expenditures immediately became a political issue; there
was much discussion, and GHQ too approved it. The
government went back and forth on the issue, but ending
the debt aside, it leaned to the idea that lowering the
interest rates was a good idea, and that’s all it did. Two
years later, at long last, the war debts were actually
cancelled.
“Afterward, too, from the same viewpoint, I wrote On
Breaking Up the Zaibatsu. And On Establishing a Wartime
Profits Tax and On Ending Military Pensions. Each was a
policy to combat rapid bourgeois inflation, and each had
some degree of socialist coloration. These were my
economic policy for Japan ‘in the early post-defeat years’
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or ‘in the early reconstruction.’ They were anti-inflationary
policies that formed a single structure.” So the Marxist
economist most reviled by public finance people produced
the wisdom and proposed the actual policies that rescued
the Japanese economy in its bankruptcy just after the war.
In my concluding chapter, I wrote that in the end,
history is a double weave of discontinuity and continuity.
This sort of thing is what lay behind that phrase. I didn’t
have space in the series to say this in such detail, but I
did assemble these materials intending to write of the flow
of history, of losers becoming winners and then winners
becoming losers. In turn, the winners became losers. After
the war, the Tōdai Faculty of Economics under Ōuchi’s lead
became a bastion of Marxist economics, but after the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War system,
Marxist economics too lost its sway. So Marxists
disappeared from its mainstream. Today adherents of the
various currents of contemporary economics have become
the mainstream of the Tōdai Faculty of Economics.
Arisawa Hiromi’s Research that Foresaw Defeat
To return to the period immediately after the war: the
Marxist economists who had been forced out of academia
took the stage in spectacular fashion as the central figures
who bore the economy on their shoulders; in this sense,
Assistant Professor Arisawa Hiromi, who had been
arrested and indicted along with Ōuchi and the others in
the Faculty Group Incident, had by far the largest presence.
What rescued the Japanese economy from its postwar
collapse was priority production, and Arisawa was the one
who thought it up. Priority production meant focusing
investment first in economic resources for the sake of
production of coal and steel and later setting the whole
economy on an upward course. Nowadays Arisawa has a
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high reputation—he is considered perhaps the man most
responsible for the recovery of the postwar Japanese
economy. But at the time of the Takigawa Incident, he was
attacked over and over in the Upper House and elsewhere
as a “famous Marxist professor who makes his nest in the
Tōdai Faculty of Economics.” When witch hunts were
carried out at Tōdai, Arisawa was always at the top of the
list of those to be arrested.
In fact, Arisawa had been involved in state policy since
before the war. He was a Marxist, of course, but he was a
specialist in war economy, planned economy. From about
1934 on, he produced one after another Plan to Mobilize
Production, On Japanese Industrial Controls, Japan Under
Economic Controls; from early on, he was seen as the leader
in the field. So given the China-Japan War and the
beginning of total state mobilization, he was called upon to
take a hand in state policy. The fundamental conception of
socialist economy, communist economy, lies in managing
the economy and in controls to force compliance; so
Marxist economy and planned economy were not so
different.
Arisawa’s original involvement in state policy came in
1937 at the time of the sudden spike in the prices of military
materiel, when in the attempt to control prices the
government created an “Emergency Committee on Price
Policy.” He became a member of that committee. As the
wartime order developed, Arisawa’s role in state policy
grew. In September 1939 when the Army established an
economic research unit—the Akimaru Unit under Lt. Col.
Akimaru Tsugurō, he joined it. This unit, directly
subordinate to the General Staff, set up its office on the
second floor of a bank, and operating in non-doctrinaire
fashion, brought together opposition scholars. Its goal was
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to collect objective data, mainly on economics, and provide
the army the most useful reports on which to base
judgments of future changes in world conditions. In
Europe, World War II had already started, and it seemed
at first glance that Germany would continue its swift and
violent advance.
The economic research unit had four desks—Japan,
Great Britain/U.S., Germany, and the Soviet Union;
Nakayama Ichirō was in charge of the Japan desk, and
Arisawa Hiromi, of the Great Britain/U.S. desk. Arisawa
was out on bail, but the military affairs chief of the General
Staff approved his involvement. Earlier, the army had sent
Akimaru to audit courses at the Faculty of Economics.
From the first he respected Arisawa’s knowledge, so he
protected Arisawa throughout even though the rightwing
camp inside the military and outside was greatly displeased
with the decision to use him.
In September 1941 the Akimaru unit issued an interim
report. The interim report of the Japan branch said that
Japanese productivity could not be increased further. The
interim report of the German branch said that German
war power was at a peak. The interim report of the Great
Britain/U.S. branch said that in contrast to Japan, which
had already cut civilian consumption 50% to finance the
war, the U.S. had cut consumption only 15% to 20%. Not
only could it continue sending military supplies to Europe
at its current pace; it could supply $35,000,000,000 in new
funds. This sum in new funds was roughly 7.5 times Japan’s
ability to raise war funds. Akimaru made this interim
report at the end of September at a meeting of Army
Ministry officials, from Chief of the Army General Staff
Sugiyama Hajime on down. Arisawa writes:6 “Sugiyama
said he found this report and its method of reasoning
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largely unimpeachable, without holes. But its conclusion
ran counter to state policy, so all copies of the draft should
be incinerated immediately. When he returned from this
meeting, Akimaru was said to be despondent. And because
he retrieved all copies of the draft team members had been
given and burned them, not even I have one….
“The Army brain trust had already decided to cross the
Rubicon. Once that resolution had been made, a report
documenting the danger of crossing the Rubicon does
great harm and no good. That’s what it meant—the strict
order to burn all copies.” The entire Army general staff
knew before the war began what this episode meant.
Afterward, on personal orders from Gen. Tōjō Hideki
(Army Minister), Arisawa had to stop working on the
research unit, and thereafter until the end of the war, no
matter where he went, the secret police paid him a visit
once or twice a month.
Arisawa Bolsters the Postwar Economic Research
Association
At the end of 1943 Arisawa received a special assignment
from the Takahashi Economic Research Institute to
rethink Japan’s postwar economic issues, was given a room
in the Institute, and began his research. In September 1944,
because air raids loomed, Arisawa rented a farmhouse
outside Tokyo, put his family and his books on a truck,
evacuated, and made his life there. He planted vegetables
in a small plot and provided for himself. He writes: “By day,
carrier planes swarmed to the attack…. Finally, August 15
arrived. At long last the war ended. And government lost its
authority. Well, what will become of Japan now? I didn’t go
6 Arisawa Hiromi no Shōwashi: gakumon to shisō to ningen to (Arisawa Hiromi no Shōwashi
henshū iinkai, Tokyo: 1989).
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to Tokyo but worked away on my garden. I wanted to wait
and see.”
But from before the end of the war, Arisawa had been
studying the postwar economy, and before long he received
a summons from a group that was thinking about postwar
economic policy. “The first time I was called to Tokyo was
for a seminar on the postwar economy that the Foreign
Ministry’s Research Group #2 convened. This seminar was
set up just before the end of the war, and once the war
ended, it began serious research. A large number of
scholars gathered.” Arisawa was unable to make the first
session, but Ōkita Saburō made a special trip to urge him
to come, and he attended from the fourth session on.
Afterward, this research group came to revolve around
Arisawa. Through late 1945, there were forty sessions in
all, and in March 1946 a report was completed for which
Arisawa was the key figure: “Fundamental Problems of the
Japanese Economy.” This report received very high praise
as a grand design giving clear direction to the people in
leading positions in financial and government circles; with
the end of the war, they had sunk into a state of lethargy.
While the group’s discussions were still going on,
Hatoyama Ichirō came to Ōuchi and Arisawa, saying he
wanted to talk. Hatoyama intended that he himself form
the first postwar cabinet (in November he formed the first
postwar political party and became its chair).
The Birth of Priority Production
In fact, as is well known, right after this, Hatoyama was
purged and was unable to grasp political power. Instead,
Yoshida Shigeru took over. Yoshida thought even more
highly of Arisawa than had Hatoyama and asked him any
number of times to become chief of the Economic
Stabilization Board, command center of the postwar
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economic recovery; but Arisawa declined. He refused to
become chief of the Economic Stabilization Board, but he
joined the Round Table Conference, which was made up of
a small number of scholars about Yoshida.
At one meeting Yoshida said he wanted to pick their
brains. From GHQ had come permission to import many of
the resources Japan desperately needed. When he gathered
requests from the various ministries, the list numbered
several hundred items. It was his desire to winnow these
down to a very few. The scholars chose five: iron, smokeless
coal, heavy oil, rubber, and buses. But GHQ did not permit
emergency imports of three of these items. Steel was in
short supply in the U.S., too. If Japan imported heavy oil,
GHQ said, it would overwhelm Japan’s coal production. In
fact, Arisawa had advocated forcefully for these two.
According to Arisawa, the greatest bottleneck in the
Japanese economy at the time was coal. If Japan were
permitted to import heavy oil, that would advance the
production of steel, and that steel would be invested in
mining—via this roundabout route, a great increase in coal
production would become possible, increasing coal
production to 30,000,000 tons. If coal production
increased to 30,000,000 tons, industrial production could
rise to half of the prewar total (at that time it had fallen to
one-third of the prewar). This was the basic concept behind
what later came to be called priority production.
In response, GHQ said the concept was interesting. If
GHQ included heavy oil and the government promised to
realize coal production of 30,000,000 tons, then heavy oil
would be approved. Reading this response, Yoshida said
that since this was his friend Arisawa’s assertion, he
wanted Arisawa to take responsibility and make coal
production of 30,000,000 tons a reality. Here is Arisawa: “I
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too thought this wasn’t an easy task but that I had to take
it on; so I told the prime minister I’d do it, but he’d have
to support me wholeheartedly on the issue of coal. Smiling,
Yoshida said, ‘If you say so, we can do anything at all: if you
say, “Face left!,” we’ll face left; and if you say, “Face right!,”
we’ll face right.’ That’s how I became chair and how the
Coal Council was established.”
Thus the Coal Council was established, with Arisawa as
chair; thereby the Japanese economy was able to take its
first step toward true recovery. A Marxist, on the one hand,
and the government and GHQ, on the other, set the
Japanese economy, then in vast stagnation, on the track to
recovery. Yet both before and after they were antagonists.
Today [2005] we are about to commemorate the sixtieth
anniversary of August 15, and what I feel acutely is the
utterly hopeless irresponsibility of Japan’s leaders. Whose
responsibility was it, that first lost war? They decided it was
okay to leave that issue unclarified, that there be “collective
atonement of 100,000,000 Japanese,” with no individuals
taking responsibility. And how about the second lost
war—the no-action no-plan for the “lost decade” (a decade
that is already fifteen years long) after the bubble burst
in 1991? Has responsibility for the second lost war been
pursued? Has the Japanese economy emerged from this
second lost war? The reforms of the much-ballyhooed
Koizumi-Takenaka combo of 2002: have they been as
successful as those of the Yoshida-Arisawa combo that
enabled Japan to emerge from the confusion of that first
lost war? I doubt it.
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Glossary of Names, Terms, and
Events
Glossary of Names, Terms, and Events1
Abe Genki. 1894-1989. Bureaucrat. Tōdai Faculty of Law
(graduated 1920). Home Ministry, 1920-45 (superintendent
general, Police, 1937-41). Home Minister, Suzuki Cabinet,
1945. Arrested as Class A war criminal but never
prosecuted.
Abe Isamu. 1902- . Marxist economist. Member, Tōdai
Faculty of Economics. Arrested in Faculty Group Incident,
1938.
Abe Yoshishige. 1883-1966. Philosopher, educator. First
Higher School (graduated 1905); Tōdai Faculty of Letters
(graduated 1908). Faculty: Keiō, First Higher School, Hōsei,
Seoul. Principal, First Higher School, 1940-. Minister of
Education, 1945-46.
Alliance for a Teidai Purge (Teidai shukusei kisei
1 I have used Tokyo University or Tōdai東大 throughout—for the early years before it
was Tokyo Imperial University, for the years it was Tokyo Imperial University 東京帝
国大学, and for the postwar years when it became Tokyo University東京大学.
Complete biographical data for many of the people who figure in this account is not
readily available. Where nothing was available, I have omitted the name.
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dōmeikai帝大粛清期成同盟会). Front group for Genri
Nihon push to rid Tōdai of its leftist professors.
Andō Yoshio. 1917-1985. Economist. Hirosaki Higher
School; Tōdai Faculty of Economics (graduated 1941).
Member, Tōdai Faculty of Economics, 1947-78.
Araki Kōtarō. 1894-1951. Economist. Tōdai Faculty of
Economics. Member, Tōdai Faculty of Agriculture, then
(1935) Faculty of Economics. Member, Kawai faction, then
Hijikata faction.
Araki Sadao. 1877-1966. Army officer, politician. Key
figure in Imperial Way faction; placed on inactive list in
1936. As Minister of Education, 1938-39, pushed for end to
university autonomy. Key actor in Hiraga Purge.
Arisawa Hiromi. 1896-1988. Marxist economist. Second
Higher School; Tōdai Faculty of Economics (graduated
1922). Member, Tōdai Faculty of Economics, 1922-38.
Arrested in 1938 and fired from Tōdai. Assisted Army
planning (1944-45) and was key figure in Japan’s postwar
economic recovery.
Arita Hachirō. 1884-1965. Diplomat, politician. First
Higher School (graduated 1905); Tōdai Faculty of Law
(graduated 1909). Diplomatic service, 1909-. Foreign
Minister, 1936, 1938, 1939, 1940.
Atcheson, George. 1896-1947. Diplomat. University of
California, Berkeley. Foreign Service, 1920- ; China, 1924-39;
Assistant Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, 1941; charge
d’affairs, U.S. Embassy, Chungking. SCAP, 1945-47; chief,
Diplomatic Section, 1946.
Awaya Kentarō. 1944- . Historian. Tōdai Faculty of
Letters. Faculty, Kobe University, Rikkyō daigaku.
Blue Sky Club (Seijitsukai製日会). Study group set up by
Kawai Eijirō, after his expulsion from Tōdai; mainly former
students living in Tokyo.
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Chō Isamu. 1895-1945. Military officer. Army Officer
School (graduated 1916). Founder of Sakurakai桜会 (1930);
planner of March and October Incidents, 1931 (disciplined).
Committed suicide, Okinawa , 1945.
Comintern. Communist International, 1919-43. Policy of
popular front—alliance with all “anti-fascist”
forces—adopted by seventh world congress, 1935. Dissolved
by Josef Stalin, 1943.
Council on Tenure of Higher Civil Servants (Bunkan kōtō
bungen iinkai 文官高等分限委員会). Bureaucratic organ
overseeing firing of higher civil servants; played role in
firing of Kawai Eijirō.
Deans’ Council (Gakubuchō kaigi学部長会議).
Bureaucratic organ including all Tōdai deans and the
president.
Emperor-organ theory. Constitutional theory
associated most closely with Minobe Tatsukichi, that the
emperor is one part of state, not superior to state; long
accepted (in law schools and civil service exam before the
1930s) as standard doctrine. Attacked by far right in 1935
and after.
Engineering II. Second Tōdai curriculum in economics,
set up during war to increase flow of engineers for war
effort.
Faculty Group Incident (Kyōju grūpu jiken 教授グルウ
プ事件). Arrests in early 1938 of many faculty members,
including (at Tōdai) economists Ōuchi, Arisawa, and
Wakimura. Also called Second Popular Front Incident.
February 26 Incident. Army revolt in central Tokyo,
February 26-29, 1936. Assassination of three major figures
(home minister, finance minister, military training chief).
First Higher School. Chief preparatory school (ages
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17-20) for Tokyo University; crucial in education of many
Tōdai professors who figure large in this account.
Five Ministers’ Council (Gosō kaigi五相会議). 1933.
Composed of prime minister, foreign minister, finance
minister, and the two service ministers.
Fresh Breeze Association (Seifūkai清風会).
Organization of unaffiliated Diet members set up by
Tanaka Kōtarō; pursued middle-of-the-road policies.
Friends of Economics (Keiyūkai経右会). Association of
students in the Tōdai Faculty of Economics; subject to
control of Dean of Faculty of Economics.
Fujii Takeshi. 1888-1930. First Higher School (Non-
Church Christian; disciple of Uchimura Kanzō); Tōdai
Faculty of Law graduate. Home Ministry. 1915-20: aide to
Uchimura. Proselytizer.
Fukuda Kanichi. 1923-2007. First Higher School; Tōdai
Faculty of Law. Member, Tōdai Faculty of Law (political
science). Editor (with Maruyama Masao) of books on
Nambara Shigeru.
Fukumoto-ism. Doctrine, associated with Fukumoto
Kazuo (1894-1983), calling for two-step revolution:
bourgeois revolution, then rapid transformation to
socialist revolution. Backed by Comintern over Yamakawa-
ism.
GHQ. General Headquarters, American Occupation of
Japan. Shorthand for Gen. Douglas A. MacArthur, Supreme
Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP).
Genri Nihon原理日本. Journal founded by Minoda
Muneki that became bellwether of right-wing attack on
Tōdai in the 1930s.
Gensuikyō原水協(Gensuibaku kinshi Nihon kyōgikai原水
爆禁止日本協議会). Japanese Council against the
Hydrogen Bomb, founded 1955 in response to U.S. testing
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at Bikini; split in the early 1960s over whether to protest
Soviet nuclear weapons.
Grew, Joseph C. 1880-1965. Diplomat. Groton; Harvard
College (graduated 1902). Ambassador to Denmark
(1920-21), Switzerland (1921-24), Turkey (1927-32), Japan
(1932-42).
Hashizume Akio. 1899-1975. Economist. Member, Tōdai
Faculty of Economics; Hijikata faction. Home Ministry spy
at Tōdai; later dean. Resigned at war’s end.
Hatoyama Ichirō. 1883-1959. Politician. First Higher
School (graduated 1903); Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated
1907). Diet member, 1915- . Minister of Education, 1931-34.
Prime Minister, 1954-56.
Hayashi Kentarō. 1913-2004. Historian (Marxist, became
anti-Marxist after the war). First Higher School; Tōdai
(graduated 1935). Faculty, First Higher, then Tōdai. Tōdai
president, 1973-77.
Higher schools. Under pre-war education system,
prepared elite students for university. Offered three-year
general course (usually, ages 17-20) prior to three-year
university course; comparable to U.S. undergraduate
colleges.
Hijikata faction. Members: Hijikata, Honiden, Yamada,
Tanabe, Araki, Nakanishi.
Hijikata Seibi. 1890-1975. Economist, dean, target of
Hiraga Purge. Sixth Higher School (Ehime), Tōdai Law
(economics). Married daughter of Hijikata Yasuji,
president of Hōka daigaku 法科大学, which became the
Tōdai Faculty of Law. Assistant professor (specialty:
economic theory), 1917-21 (three years’ study in U. S. and
Europe), professor 1921-February 1939. Forced out in
Hiraga Purge. Taught thereafter at Hōsei University
(during and after the war) and other universities.
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Hiraga Purge. January 1939. Firing of Hijikata and
Kawai, and subsequent voluntary resignations of many of
their respective adherents. End of bitter factionalism in
Faculty of Economics.
Hiraga Yuzuru. 1878-1943. Naval architect (known as
“Battleship god” for role in designing Japan’s great
battleships); dean of Faculty of Engineering; Tōdai
president. First Higher School, Tōdai Engineering
(graduated 1901). Worked at Yokosuka and Kure shipyards;
Royal Naval College (Greenwich; 1905-1908). Lecturer,
Tōdai (1909-); professor (1918- ). Promoted to rear admiral,
naval construction (1922) and vice admiral (1926); reserves
(1931). Tōdai president, December 1938-February 1943 (died
in office).
Hiraizumi Kiyoshi. 1895-1984. Historian. Fourth Higher
School; Tōdai Faculty of Letters (graduated 1918). Advocate
of Imperial-Japan history with focus on emperor. Member,
Tōdai Faculty of Letters, 1923-45 (resignation). Purged by
Occupation, 1948-52. Focus of five Tachibana chapters
preceding the chapters translated here
Home Ministry. 1873-1947 (abolished by Occupation).
Government office with jurisdiction over the police; home
minister second only to prime minister in prestige and
power.
Honiden Yoshio. 1892-1978. Economist. First Higher
School (graduated 1912); Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated
1916). Member, Tōdai Faculty of Economics, 1921-1938
(resigned in protest); Hijikata faction.
Hozumi Shigetō. 1883-1951. Legal scholar. First Higher
School (graduated 1904); Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated
1908). Member, Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1908-1943; dean, .
Justice, Supreme Court, 1949-51.
Ida Iwakuzu. 1881-1964. Baron; Army officer. Army
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College (graduated 1901). Member, House of Peers, 1925-45.
Arrested as Class A war crimes suspect, 1945; released, 1947.
Imai Tōshiki. 1886-1950. Historian. Tōdai Faculty of
Letters (graduated 1911). Faculty, First Higher School,
1919-12; Tōdai Faculty of Letters, 1923-47.
Imperial University Act (Teikoku daigakurei帝国大学
令). 1886, revised 1919, and revised again after the war.
Imperial University News帝国大学新聞(Teikoku daigaku
shimbun [1920-44], then Daigaku shimbun 大学新聞).
Prewar Tōdai publication, serious and respected journal.
Inner Government Council 内政会議 (Naisei kaigi).
Informal decision-making body for domestic affairs in
Saitō Cabinet (1932-34).
Inoki Masamichi. 1914-2012. Political scientist. Third
Higher School; Tōdai Faculty of Economics (graduated
1937). Member, Kyoto University Faculty of Law, 1949-71.
Fulbright advisor of translator, 1964-66.
Inoue Kiyozumi. 1880-1962. Naval officer; politician;
baron. Naval College (graduated 1901). Member, House of
Peers, 1925-46.
Ishida Takeshi. 1923- . Political scientist. Student,
Tōhoku Imperial University Faculty of Letters and (after
the war) Tōdai Faculty of Law. Student of Maruyama
Masao.
Ishidō Kiyotomo. 1904-2001. Journalist, editor. Fourth
Higher School; Tōdai Faculty of Letters (graduated 1927).
Member, Communist Party, 1927; arrested March 15, 1928;
committed apostasy, 1933. Nihon hyōronsha (publishing
house), 1934-38; Manchurian Railway Research, 1938-43
(arrest).
Ishigami Ryōhei. 1913-82. Political scientist. Tōdai
Faculty of Economics (graduated 1936). Professor, Seikei
daigaku, 1949-67.
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Ishizaka Kimishige. 1925- . Medical professor. Seikei
Higher School; Tōdai Faculty of Medicine. Chief, National
Institute of Infectious Diseases; professor, Johns Hopkins
University, University of California.
Izawa Takio. 1869-1949. Bureaucrat, politician. Third
Higher School; Todai Faculty of Law (graduated 1895).
Entered Home Ministry, became prefectural governor,
Ehime, Niigata. Member, Peers, 1914-45. Privy Councillor,
1940-45. Purged, 1947.
Japan-China Incident. “China Incident” that began in
summer 1937 and became all-out war between Japan and
China, 1937-45.
Kakehi Katsuhiko. 1872-1961. Constitutional lawyer,
Shinto theorist. First Higher School; Tōdai Faculty of Law
(graduated 1897). Professor, Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1903-32.
Kanamori Tokujirō. 1886-1959. Bureaucrat;
constitutional lawyer. First Higher School; Todai Faculty
of Law. Entered Home Ministry; forced out (1936) over
adherence to emperor-organ theory.
Katō Kanji. 1884-1965. Agrarian thinker. Fourth Higher
School; Tōdai Faculty of Agriculture (graduated 1912).
Advocate of Manchurian colonization; trainer of potential
colonists.
Kawai Eijirō. 1891-1944. Economist, dean, victim of
Hiraga Purge. First Higher School, then Tōdai Faculty of
Law (graduated 1915). Ministry of Trade and Industry,
1915-1919 (resigned when the Ministry rejected his draft
labor law, made public his reasons for resigning). Tōdai
Faculty of Economics, assistant professor, 1920 (study in
England, 1922-1926); dean, 1933-1934. Liberal; outspoken
critic of military. Books proscribed by Interior Ministry in
1938. Forced from Tōdai in Hiraga Purge (1939). Court case
ended in defeat (on appeal, 1943). Died February 1944.
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Kawai faction. Kawai, Honiden, Nakanishi, Araki,
Tanabe, Yamada, Yasui, Kimura, Ōkōchi.
Kawakami Jōtarō. 1891-1965. Politician; right-wing
socialist. First Higher School; Tōdai Faculty of Law
(graduated 1915). Faculty: Rikkyō, Kansai universities.
Member, Lower House of Diet, 1936-65.
Kido Kōichi. 1889-1977. Bureaucrat, politician; Minister
of Education, 1937; Home Minister, 1939-45. Defendant in
Tokyo trial, sentenced to life imprisonment (released 1955).
Kimi ga yo君が代. Japan’s national anthem (prewar). In
Basil Hall Chamberlain’s translation: “Thousands of years
of happy reign be thine; / Rule on, my lord, until what are
pebbles now / By ages united to mighty rocks shall grow /
Whose venerable sides the moss doth line.”
Kimura Takeyasu. 1909-1973. Economist. Fukuoka
Higher School; Tōdai Faculty of Economics (graduated
1931). Member, Tōdai Faculty of Economics, 1932-43; First
Higher School, 1943-45; Tōdai Faculty of Economics,
1946-69. Resigned in protest when Kawai was fired (1938)
but stayed on; disowned by Kawai.
Kiyosawa Kiyoshi. 1890-1945. Journalist. U.S. stay,
1911-18. Asahi, 1927-29; free-lance reporter/commentator.
Author of noted wartime diary.
Koizumi Shinzō. 1888-1966. Economist. Keiō gijuku
daigaku (graduated 1910). Faculty, Keiō, 1910-47; president,
1933-47.
Kokutai, clarification of. Kokutai国体: literally, form of
state/country, supposedly distinct from seitai政体(form of
government), but code for Japan’s supposedly unique
relation between emperor and people. “Clarification of the
kokutai” 国体明徴the shibboleth of anti-liberal forces
around Genri Nihon; led to Emperor-Organ Incident.
Kubota Kinuko. 1913-85. Constitutional lawyer. Nihon
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joshi daigaku graduate; Tōdai Faculty of Law (first female
student; graduated 1949). Faculty member: Tōdai, Rikkyō,
Tōhoku gakuin daigaku.
Kushida Tamizō. 1885-1934. Economist. Tokyo
gaikokugo gakkō (graduated 1908); Kyoto University
(graduated 1912). Faculty, Dōshisha University, 1914- ; dean,
Law Faculty, 1916. Lecturer, Tōdai, 1919-20 (resigned in
Morito Incident). Ōhara Institute for Research, 1920-1934.
Kwantung Army関東軍. Military command tasked with
“defending” Japanese interests in Manchuria, 1906-1945;
training ground of activist right-wing officers.
Listen to the Voices from the Sea 聞け渡津見 の声(Kike
wadatsumi no koe, 1949). Compilation of letters and diaries
of university students who became kamikaze pilots;
immensely influential in post-war Japan.
Maide Chōgorō. 1891-1961. Economist. First Higher
School; Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated 1917). Member,
Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1917-52; dean, 1938-39 (succeeding
Hijikata; resigned); dean, 1945-1948.
Makino Nobuaki. 1861-1949. Politician. Tōdai; (graduated
1880). Foreign Ministry (1880). Prefectural governor, Fukui,
Ibaraki; ambassador to Austria, Italy. Minister: Education,
Industry, Foreign Minister, Imperial Household, Home.
Manchurian Incident. September 1931. Explosion staged
by Kwantung Army and blamed on Chinese “insurgents,”
which led quickly to all-out Japanese invasion of
Manchuria, declaration (1932) of state of Manchukuo, and
Japan’s departure from League of Nations (1933).
Marco Polo Bridge. Bridge ten miles southwest of
Beijing, scene (July 7, 1937) of opening of what became full-
scale war between Japan and China.
Maruyama Masao. 1914-1996. Political scientist
(intellectual history of Japan). Son of prominent journalist.
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First Higher School (1934), then Tōdai Faculty of Law
(graduated 1937). Disciple of Nambara Shigeru. Mobilized
twice (Korea, Hiroshima) during the war. Assistant
professor, Tōdai, 1944; professor, 1950-1974.
May 15, 1932 Incident. Revolt by young naval officers that
resulted in assassination of Prime Minister Inukai
Tsuyoshi.
Mimurodo Takamitsu. Baron, politician; active in
attacking Minobe Tatsukichi and Tōdai and calling for
“clarification of the kokutai.” Purged by Occupation.
Ministry of Education. 1871-2001. Bureaucratic
organization with jurisdiction over Japanese education,
including imperial universities; led during Hiraga Purge by
Gen. Araki Sadao.
Minobe Ryōkichi. 1904-84. Economist, politician; son of
Minobe Tatsukichi. Second Higher School (graduated
1923); Tōdai Faculty of Economics (graduated 1926).
Member, Tōdai Faculty of Economics, 1926-32; Hōsei
University Faculty of Economics, 1935-38 (resigned after
arrest in Faculty Group Incident). Tokyo Prefectural
Governor, 1967-79.
Minobe Tatsukichi. 1873-1948. Constitutional lawyer;
member of the Upper House. Tōdai Faculty of Law
(graduated 1897). Member, Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1900-33.
His emperor-organ theory the focus of major ideological
struggle after 1934. Attacked by right-wing thugs and
severely injured, 1936.
Minoda Muneki. 1894-1946. Journalist; editor of Genri
Nihon. Fifth Higher School; Tōdai (law, then literature).
Graduate work at Tōdai Faculty of Law (mentor: Uesugi
Shinkichi). Lecturer (logic, psychology) at Keiō University
and Kokushikan University, 1932-1941. Founded Genri Nihon
(1925); led attack on Tōdai. Committed suicide, 1946.
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Mitani Takanobu. 1892-1985. Bureaucrat. First Higher
School; Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated 1917). Home
Ministry; Foreign Ministry. Ambassador: Switzerland,
1940; France, 1942.
Miyazawa Toshiyoshi. 1899-1976. Constitutional law.
First Higher School, Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated 1923).
Member, Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1929-1959.
Mori Arinori. 1847-89. Samurai from Satsuma sent to
England to study in 1865. First ambassador to the U.S.,
1871-3; first Minister of Education. Assassinated,1889.
Morito Incident. Firing of Morito Tatsuo (1888-1984;
Tōdai graduate [1914] and professor, 1916-20) after he
published translation of Kropotkin essay; cause célèbre
among students and faculty, with Uesugi Shinkichi
attacking and Yoshino Sakuzō defending.
Nagayo Matarō. 1878-1941. Pathologist; Tōdai president.
First Higher School; Tōdai (1904). Professor, Faculty of
Medicine; Tōdai president, 1934-1938. Named baron the day
before his death.
Nakanishi Torao. 1896-1975. Marxist economist.
Member, Tōdai Faculty of Economics Kawai faction, then
Hijikata faction.
Nakata Kaoru. 1877-1967. Legal historian. Tōdai
(graduated 1900). Faculty, Tōdai, 1902-37.
Nakayama Ichirō. 1898-1980. Economist. Tokyo
Commercial University (now Hitotsubashi; graduated
1923). Faculty, Tokyo Commercial University, 1923-;
president, 1949. Lecturer, Tōdai Faculty of Economics,
1939-49.
Nambara Shigeru. 1889-1974. Political scientist, dean,
president. First Higher School (1910); Tōdai (Law, 1914).
Convert to Christianity (Uchimura Kanzō), Non-Church
Movement. Home Ministry, 1914-1921. Member, Tōdai
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Faculty of Law, 1921-1951; dean, February-December, 1945;
president, December 1945-1951.
Nasu Shiroshi. First Higher School (graduated 1920);
Tōdai (graduated 1913). Member, Tōdai Faculty of
Agriculture, 1923-46; dean.
National spiritual mobilization 国民精神総動員運動
(Kokumin seishin sōdōin undō). Policy of Konoe Cabinet
initiated September 1937 as part of response to China
Incident, with slogans: “Eight corners [of the world] under
one roof,” “A nation united,” “Iron will.”
Nitobe Inazō. 1862-1933. Agronomist, educator. Sapporo
Agricultural College (later Hokkaido University; conversion
to Christianity); Johns Hopkins University and Halle
University. Faculty, Sapporo Agricultural College, then
Tōdai; technical advisor to Taiwan colonial government.
Principal of First Higher School (1906-13); Tōdai Faculty of
Economics (colonial policy, 1913-20). Undersecretary,
League of Nations (1920-26). Among members of his Bible
Study Group: Yanaihara Tadao, Takagi Yasaka, Nambara
Shigeru.
Non-Church (Christianity) movement. 1901- . Founded
by Uchimura Kanzō; movement without liturgy,
sacraments, clergy. Members included Yanaihara Tadao,
Nambara Shigeru.
Odagiri Hideo. 1916-2000. Journalist, critic. Hōsei
University. 1943: drafted; 1944: POW.
Ōgiya Shōzō. 1913-92. Journalist. Tōdai Faculty of Letters
(graduated 1935). Asahi, 1935-68.
Ōhara Institute for Research大原社会問題研究所研究
所 (Ōhara shakai mondai kenkyūjo). Founded 1919, Osaka,
by Ōhara Magosaburō; moved to Tokyo in 1937. Provided
research home for, among others, Ōuchi Hyōe, Morito
Tatsuo, Rōyama Masamichi.
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Oka Yoshitake. 1902-90. Political scientist. First Higher
School; Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated 1926). Member,
Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1926-63; dean, 1955-57.
Ōkita Saburō. 1914-93. Bureaucrat, economist. First
Higher School (graduated 1934); Tōdai Faculty of
Engineering (graduated 1937). Communications Ministry,
Greater East Asia Ministry, Foreign Ministry (August
1945-47). Active in postwar economic research.
Ōkōchi Kazuo. 1905-84. Economist. Third Higher School;
Tōdai. Member, Tōdai Faculty of Economics, until 1939.
Resigned in protest at time of Hiraga Purge but persuaded
to stay on (decision meant permanent break with Kawai).
Returned to Tōdai faculty, 1949; president, 1962-68.
Ōmori Yoshitarō. 1898-1940. Marxist economist;
commentator. First Higher School; Tōdai Faculty of
Economics (graduated 1922). Member, Faculty of
Economics, 1922-1928 (resignation). Arrest sought, March
15, 1928 incident. Arrested, Popular Front Incident, 1938.
Onozuka Kiheiji. 1871-1944. Political scientist. First
Higher School; Tōdai. Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1901-34. Dean;
president 1928-34. Among his disciples: Yoshino Sakuzō,
Nambara Shigeru, Rōyama Masamichi, Yabe Teiji.
Ōtsuka Hisao. 1907-96. Economic historian. Third
Higher School; Tōdai Faculty of Economics (student of
Honiden Yoshio; convert to Non-Church Christianity;
graduated 1933). Faculty, Hōsei daigaku, 1933-39; Tōdai
Faculty of Economics, 1939-68.
Ōuchi faction. Ouchi; Maide, Ueno, Arisawa, Wakimura.
Ōuchi Hyōe. 1888-1980. Marxist economist. Fifth Higher
School; Tōdai Law (specialty: economics, 1913). Finance
Ministry, 1913; Tōdai Faculty of Economics, 1919. 1920-1922:
fired from Tōdai for involvement in Morito Incident. 1938:
arrested in Faculty Group Incident, fired from Tōdai.
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Found not guilty, resigned Tōdai, 1944. Reinstated Tōdai,
1945-1949. President, Hosei University, 1950-1959.
Peace Preservation Law治安維持法. 1925. Targeted at
socialism, anarchism, communism; amended in 1928 to
include death penalty.
Popular Front. Policy adopted by the Comintern (1935)
to embrace all anti-fascist forces in a united front against
fascism.
Popular Front Incident人民戦線事件. Arrests of some
400 leftists (mainly non-Communists) in December 1937,
followed by Faculty Group Incident (sometimes called
Second Popular Front Incident): the arrests of professors
on February 1, 1938, including Tōdai Faculty of Economics
members Ōuchi Hyōe, Arisawa Hiromi, and Wakimura
Yoshitarō.
Publication Law 出版法 (Shuppanhō). 1893. Article 26
established penalties for blaspheming the dignity of the
Imperial House; Article 27 established penalties for
disturbing the public order or corrupting social mores.
Red Gate Popular Front. Tōdai student shorthand for
the Popular Front at Tōdai, including the three professors
arrested in January 1938: Ōuchi, Arisawa, and Wakimura.
Reischauer, Edwin O. 1910-90. Japan scholar. Oberlin
College (graduated 1931); Harvard Ph. D., 1939. Member,
Harvard University faculty. Ambassador to Japan, 1961-66.
Renovationist clique. Within Tōdai Faculty of
Economics, those professors favoring active collaboration
in wartime economy; published journal Renovation.
Right of supreme command帷幄上奏(Iaku jōsō). Right
of supreme command under Article XI of the Meiji
Constitution: “The Emperor has supreme command of the
Army and Navy.” Emperor—not prime minister or
Diet—controlled military.
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Rōnōha 労農派. Literally, labor-farmer faction (named
after journal Rōnō労農, established 1928); non-Communist
left in prewar Japan, subject of arrest and suppression in
Popular Front Incident, 1938.
Rōyama Masamichi. 1895-1980. Political scientist. First
Higher School (graduated 1917); Tōdai Faculty of Law
(graduated 1920). Faculty, Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1920-39
(voluntary resignation to protest Hiraga Purge); Ōhara
Research Institute. Purged by Occupation, 1947-48.
Sakisaka Itsurō. 1897-1985. Marxist economist. Fifth
Higher School (graduated 1918); Tōdai Faculty of
Economics (graduated 1921). Faculty, Kyushu University,
1922-28 (resigned under pressure). Editor/translator in
Tokyo; Rōnōha. Arrested 1937 in Popular Front Incident.
Sakomizu Hisatsune. 1902-77. Bureaucrat; politician.
Tōdai Faculty of Economics (graduated 1925). Finance
Ministry, 1925-44. Chief Cabinet Secretary, Suzuki Cabinet,
1945. Purged by Occupation, 1947-51.
Sasaki Michio. 1897- . Business accounting. Member,
Tōdai Faculty of Economics, .
Sassa Hiroo. 1897-1948. Political science. Fifth Higher
School (graduated 1917); Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated
1920). Member, Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1920- ; Kyushu
University Faculty of Law, -1928 (purged as communist).
Satō Kanji. 1876-1967. Agricultural economics. Tōdai
Faculty of Agriculture (graduated 1904). Member, Tōdai
Faculty of Agriculture; dean; acting president, 1938.
Sawayanagi Incident. 1913-14. Dispute at Kyoto
University between President Sawayanagi Masatarō and
faculty over his attempted dismissal of seven professors.
At issue: the faculty prerogative in hiring/firing professors.
Mass protest resignations at Kyoto University and support
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from Tōdai led to reversal of firings and resignation of
Sawayanagi.
Seki Yoshihiko. 1912-2006.
Shibusawa Keizō. 1896-1963. Financier. Third Higher
School (graduated 1918); Todai Faculty of Law (Economics,
graduated 1921). Banking, 1921-1945; executive director,
Bank of Japan, 1944-45. Finance Minister, 1945. Purged,
1946-51.
Shinjinkai新人会. Literally, “new men’s group.” Student
organization 1918-29, primarily at Tōdai; liberal, then
radical politics. Dissolved after mass arrests of Communist
Party members of March 15, 1928.
Shiojiri Kōmei. 1901-69. Todai Faculty of Law graduate.
Shōwa Research Group昭和研究会 (Shōwa kenkyūkai).
1933-40. Konoe Fumimaro’s brain trust, established by Gotō
Ryūnosuke, to work within constitutional limits for reform
of existing political parties.
Social Mass Party社会民主党 (Shakai minshūtō).
1926-32.
South Manchurian Railroad (SMRR). Railway
connecting Port Arthur and Harbin, built by Russia
(1888-93); transferred to Japanese control (including South
Manchuria Railway Zone) in 1905. Management of the
railway expanded after 1931 to include virtually all aspects
of Japanese “nation-building” in Manchuria.
Special Police特別高等警察 (Tokubetsu kōtō keisatsu or
Tokkō特高). 1911-45. Police reporting directly to Home
Ministry (spread to all prefectures in 1928) with primary
concern of controlling “anti-government” activity.
Students. Call-up of: December 1943. End of draft
deferments for university students. Commissioned
students: Rubric under which active-duty military officers
enrolled in courses at Tōdai. Special-researcher system:
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Wartime system of preference for students who committed
themselves to careers favored by the military. Liberal arts
students: once draft deferment ended, constituted vast
majority of student-soldiers and of kamikaze dead.
Suehiro Gentarō. 1888-1951. Civil law. First Higher
School (graduated 1909); Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated
1912). Member, Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1914-46; dean, 1942-45.
Suenobu Sanji. 1899-1989. Law professor (English and
American law). Fifth Higher School; Tōdai Faculty of Law
(graduated 1923). Member, Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1925-60.
Suzuki Kantarō. 1868-1948. Naval officer; politician.
Prime target in February 26, 1936 Incident, wounded but
not killed. Prime Minister, April-August 1945.
Suzuki Kōichirō. 1910-83. Marxist economist.
Yamaguchi Higher School (graduated 1930); Tōdai Faculty
of Economics (graduated 1934). Ōhara Institute for
Research, 1935-40. Tōdai Faculty of Economics, 1947-71;
dean, 1963-65.
Suzuki Takeo. 1901-75. Economist. Third Higher School;
Tōdai Faculty of Economics (graduated 1925). Member,
Tōdai Faculty of Economics, 1927-45 (withdrew), 1957-62.
Suzuki Tōmin. 1895-1979. Journalist, labor politician.
Todai Faculty of Economics. Osaka Asahi, Yomiuri. Anti-
Nazi activity.
Takagi Sōkichi. 1893-1979. Naval officer. Naval Academy
(graduated 1915).
Takagi Yasaka. 1889-1984. American studies. Son of
Baron Kanda Naibu. First Higher School; Tōdai (graduated
1915). Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1918-49. Quaker.
Takahashi Masao. 1901-95. Marxist economist. Tōdai
Faculty of Economics (graduated 1925). Member, Faculty of
Economics, Kyushu daigaku, 1928-38 (fired after arrest in
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Faculty Group Incident). Reporter, Osaka Shimpō, 1940-44.
Member, Faculty of Economics, Kyushu daigaku, 1946-65.
Takigawa Incident. 1932-33. Attack on Kyoto University
Faculty of Law Professor Takigawa Yukitoki by right-wing
forces, notably Kikuchi Takeo. Ministry of Education
instructed Kyoto University president to fire Takigawa.
Eight professors (of fifteen) and thirteen assistant
professors (of eighteeen) resigned in protest. Tōdai Faculty
of Law took no concerted action.
Tamba Shigeteru. Dean, Tōdai Faculty of Agriculture.
Tanabe Tadao. 1891-1967. Economist.Member, Tōdai
Faculty of Economics; Kawai faction, then Hijikata faction.
Tanaka Kōtarō. 1890-1974. Commercial law; philosophy
of law. First Higher School; Tōdai Faculty of Law (1915).
Home Ministry 1915. Tōdai Faculty of Law 1917- ; dean, 1937
(resigned in aftermath of Hiraga Purge). Minister of
Education, 1946; member, Upper House, 1947-1950; justice,
Supreme Court, 1950; justice, International Court of Justice
[the Hague], 1961-70. Non-Church Christian; then Catholic.
Tōgō Shigenori. 1882-1950. Diplomat, politician. Seventh
Higher School (graduated 1904); Todai Faculty of Letters
(graduated 1908). Diplomatic service, 1912-45; Foreign
Minister at war’s beginning and at end. Defendant in
Tokyo trial, sentenced to 20 years.
Tomita Kenji. 1897-1977. Bureaucrat, politician. Kyoto
University Faculty of Law (graduated 1921). Home Ministry,
including police in Ishikawa and Osaka prefectures. Chief
Cabinet Secretary (to Konoe Cabinet), 1940-41. Member,
House of Peers, 1941-46.
Tomizu Incident. 1905. Tomizu Hirondo (1861-1935),
professor of Tōdai Faculty of Law, who (along with six
others) criticized as insufficiently forceful the
government’s policy toward Russia and the peace
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settlement at Portsmouth placed on leave, then fired.
Widespread protest by imperial universities led to
reinstatement (1906).
Tsuda Incident. 1939. Guest lecturer on East Asian
history at Tōdai, Tsuda attacked by right-wing forces at
Tōdai and outside. His books were proscribed; he was
indicted. Court proceedings led to finding of guilty of
infringing Article 26 of Publications Law), finding upheld
on appeal (1942).
Tsuda Sōkichi. 1873-1961. Historian; anthropologist.
Tōkyō semmon gakkō (later Waseda University; 1891).
Taught in various middle schools (to 1908); researcher,
Southern Manchurian Railroad. Faculty, Waseda
University, 1918-40 (forced resignation). Guest lecturer,
Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1938; subject of right-wing attack.
Tsuji Kiyoaki. 1913-91. Political scientist. Third Higher
School (graduated 1934); Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated
1937). Faculty, Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1942-
Tsurumi Yūsuke. 1885-1973. Bureaucrat, politician. First
Higher School (graduated 1907); Todai Faculty of Law
(graduated 1910). Elected to Lower House, 1936 and later.
Purged by Occupation. After war, Diet member and
Minister for Health in Hatoyama Cabinet.
Tsūshin通信 (Tidings). Private newsletter of Yanaihara
Tadao.
Uchida Yoshikazu. 1885-1972. Architect. First Higher
School (graduated 1904); Tōdai Faculty of Engineering
(graduated 1907). Member, Tōdai faculty, 1911-45;
president, 1943-45.
Uchimura Kanzō. 1861-1930. Christian educator,
proselytizer; founder of Non-Church Movement. Sapporo
Agricultural College (graduated 1881); Massachusetts
Agricultural College, Amherst College (graduated 1887),
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Hartford Seminary. Faculty, First Higher School, 1890-1891
(fired in lèse majesté incident).
Ueno Michizuke. 1888-1962. Economist. Tōdai
(graduated 1911). Member, Tōdai Faculty of Economics,
1917-49.
Uesugi Shinkichi. 1878-1929. Constitutional scholar.
Fourth Higher School (graduated 1898); Tōdai Faculty of
Law (graduated 1901). Faculty, Tōdai Faculty of Law,
1903-1929. Adherent of theory of imperial sovereignty;
opponent of emperor-organ theory.
University Council 大学評議会 (Daigaku hyōgikai).
University deliberative body made up of dean and two
elected representatives of each faculty.
Unno Shinkichi. 1885-1968. Lawyer, human rights
activist. Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated 1908). Active in
defense of Kawai Eijirō, the Popular Front, Tsuda Sōkichi,
among others; active, too, after the war.
Uno Kōzō. 1897-1977. Marxist economist. Sixth Higher
School (graduated 1918); Tōdai Faculty of Economics
(graduated 1921). Faculty, Tōhoku Imperial University
Faculty of Economics, 1924-38. Arrested in Popular Front
Incident, February 1, 1938; found not guilty. Tōdai Social
Sciences Research Center, 1947-58.
Wagatsuma Sakae. 1897-1973. Civil law. First Higher
School (graduated 1917); Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated
1920). Faculty, Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1922-57.
Wakatsuki Reijirō. 1866-1949. Bureaucrat, politician.
Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated 1892). Finance Ministry,
1892-1911. Member, House of Peers, 1911- ; Finance Minister,
1912- ; Home Minister, 1924-. Prime Minister, 1926-27, 1931.
Senior Councilor, 1932-45.
Wakimura Yoshitarō. 1900-97. Economist. Third Higher
School (graduated 1921); Tōdai Faculty of Economics
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(graduated 1924). Faculty, Faculty of Economics, 1924-38
(arrested in Faculty Group Incident with Ōuchi and
Arisawa), 1945-61.
War Economy Study Group 戦時経済研究会 (Senji
keizai kenkyūkai). Established 1938 by Hijikata to facilitate
Faculty of Economics cooperation in the war effort.
Watanabe Jōtarō. 1874-1936. General. Chief of Military
Training; assassinated in February 26, 1936 Incident.
Watanabe Kazuo. 1901-75. Scholar of French literature.
First Higher School; Tōdai Faculty of Letters (graduated
1925). Member, Tōdai Faculty of Letters, 1942-62. Author,
preface to Listen to the Voices from the Sea.
Watanabe Shinichi. Assistant professor, Tōdai Faculty of
Economics; Hijikata faction.
Yabe Teiji. 1902-67. Political scientist. First Higher
School (graduated 1923); Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated
1926). Member, Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1928-1945 (voluntary
resignation).
Yamada Fumio. 1898-1978. Economist. First Higher
School; Tōdai Faculty of Economics. Member, Tōdai
Faculty of Economics, 1930-1938 (resigned in protest).
Member, Hijikata faction.
Yamada Moritarō. 1897-1980. Marxist economist. Tōdai
Faculty of Economics (graduated 1923). Member, Faculty of
Economics, 1923-1930 (driven from Tōdai). Arrested 1936.
Reinstated Tōdai, 1945-57; dean, 1950.
Yamakawa-ism. Doctrine, associated with Yamakawa
Hitoshi (1880-1953), at heart of Rōnō movement: emphasis
on mass political movement based on labor, with socialist
revolution a distant goal. Read out of the Communist Party
by Comintern as opportunism in favor of Fukumoto-ism.
Yanaihara Incident. Forced resignation of Yanaihara
from Tōdai in 1937.
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Yanaihara Tadao. 1893-1961. Economist, Tōdai president.
First Higher School (and conversion to Christianity by
Uchimura Kanzō); Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1917. Sumitomo,
1917. Faculty of Economics, 1920-37 (forced resignation).
Reinstated November 1945; Tōdai president, 1951-1957.
Yanaikawa . Assistant professor, Tōdai Faculty of
Economics (1938). Present at formation of War Economy
Study Group.
Yasuda Auditorium. The large auditorium beneath the
tower at the center of the Tōdai campus, scene of many
historic gatherings.
Yasui Kaoru. 1907-80. Lawyer; activist. Osaka Higher
School (graduated 1927); Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated
1930). Member, Tōdai Faculty of Law, 1931-47; professor,
1940. Purged by Occupation, 1947. Board chair, Gensuikyō,
1954-65; winner, Lenin Prize, 1958.
Yasui Takuma. 1909-1995. Economist. Tōdai Faculty of
Economics (graduated 1931). Faculty, Tōdai Faculty of
Economics, 1931-44 (transfer to Tōhoku University).
Member, Kawai faction.
Yonai Mitsumasa. 1880-1948. Naval officer; politician.
Naval College (graduated 1901). Navy Minister, 1937. Prime
Minister, 1940. Navy Minister, 1944-45.
Yoshida Shigeru. 1878-1967. Diplomat, politician. Prime
Minister, 1946-54. Tōdai Faculty of Law (graduated 1906).
Foreign Ministry, 1906-39. Foreign Minister, September
1945-52; Prime Minister, 1946-54.
Yūmoto Toyokichi. Assistant professor, Tōdai Faculty
of Economics; Hijikata faction.
Zenkyōtō (Zengaku kyōtō kaigi; All-Student Alliance).
1968-69. Student umbrella organization behind radical and
sometimes violent action on campuses in years of Japan’s
greatest postwar student unrest.
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Tōdai Presidents, 1928-1977
December 1928-November 1934 Onozuka Kiheiji
December 1934-November 1938 Nagayo Matarō
November 1938 (acting) Satō Kanji
December 1938–February 1943 Hiraga Yuzuru
February 1943 (acting) Terasawa Kanichi
March 1943-December 1945 Uchida Yoshikazu
December 1945-December 1951 Nambara Shigeru
December 1951-December 1957 Yanaihara Tadao
December 1957-November 1963 Kaya Seiji
December 1963-November 1969 Ōkōchi Kazuo
November 1969-April 1973 Katō Ichirō
April 1973-April 1977 Hayashi Kentarō
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Deans, Faculty of Economics,
1933-1953
April 1933-March 1936 Hijikata Seibi
April 1936-March 1937 Kawai Eijirō
April 1937-March 1938 Hijikata Seibi
April 1938-February 1939 Maide Chōgorō
February 1939-February 1940 President Hiraga Yuzuru (acting)
March 1940-February 1944 Mori Sōsaburō
March 1944-September 1945 Hashizume Akio
September 1945-September 1948 Maide Chōgorō
October 1948- September 1949 Yanaihara Tadao
October 1949-September 1950 Arisawa Hiromi
October 1950-September 1951 Yamada Seitarō
October 1951-September 1952 Wakimura Yoshitarō
October 1952-September 1953 Ōkōchi Kazuo
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